

**SURVEY OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1925**

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1925

VOLUME I

THE ISLAMIC WORLD SINCE THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

BY

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE

*Director of Studies in the Royal Institute
of International Affairs
Professor of International History
in the University of London
(both on the Sir Daniel Stevenson Foundation)
Additional Lecturer (in the History of the Near East)
at the School of Oriental Studies*

Ἡ δὲ γὰρ φράσδῃ πάνθ' ἄλιον ἄμμι δεδυκεῖν ;
THEOCRITUS : *Thyrsis*, line 102
(and LXX, Book xxxix, chapter 26)

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P R E F A C E

AS explained in the Preface to the first volume of this series, it had been decided that an account of the affairs of the Islamic World which, owing to pressure of space, was omitted from that volume, and from the *Survey for 1924*, should be given in the *Survey for 1925*. It was, moreover, considered that it would be better to deal with the history of the different Islamic countries as one connected subject, and not in separate instalments. One of the reasons for this was that it was necessary to incorporate a preliminary account of the development which had taken place in the years immediately following the War, which was all the more essential because in the Islamic World much had happened which did not fall within the scope of *The History of the Peace Conference*.

It was soon discovered, however, that the amount of material to be dealt with was so great that it could not be treated adequately as a single section in a volume of five hundred pages. It was therefore decided by the Committee, after consultation with Professor Toynbee, that, as an exceptional measure, the volume for 1925 should be brought out in two parts, of which the first would be entirely devoted to the affairs of the Islamic World. Subscribers who may be inclined to feel some dissatisfaction at being asked to purchase two volumes instead of one in a single year are invited to consider, firstly, the paramount importance of the subject, for which it seems essential that a full and adequate treatment should be provided, and secondly, the fact that this

survey of Islamic affairs is really supplementary not to one volume only, but to three, since it deals with events occurring in the period covered by the *Surveys* previously published, as well as in 1925.

This volume is the first part of the *Survey for 1925*. The second part, which it is hoped will be published in the summer of 1927, will deal with the outstanding events of 1925 in other fields. The subjects will include in particular the questions of Security and Disarmament (the events leading up to the Locarno agreements and the agreements themselves) and the international relations of the American Continent (no account of which has hitherto been given). There will also be a full account of the important events which took place in the Far East and the Pacific from the close of the Washington Conference to the end of 1925.

Owing to the great amount of work required in the writing of this first part, Professor Toynbee found himself unable to write the second part. This has therefore been entrusted to other writers.

G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY,
Honorary Secretary,
Royal Institute of International Affairs.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS BY THE WRITER

THE writer has to acknowledge, once again, his obligation and his gratitude to the members and the staff of the Royal Institute of International Affairs for their assistance. In the case of this volume the assistance received has been, if possible, more valuable than before. It has certainly been given at the cost of more time and trouble, owing to the nature of the field with which the volume is concerned. As the production of the *Survey* proceeds, the writer becomes increasingly conscious that while the responsibility for its defects rests upon himself alone, such success as it may achieve is the corporate achievement of the Institute.

In the present volume he has been fortunate in securing the co-operation of Mr. Leonard Stein, who has kindly contributed a very valuable account of the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, 1920-6.

The maps, which are indispensable in a volume of this kind, owe much to the patience, resourcefulness, and good workmanship of the draughtsman, Mr. Higginbottom. The index has been prepared by Miss E. M. White, a member of the library staff at the London School of Oriental Studies, who is experienced in the troublesome and exacting task of indexing Oriental names.

Printed sources are acknowledged in the foot-notes to the text ; but there are two to which the writer is so much indebted that he cannot forbear to mention them at the outset. One of these is *L'Afrique Française*—a monthly publication which, while frankly presenting the point of view of a particular school in a particular Western country, is a mine of valuable information on North-West African affairs. The other is *Oriente Moderno*, a monthly review published in Rome, under the editorship of a very distinguished Orientalist, Dr. Nallino, and under the auspices of the Istituto per l' Oriente, of which the president is H. E. cav. di Gr. Cr. Amedeo Giannini. In the writer's opinion—which in this case is based on rather a searching test—*Oriente Moderno* is by far the best existing periodical dealing with current Islamic affairs which is published in either Europe or America in any Western language. In its combination of exact scholarship with the virtues of good journalism it

offers a model which might well be imitated in other languages and applied to other fields of international affairs.

The writer has not been able to take advantage of Mr. Walter B. Harris's book, *France, Spain, and the Riff*, in preparing the present volume, which was already in page proof when Mr. Harris's book was published ; but he takes this opportunity to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Harris's dispatches to *The Times*, as well as his gratitude for Mr. Harris's kindness in answering a number of queries.

A. J. T.

SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION

IN reproducing words from non-English languages which are written, like English itself, in the Latin alphabet, no question of transliteration arises. No one would suggest that French, German, or Italian words should be reproduced in an English book in a form which would represent their phonetic value supposing the Latin letters were pronounced in these cases as they are in English. The established practice is to reproduce them as they stand, and to assume that the reader is acquainted with the different phonetic values which are conventionally attached to the letters of the Latin alphabet in the various modern vernacular languages which are written in it—not only in French, German, and Italian, but in Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Polish, Czech, Slovene, Croat,¹ Rumanian, Hungarian, Finnish, Estonian, Lettish, Lithuanian, and so on. In the case of the better-known languages written in the Latin alphabet it is also the established practice to reproduce the diacritical marks by which certain Latin letters are given special values : e. g. the French ç, the Spanish ñ, the Portuguese ã, the Swedish å ; and it seems not only logical but convenient to extend this practice to similar diacritical marks in the less well-known of these languages : e. g. to Croat š and ć.

The problem of transliteration arises in reproducing words from non-English languages which are written in other scripts than the Latin alphabet, because in this case English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese writers each tend to adopt quite different systems, corresponding to the quite different conventional phonetic values attaching to the letters of the Latin alphabet as employed in writing these respective languages. Indeed, there is no common standard of transliteration even among English writers as between themselves. For example, Sir Thomas Arnold has ascertained that there are no less than thirty-six different forms on record in which the name of the Prophet of Islam has been reproduced in Latin letters by English writers ; and at this moment the Colonial Office writes 'Iraq, while the Foreign Office—domiciled in the adjoining corner of the same quadrangle in Whitehall—writes Irak. In every case in which the original script is non-Latin the problem of transliteration does arise and cannot be evaded. In the opinion of the writer of this Survey the proper object to be aimed at, in grappling with this problem, is not (any more than in reproducing words from languages written in the Latin alphabet) to give an exact equivalent of the phonetic value of the original non-Latin signs, but to work out a standard system of transliteration applicable to any word in a particular non-English language, written in a particular non-Latin script, which has to be transliterated into the Latin alphabet as used in writing English.²

¹ Since the Serbian language is practically identical with Croat, though written in the Cyrillic alphabet, Serbian as well as Croat words are most conveniently reproduced in the Latin script in the form in which a Croat would write them.

² The ultimate goal to be aimed at is the adoption of a single standard

In the present volume the problem of transliteration arises over the Arabic alphabet, in which the languages of the great majority of Islamic peoples are still written.¹

In order to obtain a standard transliteration from the Arabic alphabet into the Latin alphabet, it is necessary to represent each single Arabic letter or diacritical mark by a single Latin letter (or combination of letters) or diacritical mark. It is not necessary for this purpose to go the length of using a *different* single Latin letter (or combination of letters) or diacritical mark to transliterate every *different* single Arabic letter or diacritical mark, in cases in which such Arabic letters or diacritical marks have phonetic values which in English are hardly distinguishable. This refinement is, of course, necessary for scientific accuracy, and it is now made not only in the writings of most English, German, and Italian Orientalists but in *Oriente Moderno*, a scholarly production which also happens to be the best existing journal of current Islamic politics and affairs. The use of a different single Latin sign to transliterate each different single Arabic sign has this important practical advantage, that any word transliterated on such a system into the Latin alphabet can be retransliterated into the Arabic alphabet with complete accuracy by any one who comes across it in its Latin dress. For the student this advantage is considerable. On the other hand, it is of no use to the general reader, and it can only be secured by a considerable increase in the number of diacritical marks, which might give the transliterated words a somewhat uncouth appearance to the general reader's eye. The writer of the Survey feels that in his case there are two desiderata to be reconciled: (i) that a standard transliteration from the Arabic alphabet should be obtained; but (ii) that this should be done with the least possible inconvenience to the ordinary reader of English. He has, therefore, compromised by adopting, not the system of the British Academy (as used, for example, by Sir Thomas Arnold in *The Caliphate*), which renders retransliteration possible, but a system in which Dāl and Dād (in Arabic) are both represented by Latin D; Zāy and Zā (in Arabic) and Zāy, Zā, and Dād (in Turkish) are all represented by Latin Z; Tā and Tā both by T; Hā and Hā² both by H; Sīn and Sād both by S; Hamzah Elif (medial) and Waslah Elif (elided) both by '. As far as the writer can ascertain, this system only differs in two minor points from 'The R. G. S. II System':³

system of transliteration into the Latin alphabet by writers not only of English but of all languages which use the Latin alphabet. In the case of transliteration from the Arabic alphabet a rapid advance towards this goal is being made—at any rate as between English, German, and Italian writers.

¹ The Latin alphabet has been adopted in Albania and Azerbaijan.

² Except Turkish medial vowel Hā, which is transliterated by A and E.

³ See R. G. S. Technical Series: No. 2: *Alphabets of Foreign Languages transcribed into English according to the R. G. S. II System by Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen and John H. Reynolds* (London, 1921, Royal Geographical Society). The two points of difference between this system and that used in the present volume are as follows: (i) R. G. S. II treats the 'silent' final Hā in Arabic, as well as in other languages written in the Arabic alphabet, as a vowel, and therefore transliterates it as A or E instead of AH or EH. The practice of R. G. S. II in this matter is possibly less accurate but probably preferable, as it avoids confusion between 'silent' final Hā and aspirate final Hā and Hā; (ii) R. G. S. II transliterates the two sequences Fat-hah + Yā

The system of transliteration from the Arabic alphabet which is used in the present volume is given in the following table :

I. CONSONANTS.

<i>Original Arabic letter or diacritical mark when transliterated in</i>		<i>Arabic words.</i>	<i>Turkish words.</i>
Hamzah Elif medial and final	.	,	,
Hamzah Elif initial	.	omitted	omitted
' Silent ' final Elif after vowel wāw	.	omitted	—
Waslah Elif elided	.	,	,
Waslah Elif unelided	.	omitted	omitted
Bā .	.	b	b
Pā .	.	—	p
Tā .	.	t	t
Thā .	.	th	th or s
Jim .	.	j	j
Chim .	.	—	ch
Hā .	.	h	h
Khā .	.	kh	kh
Dāl .	.	d	d
Dhāl .	.	dh	dh
Rā .	.	r	r
Zāy .	.	z	z
Zhey .	.	—	zh
Sīn .	.	s	s
Shīn .	.	sh	sh
Sād .	.	s	s
Dād .	.	d	d or s
Tā .	.	t	t
Ẓā .	.	z	z
'Ayn .	.	‘	‘
Ghayn .	.	gh	gh
Fā .	.	f	f
Qāf .	.	q	q
Kāf .	.	k	k and g
Kaf-Nūn .	.	—	ng or n
Lām .	.	l	l
Mīm .	.	m	m
Nūn .	.	n	n
Tanwīn .	.	n	n
Wāw .	.	w	v
Hā .	.	h	h
Yā .	.	ŷ	y

and Fat-hah+Wāw in Arabic as AI and AU instead of AY and AW. In this case the latter transliteration, which is that used in the present volume, seems preferable, since these two sequences are not true diphthongs but combinations of a vowel and a consonant (as becomes apparent in Turkish, in which the sequence Fat-hah+Wāw appears as AV or EV). Moreover, the substitution in these sequences of I for Y and U for W obscures the etymology of words. For instance, if the plural word awqāf is written auqāf, its connexion with the singular waqf does not leap to the eye.

II. VOWELS.

		<i>Arabic words.</i>	<i>Turkish words.</i>	
			<i>hard series.</i>	<i>soft series.</i>
Elif initial (Maddah)	.	ā	ā	—
Elif medial	.	ā	ā	—
Elif final	.	ā	ā	—
Yā final (= ā)	.	ā	ā	—
Fat-hah	.	a	a	e
Hā medial	.	—	a	e
Yā (= ī)	.	ī	ȳ	ī
Kasrah	.	i	y	i
Wāw	.	ū	{ ū ō	{ ü ö
Dammah	.	u	{ u o	{ ü ö

N.B.—Tashdīd is transliterated by an actual duplication of the Latin consonant, so that double consonants in transliterated words are to be pronounced double, as they are in Italian (e. g. Muham-mad, Wah-hābī). The only exception made to this practice is when Tashdīd over Wāw and Tashdīd over Yā are used in the original to represent not a double consonant but the sequence long vowel plus consonant. These sequences are transliterated ūw and īy.

In Arabic proper names the case-endings are omitted except in compounds. In compounds of two words only, such as ‘Abdu’llāh, the first word in the compound is placed in the nominative case, as ‘Abdu above (irrespective of its construction in the English sentence in which it occurs). In a double compound such as ‘Abdu’llāhi ’bnu ‘Abdi’llāh, in which words in the genitive case occur in the middle of the compound, these are placed in the genitive, as ’llāhi and ‘Abdi above, while ’bnu, being in apposition to ‘Abdu, is placed in the nominative. In all compounds the case-ending is omitted at the end of the last word.

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BENEVOLENT government is rarely associated with a ruler whose mind is over-alert and intelligence over-developed. Benevolence is most commonly found in rulers who are easy-going or who behave as if they were. The worst defect in the alert-minded ruler is that he lays burdens upon his subjects which are greater than they can bear; and he does this because his mental vision outranges theirs and because his insight penetrates to the ends of things at the beginnings—with disastrous consequences for them. The Prophet says: 'Go the pace of the weakest among you'; and in this context the exponent of the Divine Law prescribes in the case of rulers that excess of intelligence should be avoided . . . because it produces oppression and bad government and makes demands upon the people which are contrary to their nature. . . . It is evident from this that intellectuality and intelligence is a fault in an administrator, because this is an excess of mental activity—just as dull-wittedness is an excess of mental torpidity. The two extremes are to be deprecated in every attribute of human nature. The ideal is the Golden Mean. . . . And for this reason a man who is over-intellectual has Satanic attributes attributed to him and is called 'Satan', 'possessed by Satan', and so on. . . .

IBN KHALDŪN : *Muqaddamāt*, Book I, Chapter xxiv.

WHEN the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest; and finding none, he saith: I will return unto my house whence I came out. And when he cometh, he findeth it swept and garnished. Then goeth he, and taketh to him seven other spirits more wicked than himself; and they enter in and dwell there. And the last state of that man is worse than the first.

The Gospel according to St. Luke, Chapter xi, vv. 24-6.

PART I

GENERAL

(i) Introduction.

DURING the years immediately following the General War of 1914-18 the most important movement in Islam was one which was not confined to the Islamic peoples but was also in evidence among the Russians, the Chinese, the Hindus, the natives of Tropical Africa, and indeed among almost all other non-Western peoples who had come into contact with Western civilization. This world-wide movement was uniform to a remarkable degree, at least in its two principal features. The first of these was a negative impulse—which frequently found vent in vigorous action—to throw off the ascendancy of the Western Powers. The second was a positive impulse—which was no less strong and no less active than the other—to adopt the military technique, the political institutions, the economic organization, and the spiritual culture of the West, but to adopt these by deliberate choice instead of being compelled to conform to them under pressure. During the years in question the negative impulse tended to express itself in violent forms. Possibly this violence was a passing phase—an aftermath of the General War—but for the time being it gave the contact between civilizations a distinctly hostile turn and tended to divide mankind into two camps: the camp in which Western civilization was indigenous and was therefore taken for granted, and the camp in which it was an intrusive and therefore a subversive force.

On certain fronts—as between the West and Islam or between the West and Tropical Africa—the line of division happened to coincide with some dividing line between religions or races; and on this account the conflict of civilizations was identified in many people's minds with religious and racial animosities. This identification readily suggested itself, since the bitterness of the cultural conflict was accentuated when it was waged between communities which also differed in creed or colour. Moreover, a difference of dogma or of pigmentation was more palpable than a difference of mental outlook, which, being subjective, was difficult to observe and measure. Nevertheless, the conflict of civilizations, though sometimes masked

under a religious or a racial disguise, could not be interpreted satisfactorily in religious or racial terms ; for some of the most striking cases could not be thus explained. The Russians, for example, who were as white, and perhaps as highly ' nordic ', as any people in Western Europe, were unquestionably in the anti-Western camp and indeed were protagonists on that side in the struggle. In this case it was apparent that an affinity of race counted for nothing against a diversity of ' social heritage ', and the same truth was illustrated by the contemporary developments in Islam. Islamic society included communities of almost every race and colour ; yet Islam showed no tendency to become divided against itself on racial lines. The divergences which declared themselves in Islam during the years in question were divergent spiritual reactions to the pressure of Western civilization.

Although Islam was only one of several societies engaged in this conflict with the West its geographical domain gave it a commanding position. This domain covered the greater part of the arid zone which extended from the Atlantic coast of the Sahara to within a short distance of the Pacific Ocean in the neighbourhood of Peking.¹ By commanding the greater part of this zone—which presented serious physical obstacles to transit, even in an age when the physical science of the West had been brilliantly applied to mechanical locomotion—the Islamic World stood between Europe and Russia on the one hand, and Tropical Africa, India, the Far East, and the Pacific on the other. It was true that, as far back as the close of the fifteenth century after Christ, Western navigators had turned the Atlantic flank of Islam by circumnavigating the Cape of Good Hope, and that in the seventeenth century Russian backwoodsmen had opened a north-east passage to the Far East overland, along the line eventually taken by the Trans-Siberian Railway. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, the traffic between Europe and the ' trans-Islamic ' regions had attained a volume and an importance which made the Westerners impatient of the circuitous routes hitherto travelled by their merchants, missionaries, and administrators. Western enterprise then set itself to open (or reopen) direct routes—first by steamship, next by rail, and latterly by air—and all these alternative lines of communication necessarily traversed, instead of skirting, the Islamic domain. For example, the new Mediterranean water-route

¹ The north-easternmost sector of this zone had been occupied, during the sixteenth century after Christ, by the Lamaistic form of Mahayana Buddhism from Tibet.

from Europe to India was commanded by the Moroccan coast at the Straits of Gibraltar and was carried across Egyptian territory in the Suez Canal. The prolongation of this route to the Far East was again commanded, at the Straits of Malacca, by other Islamic countries—the East Indies and the Malay Peninsula. The Black Sea water-route from Europe to Southern Russia was commanded, at the Dardanelles, Marmora, and Bosphorus, by Turkey, through whose territory this international waterway ran. The prolongation of the Black Sea route—overland to the oil-fields of Baku and across the Caspian to Central Asia—was commanded by the Muslim countries of Azerbaijan and Transcaspia. Finally, the several railway, automobile,¹ and air-routes which were being opened, after the War of 1914–18, from the ports of the Eastern Mediterranean to Baghdad, Tihṙān, and the head of the Persian Gulf, traversed the heart of the Islamic World—the meeting point between nomads and cultivators and between Arabs, Turks, and Persians.

During the century and a half when these new routes were being developed their probable influence upon the destinies of the Islamic World almost escaped the attention of those Western Governments and men of affairs by whom they were being called into existence. The reason for this inadvertence was that the economic penetration of the Islamic World by the West had gone hand in hand with the establishment of a Western military ascendancy, so that the political rivalries and conflicts which the opening of the new routes excited were, in their first phase, waged almost entirely between non-Islamic Powers. The struggle over the Mediterranean and Black Sea water-routes presented itself as an ‘ Eastern Question ’ of European politics, with the British and Russian Empires as the protagonists. The struggle over the Moroccan hinterland of the Straits of Gibraltar presented itself as a trial of strength between Great Britain, France, and Germany. Even in the period immediately following the General War of 1914–18 the tension which arose at the Straits of Malacca, in the controversy over the construction of a British naval base at Singapore, was regarded by most people as an issue between the English-speaking peoples and Japan ; and few of those who took part in this controversy were conscious that ‘ British Malaya ’ and ‘ the Dutch East Indies ’, which between them commanded the passages from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, were inhabited by a Muslim population of nearly fifty millions.

¹ For the opening of the automobile route from the coast of the Mediterranean to Baghdad and Tihṙān see Part III, Section (vi), p. 329 below.

Nevertheless, a new factor, of great interest and importance, was entering into the situation. The Muslim peoples, gradually stimulated by the activities which, for the last century and a half, the Westerners had been carrying on in the Islamic domain, were abandoning their passive role and beginning to take an active and in some places decisive part in the drama. At this stage, therefore, the conditions and tendencies of Islamic society once again began to affect the course of international history in a positive way.

The contemporary Islamic World could be analysed from several different standpoints. Geographically, it fell into the two broad divisions of the 'solid core', occupying the arid zone, and the 'scattered fringe' in the surrounding regions. In absolute numbers, and even in cultural, economic, and political influence, the Muslims of 'the fringe' were a powerful force; for several of these Muslim communities lived in densely populated countries belonging to the dominions of Great Powers. Nevertheless, the seventy million Muslims in British India, the nineteen millions in the U.S.S.R., and the unknown number of millions in China¹ and Tropical Africa² were all distributed in scattered minorities, exhibiting the idiosyncrasies characteristic of minorities everywhere.³ The Muslims of the

¹ The Muslims of China Proper, who were mainly concentrated in the two north-western provinces of Kansu and Shensi (on the border of the arid zone) and in the south-western province of Yunnan, were variously estimated at from five to ten millions. These estimates did not include the Turkish-speaking Muslims (estimated at between one and two millions) in the 'new province' of Sin-kiang (covering the Turfan and Tarim Basins), who formed part of the 'core' of the Islamic World.

² There were wide divergences in the current estimates of the absolute number of Muslims in Tropical Africa at successive dates, and also in the estimates of the rate of increase in the Muslim community by conversion, and of the net effect upon this increase of the opening up of Tropical Africa by the Western Powers.

³ During the period under review, the Muslim communities of 'the fringe' were all living as minorities in states with a predominantly non-Muslim population; and this important common feature in their situation at the time tended to make them react alike, in contrast to the Muslims of 'the core'. In the past, however, the various communities of 'the fringe' had had different histories.

For example, among the Muslims under Russian rule, the populations of Transcaspia, the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin, and the Kirghiz-Qazāq Steppe properly belonged—like their neighbours under Chinese rule in the Tarim Basin—to 'the core' of the Islamic World. Geographically, they not only adjoined the other peoples of 'the core' (e. g. the Persians and Afghans), but formed an almost solid Muslim block in themselves. Since their annexation to the Russian Empire, however, they had been isolated to a large extent from their Muslim neighbours in Persia, Afghanistan, and Sin-kiang, and had been thrown into contact with the scattered Muslims of the Caucasus, the Crimea and the Volga Basin, who were genuine members of 'the fringe'. Since these latter communities tended to take the lead over their Central Asian co-religionists (having imbibed, through a Russian medium, a greater measure of Western civilization), and since the Muslims, all told, only constituted a small minority—not more than 13 per cent.—of the total population of the

'core' were of greater moment because they had a better prospect of becoming masters in their own house—though, as inhabitants of the arid zone, they possibly controlled a smaller volume of potential natural resources,¹ and almost certainly fell short of 'the fringe' in aggregate numbers.

Again, when analysed from the standpoint of the physical nature of the *terrain*, the Islamic World fell into the two divisions of regions relatively accessible to Western penetration—such as the Atlantic sea-board of Morocco, Tunisia, 'Irāq, Java, and, above all, Egypt—and regions shielded by barriers of mountain or desert. A further distinction between the mountainous and the desert regions became apparent during the years 1920–5. The aeroplane, the 'caterpillar wheel', and even the ordinary motor-car were learning how to negotiate not only the gravelly steppe (*Hamād*) but the sandy desert (*Nafūd*),² and were thus enabling the Westerners, for the first time,

Russian Empire, the habit of acting and feeling as a minority spread to them all. This habit survived the replacement of the Russian Empire by the U.S.S.R., notwithstanding the fact that the Bolsheviks made a point of granting territorial autonomy (at least on paper) to the non-Russian nationalities in the Union, and eventually organized not less than twenty distinct territorial units—ranging in size from the vast Kirghiz Republic to half a dozen minute cantons in the Caucasus—in which Muslims predominated.

Again, the communities of the fringe had been brought into existence in different ways. The Muslim communities in the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin and in British India owed their existence to past conquests of these territories by Islamic Powers—the Oxus-Jaxartes Basin by the Umayyad Caliphs, and India by Islamic dynasties which arose in succession after the original political unity of Islam had broken up. In other parts of the fringe Islam had been introduced not by conquest but by peaceful penetration. The White Bulgarians on the Middle Volga had been converted to Islam in the tenth century after Christ, and the Golden Horde on the Lower Volga in the fourteenth century, in much the same way as the Khazars had been converted to Judaism in the ninth century, and the Russians to Orthodox Christianity in the eleventh—that is, by the prestige which a superior culture often exercises over barbarians. In China again, which had never been conquered or governed by any Islamic Power, Islam had established itself by pacific means. The Muslim communities of Kansu, Shensi, and Yunnan appeared to have been founded by colonists whom the Emperors of the Yuen Dynasty (the Mongol Khāqāns) imported from the Islamic parts of their composite empire. The much smaller Muslim communities in the ports along the south and south-east coast were believed to be a relic of the medieval maritime trade between these ports and the Persian Gulf.

¹ In this field the chief unknown quantity was mineral oil. If the deposits of mineral oil in the Middle East proved to be as rich as certain Western prospectors believed them to be, this natural resource, existing in close proximity to the new 'short-cuts' from Europe to the 'Trans-Islamic' regions, might confer great wealth and power upon whatever parties obtained the control over it. An interesting estimate, in tabular form, of the natural resources of the Islamic World is given in an article by Dr. I. Bowman (*Geographical Review*, vol. xiv, No. 1, January 1924, pp. 62–74, published by the American Geographical Society, Broadway, at 156th Street, New York City).

² See Part III, Section (vi), p. 326 below.

to meet the nomadic Bedouin (*Badu*) on equal terms on their own ground.¹ On the other hand, the Muslim highlanders in the Moroccan Jibālah and Rif, in the Syrian Jabalu'd-Durūz, in the 'Irāqī, Turkish and Persian sections of Kurdistan, and in the intricate borderland between Afghanistan and British India, were demonstrating that, in practised hands, the quick-firing rifle, burning smokeless powder, was still a match for the elaborate and costly equipment which had been invented for use on European battle-fields in the War of 1914-18.²

Passing from the geographical to the psychological plane an observer could further analyse the elements in Islamic society by the test of their different reactions towards Western civilization. In modern Islam, under the pressure of the West, the same two contrasted tendencies were discernible as had been produced in Jewry, in the time of Jesus, by the pressure of Hellenism. There were 'Zealots', in whom the touch of a stronger civilization awoke a fear and an antipathy which they expressed by falling back upon everything in their own tradition that was antithetical to the intrusive force; and there were 'Herodians' who were moved to admiration and imitation by a recognition of superiority. In recent Islamic history the clash between the 'Zealots' and 'Herodians' had been one of the earliest symptoms that the influence of the West was penetrating beneath the surface; and the divergence had been most striking at the time when it first became discernible. Mehmed 'Alī's endeavour to introduce, ready-made, into Egypt the nascent industrial system of Western Europe was quite incompatible with Muhammad b. 'Abdu'l-Wahhāb's endeavour to reintroduce into the Arabian Peninsula and its border lands (*Jazīratu'l-'Arab*) the practices of primitive Islam. At first it seemed as though the two tendencies would develop on more and more divergent lines in distinct areas—the 'Zealot' Puritanism of the Wahhābīs and Sanūsīs in the deserts of Arabia and North Africa, and the 'Herodianism' of the 'Westernizing' 'Osmanlīs in the cotton-plantations of Egypt, in the tobacco and currant plantations of Turkey, and in Levantine ports like Constantinople, Salonica, Smyrna, Alexandria, and Bayrūt, through which the stream of international trade was again beginning to flow. Yet the two tendencies, widely sundered though they were, had been excited simultaneously by the same disturbing factor; and, during the years following the War of 1914-18, they began to reunite in

¹ See Part III, Section (vi), pp. 328-9 below.

² See Part II, Sections (v)-(viii); Part III, Sections (vii) (e), (xi) (b) and (e), (xiii), and (xiv).

a resolution of forces along the line of militant Nationalism. The 'Herodians' were coming to feel that a reconstruction of Islamic life on the basis of the Western conception of nationality could not be achieved without throwing off the ascendancy of the Western Powers by force, while simultaneously the 'Zealots' were coming to feel that their anti-Western campaign could no longer be waged effectively without the adoption of Western weapons, and of the Western technique and organization which that entailed. Thus the forces of Islam, which the first impact of the West had driven out of their traditional formation and even into collision with one another, were re-forming on a new common front. Before the War of 1914-18 a highland chief like the elder 'Abdu'l-Karīm had already sent one of his sons to a Western institute of technology to be trained as a mining engineer.¹ In the Anatolian War of 1919-22 wild *chetehs* from the hills fraternized with Western-trained officers of the old Ottoman Army and with a representative of the movement for the emancipation of women like Khālideh Edīb Khānym. In 1925 the Wahhābī Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd was inviting Westernized Arabs to assist him in improving the administration of his principality;² and the Damascene 'intellectual' Dr. Shāhbandar was fighting in a Syrian insurrection side by side with the Druse 'feudal baron' Sultānu'l-Atrash.³

This new-born Islamic Nationalism, being a middle term between the 'Herodian' and the 'Zealot' reaction to the West, had discarded the most individual features of both. It was not animated by Western Liberalism, as had been the movements headed by the reformers who had arisen in the third quarter of the nineteenth century—a Midhat Pasha in Turkey, a Khayru'd-Dīn Pasha in Tunisia, and a Sir Sayyid Ahmad in British India—nor again was it a recrudescence of Islamic fanaticism, as had been the contrary movements headed by an 'Abdu'l-Wahhāb or a Muhammadu's-Sanūsī.⁴ Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl, for instance, maintained a studied

¹ See Part II, Section (v), p. 110 below.

² See Part III, Section (v) (c), p. 296 below.

³ See Part III, Section (vii) (e), p. 426 below.

⁴ During the years immediately following the War of 1914-18 the 'Zealot' reaction towards the West still manifested itself—for example, in the behaviour of the Wahhābī conquerors of the Hijāz in 1925-6 or in that of the Moplah insurgents in British India in 1921 (for this insurrection see p. 10 below). During these years, however, it was no more than a secondary movement among certain backward populations. The drastic secularization policy of Mustafā Kemāl Pasha, and the studied neutrality of Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl on the Caliphate Question, were more important facts in themselves, and were also more indicative of the direction in which Islam as a whole was travelling.

neutrality on the Caliphate Question, with the sole concern of preventing it from interfering in any way with the purely secular aims of the Egyptian Nationalist Movement, while Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha secularized the Ottoman State in the name of the Turkish nation as vigorously as he had previously fought the Greeks in the same cause. This secular outlook did not prevent the new Nationalism from developing a political fanaticism of its own which inspired public crimes as appalling as any that were ever committed in the name of religion. The outstanding example was the systematic effort made in 1915 by the Ottoman Government, at that time controlled by the Committee of Union and Progress, to exterminate the Ottoman Armenians.¹ Such criminal aberrations were the evil deeds of

¹ In regard to the motives and the responsibility for the atrocities committed against the Armenians in 1915, the writer of the present Survey may perhaps be permitted to quote from the British Blue Book, *Cmd. 8325 of 1916 (The Treatment of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire : Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs : with a preface by Lord Bryce)*, which was compiled by him under Lord Bryce's direction. In the historical summary in which he attempted at the time to reconstruct the course of events from the documents (mostly supplied by American missionaries), he submitted the following conclusions (*Cmd. 8325 of 1916, pp. 651-3*):

This immense infliction of suffering and destruction of life was not the work of religious fanaticism. . . . There was no fanaticism, for instance, in the conduct of the Kurds and *chetehs*, who committed some of the most horrible acts of all ; nor can the responsibility be fixed upon them. They were simply marauders and criminals who did after their kind, and the Government which not only condoned but instigated their actions must bear the guilt. The peasantry, again, behaved with astonishing brutality to the Armenians who were delivered into their hands ; yet the responsibility does not lie with the Turkish peasantry. . . . The peasantry would never have attacked the Armenians if their superiors had not given them the word. Nor are the Muslim townspeople primarily to blame ; their record is not invariably black, and the evidence in this volume throws here and there a favourable light upon their character. Where Muslim and Christian lived together in the same town or village, led the same life, pursued the same vocation, there seems often to have been a strong human bond between them. The respectable Muslim townspeople seldom desired the extermination of their Armenian neighbours, sometimes openly deplored it, and in several instances even set themselves to hinder it from taking effect [*citations of instances omitted*]. The authorities had indeed to decree severe penalties against any Muslim as well as any alien or Greek who might be convicted of sheltering their Armenian victims. The rabble naturally looted Armenian property when the police connived, as the rabble in European towns might do ; the respectable majority of the Muslim townspeople can be accused of apathy at worst ; the responsibility cannot rest with these.

The guilt must, therefore, fall upon the officials of the Ottoman Government, but it will not weigh equally upon all members of the official hierarchy. . . . Humane and honourable Governors (and there were a certain number of these) were powerless to protect the Armenians in their province. The Central Government had its agents on the spot—the chairman of the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress, the local Chief

a militancy which was perhaps the most prominent characteristic of the new Islamic Nationalism in its earliest phase ; but this militancy also manifested itself in acts of courage and even heroism.

The classic example was the defiance of the victorious Allies by the defeated Turks within less than a year after the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918. The hardihood and endurance of the Turks, in challenging the decision of the four-years' war of 1914-18 by waging a three years' ' war after the War ' from the summer of 1919 to the autumn of 1922, were rewarded by sensational successes. They not only evicted the Greeks from Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, but—alone among the nations defeated in 1918—they refused to accept a dictated peace and successfully insisted on negotiating a settlement with the Principal Allied Powers on a footing of equality.¹ The same militant temper was displayed by other Islamic peoples who measured themselves against Western Powers, with varying fortunes, during the same period. In 1921 'Abdu'l-Karīm's tribesmen, the Moroccan Rifi clan of the Banu Wuryāghal, ventured to resist the aggression of the Spaniards, and in 1925 they actually took the offensive against the French, who at that moment were the greatest military Power in the world.² The nomads of Tripoli and the highlanders of Benghazi kept up a continual warfare against the Italians.³ Even the Egyptians, who were not only unarmed but were reputed to be the least warlike of Muslim peoples, and whose country was at the mercy of any foreign army which had once occupied the key positions, rose spontaneously against the British in March 1919.⁴ In the Yaman the Imām of San'ā, undismayed by the capitulation of his Turkish suzerains and supporters in the autumn of 1918, reinvaded the

of Gendarmerie, or even some subordinate official on the Governor's own administrative staff. . . . In one way or another, the Central Government enforced and controlled the execution of the scheme, as it alone had originated the conception of it ; and the Young Turk Ministers and their associates at Constantinople are directly and personally responsible, from beginning to end, for the gigantic crime that devastated the Near East in 1915.

So far as the writer is aware, this reading of events has been confirmed by the additional evidence subsequently published by Dr. Johannes Lepsius and others. Since the fanaticism of the Committee of Union and Progress (many of whose leaders were ' free-thinkers ' of various Western schools) was certainly not religious, it seems to follow that the treatment of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 should be classed with the *noyades* and other crimes of the French Revolution, and not with the crime of St. Bartholomew's Day.

¹ For the Anatolian War of 1919-22, the abortive Treaty of Sèvres and the definitive Treaty of Lausanne, see *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part II.

² See Part II, Section (vi) below.

³ See Part II, Section (iii) below.

⁴ *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part IV, Section 6.

British Aden Protectorate on his own account and occupied Dāla'.¹ The Syrians attempted to meet the French in regular warfare in July 1920, and learnt from their swift defeat how to fight for their independence more effectively in the guerrilla warfare of 1925-6.² The 'Irāqīs rose against the British in the summer of 1920 and remained under arms for six months in the fens.³ The Wāhhābīs raided 'Irāq and Transjordan repeatedly from 1921 to 1925.⁴ The Afghans attempted to invade British India in the spring of 1919 and succeeded in exciting an unrest among the highland tribes on the British side of the frontier which, for the next six years, continued to give trouble to the British Indian Government.⁵ Even in the interior of British India there was a Muslim insurrection in 1919 in the Panjab—an outbreak that preceded and perhaps encouraged the Afghan attempt at invasion—and another in 1921 among the remote and isolated Sunnī community of the Moplahs (Māppila) on the Malabar Coast in the Madras Presidency.⁶

¹ See Part III, Section (v) (e) below.

² See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part III 'B, Section 17, and the present volume, Part III, Section (vii) (e) below.

³ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part III C, Section 6.

⁴ See Part III, Section (vi) below.

⁵ See *Survey for 1920-3*, Part IV, Section (iv), and the present volume, Part III, Section (xiv) below.

⁶ For the Moplah insurrection see *Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India during the year 1921* (London, 1922, H.M. Stationery Office), pp. 18-21, 73-5, 79; *Oriente Moderno*, vol. i, pp. 212, 299, 361, 368, 370, 488, 492, 552, 554. The Moplah insurrection was one of the cases—exceptional during the period under review—in which Islamic militancy was inspired by religious fanaticism. Indeed, it was the clearest case of the kind, since the Najdī invasion of the Hijāz in 1924 was due to the political ambition of Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd at least as much as to the Puritanical zeal of his Wāhhābī followers. The Moplahs—a community of 'about a million persons, of mixed Arab and Indian descent'—were 'fanatical Muhammadans . . . prone to sudden waves of religious mania' . . . ; and 'no fewer than thirty-five outbreaks, principally of a minor kind, had occurred during the period of British rule; but among the most terrible of all was that which burst forth in August 1921. . . . The violent speeches of the 'Alī brothers, the early approach of Swaraj as foretold in the non-co-operating press, the July resolutions of the Khilāfat Conference—all these combined to fire the train. . . . As soon as the administration had been paralysed, the Moplahs declared that Swaraj was established. A certain 'Alī Musaliar was proclaimed Raja, Khilāfat flags were flown, and Ernad and Walluvanad were declared Khilāfat Kingdoms. . . . The main brunt of Moplah ferocity was borne, not by Government, but by the luckless Hindus who constituted the majority of the population. Massacres, forcible conversions, desecration of temples, foul outrages upon women, pillage, arson and destruction . . . were perpetuated freely. . . . Certain Khilāfat leaders were so misguided as to pass resolutions of "congratulation" to the Moplahs on the brave fight they were conducting for the sake of religion. Mr. Gandhi, doubtless deceived by those around him, himself spoke of "the brave God-fearing Moplahs" who were "fighting for what they consider as religion, and in a manner which they consider as religious"' (*Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*)

In many cases this militancy was the folly of ignorance and not the heroism of clear-sighted courage ; and sometimes it was severely punished, as in the Third Anglo-Afghan War and in the unequal trial of strength to which 'Abdu'l-Karīm challenged France in 1925-6. It was significant, however, that, as often as not, an adventure which ended in ignominious military disaster was crowned by some substantial political success. The suppression of the Egyptian rising of 1919 was followed by the Milner Report.¹ The suppression of the insurrection of the same year in the Panjab was followed by something like a conversion of the British Government in India to the ideas of the Indian Khilāfat Conference regarding the terms of peace with Turkey. The rapid and complete defeat of the Afghans in 1919 was followed by the renunciation of British control over Afghan foreign policy and by a slight rectification of frontier in Afghanistan's favour.² The suppression of the 'Irāqī rising of 1920 was followed by the translation of the British mandate over 'Irāq into an Anglo-'Irāqī treaty.³ The successive annihilating defeats of the Wāhhābī raiders by British aeroplanes and armoured cars were followed by the extension of Ibn Sa'ūd's dominions under the Agreement of Haddah.⁴

No doubt, if the Islamic peoples supposed that these political concessions were the direct product of their militant tactics, this was the folly of ignorance again. The conflict from which these concessions resulted was not a trial of strength between the Islamic peoples and the Western Powers—who, all the time, could have crushed them by military force if they had chosen to pay the cost—but a conflict of wills in Western Europe. In those West European countries which at this time held colonies, dependencies, protectorates, or mandates in various parts of the Islamic World the new Islamic militancy produced several conflicting reactions. Some Westerners willed the

Religious fanaticism was thus undoubtedly the mainspring of the Moplah insurrection in 1921, and during the period under review other symptoms of religious fanaticism in British India were discernible. The rioting between Muslims and Hindus—arising out of provocations deliberately offered on the one or the other side to the religious susceptibilities of the other party—which had long been endemic in India, continued and even showed a tendency to grow worse during the years immediately following the War of 1914-18 ; and there were other symptoms of religious excitation, such as the abortive emigration on religious grounds (*hijrah*) of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan (see Part III, Section (xiv), pp. 554-5 below). In general, however, as well as in particular matters, such as their attitude towards the Caliphate Question, the temper and opinion of the Indian Muslims were different from, and out of touch with, the temper and opinion of most other Muslims at that time.

¹ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part (iv), Section 10.

² See *Survey for 1920-3*, Part IV, Section (iv).

³ See *op. cit.*, Ch. II. Part III C, and the present volume, Part III, Section (x) below.

⁴ See Part III, Section (vi) below.

uncompromising maintenance of Western ascendancy, and likewise willed the necessary expenditure of 'blood and treasure'; a larger number half-heartedly willed the same end but shrank from the inevitable cost; and a yet larger number not merely shrank from the cost but were determined not to pay it, and, rather than do so, were prepared to sacrifice Western ascendancy in large measure or even completely. In some cases—as in the attitude of the Principal Allied Powers in Europe towards the Turks from the rise of the Turkish Nationalist Movement to the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty—this conflict of wills in the West assumed the form of a diplomatic conflict (sometimes overt but more often unavowed) between the several Western Governments concerned. In other cases the conflict took place within a single country, where it assumed the form of disagreements between the nation at home and its nationals domiciled in the ports of the Levant (who naturally looked at the question from a very different angle), or between different political parties in home politics, or again between 'official circles' and the voters or the tax-payers. It would be misleading, however, to suggest that the several conflicting reactions became identified with particular countries, classes, or parties. The conflict was far more intricate than that; and in every country, party, and class, in certain departments of state of certain Governments, and even in many individual minds there was a division of opinion. On the other hand, the general outcome of the conflict was clear. The conclusions which prevailed in the West were that the General War of 1914–18 had left no margin of national wealth and energy for expenditure on the luxuries of 'imperialism'; and that, in the Islamic World, at any rate (though not, perhaps, in Tropical Africa), 'imperialism' had begun to bring in diminishing returns, even under the most favourable conditions. Since France and Great Britain, the two Western Powers which had emerged from the War of 1914–18 with the largest Islamic territories under their dominion, were both democracies, the general sense (which in this matter was the common sense) of the French and English nations slowly but surely bent the course of public policy into conformity with the prevailing national will. Thus the militant peoples of Islam obtained political concessions, out of proportion to their military achievements, through the play of extraneous forces in countries beyond their horizon. Yet, just because they were unaware that these other unseen forces existed, they attributed the visible results to their own prowess and drew thence encouragement to continue in the same militant course.

This wave of militancy bore into power a number of military dictators. Some of them were 'tyrants' with no hereditary status, whose rise would have been revolutionary in the West, though it was less at variance with Islamic tradition. Mustafā Kemāl Pasha, for instance, rose from being a successful staff-officer to be the first president of the new Turkish Republic, while Rizā Shāh Pahlawī rose from being a trooper in a Russian-trained corps of Persian Cossacks to be the founder of a new Persian dynasty.¹ Others, again, inherited some petty local chieftainship from which they would never have risen into prominence if they had not offered themselves as leaders in the new movement which was sweeping over the Islamic World. Such was the Amīr Muhammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm, who, starting as the hereditary chief of the single Rifī clan of the Banu Wuryāghal, made himself master of the whole Rif, Ghumārah, and Jibālah for two years, and did not fall until he had driven the Spaniards back to the walls of their *presidios* and had all but entered Fez as a conqueror.² Such, again, was Sultānu'l-Atrash, who, starting as one of the less prominent representatives of the principal noble family in the Jabalu'd-Durūz, won a leading position, not only in the Jabal but in all Syria, by reopening against the French the struggle for Syrian independence.³ Only two of these dictators—'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, the Sultan of Najd, and Amānu'llāh, the Amīr of Afghanistan—were representatives of royal houses which could boast of an historic past, and even these two won their position by their personal efforts. 'Abdu'l-'Azīz started as a landless refugee, and had to recover every foot of his ancestral dominions from the rival Āl Rashīd before the conquest of the Hijāz made him the paramount prince in Arabia.⁴ Amānu'llāh started with a doubtful title to the throne of a principality which had surrendered the control over its foreign policy to a Western Power; and his enemies asserted that he had removed his predecessor by foul play and had plunged into the war of aggression which eventually led Afghanistan through military defeat to the recovery of her diplomatic independence, in order to distract the attention of his subjects from the circumstances in which he had acquired his crown.⁵

It was noteworthy that, among the Nationalist leaders of this period in the Islamic World, the men of war, of the several types

¹ See Part III, Section (xiii) below.

² See Part II, Sections (v)–(vii) below.

³ See Part III, Section (vii) (e) below.

⁴ See Part III, Section (v) (b) and (c) below.

⁵ See *Survey for 1920–3*, Part IV, Section (iv).

enumerated, were on the whole more successful in achieving their aims than 'intellectuals' like the Egyptian Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl, the Damascene Dr. 'Abdu'r-Rahmān Shāhbandar, or the brothers Muhammad and Shawkat 'Alī in India. The Nationalist 'intellectuals', however, trampled under foot the 'Herodians' of the old school, who had been more concerned to assimilate Western culture than to shake off Western domination. Adherents of this school—even when, like the Albano-Egyptian 'Adlī Pasha, they were able, experienced, and disinterested—could no longer attain to power in their own countries without the backing of some Western Government; and Dāmād Ferid Pasha at Constantinople or Bereket Subhī Bey in Syria could not have remained a single day in office if they had not been hedged about by Western bayonets.

The rise of dictators inevitably took place at the expense of established dynasties. The tallest tree that fell was the House of 'Uthmān (Osman), which had given its name to the Ottoman Turkish people, had conquered from the Egyptian Mamlūks the guardianship over the Holy Cities of Islam, and had asserted a claim to the Caliphate which secured widespread (though not universal) acceptance among the Sunnīs of 'the fringe'.¹ The fall of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1922 and the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924² were followed in 1925 by the deposition of the Qājār Dynasty in Persia in favour of the Pahlawīs³ and of the Hāshimīs in the Hijāz in favour of the Āl Sa'ūd.⁴ So far as the older dynasties survived they did so, like the statesmen of the 'Herodian' school, under Western protection. While Ibn Sa'ūd drove first King Husayn and then King 'Alī b. Husayn from the Hijāz, he did not venture to attack the ex-king Husayn's other sons Faysal and 'Abdu'llāh, whom Great Britain, as mandatory Power, had placed on the thrones of 'Irāq and Transjordan. In Egypt the constitutional struggle over the royal prerogative might have gone hard for King Fu'ād if the British occupation had not acted as a check upon his despotic tendencies and at the same time put out of court, so long as it lasted, the overthrow of the dynasty of Mehmed 'Alī by a Nationalist revolution.⁵ In Tunisia the Bey was almost buffeted off his throne in the *mêlée* between the Nationalists and the French Residency.⁶ In Morocco, where the nominal authority of the Sultan had been reasserted over highland

¹ See Part I, Section (ii) (a) and (b) below.

² For the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate see Part I, Section (ii) (c) and (d) below.

³ See Part III, Section (xiii) below.

⁴ See Part III, Section (v) (c) below.

⁵ See Part III, Section (i) below.

⁶ See Part II, Section (x) below.

tribesmen and feudal lords by the French Resident, Marshal Lyautey—who had established the French protectorate by speaking and acting in the Sharifian Sultan's name—a change of dynasty through the traditional arbitrament of the sword was only averted by the cordon of French troops that barred 'Abdu'l-Karīm's road to Fez in the summer of 1925.¹

The fall of ancient Islamic dynasties was one incident in a general destruction of the fundamental institutions of the old order of society—institutions which had formed a coherent whole and therefore fell simultaneously. With the Ottoman Dynasty there passed away not only the Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate, but the traditional organs for the administration of the Islamic Law (*Sharī'ah*), the Millet System—under which the geographically interlocked religious communities of the Ottoman Empire had been able to enjoy a cultural autonomy on a non-territorial basis—and the Capitulations, under which the foreign communities resident in the Empire had similarly managed their own communal affairs.²

The almost complete disendowment of the Sunnī 'Church' in Turkey and the thorough-going secularization of the Turkish State,³ cut deeper into the life of the Turkish people than the abolition of the Caliphate, and were also likely, owing to the prestige of the Turks among other Islamic peoples, to have a greater ultimate effect upon the Islamic World as a whole. This 'anti-clericalism' was imposed from above by a comparatively small group of militant revolutionaries; but the active resistance which it encountered was surprisingly slight, and there were symptoms—such as the continued abstention of the Turks from the Pilgrimage, even when the material obstacles to their participation had been removed by the Peace of Lausanne⁴—which indicated that the acquiescence of the Turkish people in Mustafā Kemāl Pasha's secularization policy was due to religious indifference as much as to political intimidation. The relative equanimity with which the iconoclastic treatment of the Holy Cities of Islam by the hyper-orthodox Wahhābis was received in 1925 seemed to show that this religious indifference had been gaining ground throughout the Islamic World since the first Wahhābi conquest of the Haramayn a century earlier, when all Islam had been convulsed with horror and the Ottoman Pādishāh had been in danger

¹ See Part II, Section (vi) below.

² For the abolition of the Millet System and the Capitulations in the Lausanne Treaty see *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 113–14.

³ See Part I, Section (ii) (e) below.

⁴ See Part III, Section (v) (b), p. 289 below.

of losing his throne because he had failed to defend the Faith. It was significant that, in his aggression against the legitimate Hāshimī rulers of the Hijāz, the Wāhhābī conqueror was openly incited and supported by the militant elements in the Muslim community in India,¹ who previously had been agitating, on alleged grounds of religion, against the abrogation of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph's sovereignty over the Jazīratu'l-'Arab.² Their behaviour in this matter showed that, in their parade of religious orthodoxy, they too were seeking—whether consciously or not—to achieve a political aim. As a Muslim minority, scattered among an overwhelming mass of Hindus and subject to the rule of a Western Power, they looked to the 'core' of the Islamic World for some independent Islamic Power which might serve as a political rallying point for Muslims of the 'fringe'. When their efforts to rehabilitate the Ottoman Empire through the Ottoman Caliphate had been frustrated conclusively by the revolutionary action of the Angora Government they were ready to turn their eyes toward the first Muslim ruler—even a hyper-orthodox iconoclast—who gave any promise of being able to fill the same political role. Only the Shī'īs of 'Irāq and Persia evinced a genuinely religious animosity against the Wāhhābīs, such as had inflamed the whole Islamic World a century earlier ;³ and the same spirit was displayed by the Shī'ī divines (*mujtahids*) when they defeated Rizā Khān Pahlawī's attempt to follow Mustafā Kemāl Pasha's example by declaring a republic in Persia, but did not oppose his subsequent assumption of the royal title.⁴ Again, in Afghanistan—a Sunnī country which had been penetrated by Western influence to a lesser degree than Shī'ī Persia—the 'Westernizing' Amīr Amānu'llāh's reforms aroused a religious opposition which compelled him to draw rein.⁵ On the other hand, the dismissal of Shaykh 'Alī 'Abdu'r-Razzāq from his chair in the university-mosque of Al-Azhar⁶—after a 'heresy trial' which bore an entertaining resemblance to the trial at Dayton, Tennessee, that had ended a few weeks before in the dismissal of the Darwinian heretic, Mr. Scopes—became a move in the game of Egyptian party politics ;⁷

¹ See Part III, Section (v), p. 297 below.

² See Part I, Section (ii) (c) below. • ³ See Part III, Section (vi) below.

⁴ See Part III, Section (xiii) below.

⁵ See Part III, Section (xiv) below. ⁶ See Part I, Section (ii) below.

⁷ The incident gave King Fu'ād's Unionist Party an opportunity to get rid of the Liberals (after having benefited by Liberal support against the *Wafd*). For a moment, King Fu'ād may have hoped, in addition, to gain the permanent political support of the orthodox Egyptian '*ulamā*', who followed the lead of Al-Azhar. (See Part III, Section (i), p. 227 below.)

and for this reason the fact that the sentence of the university authorities was eventually upheld by the Egyptian Government gave no better measure in Egypt than the Scopes Trial had given in the United States of the true state of religious belief and sentiment among the laity.

When the Sunnī 'Church' in Turkey was being deprived of its inherited endowments and its traditional institutions it was inevitable that the non-Muslim *millets* should also forfeit their autonomy and that resident aliens should lose the benefit of the Capitulations—especially when the minorities and the foreigners in Turkey had been reduced in numbers almost to vanishing point. The *millet* which suffered most conspicuously—because it had held the primacy among these bodies under the old Ottoman régime—was the *Millet-i-Rûm* or Orthodox Christian community, whose *millet bâshî*, the Oecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, became the companion in misfortune of the Ottoman Caliph and the Hâshimî King of the Hijâz. As for the abolition of the Capitulations it not only deprived individual foreign residents in Turkey and the mandated territories of their fiscal and legal privileges, and foreign diplomatic and consular representatives of their extra-territorial jurisdiction, but it involved the extinction of the French Government's protectorate over Catholics and Uniates in the former Ottoman dominions¹—an institution which had been just as characteristic of the old Ottoman order as the Sultan-Caliph's guardianship over the Holy Cities of Islam.

The overthrow of indigenous institutions was accompanied by the wholesale elimination of minorities from the population of the Islamic World; and the two phenomena were logically inseparable. Those institutions had grown up to meet the requirements of a society in which nationalities, organized on a non-territorial basis and interlocked in adjoining quarters of the same city and in alternate villages of the same countryside, corresponded in certain ways to the economically interdependent occupational groups in some single Western country rather than to the geographically segregated nations of the Western World. On the other hand, this geographical segregation of nations into solid homogeneous blocks was the environment which had produced the Western institution of the 'National State'—an order of society in which every state tended to become identified with some particular nation and every nation

¹ See Part II, Section (vii). The similar claim of the Imperial Russian Government to exercise a protectorate over Ottoman subjects of the Orthodox Faith had become extinct with the fall of the Czardom.

claimed a divine right to be established in a separate state. When this Western conception of nationality penetrated into the Islamic World, Islamic society was theoretically confronted with two alternatives. It might either refuse to try on a shoe which had been shaped for other feet, or it might mutilate itself for the sake of wearing Cinderella's slipper. In practice, however, it was impossible for the weaker society to remain impervious to the stronger society's prestige and refuse to follow its fashions ; and therefore the fate which brought Islam into contact with the West doomed Islamic society to turn and rend itself. The triumphal progress of the Western conception of nationality across the Islamic World required that the interlocked nationalities should be segregated, and this process, which had begun in the Serb and Greek Revolutionary Wars at the opening of the nineteenth century after Christ, reached its culmination during and after the General War of 1914-18. The segregation was accomplished—and perhaps only could be accomplished—through an internecine struggle for existence in which the weaker parties were eliminated by compulsory migration or massacre. The less unfortunate victims, like the Parganotes in 1819, the Circassians in 1859, and the Anatolian Greeks in 1922, were uprooted and transplanted to new national homes (though not without an appalling loss of life, wealth, and happiness). Others, like the Moreot Turks in 1821 and the Anatolian Armenians in 1915, were almost blotted out of the book of life. There was perhaps no single community which was not successively the perpetrator and the victim of these atrocities in some part of the Islamic World at some moment during these terrible generations of violent transition ; and the total suffering inflicted upon innocent and impotent individuals—children, women, and men—was beyond calculation. In 1921 the writer of this Survey came across a family of refugees, belonging to a nationality which Western public opinion at that time regarded as less sinned against than sinning, who had been uprooted six times since 1912 ; and such experiences were the lot of hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Kurds, and Assyrians in five or six successive generations.

The climax of this long-drawn-out tragedy was marked by the systematic deportation and massacre of the Ottoman Armenians in 1915,¹ and by the flight or eviction of the Anatolian Greeks in the

¹ See the British Blue Book, *Cmd.* 8325 of 1916 ; and Dr. Johannes Lepsius, *Deutschland und Armenien, 1914-1918* (Potsdam, 1919, Tempelverlag).

autumn of 1922.¹ Provision for the compulsory but regulated interchange of Christian minorities in Turkey and (non-Albanian) Muslim minorities in Greece was made in the Graeco-Turkish Convention signed on the 30th January, 1923, during the Peace Conference of Lausanne; and the terms of this convention were executed, after many disputes and delays, and with many shortcomings, during the period under review.² During the same period panic flights and violent evictions continued to occur sporadically, though happily not on so vast a scale as during the ten years ending in the autumn of 1922. In 1924 the Nestorian Assyrians of the Hakkīyārī district in Kurdistan, who had paid for their insurrection against the Ottoman Government in 1915 by being driven from pillar to post between 1915 and 1918, were forced again to fly from their homelands, which they had been gradually reoccupying since the Armistice.³ In 1925 the inoffensive Chaldaeans of the neighbouring Gōyān district suffered treatment at the hands of the Turks which in the degree of atrocity—though not, of course, in the number of victims—reproduced the treatment of the Armenians in 1915.⁴ In the same year there was an exodus of the Christian minority from the southernmost districts of the Great Lebanon during the incursion of the Druses from the Jabal.⁵

Indeed, wherever the free play of local forces was not interfered with by the effective intervention of some extraneous Power, the elimination of minorities, by massacre, eviction, flight, or expatriation under treaty, was carried to completion during the years 1920–5. The only minorities that escaped the general doom were those that deliberately threw in their lot with the majorities among whom they lived. The most conspicuous example was given by the Coptic Monophysite Christians in Egypt, who not only very largely identified themselves as a community with the national aspirations of their Sunnī compatriots, but provided the *Wafd* with several of its most energetic leaders.⁶ In contrast to the Copts of Egypt, the Maronite and other Christian minorities of the Syrian territory mandated to France were divided in their counsels. The Syrian Christians living abroad in Egypt, the United States or Latin America were inclined—partly because they were exposed at closer

¹ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, p. 105.

² This will be dealt with in *Survey for 1925*, vol. ii.

³ See Part III, Section (xi) (b), pp. 483–5, and (d), pp. 500–1 below.

⁴ See Part III, Section (xi) (f), pp. 517–18 below.

⁵ See Part III, Section (vii) (e), pp. 432–3 below.

⁶ See Part III, Section (i) below.

range than their co-religionists at home to the influence of Western political ideas, and partly because the outbreak of internecine war in Syria did not place their wives, children, and property in immediate peril—to embrace the cause of Syrian nationalism and to sympathize with those Druse and Sunnī Syrians who took up arms against the French. On the other hand, the Syrian Christians who remained at home, though they suffered directly from the imperfections of the French régime, instinctively regarded the Druse and Sunnī insurrection as a threat to their existence and readily enlisted, when the French authorities called for volunteers, in order to fight against their fellow Syrians on behalf of a Western Power.¹ In 1926 it was still uncertain whether the Syrian Christian community as a whole would ultimately follow the example of the Copts or expose themselves to the danger of incurring the fate of the Armenians.

The Christian minorities resident in the French mandated territory, as well as the Syrian Christians living abroad, would probably have come to terms with the majority of the Syrian people if the mandatory Power had not fostered a separate Lebanese Christian nationalism by creating the Great Lebanon State and undertaking to uphold its independence as against the State or States of Syria.² It was a curious fact that at a time when, in Islamic countries that were left to themselves, the minorities were being either eliminated or assimilated in the evolution of homogeneous national states on the Western pattern, the traditional interlocking of diverse nationalities was being deliberately preserved, and even carried further, in the Islamic territories mandated to Western Powers. In the territory mandated to France in Syria the French not only stimulated the development of an anti-Syrian national consciousness among both the Lebanese Christians and the 'Alawīyīn, but introduced a new minority in the shape of the Armenian refugees from Turkey.³ In 'Irāq the British mandatory authorities introduced two new minorities—the Nestorians from Hakkīyārī and the Chaldeans from Gōyān—and also took steps to develop on national lines the local life of the Kurdish population in the Vilāyet of Mosul.⁴

This latter policy, pursued with discretion in a clearly defined geographical area where the Kurds were in a local majority, was free from the drawbacks of the French policy in the Lebanon and

¹ See Part III, Section (vii) (e), pp. 435–7 below.

² See Part III, Section (vii) (a), pp. 355–60 below.

³ See Part III, Section (vii) (e), pp. 435–6 below.

⁴ See Part III, Section (xi) (b) and (f), pp. 482–90 and 516–18 below.

was specifically enjoined upon the mandatory by the Council of the League of Nations as one of the conditions on which they awarded the Mosul Vilāyet to 'Irāq instead of to Turkey.¹ Again, the reception of the Armenian, Nestorian, and Chaldaean refugees from Turkey, though it undoubtedly complicated the political problems of the mandated territories, was an elementary act of humanity in regard to which the mandatory Powers really had no option. On the other hand, the creation of the States of the Great Lebanon and the 'Alawiyīn was a deliberate act of policy, and so were the enrolment of the Lebanese Christians as volunteers during the Syrian War of Independence and the permanent enlistment of Armenians and Circassians in the French mandated territory,² and of Assyrians in 'Irāq,³ as mercenary troops at the disposal of the mandatory authorities. No doubt a mandatory Government, which could not count either upon the consent of the majority of the governed in the mandated territory or upon the willingness of its constituents at home to spend their own blood and treasure in order to make the mandate effective, was under a strong temptation to turn to military account any warlike local minorities which were loyal to the mandatory because they happened to be estranged from the majority of their fellow countrymen. Nevertheless, this policy was almost certainly short-sighted; for, if it temporarily alleviated the mandatory Power's military difficulties, it threatened in the long run to perpetuate or create blood-feuds between the interlocked communities of the mandated territory and so to make the task of administering the mandate more difficult than ever.

The most deliberate, most controversial, and most momentous attempt to introduce a new minority into a mandated territory was the British Government's undertaking to establish in Palestine a 'National Home' for the Jews. This remarkable experiment⁴ appealed to the imagination and excited the sympathy of almost every observer who was acquainted with the long and tragic history of the Jewish people, with the devastating effects of the General War of 1914-18 upon the life of the Jews in Eastern Europe, and with the disinterested heroism which was displayed in Palestine—before, during, and after the War—by the Zionist pioneers. At the same time any observer who did not allow his feelings to get the better of his

¹ See Part III, Section (xi) (*f*), pp. 520-1 below.

² See Part III, Section (vii) (*e*), pp. 435-7 below.

³ See Part III, Section (xi) (*b*), p. 486 below.

⁴ For the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine see Part III, Section (vii) (*b*) below.

reason was bound to reflect that the undertaking was a *tour de force*. At a moment when, in the Islamic World as a whole, minorities were rapidly disappearing—whether by assimilation as in Egypt or by elimination as in Turkey—it was audacious to attempt, in one tiny corner of this world, to bring a new minority into being. Nevertheless this audacity was committed in Palestine by the mandatory Power with apparent impunity—at least down to the time of writing. The credit for this remarkable achievement was shared, in different measure, by the several parties concerned. The leaders of the Zionist Organization, for example, showed statesmanship and strength of mind by persisting in a policy of moderation, notwithstanding the impatience of powerful supporters in distant countries whose enthusiasm for the Zionist ideal was not balanced by a first-hand acquaintance with actual conditions in Palestine. The leaders of the Palestinian Arab Nationalists, again, though they were intransigent in their political demands, distinguished themselves from their contemporaries in Egypt and Syria by not inciting their followers to revolutionary violence. The chief credit, however, must be assigned to the British administrative staff. No prudent Government would have undertaken to establish in Palestine a ‘National Home’ for the Jews if it had not had supreme confidence in the character, ability, and experience of its own public servants on whom the task would devolve. Presumably the British Government embarked on the enterprise in the belief that it could count upon finding a British *personnel* which was equal to the occasion. At any rate the Government’s audacity was justified in the event by the record of the administrators whom it selected. They proved, once again, the truth that good administration works political miracles.¹ By 1926—when the last unit of the British garrison in Palestine had been withdrawn,² and this at a moment when the adjoining parts of the French mandated territory were in insurrection—the administration of the British mandate in Palestine had become one of the wonders of the Islamic World: an honourable though a somewhat uncomfortable distinction.³

¹ The converse of this truth is that the desire for political change (e. g. in the form of Nationalism) seldom becomes revolutionary except where the ground has been prepared for this by bad administration.

² The last, that is, except certain details of the Tank Corps and the Air Service, which remained because they were needed, not to uphold the authority of the mandatory Power over the population of the mandated territory, but to assist the inhabitants of Transjordan to repel Wahhābī raiders. (See Part III, Sections (vi) and (vii) below.)

³ Lack of space has made it impossible to include in this volume of the Survey any account of the administrative work of the British authorities in

Apart from the Zionist experiment in Palestine, the general tendency in the Islamic World at this time was for minorities to disappear; and there was a related tendency towards the taming of the wild highland or desert tribes which had hitherto broken the regularity of administration in Islamic countries while the minorities had broken the uniformity of national life. The Republican Government in Turkey, the founder of the Pahlawī Dynasty in Persia, and the Amīr Amānu'llāh in Afghanistan crushed by brute force the Kurds, Shāhsevens, Lurs, Turkmens, Mangals, and other turbulent tribesmen in their respective territories.¹ On the other hand, the French employed more humane and diplomatic methods in pacifying the feudal lords of Southern Morocco, the Berber clans of the Atlas highlands,² and the Syrian 'Alawīyīn³; and Ibn Sa'ūd, on his part, appears to have employed more statesmanship than coercion in inducing the Badu of Central Arabia to settle down in his agricultural colonies.⁴

It was noticeable that the native Islamic Governments—whether because or in spite of their greater ruthlessness—proved on the whole more successful in taming the tribesmen than the Western Colonial Powers. The Amīr Amānu'llāh's war of extermination against the Mangals was at least more rapidly effective than the

Palestine, though properly the Survey ought to take account of the whole field covered by the annual reports of the mandatory Powers to the Permanent Mandates Commission. The writer of the Survey regrets the necessity for this omission, and ventures—in the hope of guarding against any misleading impression which it might possibly leave in the reader's mind—to quote the following observations by Mr. Leonard Stein, a distinguished member of the Zionist Organization who has been good enough to contribute the Sub-section in Part III, Section (vii) on the development of the Jewish National Home:

I cannot help thinking that it is a pity that the Survey should contain no indication of the moral and material progress which has been made by Palestine as a whole under the British mandate. While I am naturally the last person to underrate the importance of the constructive work done under Zionist auspices, I feel, nevertheless, that the really remarkable work of the Palestine Administration ought not to be passed over without notice. No one would suggest that the Survey should deal in detail with the ordinary routine of colonial government, but we are here dealing with a conspicuously successful attempt to rebuild a derelict country *de novo*. I think it would be unfortunate if the ordinary reader were to go away with the impression that, apart from what is being done by and for the Jews, the history of Palestine since the Armistice has been merely a history of constant friction between the Government and the Arab population. If the picture is to be in proper perspective, it seems to me that this, the first volume of the Survey to deal with the new Palestine in detail, should make some attempt to summarize, however concisely, the story so admirably told by Sir Herbert Samuel in his final report. (*Colonial*, No. 15 of 1925.)

¹ See Part III, Sections (xi) (e), (xiii), and (xiv) below.

² See Part II, Section (vi) below.

³ See Part III, Section (vii) (a) below.

⁴ See Part III, Section (v) (a) below.

British Indian Government's efforts to impose the Pax Britannica upon the Mahsuds;¹ and, conversely, the most striking local successes gained by the tribesmen in a struggle which in most cases ultimately went against them were gained by the Rifis over the Spaniards in 1921-4² and by the Druses over the French in 1925-6.³

The effects of Western influence on the Islamic World which have been mentioned up to this point were all destructive and, during the years under review, this process of destruction was predominant. Under the impact of the West the institutions of the old order were overthrown one after another. Yet though the ruins cumbered the ground, the beginnings of fresh construction, on the Western plan, were already visible here and there in the several fields of political, economic, and cultural life, as they were in the devastated areas of Stamboul, Salonica, Smyrna, and Damascus. The positive process of 'Westernization', for which the previous destruction had made way, revealed itself partly in external (though not necessarily trivial) symptoms like the adoption of Western head-gear,⁴ and partly in the growth of new institutions, habits, and aspirations. A genuine struggle for constitutional government was being waged, as yet inconclusively, in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, the Lebanon, Syria, 'Irāq, and Persia against the domination of native dictators or extraneous Powers; and even in such remote and backward countries as Afghanistan and the Najd Western political ideas were in the air. When the Great National Assembly at Angora abolished the Ottoman Caliphate, and when the Wahhābīs drove the Hāshimī Dynasty out of the Hijāz, the general impulse in Islam was to deal with the situation by the modern Western method of convening an international conference and not by the traditional Islamic method of preaching a Holy War. This change of outlook in politics was significant, yet perhaps not so significant as the contemporary changes on the social and cultural planes. The most striking phenomena there were a movement for the emancipation of women and a determination to master the material technique of Western civilization in its multifarious branches. The future of Islamic society probably depended more upon the outcome of these social and cultural endeavours than upon the course of the diplomatic and military affairs with which the present Survey is primarily concerned.

¹ See Part III, Section (xiv) below.

² See Part II, Section (v) below.

³ See Part III, Section (vii) (e) below.

⁴ See Part I, Section (ii) (e) below.

(ii) The Abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate by the Turkish Great National Assembly and the Progress of the Secularization Movement in the Islamic World.

(a) THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE OTTOMAN CALIPHATE.¹

The question of the Caliphate (*Khilāfat*), which perplexed and divided the Islamic World during the period under review, had likewise produced the first schism in Islamic society—a schism which began, only twenty-four years after the death of the Founder, with the disputed succession of the fourth Caliph 'Alī, and which had never afterwards been repaired. The Shī'īs ('sectaries')² took the view that 'Alī (who held the office from A. D. 656 to 661) was the first and last legitimate Caliph in the series recognized by the Sunnī ('Orthodox') majority of Islamic society, and that the true succession had passed from the Founder himself to 'Alī (the first three *de facto* Caliphs being dismissed by the Shī'īs as illegitimate interlopers), and from 'Alī, by right of inheritance and direct appointment (*nass*), to a series of *Imāms* of 'Alid descent, who had lived under persecution or in obscurity until the last of them had supernaturally disappeared. According to the Shī'ī doctrine this last of the *Imāms* (there were divergences of view among the Shī'īs themselves regarding the number and identity of the persons in the series) was still living, in mysterious withdrawal from the world, and was one day to appear again. Until his reappearance the Imamate, *ex hypothesi*, could not be held by an ordinary mortal; and therefore, for the Shī'īs, no 'Caliphate Question' could arise as a practical issue. In general the Sunnīs—who at all times constituted the major part of Islamic society—had recognized the legitimacy of those Caliphs who, after 'Alī's death, had seized and held the office *de facto*; and the protest of a minority of Muslims³ against the historical facts, though

¹ See the bibliography at the end of the section, especially the exact and lucid exposition of the subject by Sir Thomas Arnold in *The Caliphate* (Oxford, 1924, Clarendon Press).

² The terms Shī'ī and Sunnī were of course coined by the Sunnīs.

³ This minority included not only the Shī'īs but also some Sunnīs. 'The view that the *Khilāfat* had only lasted thirty years, i. e. up to the death of 'Alī . . .,' was held by 'Nasafi (A. D. 1068–1141), one of the greatest legists of the Hanafi School, whose exposition of Muslim doctrine was an accepted text-book in Turkey, and was commented upon by many scholars there. From him this opinion had been adopted by the great Turkish jurist Ibrāhīm Halabī (*ob.* 1549), whose *Multaqā u'l-Abhur* became the authoritative Ottoman code of law' (Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 163). In the Hanafi School of the Sunnah, however, this opinion seems to have been purely academic, and indeed to have remained in abeyance, whereas the Shī'īs regarded it as the most vital issue in Islamic affairs.

continuously maintained, had not prevented the Caliphate from being, in its day, a great political institution.

The Prophet Muhammad, who had set out to preach a religion, was led incidentally—by force of circumstances into which it is unnecessary to enter here—into founding a state ; and Islam, the new community (*ummah*) which he brought into existence, was both a religious and a political association. Accordingly, in the *Shari'ah* or 'Path' of Sunnī Islamic Law, which was deduced, during the first two centuries after the Hijrah, from the Qur'ān and the approved Traditions of the Prophet, and which became crystallized thereafter in the alternative expositions of the four canonical schools, there did not arise that distinction between 'religious' and 'political', 'sacred' and 'profane', 'ecclesiastical' and 'secular', 'spiritual' and 'temporal', which was so characteristic of Western thought that it was difficult for Westerners not to read it unconsciously into the thought of other civilizations.¹ The Islamic community was, and remained, a 'Church-and-State' indivisible. At the same time Muhammad was regarded by the Muslims as the last of the Prophets, so that his Caliph or 'successor' (the literal meaning of the Arabic word *Khalīfah*) could not, *ex hypothesi*, inherit his function as a medium of fresh religious revelation. Ibn Khaldūn, a great Muslim thinker of the eighth Islamic (fourteenth Christian) century—writing at a time when the history of the early Caliphate could be seen in perspective and when the academic theory of the office had been worked out—defined the nature of the Caliphate as follows :

It is evident that the true function of the Caliph is to be a deputy of the Lawgiver [i. e. of the Prophet Muhammad] in the defence of the Faith and in the administration of this world. Now the Lawgiver was charged with a twofold responsibility—a responsibility, in regard to the Faith, to secure the observance of the *Shari'ah*, and to induce men to accept the duties which it imposes ; and a responsibility, in regard to the administration of this world, to secure the social welfare of his subjects.²

According to this passage the Caliph's function was limited to securing the execution of the Islamic Law one and indivisible ; and it will be seen that his two responsibilities of defending the Faith and administering mundane affairs both fell entirely within that sphere

¹ Historically, this Western distinction was a peculiarity of Western society. It was unknown, for example, not only in Islam, but in the City States of Ancient Greece, as well as in most primitive communities, ancient and modern.

² Ibn Khaldūn : *Muqaddamāt* (Arabic text, third Bayrūt edition, 1900, p. 218 ; French translation by Baron McG. de Slane, Paris, 1863, Imprimerie Impériale, vol. i, p. 444).

which, in the West, was regarded as appertaining to 'the Temporal Power'.¹ This is equally apparent from the exposition of the Caliph's duties which is given by a writer of the eleventh century after Christ, Al-Māwardī, and which is summarized by Sir Thomas Arnold as follows :

The Caliph must thus be a person capable of fulfilling administrative, judicial, and military functions. These functions Māwardī sets out in detail as follows : the defence and maintenance of religion, the decision of legal disputes, the protection of the territory of Islam, the punishment of wrongdoers, the provision of troops for guarding the frontiers, the waging of war [*jihād*] against those who refuse to accept Islam or submit to Muslim rule, the collection and organization of taxes, the payment of salaries and the administration of public funds, the appointment of competent officials, and lastly, personal attention to the details of government. These varied activities expected of the Caliph, Māwardī sums up as being 'the defence of religion and the administration of the state'.²

The academic theorists deduced the functions of the Caliphate *a priori*, from texts of the Qur'ān and the Traditions, by fine-drawn logical processes resembling those employed by medieval Western Schoolmen, and they eventually worked out a comprehensive and detailed exposition of the nature of the Caliphate ; the necessity for its existence ; the qualifications required for holding the office or for acting as an elector of a new incumbent ; the alternative procedures of election by the qualified representatives of the Islamic community (the *Arbābū'l-Hallī wa'l-'Aqd*, 'the possessors of the power to loose and bind', which meant, in fact, the holders of power *de facto*, whoever these might be at the moment) or designation by the previous holder of the office (the effect, in either case, being the conclusion of

¹ According to certain Islamic 'theologian-publicists' (theology and political theory were not differentiated in Islamic thought of the classical period) the accomplishment of the Caliph's primary function—that of securing the execution of the *Shari'ah*—required that he should possess the capacity of *Ijtihād*, that is, of interpreting the *Shari'ah* 'with authority and not as the scribes'. (See Count L. Ostorrog's French translation of Al-Māwardī on the Caliphate, second edition, Paris, 1925, Leroux, pp. 86-7, and foot-note on p. 144.) The later view, however, was that, after the foundation of the four orthodox schools of interpretation, the door of *Ijtihād*, in the absolute sense, had been closed (*op. cit.*, p. 45). In any case, *Ijtihād* was mere interpretation of past revelation, and it was not binding upon the Islamic community unless there were a consensus among the *Mujtahids*. See further the article *Ijtihād* in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

² Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 72. For the full text of the passage in Al-Māwardī see Count Ostorrog's translation, cited in the preceding foot-note, pp. 143-9. During the period under review, the Caliph's traditional functions of defending the frontiers and mobilizing the armies of Islam were cited, by those Turks who wished for the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, as evidence that the maintenance of the Caliphate was incompatible with the constitution of the Turkish Republic.

a social contract between the Caliph and the community); the duties of the Caliph, when once in office, towards the community; the duties of the community towards the Caliph; and the circumstances—physical, mental, and political—which entailed a forfeiture of the office by an incumbent of it.¹

No doubt these academic thinkers, like their Western counterparts, lived in a world of abstract thought which had little relation to the facts of the world around them; and for this reason their theories regarding the Caliphate were almost without influence upon the history of that institution until after the abolition of the last historical vestige of it in 1924. Indeed, the Caliphate Congress which met in Cairo on the 13th May, 1926, was perhaps the first assemblage of Doctors of the Islamic Law which had ever had a free hand to discuss the practical question of the succession to the Caliphate in academic terms. Nevertheless, the theory of the Caliphate had always coincided with the practice in one important respect. The 'temporal' or political character of the office, as established theoretically in the definitions of the Islamic Schoolmen when translated into terms of Western thought, is established with even greater force by the historical facts (which came to pass before the theory took shape, and perhaps accounted in large measure for the shape which it eventually took).

The Caliph or Successor of the Prophet became known by two alternative titles: ² *Imām* or 'leader of the people' (*ummah*)—by

¹ The two most celebrated expositions of the academic theory of the Caliphate were those of Al-Māwardī (*obit* A. D. 1058) and of Ibn Khaldūn (*obit* A. D. 1405), both of which have been cited above.

² See Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–41. Ibn Khaldūn (*Muqaddamāt*, third Bayrūt edition, p. 191; Baron McG. de Slane's translation, vol. i, p. 387) appears to imply that the titles *Khalīfah* and *Imām*, at any rate, are simply interchangeable; and in the decision published on the 25th March, 1924, by the Rector of Al-Azhar and by the other principal 'ulamā in Egypt (see p. 82 below, and, for the complete text, the Appendix to the present volume) it is stated that 'the Caliphate' is 'synonymous with the Imamate' (beginning of Clause 2). Sir Thomas Arnold (*op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*) writes:

The early Caliphs could be described by either one of these three titles—*Khalīfah*, *Amīr ul-Mu'minīn*, and *Imām*. Each was a title of one and the same personage, but *Khalīfah* emphasized his relation to the founder of the faith, 'The Apostle of God,' and put forward this apostolic succession as a claim for the obedience of the faithful; the second title, 'Amīr ul-Mu'minīn,' asserted more distinctively the authority of the ruler as supreme war lord and head of the civil administration: the third, 'Imām,' emphasized rather the religious activity of the head of the state as performing a certain definite religious function. This last title—*Imām*—is the favourite designation for the head of the Church among the Shīahs, since they lay special emphasis on the sacrosanct character of the successors of the Prophet. . . .

A high authority, who is himself a Shī'i, Mr. Ameer Ali, draws a sharper

an analogy between public prayer and other public affairs—and *Amīru'l-Mu'minīn* or Commander of the Faithful, which coincided in meaning with the Roman title *Imperator*. The title *Amīru'l-Mu'minīn* came into use as early as the time of the second Caliph, 'Umar, when the little community founded by Muhammad in the Arabian hinterland of the Roman Empire was already expanding into a 'universal state' of the same type as the Roman Empire itself; and thereafter the Islamic office of Caliph developed on lines analogous to the development which the Roman office of Emperor had already undergone.

Like the Emperor of the Romans the Commander of the Faithful was theoretically a constitutional magistrate elected by the community in order to execute the public law, by which he himself did not cease to be bound. In practice the fifth Caliph Mu'āwiyah and his successors, no less than Augustus and his successors, were military dictators who seized political power by force, governed autocratically under a parade of legal forms, and handed on their position to their natural heirs if they were able. Succession by revolution—the ultimate reality which the form of election only thinly disguised—was tempered by a strong dynastic tendency; but the successive dynasties maintained themselves by force or *vis inertiae*, not by the sanction of recognized 'legitimacy' or 'divine right', and they were exposed to the danger of being supplanted by a fresh military revolution at any moment. The 'Alids gave place to the Umayyads and the Umayyads to the 'Abbāsids as the Julii had given place to the Flavii and the Antonini to the Severi; and the only bond between these successive dynasties was that all of them, no less than the first four Caliphs and the Prophet himself, belonged

distinction between the titles *Khalīfah* and *Imām*. In a letter to the writer of the present Survey, he writes:

In the Muhammadan system there are two dominant conceptions: (i) the spiritual leadership; (ii) the temporal magistracy. They originate from the Prophet's own example and precedent. He was a spiritual leader as well as the head of a commonwealth. The first is called the *Imāmat*, the second the *Khilāfat*. In the Shi'ah system the *Imāmat* stands separately from the *Khilāfat*; among the Sunnīs the *Imāmat* is commonly combined with the *Khilāfat*; and you will find this the main point of difference between these two great sections. I am afraid you have not sufficiently differentiated between these two conceptions.

For Mr. Ameer Ali's exposition of the subject see further his *The Spirit of Islam* (second edition, London, 1922, Christophers), and an article entitled 'The Caliphate and the Islamic Renaissance' in the *Edinburgh Review*, January 1923, in which he writes:

The *Khilāfat* . . . is the vice-gerency of the Prophet. . . . The *Imāmat* is the spiritual leadership; but the two dignities are inseparable.

to the Quraysh, that is, to the aristocracy of pre-Islamic Mecca.¹ Thus the vast majority of historical Caliphs obtained the office either by inheritance or by revolution ; and the peaceable appointment of a Caliph on account of his individual merits—though it did occur in the case of one at least out of the first four ‘rightly-directed’ Caliphs—was as rare an exception in the history of the Caliphate as the succession of ‘philosopher kings’ from Nerva to Marcus had been in the history of the Roman Empire.

Nevertheless, this disorderliness of succession and precariousness of tenure did not prevent the office itself, as distinct from the transitory holders of it, from acquiring political prestige—a prestige which grew so great that it long outlasted the real political power through which it had been originally accumulated. When, in the ninth Christian century, the ‘Abbāsids of Baghdad had become the creatures of their own barbarian palace guards, the *de facto* rulers who sprang up in different provinces of their former dominions still sought investiture from them, as barbarian usurpers in the Roman provinces of the West had once sought it from Roman Emperors living impotently under the shadow of their barbarian Masters of the Soldiers ; and after the extinction of the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate at Baghdad by the Mongols in A. D. 1258 the Mamlūk Slave-Sultans of Egypt found it convenient to rule, by a legal fiction, as deputies of a branch of the ‘Abbāsid line, who were maintained as pensioners in Cairo—with the sole function of investing successive Mamlūk Sultans with lawful authority—until the Mamlūk Power itself was extinguished by the ‘Osmanlis in A. D. 1517.²

¹ The historical reason for this was that the Founder of Islam himself had belonged to the Quraysh, and that the old bond of kinship, which was exceedingly strong in Arabian tradition, prevailed over the new bond of religion. (The Umayyads, for instance, were able to profit by their descent though they had been bitter opponents of Muhammad during his lifetime.) The historical fact that, from the death of Muhammad down to the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in A. D. 1258, there was never a Caliph who did not belong to the Quraysh gave rise, in retrospect, to the tradition that the Prophet himself had declared Qurayshite lineage to be an essential qualification for holding the office. This question is discussed at length by Ibn Khaldūn (*op. cit.*, de Slane, vol. i, pp. 394–400). He records that in this matter the doctors disagreed ; and though he himself accepts the tradition, he characteristically rationalizes it by interpreting it as a local and temporary application of the general and permanent qualification of fitness.

² The relation of the Cairene ‘Abbāsids to the Mamlūk Sultans resembled the relation of the Merovingian *rois fainéants* to their Carolingian Mayors of the Palace or that of the Japanese Emperors to their Shoguns. The distinction was one between political prestige without *de facto* power and *de facto* political power without prestige ; but the ‘Abbāsid Caliphate and the Mamlūk Sultanate at Cairo were alike political institutions. The Caliphate did not become a spiritual office by virtue of ceasing to be an effective political office.

This Cairene Caliphate, however, does not appear to have obtained any general recognition among Islamic rulers other than the Cairene Mamlūks for whose convenience it existed.¹ Elsewhere in the Sunnī World it seems to have been held that even the right of investiture, which the 'Abbāsids had succeeded in preserving four centuries longer than their own direct power, had lapsed in A. D. 1258, when the last 'Abbāsīd Caliph of Baghdad was put to death in his capital by an Infidel conqueror. Thenceforward, except in Egypt down to A. D. 1517, the title of Caliph appears to have been assumed as a matter of course by any Sunnī ruler with pretensions to importance.² The Ottoman Sultans, for example, were already styling themselves Caliphs in the last quarter of the fourteenth century after Christ, when their European conquests had raised their principality *de facto* to the rank of a Great Power. So far as the title retained any positive significance, and remained something more than an empty form, it was perhaps intended to imply an assertion of complete sovereign independence, in contrast to that connotation of delegated authority which was implicit in such titles as 'Sultan'. It was certainly not regarded at this time as implying any serious claim to exclusive sovereignty over the entire Islamic community in all parts of the world. In the sixteenth and seventeenth Christian centuries, for example, the Mughūl rulers of India, in their diplomatic correspondence with the Ottoman Court, sometimes applied the title of Caliph both to themselves and to their Ottoman contemporaries in the course of the same letter.³ Incidentally, none of these dynasties

It remained a political office, kept alive, in spite of having lost effective political power, by the prestige of a great political past.

¹ See Arnold, *op. cit.*, ch. viii: 'Relations of the 'Abbāsīd Caliphs in Cairo with other princes in the Muslim World.' Sir Thomas Arnold notes several exceptional cases in which the Cairene Caliphs did receive recognition from Islamic rulers other than the Mamlūks; but he also cites evidence to show that in general 'their position was a very humiliating one'.

² See Arnold, *op. cit.*, ch. ix: 'The Muslim monarch now claimed to derive his authority directly from God, to be the vice-gerent of Allāh, not a mere successor of the Prophet, and the other designations, such as Imām and Amīr ul Mu'minīn, that had hitherto been associated with the Caliphate, generally dropped into abeyance, and were rarely assumed by those who called themselves Caliphs.'

³ See Sir Thomas Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-62. The mutual tolerance of these respective claimants to the Caliphate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is in significant contrast to the acrimony with which the title of Roman Emperor was contested between East Roman Emperors and Holy Roman Emperors in the Middle Ages. The inference is not that modern Islamic rulers were more courteous or forbearing than mediæval Christian rulers, but that the title to the Caliphate was regarded by them with indifference. Sir Thomas Arnold cites evidence (*op. cit.*, pp. 139-58) to show that the Ottoman Sultan Selim I, who conquered Egypt—Mamlūk Sultans, 'Abbāsīd Caliph-pensioners and all—and who might on this account have claimed the Caliphāte

which rose to greatness, and consequently assumed the title of Caliph, in the Islamic World after the barbarian invasions of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries of the Christian era was of Qurayshite descent. Yet, although by this time the tradition which made Qurayshite blood an essential qualification for holding the Caliphate had become more or less established in academic theory, that did not deter princes of Turkish or Mongol origin from assuming the title when they had attained *de facto* to a certain degree of political power, nor again did it embolden princes of authentic Qurayshite lineage, like the Hāshimī Amīrs of the Hijāz, to assume the title so long as they remained dependent *de facto* upon the Mamlūk or Ottoman masters of Egypt. In fact, if the titular Caliphate, so lightly assumed by numerous Islamic princes between the sack of Baghdad in A. D. 1258 and the accession of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph 'Abdu'l-Hamīd II in 1876, possessed any feature in common with the original Caliphate, which had been an effective dominion over the whole of Islam, it was that in both ages the fundamental qualification for holding the title or the office had been neither individual merit nor Qurayshite lineage nor (least of all) 'spiritual power', but the command of sufficient force.¹

, (b) THE HAMIDIAN REVIVAL (1876-1922).

A new chapter in the history of the Caliphate was opened in the eighteenth century by the growing influence of the West upon Islam—an influence which first declared itself in the form of military and diplomatic pressure and later in the subtler but more penetrating form of the transmission of ideas.

During the century which began with the negotiation of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty of Küchük Qaynārjah in A. D. 1774 and ended with the accession of 'Abdu'l-Hamīd II to the Ottoman throne in 1876 the Ottoman Caliphate ceased to be merely titular and

with better grounds than his Ottoman predecessors, was actually more indifferent to the title than his predecessors had been. In contrast to this Selīm apparently set great store by the guardianship of the Holy Cities of the Hijāz, which passed to him, by right of conquest, from the Mamlūk Sultans.

¹ The Ottoman Dynasty not only lacked the qualification of Qurayshite descent but had given their official patronage in their dominions to the Hanafī School of interpretation of the *Sharī'ah*, which held in theory that the legitimate Caliphate had come to an end with 'Alī (see p. 25 above). This, however, neither deterred the Ottoman Pādishāhs from assuming the title nor evoked (apparently) any active protest from the Hanafī 'ulemā of the Ottoman Empire. This may indicate either that the title had come to be regarded as an empty form or else that the Hanafī opinion concerning the duration of the Caliphate was a dead letter.

became for the first time an active factor in international affairs. This change was the consequence of three new developments : first, the continual transfer of ex-Ottoman provinces, containing Muslim populations, to the rule of Western Governments ; second, the successive extinction of all sovereign independent Sunnī Powers of any importance, with the single precarious exception of the fast diminishing Ottoman Empire, and their replacement by the colonial empires of Western Powers (the most conspicuous example of this second development being India, where a large Muslim population passed from the Mughūl Rāj to the British Rāj after a short interval of anarchy) ; and, third, the gradual emergence in Islamic society of a new sense of solidarity and a new desire to express this feeling in some practical form—a development which was a natural and, indeed, almost inevitable reaction to the other two. As a result of these three related developments interest in the Caliphate revived, and at the same time a confusion of thought arose regarding the character of an office which had been obsolete, in all but name, for many centuries.

This confusion was due to the misinterpretation of both the history and the theory of the Caliphate by insufficiently instructed Western observers, who drew a false analogy between an Islamic institution which they failed to understand and a Western institution with which they were familiar. They equated the Caliphate with the Papacy ; explained it as a ‘ spiritual ’ office in the Western sense (an abstraction which was quite foreign to Islamic thought) ; assumed that the double title of Sultan-Caliph implied a personal union of the ‘ spiritual ’ and ‘ temporal ’ powers in the Ottoman Pādishāh ; and inferred that these powers could alternatively be divided between different persons. Their error obtained a wide currency in the West ¹ (except among a few scholars without influence in international affairs) and even among Muslims who had received a modern Western in place of a classical Islamic education. It was consciously and skilfully exploited by ‘Abdu’l-Hamīd in his dealings with Western Governments, with Muslim peoples under Western rule, and with his own Muslim subjects.

The subjection of Muslim populations to non-Muslim Governments had not been foreseen by the canonical interpreters of the *Sharī‘ah*—or, rather, it had not been contemplated as a situation in which

¹ It seems to have been popularized by M. C. M. d’Ohsson in the first volume of his *Tableau Général de l’Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1787), in which he speaks of the “ sacerdotal authority ” of the Sultan and styles him the “ Pontiff of the Musulmans ” (Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 170).

Muslims could acquiesce. This followed logically from the fact that mundane administration was an integral part of the activities of the Islamic community and, therefore, could not be resigned into non-Muslim hands without preventing the community as a whole, and its individual members, from leading the true Islamic life in all its completeness. For this reason any territory under non-Muslim rule was regarded as *Dāru'l-Harb* (a 'war zone'), and it was the duty of all Muslims, whether resident in such territory itself or elsewhere, to wage perpetual warfare until the territory had been brought under Muslim rule. Presumably this duty applied with special force in the case of territories over which Muslim rule had once been established and in which a Muslim population survived, such as the ceded provinces of the Ottoman Empire or the lost dominion of the Mughūls. In practice, however, all the parties to the new situation would be anxious not to push the logic of it to extremes. The former Muslim Government of the territory that was passing under non-Muslim rule had either ceased to exist, like the Mughūl Government, or else, like the Ottoman Government, it had ceded the province, under *force majeure*, as the price of a necessary peace. *Ex hypothesi*, it could not or would not continue the war; nor, again, would the Muslim populations in the ceded territory be in a position to carry on, single-handed, a struggle which had gone against them even before they had lost the protection of their former Muslim sovereigns. Least of all would the new non-Muslim rulers desire to drive their new Muslim subjects to desperation by rendering the fulfilment of their religious duties flagrantly impossible for them under the new régime. Since these new rulers happened to be Western or Westernized Powers they naturally sought a solution in the convenient Western distinction between 'temporal' and 'spiritual' power and attempted, on the false analogy above-mentioned, to apply it to Islamic conditions.

For example, in the Russo-Turkish peace treaty, signed at Küchük Qaynārjah on the 21st July, 1774 (Art. 3), in which the Crimean Tatars were declared independent of the Ottoman Empire, it was provided that

In regard to religious ceremonies, since the Tatars profess the same cult as the Musulmans, and since His Majesty the Sultan is regarded as the sovereign Caliph of the Muhammadan religion, they shall conduct themselves towards him as is prescribed by the precepts of their law—without, however, thereby compromising their political and civil liberty in the form in which it has just been established.

Again, in the Italo-Ottoman preliminaries of peace which were

signed at Ouchy on the 15th October, 1912, and in which the provinces of Tripoli and Benghazi were detached from the Ottoman Empire, it was provided that the Sultan should proclaim to the Muslim population of the ceded territories that, 'availing' himself of his 'sovereign rights', he was conceding to them 'full and complete autonomy'; and further that

our intention being that the ordinances of the Sacred Law of the *Sheri'eh* remain continually in force, we reserve to ourselves, with this end in view, the nomination of the *qādī*, who in his turn will nominate the *nā'ibs* from among the local 'ulemā, in accordance with the rules of the *Sheri'eh*.

Similarly, in the Turco-Bulgarian peace treaty signed at Constantinople on the 29th September, 1913, it was provided (Art. 8) that

the name of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as Caliph, will continue to be pronounced in the public prayers of the Muslims [of Bulgaria],

and there was annexed to the treaty an arrangement concerning the muftis in Bulgaria. The local muftis were to be elected by the Muslims on the Bulgarian electoral registers, and were in turn to elect a Chief Mufti for the whole country who was to serve as a liaison between them and the *Sheykhul-Islām* at Constantinople. The *Sheykhul-Islām* was to issue the authorization for rendering *fatvās*, not only to the Chief Mufti of Bulgaria, but to the local muftis on the Chief Mufti's recommendation; so that the Bulgarian muftis, though elected by the Bulgarian Muslim population, could not enter on their functions without licence from an Ottoman public authority. It was further provided that if the Chief Mufti disallowed a judgement (*hujjet*) of a local mufti on the ground that it was contrary to the *Sheri'eh* the case was to be referred to the *Sheykhul-Islām*, who was to have power to reverse the Chief Mufti's decision. Since the *Sheykhul-Islām* was a law-officer of the Ottoman Crown the effect of this arrangement was to give the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph jurisdiction over Muslims who were Bulgarian nationals.¹

In international agreements, of the type illustrated by these three texts, between the Ottoman Government and non-Muslim Powers,

¹ Compare the Graeco-Turkish peace treaty of the 14th November, 1913, Arts. 11 and 13. The provisions of the Turco-Bulgarian peace treaty of the 29th September, 1913, cited above, had been anticipated in the Turco-Bulgarian convention of the 19th April, 1909 (relative to the Bulgarian declaration of independence), and in the Turkish-Austro-Hungarian convention of the 26th February, 1909 (relative to the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina). The same questions arose in the negotiations for a new Turco-Bulgarian treaty during the period under review.

the High Contracting Parties thus tacitly agreed to accept as applicable the Western distinction between 'temporal' and 'spiritual' power; but since that distinction did not apply in fact the result was wholly disadvantageous to the party which had introduced it under a misconception. The non-Muslim Governments concerned imagined that they were securing a valid political title without incurring the risk of an interminable religious war, and this at the cheap price of leaving the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph in possession of that 'spiritual' power for which they believed the Caliphate to stand. On the other hand, the Sultan-Caliph, in tacitly allowing the other party thus to deceive themselves, was unobtrusively receiving back, as Caliph, that full measure of 'temporal' power which he had surrendered as Sultan. So long as the non-Muslim Governments which conquered his provinces continued to recognize him as Caliph and acknowledged his right to appoint the local officers of the Islamic Law, so long, in the eyes of the local Muslim population, his juridical sovereignty would remain unimpaired.

So true was this that the new Governments rapidly discovered that such arrangements, based on a supposed distinction between 'temporal' and 'spiritual' power, were unworkable. The Russian Government, for example, insisted in 1783 upon the cancellation of the passage above-quoted from the treaty of 1774; and the Italian Government caused to be inserted in the Lausanne Treaty of the 24th July, 1923, a clause (Art. 22) in which Turkey recognized 'the definite abolition of all rights and privileges whatsoever which she enjoyed in Libya under the Treaty of the 18th October, 1912, and the instruments connected therewith'. It is not surprising that when the Great National Assembly of Turkey attempted in the Law of the 1st November, 1922, to maintain the Caliphate in Turkey, while itself assuming the entire sovereignty in the Turkish State, it rapidly discovered, as the Russians and Italians had discovered before, that a Caliph without sovereignty was a contradiction in terms. The abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey on the 3rd March, 1924, was as inevitable as had been the abolition of the Ottoman Caliph's authority in the Crimea in 1783 or in Libya in 1923. In all such cases, however, the false analogy produced at least a temporary confusion of thought, and gave any titular holder of the Caliphate an opportunity for profitable equivocation. 'Abdu'l-Hamid II (1876-1909) used his opportunity with consummate skill.

When 'Abdu'l-Hamid ascended the throne the misinterpretation of the Caliphate was already well established, and the other two

developments, mentioned above, were also far advanced. Between 1876 and 1882 a number of former Ottoman territories or dependencies, containing large Muslim populations—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, the three Transcaucasian Sanjāqs of Qārs-Ardahān-Batūm, Egypt, and Tunisia—all passed under the rule of non-Muslim Governments. Meanwhile, a number of formerly independent Muslim states were being reduced to vassalage or being extinguished altogether. The last titular Mughūl Emperor had been deposed by the British in 1857 ; and, for more than half a century before that, the dynasty had been living in Delhi as pensioners of the East India Company, without a vestige of effective power. In the Caucasus the last independent Muslim populations had submitted to the Russians, or migrated to Ottoman territory as refugees, between 1859 and 1864. In West Central Asia the Russians had conquered the independent Uzbek Khanates between 1863 and 1873 ; and in this quarter they rounded off their dominions by conquering the independent Turkmen tribes of Transcaspia, up to the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan, between 1873 and 1886. Afghanistan herself surrendered the control over her foreign relations to the British-Indian Government in 1879. Lastly, in East-Central Asia, the Chinese Muslim minorities in the south-western and north-western provinces of China proper and the Turkī Muslim peoples of Chinese Turkestan, who had revolted against the Chinese Imperial Government in the middle of the nineteenth century, and had attempted to found independent Muslim states, were crushed after struggles which lasted in the south-west from 1856 to 1872 and in the north-west from 1862 to 1878.

In consequence ‘Abdu’l-Hamīd, though his own dominions had been dwindling fast, found himself, soon after his accession, almost the sole survivor among those Sunnī Powers which in modern times had added the Caliphate to their titles. The only other serious claimants to the title that remained were the Filālī Sharīfs of Morocco, who were still maintaining their independence in the Maghribu’l-Aqsā or Far West of the Islamic World. These Sharīfs had the advantage over ‘Abdu’l-Hamīd in tracing their descent not merely to the Quraysh but to the Prophet himself through Fātimah and ‘Alī ; but Morocco was too isolated and too backward to take the lead in Islamic affairs. As far as the rest of the Sunnī World was concerned ‘Abdu’l-Hamīd was now the only titular Caliph in existence, and merely through becoming unique the title acquired a new value. Meanwhile, a Western publicist, M. C. M. d’Ohsson,

in his *Tableau Général de l'Empire Ottoman* published in 1787, had given currency to a legend that the Ottoman Dynasty had acquired the title of Caliph by a formal act of transfer from the last 'Abbāsid Caliph in Cairo to the Ottoman Conqueror of Egypt, Selim I, in A.D. 1517, and not by an arbitrary act of assumption.¹ This legend, which raised the Ottoman Caliphate to an altogether different plane of legitimacy from the Mughūl Caliphate, does not appear to be supported by any contemporary record ;² and the evidence indicates that, on the contrary, the 'Osmanlīs had assumed the title with as little warrant and as little concern as the Mughūls and their kind. Nevertheless, the legend, once put in circulation, was repeated without verification or effective criticism ;³ and 'Abdu'l-Hamid, as the surviving holder of the title, with an established, though legendary, claim to a legitimacy of which no other claimant could boast, was in a favourable position for exploiting the Ottoman Caliphate to advantage. He had a good opportunity and a strong incentive for doing so.

His opportunity lay not so much among the Muslim populations in the late provinces of his own empire as among the former subjects of his vanished peers, who were now living under non-Muslim rule as 'sheep without a shepherd'. Many of the ex-Ottoman Muslim populations which had passed under Western rule—for example, the Egyptians and the Tunisians—lay in 'the core' of the Islamic World and in close proximity to Western Europe ; and these two circumstances both inclined them to seek salvation by standing on their own feet and developing a local national life of their own on Western lines, rather than by falling back upon the Islamic past and putting their trust in an Ottoman Caliph who had recently failed to save them from passing under Western domination. On the other hand, the ex-subjects of the Mughūls and the other extinct Islamic Powers mostly belonged to the Islamic 'fringe' ; and, as minorities, they

¹ See Sir Thomas Arnold, *op. cit.*, ch. xii : 'Sultan Salīm in Egypt.'

² 'For such information as we have of Mutawakkil's [the last Cairene Caliph's] position during this period we are indebted to an Egyptian scholar Ibn Iyās, who appears to have been well informed and to have been interested in the fate of the 'Abbāsid Caliph. Though he gives many details there is not the slightest indication of such a transfer of his high office' (Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 143). Mr. Ameer Ali contests this negative evidence. In the private letter above quoted he writes : 'Ibn Iyās is most bitter against Selīm, and writes as a propagandist and partisan. D'Ohsson, the Swedish Ambassador, in my opinion is far more reliable, as he had access to the archives of the Ottoman sovereigns.' D'Ohsson, however, does not in fact cite any official document in support of his story, and no such document appears to be known.

³ See Sir Thomas Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-7 and 212.

had little to gain and much to lose by the spread of nationalism into the countries where they lived. If national states were to arise out of the Indian, Russian, and Chinese Empires these would not be Muslim national states but Hindu, Russian, and Chinese. The spread of Nationalism threatened these Muslims with submergence, and, therefore, they were ready to welcome a revival of the Caliphate as an institution which might provide them with a rallying point, and might mobilize in their defence the united forces of the Islamic World. It was noteworthy that the Shi'ī as well as the Sunnī elements in Indian and Russian Islam were attracted by the Hamidian revival. In this matter the psychological demands of the actual situation were more potent than the fundamental doctrines of the Shi'ī faith.

At this time the Indian and Russian Muslims were at just the right range from Constantinople for 'Abdu'l-Hamīd to play upon their feelings with effect. They were sufficiently remote to be unaware of the shoddiness of the Ottoman Empire and of the tyranny which weighed heavily upon the Muslims, as well as the Christians, who had the misfortune to live under the Hamidian Government.¹ At the same time they were sufficiently accessible to acquire a new sense of solidarity and to fall under the glamour of the Ottoman Caliph's prestige. A century earlier the maintenance of continuous relations between the scattered Muslim communities of India and Russia and a Caliph seated at Constantinople would have been physically impossible; but the means had now been provided by

¹ The present writer once heard, from a British resident in Constantinople, of one instance in which this ignorance was cruelly dispelled. His informant had been in commercial relations with an Indian Muslim merchant who was a capable man of business and a loyal subject of the British Indian Government, but who cherished a keen sentimental regret for the lost dominion of Islam in India, and consoled himself with the belief that, in the Ottoman Caliphate, there survived one Islamic Power which was as splendid as the Mughūl Empire and as efficient as the British Rāj. After sustaining his self-respect as a Muslim upon this illusion for many years this Indian merchant saved enough money to make a pilgrimage to the seat of the Caliphate at Constantinople—which meant more to him than the Holy Land of the Hijāz—and there became the guest of his British correspondent. The contrast between his long-cherished dream of the Caliphate and the sordid reality of the Ottoman Empire caused him a distress which it was painful to witness. He was appalled by the vast difference of standard between Muslim Government in *Dāru'l-Islām* and British Government in India; and he went home with his spirit broken. In his case, no doubt, the reaction more than counteracted the original effect of the Hamidian propaganda; but he was, of course, an exception. The number of Indian or Russian Muslims who visited Constantinople in order to verify the facts for themselves was exceedingly small; and these witnesses did not expose themselves to the indignation of their co-religionists by publishing criticisms of the Ottoman Caliphate upon their return to their own countries.

the world-wide extension of modern Western facilities for communication—steamships and railways, telegraphs and newspapers, and business-like methods of organization and propaganda. The invention of the steamship stimulated the sea-borne pilgrim traffic from the Dutch East Indies and British India to Jiddah; while pilgrims from Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the Caucasus were now able to travel on Russian-built railways to Batūm and there take passage on some Russian, British, French or Austrian ship which would carry them—past the windows of the Ottoman Caliph's palace overlooking the Bosphorus and then through the French-built Suez Canal—until they too were landed at Jiddah without having had to perform any part of their journey in the old laborious way. 'Abdu'l-Hamīd himself extended the new facilities by constructing the Hijāz Railway, from Haifa and Damascus to Medina, out of funds mainly raised by voluntary subscriptions throughout the Islamic World. This enterprise served the double purpose of advertising the Ottoman Caliphate and of strengthening the Ottoman Government's strategic position in Syria and Arabia.

'Abdu'l-Hamīd discreetly refrained from pushing his propaganda too far. Had he emphasized the 'temporal' character of the Caliphate Western Governments would have been forced to resist his pretension to be recognized as Caliph by their Muslim subjects. As it was 'Abdu'l-Hamīd neither obtruded nor renounced the political implications of his office; and his masterly ambiguity allowed the Western misconception of the Caliphate to tell in his favour. During the early years of his reign, when relations between Great Britain and Russia were strained by the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 and its diplomatic consequences, the British Indian Government actually encouraged Indian Muslims to accept the Ottoman pretension,¹ in their desire to build up a common front between

¹ 'It was strangely enough England herself who did most to magnify Turkey in the eyes of the Muhammadans of India. For a long time during the nineteenth century it was her policy to bolster up the Ottoman Empire against Russia. . . . That policy culminated in the dispatch of Indian troops as far as Malta in 1878, when the Russian armies were at the gates of Constantinople. . . . It was a gesture that brought Turkey nearer to India than she had ever been before, and nearest of all to the Indian Muhammadans, upon whom Englishmen themselves then took great pains to impress the close community of interests between Turkey and India—often even talking about the British Empire as the greatest Muhammadan Empire in the world, because its population included far more Muhammadans than did Turkey' (Sir Valentine Chirol, *India* [London, 1926, Benn], pp. 217-18). During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 the Ottoman Government, at the British Government's suggestion, dispatched to Afghanistan, via British India, a mission of Ottoman 'ulemā, headed by one of the two qādī-'askers, to impress

Great Britain and Islam against Russia ; and apparently they failed to realize that, however well the Ottoman pretension to the Caliphate might serve their immediate purpose, it was at the same time a challenge to the political authority of the Indian Government itself over the Indian Muslims. 'Abdu'l-Hamīd did, indeed, retort to the new orientation of British policy, which became increasingly unfavourable to Turkey from 1880 onwards, by conducting anti-British propaganda in India ;¹ but he never pushed this to extremes ; and, so long as he remained on the throne, the Indian Muslims were not seriously perplexed by a problem of divided allegiance. Under cross-examination, perhaps, they might have been driven to admit, with some embarrassment, that, as Caliph, 'Abdu'l-Hamīd was not only the official Defender of their Faith but their lawful sovereign in the administration of mundane as well as religious affairs ; but in earlier ages Indian Muslims had been accustomed to a legal fiction by which an 'Abbāsīd Caliph at Baghdad legitimized the *de facto* administration of a local Islamic ruler—a Ghaznawī or a Ghōrī—by investing him with delegated authority.² The relation between the Ottoman Caliphate and the British Rāj could be conceived in the same terms ; and, for the rest, neither the Indian nor the Russian Muslims had any desire at this time to raise an awkward issue.

Both the British and the Russian conquerors had treated their new Muslim subjects well. The British had saved the Indian Muslims from being overwhelmed by the Hindus ; and though they had abolished the Muslim officers of the Islamic Law in 1864³ they continued, in British Indian courts, when the personal statute of Muslims was concerned, to administer the *Shari'ah*. A band of irreconcilable Indian Wahhābīs, who had established themselves in a fastness beyond the North-West Frontier and kept up a Holy War against the British Rāj until after the Indian Mutiny, failed to obtain any widespread support in the Indian Muslim community and was eventually broken up ; and in 1870 British India was explicitly de-
upon the Afghans that Russia was the enemy and Great Britain the friend of Islam. (This fact was told to the writer of the present Survey by a Turkish friend of his whose father had been a member of the mission.)

¹ 'In 1884 the *Peyk-i-Islām*, the Pan-Islamic organ printed for specially Indian consumption at 'Abdu'l-Hamīd's private press at Yıldız Kyōshk by a Panjabi Muhammadan dismissed from the Indian public service, was already found to be in circulation among Indian Muhammadans' (Sir Valentine Chirol in a letter to the writer of the present Survey).

² Compare the investiture of Muhammad b. Tughlaq and Firūz Shāh, in the fourteenth century after Christ, by the Cairene Caliph (Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-5 ; Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, p. 131).

³ See Sir W. W. Hunter: *Our Indian Muslims : Are they bound in conscience to rebel against the Queen ?* (London, 1871, Trübner), p. 136.

clared to be *Dāru'l-Islām* and not *Dāru'l-Harb* in *fatwās* rendered by authoritative Doctors of the Law.¹ As for the Russian Government it had been more liberal than the British Indian Government in leaving the administration of the *Sharī'ah* in Muslim hands and largely under Muslim control; and the Muslim subjects of the Russian Czar in the Caucasus and Central Asia, like the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Pādishāh, had been exempted from compulsory military service on payment of a special tax in commutation.²

Thus, all parties were content to leave the implications of the Ottoman Caliphate obscure, and not least 'Abdu'l-Hamīd himself. As far as his motives can be read from his actions it would appear that his strongest incentive in building up the prestige of his office among the Muslims of 'the fringe' was not an ambition to extend the political authority of the Ottoman Pādishāh, by a gradual encroachment, over Muslim populations which had never previously been under Ottoman rule, but rather to fortify his authority over his own Muslim subjects by securing, through the recognition of his Caliphate, the moral support of Muslims abroad. On the 23rd December, 1876, less than four months after his accession to office, 'Abdu'l-Hamīd had been compelled to promulgate a constitution in which he was styled Caliph (Art. 3) as well as Sultan and Pādishāh, but in which his 'temporal' power was at the same time reduced from autocracy to constitutional monarchy on the lines of the Belgian Constitution of 1831.³ He speedily dismissed the leader of the Young Turkish reformers, Midhat Pasha,⁴ dissolved the first parliament and suspended the constitution; but he always lived in terror of the constitutional movement, and his fears were justified by the event, since, after the successful revolution of 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress compelled him to restore Midhat's constitution on the 23rd July of that year, and his abortive counter-revolu-

¹ See Sir W. W. Hunter, *op. cit.*, for texts of these legal opinions and a critical examination of them.

² For the status of Muslims in the Russian Empire before the Revolution of 1917 see *Die Russische Gesetzgebung über den Islam bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges*, by H. Koch (Berlin, 1918, 'Der Neue Orient' Press). There was compulsory military service for the Muslims of the Volga Basin, who had been Russian subjects since the sixteenth century. In British India, of course, the question of compulsory service did not arise.

³ See E. Pritsch: 'Verfassungsgeschichtliche Entwicklung der Neuen Türkei,' in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen* an der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, Jahrgang xxvi und xxvii, Zweite Abteilung (Berlin, 1924, de Gruyter), p. 165.

⁴ Midhat Pasha was afterwards condemned on a false charge of complicity in the murder of Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz, exiled to Tā'if in the Hījāz, and there made away with.

tion of April 1909 finally cost him his throne. In reviving the Ottoman Caliphate during the intervening years he was deliberately laying up his treasure in an office which concerned not merely Ottoman Muslims but the whole Sunnī world, and which was not susceptible of constitutional limitation without violence to the classical interpretations of the *Sharī'ah*.¹

The Hamidian revival of the Ottoman Caliphate did not save 'Abdu'l-Hamīd himself from eventually losing first his autocratic power and then his throne; but his success in building up the prestige of the Ottoman Caliphate abroad received acknowledgement from the Committee of Union and Progress, though they had most to fear from the reaction of this prestige upon the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire. So highly did they value the revived Ottoman Caliphate as a factor in the Empire's international position that, even after the deposition of 'Abdu'l-Hamīd, they retained the office, in spite of its autocratic implications, among the titles of his constitutional successors. From 1908 to 1918 the Ottoman Empire was ruled by an oligarchic party organization in the name of a puppet Ottoman Caliph, as Egypt had once been ruled in the name of a puppet 'Abbāsīd Caliph by the Mamlūks.

- (c) FROM THE DECLARATION OF A HOLY WAR (*Jihād*) IN THE NAME OF THE OTTOMAN CALIPH ON THE 23RD NOVEMBER, 1914, TO THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW OF THE 1ST NOVEMBER, 1922, IN THE TURKISH GREAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

The value of the revived Ottoman Caliphate as a factor in international affairs was tested by the Great War, which, in Turkey's case, lasted from the end of October 1914 to the signature of the Mudania Armistice on the 11th October, 1922.

On the strength of a *fetvā* rendered by the Ottoman *Sheykhū'l-Islām* a proclamation, signed by the *Sheykhū'l-Islām* himself and by a number of other eminent Ottoman Doctors of the Islamic Law, was promulgated by the Sultan-Caliph on the 23rd November, 1914. In this document² a Holy War (*Jihād*) was declared in the Caliph's name, and the Muslim inhabitants both of territories subject to

¹ The Schoolmen had laid down that the community owed the Caliph the two duties of obedience and assistance—on condition that the Caliph governed in conformity with the *Sharī'ah* and in accordance with the public interest (Al-Māwardī, translated by L. Ostrorog, *ed. cit.*, p. 151).

² For the text (in French translation) see A. Mandelstam: *Le Sort de l'Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1917, Payot), pp. 372-3.

the Entente Powers¹ and of neutral countries² were summoned to take up arms and fight side by side with the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire. This Pan-Islamic appeal had different effects from those which were generally anticipated.

Its immediate and direct effect was negligible. The Great Sanūsī and the Imām of San'ā were the only Muslim rulers who took up arms on the Ottoman side, and their intervention did not affect the outcome of the War. In Arabia the Wahhābī prince 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, the rising star in the Peninsula, repudiated his recently reaffirmed allegiance to the Ottoman Empire and made a treaty with the British Indian Government, which was at that moment invading adjacent Ottoman territory.³ The Amīr Husayn of the Hijāz—who had the advantage of the Ottoman Caliph in being a member of the Quraysh and, indeed, of the Prophet's own family—revolted against the Ottoman Government, with British aid, in the name of Arab Nationalism against Ottoman Imperialism and also in the name of Islam against the impiety of Young Turk Free Masons and free-thinkers. In the British and the Russian armies Muslim volunteers from the Panjab and Muslim conscripts from the Volga Basin fought loyally and valiantly against the Ottoman forces. Under the Mudros Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, the Ottoman Caliph had to resign himself to the loss of the Holy Cities of the Hijāz—the guardianship of which had provided a more solid foundation than the Caliphate for Ottoman prestige in the Islamic World—and to the cession of all his Arab provinces. The assumption of the title of *Malik*, with its implication of sovereign independence, by the Amīr Husayn of the Hijāz in 1916⁴ and by King Fu'ād of Egypt in 1922 was an indication that the Arab peoples had turned their backs on the old ideal of Islamic solidarity and had become converted to a new ideal of separate nationhood.

However, the idea of the Ottoman Caliphate, as revived by 'Abdu'l-Hamīd and exploited by the Committee of Union and Progress, did not cease to exercise its effect after the Armistice of October 1918, which, for Turkey, ended only the first phase of the War. During the next four years the Turkish people, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, and the Indian Muslims all continued to be impelled by it, though in divergent and ultimately conflicting directions.

The effect upon the Turks was negative. Under the shock of over-

¹ The Crimea, Kāzān, Turkestan, Bukhārā, Khwārizm, and India were mentioned by name.

² China, Afghanistan, Persia, and Africa were mentioned by name.

³ See below, pp. 282-3.

⁴ See below, p. 287.

whelming defeat they reacted violently from that ambition to retain Turkish dominion over the non-Turkish Muslims of the Ottoman Empire and to assert Ottoman hegemony over Muslims abroad for which the Ottoman Caliphate partly stood. Following the example of the Arabs they set themselves to save the Turkish national home from partition, and to build up their own Turkish national life ; and this was the paramount concern of the Turkish National Pact of the 28th January, 1920. The Pact laid down, it is true, that 'the security of the City of Constantinople, which is the seat of the Caliphate of Islam, the capital of the Sultanate and the head-quarters of the Ottoman Government, . . . must be protected from every danger' ; but this incidental reference to the Caliphate was the only mention of it in the Pact. On the other hand, the Pact, in its first and most important article, explicitly renounced all Turkish claims to dominion over 'portions of the Ottoman Empire inhabited by an Arab majority' ; and the territories thus renounced contained the Holy Cities of Islam, the guardianship of which was almost essential to the Ottoman Caliph if his prestige in the Islamic World was to be maintained. Thus, though Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and his companions did not at first repudiate the Ottoman Caliphate, it took a subordinate place among the objects of the War which they reopened in 1919 against Greece and the Principal Allied Powers.

The idea of the Ottoman Caliphate had a different effect upon the Sultan-Caliph Mehmed VI Vahīdu'd-Dīn, who had come to the throne on the 3rd July, 1918. The Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, which had brought his capital and his person under the power of the victorious Allies, had released him simultaneously from the power of the Committee of Union and Progress, who had made the Ottoman Dynasty their puppets for the past ten years. The rise of the new Turkish Nationalist Movement in Anatolia threatened to reimpose on the Sultan-Caliph this domestic servitude to his own Turkish subjects from which he was momentarily free, and Mehmed VI—seeing that the Nationalists' resistance to the Greeks in Anatolia was a challenge to the Principal Allied Powers, and believing that the Allies were bound to prevail—threw his influence into the balance against Mustafā Kemāl. In the winter of 1919–20 he allowed his Grand Vizier Dāmād Ferīd Pasha, a convinced opponent of the Nationalists, to organize an irregular force of Circassian *chetehs* in the Sanjāq of Bīghah ; and in the spring of 1920, when these irregulars failed to withstand the Nationalist Army's counter-offensive, the

Constantinople Government obtained a *fatvā* from the *Sheykhū'l-Islām* in which the conduct of the Nationalists was declared to be contrary to religion. The text of this *fatvā*, together with an Imperial rescript and a proclamation by the Ministry to similar effect, was published on the 11th April. These manœuvres of the Sultan-Caliph against the Nationalists had no appreciable effect, but they were a declaration of hostility, and the Nationalists neither forgot nor forgave them.

Meanwhile, the idea of the Ottoman Caliphate was having a different effect again upon the Indian Muslims. In Oriental countries under Western rule the world-wide wave of unrest set in motion by the War took the form of agitation against Western ascendancy ; and the political leaders of the Indian Muslims—or at least those of the younger generation—were carried by this wave of feeling into co-operation with the Hindu Nationalists in an anti-British movement. This was a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the Indian Muslim community. Even after their reawakened sense of solidarity with Muslims abroad had enlisted their sympathies in the cause of Turkey when she was attacked by Italy in 1911 and by the Balkan States in 1912, their political attitude at home had still been governed by a fear that a Hindu ascendancy might be established in India over the Muslim minority ; they had not ceased to look upon the British Indian Government as their bulwark against this danger ; and it was no doubt the persistence of this traditional attitude of mind, as well as a generous and disinterested loyalty aroused by the sudden crisis in the fortunes of the British Empire, which restrained the Indian Muslim community as a whole from following the lead of Mr. Muhammad and Mr. Shawkat 'Alī in the autumn of 1914, when these gentlemen espoused the cause of Turkey not (this time) in a war of defence against other non-Islamic Powers, but in an unprovoked intervention on the side of the British Empire's opponents in a war in which the British Empire was fighting for its existence. It was only gradually, as the unrest generated by the Great War gathered head, that the anti-British movement began to pervade the Indian Muslim community as a whole ; yet even when they found themselves in opposition to the British Rāj, on a common platform with the Hindus, this abnormal situation, created by a passing disturbance which was external to the life of India herself, did not dispel the ' minority complex '—the deep underlying dread of submergence—from the Indian Muslims' minds. They still needed some psychological make-weight against the superior mass and momentum of the

Hindus, even when their relation with the Hindus had temporarily shifted from the footing of rivalry to that of co-operation ; and since they were in a state of alienation from the British Rāj they were driven to seek satisfaction for their psychological need in some force outside the frontiers of the Indian Empire. The Ottoman Caliphate opportunely filled the void ; but at the very moment when the Indian Muslims were turning to the Ottoman Caliphate with a new sincerity and even fervour of feeling the Ottoman Empire was in course of being partitioned in the peace settlement following the Great War.

This aroused keen feeling in the Indian Muslim community in general and not merely among the political leaders of the younger generation—a feeling which in turn gave impetus to the movement of co-operation with the Hindu Nationalists in opposition to the British Rāj. Indian Muslims who had volunteered for service in the Indian army, and had fought against Ottoman troops on Ottoman soil in defence of the British Empire, were distressed to find that their victory was resulting in the break-up of the Ottoman Caliph's dominions and the overthrow of the last surviving Islamic Great Power. They did not realize that the break-up of the Ottoman Empire was not an isolated event but part of a world-wide process, of which other examples were the simultaneous break-up of the Hapsburg Monarchy and the curtailment and transformation of Russia and Germany. Nor did they realize that it had other and deeper causes than the vindictiveness or acquisitiveness of the victorious Allied Governments.¹ They did not understand the phenomenon of Nationalism which was now spreading, with disruptive force, from the West into 'the core' of the Islamic World ; and, had they understood it, they could hardly have sympathized with a movement from which minorities, such as their own community, could derive no benefit and might suffer the gravest detriment. In the eyes of the Indian Muslims the Arab Nationalists were not patriots 'rightly struggling to be free' but traitors to the cause of Islamic solidarity—Muslims who had made common cause with the Caliph's enemies at a time when the duty to assist the Caliph was especially incumbent upon them. The resentment of the Indian Muslims towards the Arab Nationalists was in curious contrast to the attitude of the Turks, who frankly recognized the *fait accompli* of Arab national independence

¹ These considerations were put before the Indian Khilāfat Delegation, with great clarity and force, by Mr. Lloyd George in the interview which he gave them on the 19th March, 1920.

and bore their former subjects no ill will for having successfully asserted against Turkey a right which the Turks themselves were determined to assert against the Allies. The Indian Muslims did support Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and his fellow nationalists in their resistance to the Allies, down to its victorious outcome in the Mudania Armistice; but, here again, the Indian Muslims misconceived—mainly out of ignorance¹ but partly, perhaps, out of unwillingness to face the facts—the cause for which the Turkish Nationalists were fighting. They idealized them as loyal servants of the Caliph of Islam, fighting to rescue their master from a humiliating captivity in the hands of non-Muslim Powers. They thus championed the Sultan-Caliph Mehmed VI and Mustafā Kemāl Pasha with indiscriminate enthusiasm, and did not pause to take stock of their position when the Caliph anathematized the Ghāzī as an enemy of religion, and the Ghāzī denounced the Caliph as a traitor to the Turkish nation.

In the last months of the year 1919 a series of All-India Khilāfat Conferences were organized by the brothers Mr. Shawkat and Mr. Muhammad 'Alī—the two militant leaders of the younger generation of Indian Muslims who had been interned by the Indian Government during the War for sedition,² and who were perhaps themselves inspired less by concern for the Ottoman Caliphate than by hostility towards Great Britain—and it was resolved that an Indian Khilāfat Delegation should proceed to Europe, with the consent of the Viceroy, in order to lay their views before the statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers. The Viceroy received a deputation at Delhi on the 19th January, 1920, and gave his authorization; and the Indian Delegation headed by Mr. Muhammad 'Alī—which sailed for Europe about the time when the quarrel between the Sultan-Caliph and the Turkish Nationalists was coming to an open breach—was received in London by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, on behalf of the Secretary of State

¹ In fairness to the Indian Muslims it must be remarked that the Turkish Nationalists abstained from enlightening their ignorance until the overthrow of the Greeks and the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty had made Turkey indifferent to Indian support. Indeed, even after the breach of 1920, which made the Nationalists resolve in their own minds to depose Mehmed VI and to cut down the powers of his office (as certain of them declared frankly to the writer of this Survey in the summer of 1921), they still professed in public to be champions of the Caliphate. Like the Committee of Union and Progress before them they valued the Caliphate as an instrument of foreign policy. It was not till after the autumn of 1922, when they had experimented in a purely 'spiritual' Caliphate and found it unworkable, that they determined to abolish the Caliphate altogether.

² This sedition had consisted in propaganda among their Indian co-religionists in favour of the Ottoman Empire (see p. 46 above).

for India, on the 2nd March, 1920, and by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, on the 19th.¹ This intervention on the part of the Indian Muslims had little direct effect upon the peace settlement in the Middle East, which was determined by the outcome of the Anatolian War of 1919-22. At the same time the demands which they put forward, the terms in which they formulated them and the grounds which they gave, were of some importance in the history of the Islamic World because these demands crystallized the policy of the Indian Muslim community regarding the Caliphate in a shape which was quite out of harmony with the Turkish National Pact of the 28th January of the same year.

The demands were three in number : first, that the Caliph should retain the custody over the three Holy Cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem ;² second, that he should retain the sovereignty over the whole Jazīratu'l-'Arab (which was defined as including not only the Arabian Peninsula proper but the adjacent Arab countries of 'Irāq, Palestine, and Syria up to the Euphrates, the Tigris, and the Mediterranean) ; third, that he should not suffer any diminution of his dominions as they existed at the outbreak of the Great War.³ The grounds given were as follows : that in Islam the distinction between 'temporal' and 'spiritual' was non-existent ; that the temporal power of the Khilāfat was of the essence of the office ; that the temporal power of the Ottoman Caliph 'had been reduced after the Balkan War to about the minimum with which a Caliph' could 'maintain his dignity and act effectively as Defender of the Faith' ; and that a peace settlement which did not satisfy the conditions necessary for the maintenance of the Caliphate could not be accepted by any Muslim 'without jeopardizing his eternal salvation'.

This is the one governing consideration on which attention must be focused ; and so potent is it that, even if the Ottoman Turks could be made to acquiesce in such a settlement, it would remain as unacceptable as ever to every believing Musulman.⁴

The contradiction between the Indian Muslim and the Turkish

¹ For texts of the address presented to the Viceroy by the deputation of the All-India Khilāfat Conference on the 19th January, 1920, and of the conversations which the Khilāfat Delegation held with Mr. Fisher on the 2nd March and with Mr. Lloyd George on the 19th, see the Indian Khilāfat Delegation publications, Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (privately printed).

² The Shi'i Holy Cities in 'Irāq were sometimes added to the list, but with somewhat less insistence.

³ This was to be without prejudice to the grant of autonomy to the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire within limits compatible with the sovereignty of the Sultan-Caliph.

⁴ Statement to the Viceroy on the 19th January, 1920.

Nationalist points of view was thus complete. The Turks were fighting not for the eternal salvation of their individual souls but for the mundane salvation of their corporate existence as a nation. In order to focus their energies on this paramount object they had expressly renounced Turkish rights over the Arab provinces, containing the Holy Cities, which the Indian Muslims regarded as the essential nucleus for the dominions of the Ottoman Caliph. Finally, so far from fighting in order to restore the Sultan-Caliph's temporal power, they were fighting to establish the sovereign independence of the Turkish nation¹ against all its enemies—among whom the Sultan-Caliph Mehmed VI now figured side by side with the Greeks and the Principal Allied Powers.

After their victory in the Anatolian War the Turkish Nationalists lost no time in settling accounts with the enemy in Constantinople. The blow was precipitated by the action of the Principal Allied Powers, who, on the 27th October, 1922, addressed an invitation for the forthcoming Lausanne Conference to the Sublime Porte as well as to Angora. The Great National Assembly protested against this on the 30th October, and was not placated when the Constantinople Government, conscious of being *in articulo mortis*, made timid overtures to Angora with a view to concerted action. On the 1st November the Assembly voted the following law : ²

Whereas the Turkish people has decided in the Constitutional Law³ that its rights of sovereignty and rulership are incorporated in and exercised by the juridical personality of the Turkish Great National Assembly, which is its true incorporation—and this in such a manner that those rights can be neither abandoned, divided, nor transferred—and has further decided that it recognizes no power and no body which is not based upon the National Will, the Turkish people recognizes no form of government except the Government of the Turkish Great National Assembly within the limits of the National Pact.

Accordingly, the Turkish people regards the form of government at Constantinople, which is based upon the personal sovereignty of an individual, as having passed into the domain of history [i. e. out of the domain of present existence] as from the 16th March, 1920,⁴ in perpetuity.

¹ 'Sovereignty (*hâkimîyet*) resides in the Nation without limitations and without conditions' (Art. 1 of the Constitutional Law passed by the Great National Assembly at Angora on the 20th January, 1921).

² Text in Pritsch, *op. cit.*, p. 185. For a *résumé* of the proceedings in the Great National Assembly on the 30th October and the 1st November, 1922, see *Etablissement de la Souveraineté Nationale*, publication de l'Agence d'Anatolie (Constantinople, 1922, Fratelli Haim). A French translation of Mustafâ Kemâl Pasha's speech in this debate was published as a pamphlet by the Press Bureau of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne (Imprimerie Henri Held, 1922).

³ i. e. the law voted by the Great National Assembly on the 20th January, 1921 (quoted in foot-note 1 above).

⁴ The date on which the Allied Powers had formally occupied Constanti-

The Caliphate resides in the Dynasty of the House of 'Osmān. The member of the Dynasty who is best qualified in character and knowledge is elected Caliph by the Turkish Great National Assembly. The Turkish state is the foundation on which the Caliphate is based.

On the 4th November the administration of Constantinople was taken over, in the name of the Great National Assembly, by Re'fet Pasha ;¹ and the Ottoman Government and all its organs ceased to exist. On the 17th November the ex-Sultan-Caliph, Mehmed Vahidu'd-Dīn, sought asylum on board the British battleship *Malaya*. On the 20th he arrived at Malta as the guest of the British Government and proceeded thence to Mecca as the guest of King Husayn.² The Commissary (*Vekīl*) for the *Sherī'eh* in the Government of the Great National Assembly rendered a *fatvā* to the effect that Vahidu'd-Dīn Efendī³ had forfeited the office of Caliph, and that a declaration of allegiance (*bay'ah*) to some other person was necessary. On the 18th November, 1922, the Assembly voted unanimously that this *fatvā* rendered the Caliphate vacant without further action on their part, and at the same sitting they elected as Caliph 'Abdu'l-Mejīd Efendī, the second son of Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz, who had been deposed in 1876.⁴

(d) FROM THE ELECTION OF 'ABDU'L-MEJĪD EFENDĪ TO THE OTTOMAN CALIPHATE BY THE TURKISH GREAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THE 18TH NOVEMBER, 1922, TO THE ABOLITION OF THE OTTOMAN CALIPHATE UNDER THE LAW OF THE 3RD MARCH, 1924.

On the 19th November, 1922, 'Abdu'l-Mejīd Efendī was informed of his election to the Caliphate by the President of the Turkish

nople. Simultaneously, a number of leading Nationalists in the city had been arrested by the British military authorities and interned in Malta. On the 6th April Sultan Mehmed VI had dismissed the semi-Nationalist 'Alī Rizā Cabinet and had recalled to office the anti-Nationalist Dāmād Ferīd Pasha. On the 12th April he had formally dissolved the Ottoman Parliament. The Great National Assembly had been inaugurated at Angora on the 23rd April. Its nucleus had consisted of 80 Nationalist deputies from the late Ottoman Parliament who had escaped arrest and internment.

¹ Re'fet Pasha had arrived in Constantinople on the 19th October, 1922, as Governor of Eastern Thrace on the Great National Assembly's behalf.

² *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 409 and 467.

³ The title Efendī (derived from the Greek *αἰθέρης*) had originally been a mark of distinction which had gradually sunk, in popular usage, to the level of the English 'Mr.' ('Bey' being equivalent to 'Esquire'). Its original usage, however, had survived in the Ottoman Royal Family as applied to members who had not ascended the throne (cf. the special meaning of 'Monsieur' in the French Royal Family). After his deposition Sultan Vahidu'd-Dīn once more became 'Efendī' in this sense (cf. 'Louis Capet').

⁴ For the text of the *fatvā* and the proceedings at this sitting of the Assembly see *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 404-5.

Great National Assembly, Mustafā Kemāl Pasha ;¹ and on the 24th His Majesty the new Caliph was invested and received the declaration of allegiance (*bay'ah*) in Constantinople with the traditional ceremonial.² On the same day he issued a proclamation to the Islamic World.³

The news of these revolutionary proceedings in Turkey was received in other Islamic countries with considerable surprise and some disquietude, but with general acquiescence ;⁴ and the counter-proclamation which the deposed Vahidu'd-Dīn Efendī launched from Mecca⁵ met with little or no response. Vahidu'd-Dīn Efendī maintained that the abstraction of the Caliphate from the Sultanate or temporal power was contrary to the *Sharī'ah*, 'as all the 'Ulamā are aware'. He denied that the question of the Caliphate could be settled by 'a band of individuals of doubtful religious beliefs and national sentiments', or again by five or six million Turks acting under constraint or ignorance. 'The question of the Caliphate touches the rights of three hundred million Muslims.' These propositions were theoretically unanswerable ; and pious Muslims were themselves embarrassed by their desire not to embarrass the Turkish Government and at the same time not to become parties to a possible violation of the Islamic Law. The *fait accompli*, however, once again proved itself potent in Islamic affairs. After all Ottoman Caliphs had been unmade and made by revolution many times before ; and in the early Caliphate new dynasties had been imposed on the Islamic community by the Army of Syria or the Army of Khurāsān. The Great National Assembly at Angora had as good a claim to represent the 'Loosers and Binders' (*Arbābu'l-Hallī wa'l-'Aqd*) in the Islamic community of the day as those early Caliph-makers. Were not the Turkish Nationalists *ghāzīs*, who had just brought to a victorious end their heroic struggle in the common Islamic cause against a world of non-Muslim enemies ? The men of Angora had proved in action

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 405.

² For details see *op. cit.*, pp. 406-8. The only innovation appears to have been that the *Khutbah* (a sermon constructed round a bidding prayer, preached only on Fridays, except in Bayrām) was recited in Turkish instead of Arabic. The preacher took as his principal text the traditional saying of the Prophet, 'We have turned from the lesser Holy War to the Greater,' and interpreted the Greater War as a campaign against ignorance. He cited another tradition of the Prophet as an incentive to the Turkish people to concentrate their energies on economic reconstruction and development.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 466-7.

⁴ For a survey of the reaction among Muslims outside Turkey see *op. cit.*, pp. 662-6.

⁵ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 702-5. While publishing this proclamation Vahidu'd-Dīn Efendī congratulated 'Abdu'l-Mejīd on his appointment in a private letter.

that they were a military and political force in international affairs ; and in achieving this they had satisfied the desire—which had underlain the championship of the Ottoman Caliphate by Muslims abroad—that at least one sovereign independent Islamic Government should survive as a Power in the modern world. The internal constitution of a Government which fulfilled this desire was a secondary consideration. The Turkish Great National Assembly had arrogated to itself the sovereignty in the Turkish state, but at the same time it had elected a Caliph with the traditional forms. The Turks might hold that, as far as Turkey was concerned, the new Caliph was not invested with temporal power ; but the Turkish constitution was a matter of internal politics which had no binding force for the rest of the Islamic World. So long as a Caliph existed other Muslims were at liberty to interpret his powers in conformity with the *Sharī'ah*.

Accordingly, the *'ulamā* of the Azhar University-Mosque at Cairo declared their allegiance (*bay'ah*)¹ to 'Abdu'l-Mejīd in the first days of December 1922 ; and the example of the Alma Mater of Islamic learning was followed almost unanimously by the *'ulamā* of Egypt. Deputations conveying similar declarations of allegiance from the Muslims of Jugoslavia, Rumania, and the Crimea were received by the new Caliph in Constantinople in April and November 1923 and January 1924 respectively.² On the other hand, the Albanian Muslims seized the opportunity to break away from the Ottoman Caliphate ; and, at a congress held at Tirana in the spring of 1923, they appear not only to have reorganized their community on an independent national basis but to have introduced revolutionary changes in ritual and social custom.³ The Moroccan Muslims, who had never recognized the Ottoman Caliph, remained unaffected, as was pointed out by a member of the Filāli Sharifian Dynasty in an interview with a Cairo newspaper.⁴ The Chinese Muslims, at the

¹ Text of their declaration in *op. cit.*, p. 464.

² *Op. cit.*, II, p. 705 ; III, 7, p. 409 ; IV, 2, pp. 84-5.

³ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 706 ; III, 2, p. 78 ; IV, 7, pp. 403-4. It may be noted that the Albanian adherents of the Orthodox Christian Faith likewise severed their connexion with the Oecumenical Patriarchate at Constantinople and set up an autocephalous Albanian Church. This step, however, was not out of harmony with the Orthodox Christian tradition, which had always envisaged Orthodox Christian society as a comity of sovereign independent states each possessing an autocephalous Church of its own. The parallel step taken by the Albanian Muslims was more revolutionary, because it was a breach with the Islamic tradition that unity of Faith involved unity of Government.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 670. The Moroccan Sharifs appear to have assumed the Caliphate in A. D. 1529 (see an article on 'The Ottoman Caliphate' in *The Times*, 5th March, 1924).

opposite extremity of the Islamic World, sent congratulations to Mustafā Kemāl Pasha on his victory over the Greeks¹ but appear to have taken no action in regard to the Caliphate question. The Muslims of the Hijāz, 'Irāq, Transjordan, and Palestine, who at this time were either the subjects of Hāshimī princes or were attached by ties of sentiment to the Hāshimī cause, seem for the most part to have taken their cue from King Husayn, who withheld recognition of 'Abdu'l-Mejīd Efendī and gave asylum to Vahidu'd-Dīn Efendī without, at this stage, claiming the Caliphate for himself.² In India the All-India Khilāfat Conference and the Association of Doctors of the Law (*Jam'iyatu'l-'Ulamā*) held a joint congress at Gaya on the 24th-27th December, 1922,³ at which they passed a resolution declaring their confidence in Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and in the Turkish Great National Assembly, and approving the action of the Assembly in treating Vahidu'd-Dīn Efendī as having forfeited office and in electing 'Abdu'l-Mejīd Efendī in his stead. The withholding of temporal power from the new Caliph was passed over in silence ; but the Indian Congress significantly prayed the Turkish Assembly 'to maintain intact the power and prestige of the Caliph as prescribed by the *Sharī'ah*', and not to take definite decisions regarding the status of the Caliphate without taking into consultation the whole Islamic World.⁴

Under the phrases of this resolution the Indian Muslims failed to cover the embarrassment into which they had been thrown by the Turkish Law of the 1st November, 1922 ; but the situation created by that law proved even more embarrassing to its authors. The law had been drafted at Angora by men more familiar with modern Western ideas than with Islamic tradition ; and they had drafted it on the strength of the erroneous Western interpretation of the Caliphate as a 'spiritual' power.

Selim I [declared Mustafā Kemāl Pasha (following M. d'Ohsson) in his speech in the Assembly on the 30th October, 1922] judged it a dis-

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 582, and III, 7, p. 403.

² The Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine appear to have sent an emissary to Constantinople to ask 'Abdu'l-Mejīd to issue an appeal to the Islamic World for funds for the restoration of the Mosque of Al-Aqsā at Jerusalem. This request implied a tacit recognition of 'Abdu'l-Mejīd's title to the Caliphate. The Turkish Government, however, did not permit him to take the action requested, and the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine, in a letter addressed to the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh b. Husayn of Transjordan (*op. cit.*, IV, 2, p. 167), appear afterwards to have denied that they had accorded 'Abdu'l-Mejīd recognition.

³ The Indian National Congress met at Gaya simultaneously.

⁴ On the Gaya Congress see *op. cit.*, II, pp. 408-9, 466, 494-5, 519-20 ; III, 7, p. 408.

honour to Islam that the throne of the Caliphate should be occupied by a person without authority, and he therefore attributed to himself the religious power, supported by the might of the Ottoman Empire. . . .

One may ask, What becomes of the Caliphate when the temporal power is taken away from it? We have seen that at Baghdad, during the Caliphate of the 'Abbāsids, and later in Egypt, the spiritual and temporal power existed separately side by side. It is perfectly natural that to-day the national sovereignty and the power of the Caliph should be capable of being exercised side by side, without being united in one and the same person. The only difference is that at Baghdad and in Egypt the sovereign was an individual, whereas in Turkey, to-day, the sovereign is the nation. . . .¹

In adducing these supposed Islamic precedents in favour of the new Turkish Law Mustafā Kemāl Pasha had fallen into the error of conceiving as 'Pope' and 'Holy Roman Emperor' two parties whose real relation was that of 'King Log' and 'King Stork'; and his mistake was turned to account against him. Mustafā Sabrī Efendī, an Ottoman ex-*Sheykh* *u'l-Islām*, now living in Egypt as a political refugee, was not slow to point out publicly that 'the two offices [of Caliph and Sultan] are united and inseparable, both in content and in form, in the very nature of Islamic administration', and to draw the conclusion that, in taking the political power away from the Caliphate, 'The Turkish Government, as a Government, has committed apostasy from its religion.'² In January 1923 Shukrī Efendī, at that time deputy for Qārah Hisār in the Turkish Great National Assembly, published a dissertation on the Caliphate, in which he explained that the Caliphate was not analogous to the Papacy but was a species of Government whose function was to secure the execution of the *Sherī'eh* in every department of human affairs with which the *Sherī'eh* was concerned.³ The Defence of Rights Group appointed a committee to investigate Shukrī Efendī's thesis;⁴ the Procurator-General requested the Assembly (though without success) to suspend Shukrī Efendī's parliamentary immunity with a view to his prosecution. Meanwhile, neither the committee nor the Group nor the Assembly nor its President nor the unfortunate Caliph 'Abdu'l-Mejīd himself ever succeeded in finding a satisfactory answer to the question formulated by Mustafā Kemāl Pasha—'What becomes of the Caliphate when the temporal power has been

¹ Text quoted from *ed. cit.* For a speech of the 19th January, 1923, in which Mustafā Kemāl Pasha again discussed the Caliphate see *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 521.

² *Précis* of Mustafā Sabrī Efendī's statement in *op. cit.*, pp. 465–6.

³ *Précis* of Shukrī Efendī's dissertation in *op. cit.*, pp. 585–8.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 518.

taken away from it?' The true alternatives had been stated by Sabrī and Shukrī Efendīs: the Caliphate was either a temporal power or it was nothing at all; and the more extreme revolutionaries had wished all along to act on the second of these hypotheses. In the original draft of the Law of the 1st November, 1922, as moved by Dr. Rizā Nūr Bey, it had been laid down that 'the Turkish Government will rescue the Caliphate, which lawfully belongs to it, from the hands of the foreigners to whom it has fallen captive'—a phrase which hinted at the investment of the Caliphate, as well as the sovereignty of the Turkish State, in the Assembly. The tension became so serious that in April 1923 the Assembly was driven to the desperate expedient of resolving—though not without lively opposition—that any criticism of or opposition to the Law of the 1st of November, 1922, should thenceforth be treated as High Treason.

On the 29th October, 1923, the Assembly passed a law¹ not only reaffirming that the sovereignty in the state belonged absolutely and unconditionally to the nation but proclaiming Turkey a republic (*jumhūrīyet*). The law incidentally declared that the religion of the Turkish State was Islam (a declaration which, on Shukrī Efendī's showing, was incompatible with the Law of the 1st November, 1922); but it went on to lay down that the chief of the state (*devletin re'is-i*) was the President of the Turkish Republic; and at the same sitting the Assembly elected, as first President of the Republic, Mustafā Kemāl Pasha. Thenceforth, the status of 'Abdu'l-Mejīd as Caliph according to the *Sherī'eh*—which Mustafā Kemāl could neither re-interpret nor put out of court—was incompatible, not only with the Law of the 1st November, 1922, but with Mustafā Kemāl Pasha's personal position under the law of the 29th October, 1923. It was therefore almost inevitable that, however loyal and correct the attitude of the Caliph towards the President might be, his office should be taken as a rallying point by the political opposition in Turkey—an opposition which was growing in numbers and in liveliness with every fresh revolutionary change in the constitution, and with each successive advance along the road towards dictatorship on the part of Mustafā Kemāl Pasha. This being so the days of the Ottoman Caliphate were numbered.

The thunderbolt was called down upon 'Abdu'l-Mejīd's unoffending head by the well-meaning intervention of two distinguished Indian Muslims of the older generation: His Highness the Agha Khan, who was the hereditary head of the Ismā'īlī 'Seven Imām'

¹ Text in Pritsch, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

branch of the Shī'īs (known to the Crusaders as the Assassins), and the Right Honourable Sayyid Ameer Ali, a member of his Britannic Majesty's Privy Council and a Judge of the High Court of Appeal.¹ These two gentlemen had courageously taken on their shoulders the burden of championing in Great Britain the Turkish Nationalist cause during the Anatolian War of 1919–22, when Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and his companions had been fighting for their existence; and they had publicly defended this championship (which certain sections of British public opinion had been inclined to resent) on the ground that, Turkey being the seat of the Caliphate, her fate was a matter of concern to the rest of the Islamic World. Having persevered in this ungrateful task they presumably felt that they had the right, if not the duty, to take up this same question of the Caliphate—now in danger from an unexpected quarter—with the Turkish Nationalists themselves. The lack of contact, however, between Indian Muslims and Turkish Nationalists was apparently still so extreme—even after the restoration of peace at Lausanne—that the Turks were unaware of the services which these two Indian leaders had rendered them in the recent past, while the Agha Khan and Mr. Ameer Ali, on their side, were equally unaware that, at this moment, any action, however legitimate in itself, which might be taken in regard to the Ottoman Caliphate by Muslims outside Turkey, could not fail to have a violent repercussion upon Turkish internal politics.

The action which the Agha Khan and Mr. Ameer Ali took was to address themselves to 'Ismet Pasha, the then Prime Minister of Turkey, in a letter² inviting attention 'to the very disturbing effects [which] the present uncertain position of the Caliph-Imām is exercising among the vast populations who belong to the Sunnī communion', and respectfully urging 'the imminent necessity for maintaining the religious and moral solidarity of Islam by placing the Caliph-Imamate on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations'. The letter, like other documents from the hand of its authors,³ was couched in moderate and con-

¹ It was noteworthy that Mr. Ameer Ali as well as the Agha Khan was a Shī'ī. This was a striking demonstration that the revived sentiment for the Caliphate was not a mere reflowering of the old Sunnī doctrine, but was a new psychological phenomenon, produced by the new relation of Islam to the West, and as such was prone to appear among Muslims of all denominations.

² The text of this letter, which was dated the 24th November, 1923, is reprinted from *The Times* of the 14th December, 1923, in the Appendix to the present volume.

³ See, for example, the message which the Agha Khan telegraphed to the Muslim World from Lausanne upon the signature of the peace treaty between

ciliatory terms ; but, by an unfortunate blunder, duplicates were dispatched simultaneously to the leading organs of the Turkish press in Constantinople—most of which happened at the time to be in opposition to the Government at Angora—without any intimation that the document was not an open letter. The editors promptly published the document in all good faith ; and ‘Ismet Pasha read the letter in the press before he had taken cognizance of the original.’¹

The misunderstanding was complete. On a motion from ‘Ismet Pasha himself the Assembly decided, in a secret sitting on the 8th December, 1923, to institute a special ‘Tribunal of Independence’ ;² and before this court there were brought to trial not only the editors of three offending newspapers—Huseyn Jāhyd Bey of the *Tanīn*, Velid Bey Ebū’z-Ziyā of the *Tevhīd-i-Efkyār*, and Ahmed Jevdet Bey of the *Iqdām*—but also Ekrem Bey, the Caliph’s adjutant, and Lutfi Fikrī Bey, the President of the Constantinople Bar Association, who had written articles in the press arguing that the Caliphate could not exist without some measure of temporal power. Lutfi Fikrī Bey was condemned on the 27th December to seven years’ imprisonment ; but the three editors were acquitted on the 2nd January, 1924, and their acquittal was received in Constantinople with popular demonstrations of satisfaction which were an indirect censure upon official policy at Angora.³ Meanwhile, ‘Ismet Pasha had given vent to his exasperation against the authors of the letter in a harshly worded statement to a special correspondent of *The Times* at Angora,⁴ in Turkey and the Allies (*The Times*, 28th July, 1923). He pointed out that this was the first treaty signed by a Muslim nation on a footing of complete equality with the Great Powers of the West ; that ‘the historic Caliphate of Constantinople’ was preserved ; and that the Turks were now desirous of living on good terms with Great Britain and France. On these grounds he urged his co-religionists to give up the struggle [against the Western Powers] on behalf of the Caliphate—a struggle which had no longer any significance—and to concentrate their efforts upon assisting in the reconstruction of Turkey by philanthropic work for the care of orphans and the improvement of hygienic conditions.

¹ The original appears to have reached the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at Angora not later than the duplicates arrived at the newspaper offices in Constantinople ; but since the letter was written in English it was sent to the competent department of the Commissariat for translation and in a Government office the process took longer than in newspaper offices. Thus the newspapers had published their Turkish versions before the official translation was laid on ‘Ismet Pasha’s table.

² *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 1, p. 23.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 24–5.

⁴ See *The Times*, 29th December, 1923, for the text of this statement. The special correspondent of *The Times* gave an illuminating account of the state of feeling in Constantinople and the effect of the Agha Khan and Mr. Ameer Ali’s letter upon Turkish internal politics.

which he denied both their competence, as foreigners, to discuss the constitution of Turkey and their competence, as Shī'īs, to discuss an institution of the Sunnī community.¹ Their offence was magnified in Turkish eyes by the fact that they had written the letter in English; and it was actually insinuated at Angora²—though not officially—that they had acted at the instigation of the British Government, which was credited with the desire to see the Turkish Republic overthrown and the Ottoman Dynasty restored to power.³ This insinuation—which betrayed the utter ignorance of the Turks regarding the relations between the British Government and the authors of the letter, in the matter of the Caliphate, during the past five years—seemed ludicrous to detached observers; but it was naturally painful to the Agha Khan and Mr. Ameer Ali themselves, who felt that they had been treated with gross discourtesy and ingratitude.⁴

A last attempt to save the Ottoman Caliphate was made by the Indian *Jam'iyatu'l-'Ulamā*, who, on the 1st January, 1924, passed a resolution⁵ declaring their confidence in Angora, but at the same time expressing the hope that the status of the Caliphate might be referred for settlement to an international congress of Doctors of the Islamic Law. The idea of a congress had been canvassed already in November 1923 in the Constantinople Press;⁶ and there was a rumour that it was being taken up by the Soviet Government;⁷

¹ The only point on which the Agha Khan, Mr. Ameer Ali, and 'Ismet Pasha agreed was in discussing the Caliphate in terms of 'spiritual' power. The authors of the letter asserted that 'in the Sunni communion . . . the spiritual headship forms the link which binds the followers of Islam in a vast congregation', and pleaded that 'the Caliph's position and dignity should not, in any event, be less than that of the Pontiff of the Church of Rome'. 'Ismet Pasha retorted by citing the Turkish Law of the 1st November, 1922.

² *The Times*, loc. cit.

³ The policy which the British Government had pursued from the Armistice of Mudros to the Armistice of Mudania had created at the time a widespread impression among the Turks that Great Britain was implacably hostile to Turkey. Since the Mudania Armistice this impression had been more or less effaced, and it had been the policy of the Turkish Government to maintain courteous relations with the British Government and its representatives. 'Ismet Pasha's assumption of British hostility on this occasion had no foundation in existing facts; and, had he been better informed, he must have realized the absurdity of seeing the 'hidden hand' of the British Government behind the action taken by the Agha Khan and Mr. Ameer Ali. His error of judgment may be accounted for in part by his undoubted nervousness regarding the internal situation in Turkey.

⁴ See letters published in *The Times* from Mr. Ameer Ali on the 14th December, 1923, and from the Agha Khan on the 17th.

⁵ *The Times*, 2nd January, 1924.

⁶ *Oriente Moderno*, III, 7, pp. 408-12.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, IV, 2, p. 84, quoting the Armenian Journal *Verchin Lur* of Constantinople, 29th January, 1924.

but no effective action could be taken by Muslims abroad before the Gordian Knot was cut by the Turkish Great National Assembly.¹

On the 25th February, 1924, Shukrī Bey (députy for Smyrna) raised in the Assembly the general question of separating politics from religion. On the 27th Vāsyf Bey (deputy for Sārūkhān) moved, in a debate on the Budget, that the Caliphate should be abolished, the ecclesiastical schools (*medresehs*) be closed, and the *Vekīl* for the *Sherī'eh* and *Evgāf* (Pious Foundations), as well as the Chief of the General Staff, be excluded from the Cabinet.² On the 1st March Mustafā Kemāl Pasha supported Vāsyf Bey's proposals in the Assembly in general terms.³ On the 2nd March the proposals, including that for the abolition of the Caliphate, were endorsed at a meeting of the People's Party (as Mustafā Kemāl Pasha's Party for the Defence of National Rights was now called).⁴ On the 3rd March the proposals were adopted—though again not without a lively debate—in the Great National Assembly,⁵ in the form of three somewhat hastily drafted laws: the first concerning the abolition of the two Commissariats for the *Sherī'eh* and *Evgāf* and for the General Staff, the second concerning the unification of educational systems, the third concerning the abolition of the Caliphate and the banishment of the members of the Ottoman Imperial Family from the territories of the Republic of Turkey. The texts of these laws are reprinted in the appendix to the present volume,⁶ and the first and second are dealt with in the following section. The third, concerning the abolition of the Caliphate, was executed forthwith.

'Abdu'l-Mejīd Efendī, who had held his last *Selāmlyq* on the 29th February,⁷ received an official communication of the Law of the 3rd March on the day of its passage in the Assembly, and an order to leave Turkish territory immediately (notwithstanding the ten days' grace accorded in Article 3 of the Law) during the night of the 3rd–4th.⁸ At dawn on the 4th he left Constantinople with a son, a

¹ For a diary of events in Constantinople from the 26th February to the 6th March, 1924, by a member of the staff of *Oriente Moderno*, Dr. E. Rossi, who happened to be on the spot, see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, pp. 169–74.

² For Vāsyf Bey's speech see Rossi, *loc. cit.*, and *The Times*, 29th February, 1924.

³ *Précis* of his speech in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, pp. 168–9.

⁴ See Rossi, *loc. cit.*, for speeches on this occasion.

⁵ *The Times*, 4th March, 1924.

⁶ For the official texts in the original Turkish, from which the English translations in the Appendix to the present volume are taken, see *Qawānīn Mejmū'asī*, 1924/1340 (printed at Angora by the press of the Great National Assembly of Turkey), Nos. 429, 430, 431.

⁷ For a description of this last performance of an historic ceremony see Rossi, *loc. cit.*, and *The Times*, 1st March, 1924.

⁸ Rossi, *loc. cit.*; *The Times*, 5th March, 1924.

daughter, and two wives,¹ and arrived at Territet in Switzerland on the 7th.² On the 11th he followed the example of his predecessor Vahîdû'd-Dîn Efendî by publishing an appeal to the Islamic World,³ in which he argued that the Turkish Great National Assembly had exceeded and thereby abdicated its powers; drew the conclusion that the Islamic World had automatically become seized of the question of the Caliphate, with plenary power to settle it; and announced his intention of convening an Islamic Congress for this purpose. The only immediate effect of 'Abdu'l-Mejîd Efendî's appeal was to elicit a protest from the Swiss Federal Government, who considered his action a breach of the understanding on which they had granted him asylum on Swiss territory.⁴ 'Abdu'l-Mejîd Efendî was a victim of circumstances. During the Allied Occupation of Constantinople he had had the moral courage not to conceal his disapproval of his cousin Mehmed VI's policy and his sympathy with the Turkish Nationalists; since his election to the Ottoman Caliphate under the conditions of the Law of the 1st November, 1922, he had shown unfailing loyalty and tact in attempting to play the impossible role that had been assigned to him; and he had endured with dignity his deposition and expulsion, which he had done nothing to deserve, and which the Turkish Government did nothing to mitigate. Personally he passed into obscurity;⁵ but his proposal for a Caliphate Congress, which was already in the air, was destined to materialize.

It remains to review the effect of the Turkish Law of the 3rd March, 1924, upon the Islamic World.⁶ In Turkey itself the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate and the expulsion of 'Abdu'l-Mejîd Efendî and the other surviving members of the Imperial Family was received with at least outward indifference;⁷ and there was no disturbance

¹ *The Times*, 6th March, 1924.

² *Ibid.*, 8th March, and *Le Temps*, 10th March, 1924.

³ Text in *Le Temps*, 13th March, 1924, and in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, p. 177, reproducing the Rome *Giornale d'Italia* of the 13th March.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, p. 210; cf. *Le Temps*, 14th March, 1924.

⁵ He accepted, as from the 1st July, 1924, a pension of £300 sterling a month from the Nizam of Hyderabad (*The Times*, 23rd June and 14th July, 1924). The Law of the 3rd March, 1924, had deprived the Ottoman Imperial Family of a considerable part of their private property, as well as the property of the Crown (Arts. 8, 9, 10), and had forbidden them to own real property in Turkey (Arts. 5 and 7). It had provided (Art. 6) for the payment of lump sums to cover the cost of the journeys of the entire Imperial Family (all members of which were condemned to go into exile, with the Caliph, under Art. 3). The Turkish Government, however, had afterwards declined to make any payment under this head, in view of 'Abdu'l-Mejîd Efendî's proclamation of the 11th March, 1924 (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, p. 244).

⁶ See the admirable survey of this in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, pp. 211-42.

⁷ President Mustafâ Kemâl had prepared the ground by announcing in

when the name of the Caliph was replaced in the *Khutbah* by that of the Government of the Republic.¹ If the Turks cared little about the Ottoman Caliphate itself, they cared still less about the effect which the abolition of it might produce among Muslims abroad. This was frankly stated in their press;² and the consideration at the back of their minds was expressed on the 3rd March, during the debate in the Assembly, by 'Ismet Pasha.

If the Muslims have made demonstrations of friendship towards us Turks, the true explanation of this is not that the Caliphate was in our hands but that we were known to be strong.³

Indeed, in the matter of the Caliphate, the Turks showed themselves less sensitive to Islamic opinion than to criticism from their friends in Western countries.⁴

Among the non-Turkish Muslims the regret and resentment aroused by the Turkish Law of the 3rd March, 1924, appear to have been greatest in India. The Indian Muslims had made the best of the Law of the 1st November, 1922, as has been recorded above; but this time the divergence between the Turkish and the Indian standpoints was too great to be either bridged or ignored, and the Indian Muslims were incensed with the Turkish Nationalists for two distinct reasons. The Turks had not only overthrown an Islamic institution by which the Indians genuinely set great store; but they had also stultified the whole Indian Khilāfat Movement of the past five years and had made the leaders of that movement a laughing-stock. The Turkish Law of the 3rd March, 1924, delivered the *coup de grâce* to the All-India Khilāfat Conference controlled by Mr. Muhammad and Mr. Shawkat 'Ali, which had long been unpalatable to the older and more conservative elements in the Indian Muslim community on account of its militancy, and which had latterly been labouring under serious accusations respecting the alleged misappropriation of funds raised by public subscription. At the same time the news caused distress to Indian Muslims of all complexions.

At the annual meeting of the Khilāfat Conference—which had been held in December 1923 at Concanada simultaneously with the

advance, to a conference of journalists at Smyrna, the intention to abolish the Caliphate, and exhorting them not to treat it as a controversial issue.

¹ See *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, p. 176; *The Times*, 10th March, 1924.

² *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, p. 220.

³ *Op. cit.*, IV, 3, p. 174, quoting *Verchin Lur* of Constantinople, 4th March, 1924.

⁴ See, for example, an elaborate reply in the Constantinople *Aqshām* of the 14th March, 1924 (reproduced in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, pp. 242-4), to articles in the French press by M. Claude Farrère.

meeting of the Indian National Congress at the same place—it had been decided to send to Turkey a deputation including Mr. Muhammad ‘Alī and two Hindu delegates;¹ but their departure had been forestalled by the action of the Turkish Assembly, and the Government of India afterwards declined to issue passports to several of their number.² Before the month was out the All-India Muslim League—an older association which the Khilāfat Conference had pushed into the background—was revived, and an attempt by the militants to take control of it was successfully resisted. It was decided to hold a full meeting of the League at Lahore in June.³ The general sense of the Indian Muslim community declared itself in favour of an Islamic Caliphate Congress⁴—the suggestion which had been ventilated by ‘Abdu’l-Mejīd and which had since been taken up in Egypt in authoritative quarters⁵—though this line of procedure was not welcomed by the militant wing.⁶ Both wings, however, were deeply estranged from the Turks;⁷ and this estrangement was not diminished by an exchange of telegrams between the Khilāfat Conference and *Jam‘iyatu’l-‘Ulamā* in India and Mustafā Kemāl.⁸ The Indian militants turned their eyes from Angora towards Riyād and looked to the hyper-orthodox Wahhābī ruler ‘Abdu’l-‘Azīz. Sa‘ūd to act as the sword of Islam in place of the sacrilegious President of the Turkish Republic.⁹ The moderate majority of the Indian Muslims showed signs of reverting to their traditional policy of concentrating their attention upon their own position at home and seeking support in the British connexion.

If the Muslim community in India were confounded by the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, their *bête noire* King Husayn

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, p. 150.

² *The Times*, 26th March, 1924.

³ *Ibid.*, 18th March, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 5th and 7th March, 1924.

⁵ For the genesis and history of the Cairo Caliphate Congress see subsection (f) below.

⁶ See, for example, the text of a joint telegram dispatched to *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo on the 27th March, 1924, by Mr. Shawkat ‘Alī, as president of the Khilāfat Conference, and by Mr. Kifāyatu’llāh, the president of the *Jam‘iyatu’l-‘Ulamā* (reproduced from *Al-Ahrām* of the 29th March in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, p. 214).

⁷ A mission from the Turkish Red Crescent Society, which was collecting funds in India at the moment when the news of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate arrived, found it advisable to cut short its activities and return home. (*The Times*, 5th March, 1924; *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, p. 181). The news was actually received during a tea-party at Delhi, where the members of the Turkish mission were being entertained by their Indian co-religionists. Upon the recital of the telegram containing the text of the Turkish Law of the 3rd March, all but two of the Indians present immediately left the room.

⁸ Texts in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 5, pp. 290–1.

⁹ See pp. 297 and 300 below.

of the Hijāz was likewise placed in a difficult predicament by the same event. King Husayn was by this time aware that the hostility of the Indian Muslims and other Islamic communities abroad considerably aggravated the precariousness of his position in the Arabian Peninsula *vis-à-vis* Ibn Sa'ūd ;¹ and he was also aware that this hostility would be accentuated if he ventured to assume the Caliphate—a step which would be regarded by his numerous enemies as an act of provocation. The Amīr 'Abdu'llāh b. Husayn, more sanguine than his father, suffered under no such disquietude ; and in January 1924, when King Husayn was on his way from Mecca to pay a state visit to 'Ammān, the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh—seeing that the Ottoman Caliphate was then tottering to its fall—started a propaganda in favour of recovering the Caliphate for the Arabs and for the Quraysh by proclaiming King Husayn as *Amīru'l-Mu'minīn*.² It was in vain that the King, who arrived at 'Ammān on the 14th January,³ declared⁴ that he would not accept the Caliphate, either for himself or for any member of his family, even if it were offered by the united voice of the Islamic World. His abnegation was explained away in an official *communiqué* from the Transjordanian Government ;⁵ and his hand was forced by the Turkish Law of the 3rd March, 1924.⁶

The *bay'ah* was immediately proffered to him by the authorities of the Hijāz and Transjordan, and on the 5th March he accepted it in the Transjordanian village of Shūnah. On the 10th March an assembly of Palestinian Muslim notables, convened at Jerusalem on the initiative of the Supreme Muslim Council, decided (though by no means unanimously) to recognize King Husayn as Caliph on condition that he pledged himself, on his part, not to recognize any form of foreign dominion over the countries under his aegis. The Palestinian *bay'ah* was formally presented at Shūnah on the 11th March, the Transjordanian on the 14th ; and on the 11th King Husayn published, as Caliph, a long-winded and almost apologetic proclamation to the Islamic World.⁷ On the 12th March the recognition of King Husayn as Caliph was voted by the Sunnī 'Ulamā of 'Irāq and by the 'Irāqī Constituent Assembly, and the Shī'ī com-

¹ For the relations between King Husayn and Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, 1919–25, see Part III, Section (v) below.

² *The Times*, 11th January, 1924 ; *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, p. 167.

³ *The Times*, 15th January, 1924.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, p. 167.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 167–8.

⁶ For King Husayn's assumption of the Caliphate see *op. cit.*, IV, 4, pp. 226–39.

⁷ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 229–31.

munity in 'Irāq were stated¹ to have associated themselves with this gesture. Among the Muslims of Syria and the Lebanon there appears to have been a widespread feeling in favour of recognizing King Husayn, which declared itself spontaneously in most of the principal cities before the French authorities had time to intervene by causing the local Governments to forbid the introduction of any personal name when the Caliph was mentioned in the *Khutbah*.² There was, however, another party in the French mandated territory, led by the family of the celebrated Algerian patriot 'Abdu'l-Qādir, which was disinclined to recognize King Husayn and preferred the Egyptian plan of an Islamic Caliphate Congress; and this party founded a Caliphate Association at Damascus to promote its point of view.³ Finally, King Husayn was recognized as Caliph by his recent guest the ex-Sultan-Caliph Vahīdu'd-Dīn Efendī (then resident in Italy, at San Remo).⁴ On the other hand, King Husayn's pretension to the Caliphate was rejected vigorously and almost unanimously not only in India but in Egypt; and a special correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*, who visited King Husayn at Shūnah on the 11th March, 1924,⁵ reported that his 'tone throughout' the interview 'was melancholy and diffident, like that of a man shouldering a heavy burden from a sense of duty, and more conscious of difficulties and dangers than of glories'.

I have not sought or desired the Caliphate [King Husayn declared to this interlocutor]. It has been thrust upon me. . . . My position is very critical. In Arabia there are dangers from Ibn Sa'ūd and from the Imām Yahyā. Then there is the situation created by the War. I joined the Allies at the darkest hour. . . . Now the Allies' promises are not being kept. . . . My peoples come to me and say: 'The Allies have not kept their promises and you broke the unity of Islam by joining them.' They hold me responsible, and my situation is critical. . . . Now, on top of all these difficulties, there comes the burden of the Caliphate. I am a man without luck!

In these dismal forebodings the unfortunate head of the House of Hāshim showed greater political discernment than he had shown at other critical moments of his career. Seven months after his acceptance of the Caliphate he was driven by a Wahhābī invasion from his patrimony in the Hijāz, compelled to abdicate the Kingship which he had held since 1916, and condemned to end his days in

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 233, quoting *Al-Akrām* of Cairo, 20th March, 1924.

² See, for example, the instructions, dated the 17th March, 1924, from the Mufti of Damascus (*op. cit.*, p. 235).

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 236-7.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 233; *The Times*, 13th March, 1924.

⁵ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 13th March, 1924.

exile as the third Caliph who had fallen within the space of two years.¹

In Egypt the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate was seen to offer a favourable opportunity for recovering that position of primacy in the Islamic World which Egypt had held from the extinction of the Shī'ī Caliphate of the Fātimids by Saladin in A. D. 1171 down to the Ottoman conquest in A. D. 1517. Without wasting their energies on polemics against King Husayn or President Mustafā Kemāl² the Egyptians set to work to convene at Cairo an Islamic Congress on the Caliphate, the history of which is recorded separately below.³

The Turkish Law of the 3rd March, 1924, was also of consequence to Western Governments with Muslim subjects. The action taken by the French authorities in Syria has been mentioned already. The British Government reaffirmed the policy of studious aloofness which it had repeatedly proclaimed since the outbreak of the War of 1914-18; and on the 10th March, 1924, the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons that

The Government are not entitled on either political or religious grounds to comment on or interfere in any way in a matter on which their policy has consistently been and will remain one of complete disinterestedness.

In the province of Benghazi, belonging to the Italian Colony of Libya, the name of the Ottoman Caliph was replaced in the *Khutbah* by that of King Victor Emmanuel III; but though this change was stated to have been made spontaneously by the local *imāms* and preachers⁴ it elicited a protest to the Italian Ministry of Foreign

¹ For the fall of King Husayn see pp. 298-9 below. The contrast between King Husayn's discerning despondency and the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh's blind exultation appeared in their respective interviews with the correspondent of *The Manchester Guardian*, above mentioned. The Amīr 'Abdu'llāh declared: 'The Turks have committed suicide. . . . They have rendered the greatest possible service to the Arabs. . . . Now the Caliphate has come back to Arabia. . . .' Before his fall King Husayn attempted to fortify his position as Caliph by convening at Mecca, on the 3rd April, 1925, an assembly of about seventy notables—some being Hijāzīs and others distinguished foreign residents—to whom he communicated a project for the establishment of a Consultative Council of the Caliphate. On the 5th April, under the chairmanship of the Qādī of Mecca, the Council was elected, with the following membership: nine Sharīfs of Mecca, seven other Hijāzīs, one Syrian, one Daghistānī, two Bukhārīs, three Indians, one Turk, one Afghan, two Javanese, three Sudanese, one Maghribī (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 5, pp. 295-6).

² The only Egyptian publicist of any importance who engaged in such polemics appears to have been the Shaykh 'Abdu'l-'Azīz Shāwīsh (see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, pp. 215-17 and 239), who was a Tunisian by origin, and was not representative of Egyptian public opinion.

³ See sub-section (f) below.

⁴ The *Giornale d'Italia* of Rome, 26th March, 1924.

Affairs from the Executive Committee, now constituted at Cairo, of the forthcoming Islamic Conference,¹ and gave rise to a controversy between the *'ulamā* of Benghazi and Egypt in the Egyptian press.²

(e) THE SECULARIZATION MOVEMENT.

Since the Islamic way of life was a seamless garment, woven of one piece, without any dividing line between politics and religion, the secularization movement in the Ottoman Empire may be said to have begun when the first unit of Muslim troops was equipped and drilled in the Western fashion by an Ottoman Sultan-Caliph (Selim III, *regnavit* A.D. 1789–1807) under the stimulus of the disastrous peace-treaty of Küçük Qaynārhah, which ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–74. The movement reached its logical conclusion in the constitution of the Turkish Republic which was voted by the Turkish Great National Assembly at Angora on the 20th April, 1924.³ In this constitution—which embodied and supplemented the essential elements in the Constitutional Law of the 20th January, 1921; the Law of the 29th October, 1923, establishing the Republic; and the three Laws of the 3rd March, 1924—the First Section set forth the following Fundamental Provisions :

Article 1 : The Turkish State is a Republic.

Article 2 : The religion of the Turkish State is Islam ; the official language is Turkish ; the seat of government is Angora.

Article 3 : Sovereignty belongs without restriction to the nation.

Article 4 : The Great National Assembly of Turkey is the sole lawful representative of the nation, and exercises sovereignty in the name of the nation.

Article 5 : The legislative and executive powers are vested and centred in the Great National Assembly, which concentrates these two powers in itself.

Article 6 : The Great National Assembly of Turkey exercises the legislative power directly.

Article 7 : The Assembly exercises the executive power through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a Cabinet chosen by him. The Assembly controls the acts of the Government and may at any time withdraw power from it.

Article 8 : The judicial power is exercised in the name of the Assembly by independent tribunals constituted in accordance with the law.

¹ For the text of this protest, dated the 29th March, 1924, see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, pp. 241–2.

² See *op. cit.*, IV, 6, pp. 366–8.

³ For a Turkish text and German translation of this document with a commentary and introduction see *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen*, Jahrgang xxvi und xxvii, Zweite Abteilung. For an English translation by Professors E. M. Earle and H. Y. Hussein Bey see *The Political Science Quarterly* of New York, vol. xl, No. 1, March 1925.

It will be seen that these provisions were based exclusively on Western precedents ; that they could not have been evolved either from the political theory or from the political experience of Islamic society ; and, more than this, that Islamic theory and experience were flatly contradicted by them.¹

In looking back over the century and a half between the years 1924 and 1774 it becomes apparent that the secularization movement had not only acquired a vast increase in momentum and velocity but had undergone a profound change in its psychological character. During the first hundred years it had proceeded at a sluggish pace with constant checks and backslidings ; and the reason for this had been that even the small minority of 'Osmanlis in high places who were promoting the movement had looked on it, not as a positive good, but as a necessary evil—a disagreeable and humiliating adaptation to a new environment in which some tincture of Westernism had become indispensable for self-preservation. During the next phase, which extended from the disastrous war of 1876–8 to the still more disastrous war of 1914–18, the movement took a more positive and constructive form, which declared itself in Midhat Pasha's constitution of 1876 and in the restoration of that constitution after the Revolution of 1908. In this phase, however, the movement was first repressed by the Hamidian tyranny and afterwards thrust into the background by struggles for existence against foreign Powers. It broke out again, and advanced thereafter at a revolutionary speed, in the Nationalist Movement initiated by Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and his companions in Anatolia as an answer to the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna on the 15th May, 1919.

At the outset this new Nationalist Movement, like the previous impulses of Selīm III, Mahmūd II, Midhat Pasha, and the Committee of Union and Progress, was preoccupied with the task of parrying a pressing external danger, and was only interested in a secondary way in those modifications of Islamic tradition which it adopted as a means to that end. Even, however, before the expulsion of the Greek army from Anatolia the Turkish Great National Assembly at Angora was setting about the internal reconstruction of

¹ A strictly orthodox Muslim could not have drafted a constitution for a Turkish Republic but only a constitution for the Islamic community (*ummaḥ*). On the analogy of the Turkish constitution of 1924 he would have opened as follows :

Art. 1. Islam is a theocratic community.

Art. 2. The incumbent of the Islamic Caliphate is the Ottoman Pādishāh ; the language of Islam is Arabic ; the Holy Places of Islam are Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem.

the state as an end in itself ; and after the Armistice of the 11th October, 1922, the combative energies which had been called out by a life-and-death struggle against a foreign enemy and then stimulated by a sensational victory were consciously directed inwards and deliberately employed in the systematic uprooting of those Islamic institutions which had been the main foundation of Ottoman life.

In this matter the temper and outlook of the Turkish Nationalists in 1919-25¹ were perhaps not essentially different from those of the so-called ' Young Turks ' of 1908-18.² The ' Young Turks ' of the Committee of Union and Progress had made the first moves in many of those revolutionary changes which their Nationalist successors carried to completion ; but they had been burdened with the heritage of the Ottoman Empire and had been entangled in the vain effort to salve it from inevitable destruction. Their attention and energy had thus been distracted and to a large extent neutralized by a certain confusion of aims. On the other hand, the Nationalists of 1919-25 unquestionably knew their own minds. Their loyalty was consciously given, not to Islam or to the Ottoman Empire, but to a new ideal of a Turkish nation ; they were convinced that the realization of this new ideal was obstructed by the survival of the old order ; and they were determined ruthlessly to clear this obstruction away (so far as their work had not already been done for them by the almost continuous state of war in which Turkey had found herself between the autumn of 1911 and that of 1922). Their aim was an absolute revolution on the cultural and economic as well as the political plane. They aspired to convert the Turkish people from the Islamic way of life as embodied in the old Ottoman Empire to the Western way of life as embodied in post-revolutionary France. At the time of writing it was already evident that they had succeeded in their negative purpose of uprooting the traditional institutions of Islam within the domain of the new Turkish Republic. Whether they were likely to succeed in their second and more difficult enter-

¹ For an exposition of this outlook see a statement made in September 1923 by Mustafa Kemāl Pasha to a correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna (reproduced in *Oriente Moderno*, III, 5, pp. 269-70).

² Many leaders in the movement of 1919-25, from Mustafa Kemāl Pasha downwards, had previously played more or less prominent parts in the movement of 1908-18 ; but the second movement was nevertheless in conscious and even violent opposition to the first on certain questions of policy, e. g. in regard to Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism, and this opposition was accentuated by personal rivalries—e. g. that between Enver Pasha and Mustafa Kemāl Pasha, which dated from the Dardanelles Campaign of 1915-16. The feud culminated in the conspiracy trial of 1926, in which a number of prominent Unionists, including the able and distinguished financier, Jävyd Bey, were convicted and hanged.

prise of transplanting so delicate a plant as Western civilization to an alien soil which had only just been cleared of its previous crop was a question which could not be answered yet, and perhaps not conclusively for many years to come. Even so the Turkish Revolution, as far as it had proceeded by 1926, was an outstanding event in the history not only of Turkey but of the Islamic World as a whole, and took rank among the important and interesting international affairs of the time.

The process of secularization can be recorded most conveniently under several separate heads. In the administrative sphere the *Sheri'eh* and the organs by which it was traditionally administered were replaced by codes borrowed wholesale from Western countries together with the new organs entailed. In what might be called the ecclesiastical sphere monastic orders were abolished. In the educational sphere the ecclesiastical schools and colleges were partly replaced by secular institutions and entirely brought under the control of the civil Government. In the social sphere the outstanding feature was the emancipation of women, which deserves consideration by itself, while further features were the adoption of Western male head-gear, the substitution of the Gregorian calendar for the Islamic,¹ the determination of the beginning and end of the Fast of Ramadān by astronomical observation,² and the violation of the Islamic ban upon graven images by the erection in Constantinople of a statue representing Mustafā Kemāl.³ The first experiment in writing the Ottoman Turkish language in the Latin script by employing this on postage-stamps⁴ may also be mentioned here, though this was an expression, not of secularism, but of nationalism.⁵

¹ As from the 1st January, 1926 (*The Manchester Guardian*, 28th December, 1925).

² *The Times*, 13th March, 1926.

³ In this matter Turkey was not the pioneer. Statues had already been erected in Egypt, e. g. to Mehmed 'Alī.

⁴ Since the latter part of April 1926 (*Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, p. 371). In this matter Turkey was forestalled by the Transcaucasian Republic of Azerbaijan, where, at the time of writing, the Latin script had already been substituted for the Arabic for all purposes. Phonetically, the Latin script was a better vehicle than the Arabic for the conveyance of languages of the Turkish family, which were rich in vowel sounds. The change was easier to make in the case of Azerbaijani Turkish than in that of 'Osmanlı Turkish, since Azerbaijani did not, like 'Osmanlı, possess a great literary heritage recorded in the Arabic script, and the change did not therefore involve so painful a break with the past.

⁵ As a member of the Berne Postal Union the Turkish Government was bound to make its postmarks, &c., intelligible to other members. The Turkish Post Office had previously fulfilled this obligation by the use of French as well as Turkish inscriptions, e. g. 'Postes Turques'. The change consisted in substituting the Turkish phrase, 'Türkiyeh Postaları', written in Latin characters, for the French.

In the administrative sphere the 'Young Turk' régime had made a beginning by a law of the 12th March, 1917, which had placed the *Sherī'eh* courts under the authority of the civil Ministry of Justice.¹ The Great National Assembly followed this up—in the Law of the 2nd May, 1920, in which it set up an executive government only nine days after it had come into existence itself—by substituting for the old offices of *Sheykhū'l-Islām* (i. e. principal muftī or jurisconsult on the *Sherī'eh*) and Minister of *Evgāf* (Pious Foundations), a single Commissary (*Vekīl*). Subsequently, the former functions of the *Sheykhū'l-Islām* as Chief Muftī or jurisconsult on the *Sherī'eh*, which he had discharged through his *Fetvā Khāneh*, were assigned to a Council for the emission of legal opinions in respect of the *Sherī'eh* (*Iftā Hey'etī*). In the first of the four laws of the 3rd March, 1924,² the Commissariat for the *Sherī'eh* and *Evgāf* was abolished and the former functions of the *Sheykhū'l-Islām* were assigned to a departmental head of religious affairs in the office of the Prime Minister.³ Having thus cleared the ground of every Islamic encumbrance the Assembly adopted, on the 17th February, 1926, a new civil code which seems to have been an integral translation of the Swiss civil code, and on the 1st March a new penal code which was an adaptation of the penal code of Italy.⁴

The introduction of the Swiss civil code brought with it the renunciation of the minority rights which had been secured to the Jewish, Armenian, and Greek Orthodox Christian communities in Turkey under the Lausanne Treaty (Arts. 37–45). These rights were of much the same character as those secured to minorities in Eastern Europe under the Minorities Treaties and other diplomatic instruments which had formed part of the European peace settlement after the War of 1914–18—a mere shadow of the rights which the non-Muslim communities of the old Ottoman Empire had formerly possessed under the Millet System.⁵ In October 1925 the Temporal and Spiritual Council of the Jewish Rabbinate in Turkey notified the Turkish Government, in the name of the Jewish community,

¹ Pritsch, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

² The text is printed in the Appendix to the present volume.

³ The constitutional effect of this change was to make all religious questions become questions of confidence, by which the whole ministry would stand or fall instead of one member of it, the Commissary for the *Sherī'eh* and *Evgāf*, as formerly.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 10, p. 519, and VI, 3, pp. 134–6.

⁵ Both the Millet System and the Capitulations had been abolished in the Lausanne settlement (see *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 113–14). The substitution for the Millet System of minority rights on the post-war European pattern was in accordance with the Turkish National Pact, Article 5.

that they renounced these rights in view of the forthcoming introduction of a Western civil code.¹ Before the end of the month the Armenians followed the example of the Jews.² The Turkish Government then set to work to induce the Greeks to take the same step,³ and in January 1926 they did so, though not without a heated debate at the meeting in which the decision was taken.⁴ The Armenian community, in an address to the Turkish Government, welcomed 'the auspicious era of the secular régime inaugurated by the Republic in place of the precepts of Islam by which the country was formerly governed'.⁵ After the enactment of the new civil code the Minister of Justice informed the three communities afore-mentioned, in response to their renunciation of their minority rights, that the new code would thenceforth be applied to all citizens of the Turkish Republic without distinction of race, nationality, or religion.⁶

The abolition of the Commissariat for the *Sherī'eh* and *Evqāf*, which had been effected in the first of the four laws of the 3rd March, 1924, was followed eighteen months later by the dissolution of various religious orders and ecclesiastical establishments. Considering that the Government was in perpetual straits for revenue, and that these religious institutions had long ceased to perform any social service proportionate to the toll which they took from the national income,⁷ it was inevitable that, sooner or later, the Turkish Government should follow the examples of Henry VIII in sixteenth-century England and of Prince Couza in nineteenth-century Rumania.⁸ The Turkish Government's action was precipitated by the Kurdish Revolt of 1925,⁹ which was on one side a religious movement of a reactionary complexion, and in which the religious orders and ecclesiastical establishments of the Eastern Vilāyets were credited with having taken a leading part.¹⁰ On the 2nd September, 1925, the Government passed three administrative decrees.¹¹ The first closed all religious houses (*tekkehs* and *zāwīyehs*), and abolished all religious orders in Turkey; prohibited individuals from living as members of

¹ *Le Temps*, 10th October, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 31st October, 1925.

³ *The Times*, 5th November, 1925.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 9th January, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 4th February, 1926.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 2nd June, 1926.

⁷ For sketches of the history of the religious orders and ecclesiastical establishments in Turkey see *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th September, and *The Times*, 10th October, 1925.

⁸ For the Rumanian decree of 1863 see W. Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801-1922* (Cambridge, 1923, University Press), pp. 320-1.

⁹ See Part III, Section (xi) (e) below.

¹⁰ See the Angora *Hākimīyet-i Milliye*, 10th April, 1926, quoted in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 273-5.

¹¹ Texts, with common preamble, in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 10, pp. 513-15.

orders and from wearing the costumes or bearing the titles associated therewith; closed all chapels (*mesjids*) attached to religious houses and all mausolea (*türbehs*); and abolished the office of custodian of such establishments. The second decree defined the categories of persons who were to be reckoned as '*ulemā*, and their costumes, and prohibited the wearing of these costumes by unauthorized persons. The third decree laid down that all public servants who were not required to wear a special uniform were to dress in 'the ordinary clothes in use among the civilized nations of the world'—including the hat (*shapqah*)—and were to uncover the head indoors, and also out-of-doors as a sign of salutation.

The question of head-gear was socially and politically significant, because in the Near East a distinctive head-dress was the traditional outward mark of differences of nationality, occupation, and religion, and a general change of head-dress was therefore bound to have a psychological effect of some importance. Under the old Ottoman order the differentiation of head-gear had been carried to great lengths; and not the least effective of the reforms initiated by Sultan Mahmūd II (1808-39) had been the introduction of the *fez* as the uniform head-dress of all Ottoman subjects, whatever their rank or religion.¹ The men of Angora had discarded the *fez* owing to its associations with the Ottoman régime of the past century, and had at first adopted the *qalpāq*—the black lamb-skin cap of the Turkish and other nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppe, which symbolized the 'Turanian' as opposed to the Ottoman and Islamic elements in Turkish national life. The *qalpāq* satisfactorily expressed the Turks' new consciousness of their distinctive nationality and its historical origins;² but it did not satisfy their new desire—which was equally strong—to cease to be 'a peculiar people' and 'to

¹ Sultan Mahmūd appears to have abolished those regulations or customs which had made the wearing of certain distinctive head-dresses compulsory for particular classes of Ottoman subjects, and to have given the option of wearing the *fez* to all Ottoman subjects alike. On the other hand, he does not appear to have made the wearing of the *fez* compulsory except for public servants (both civil and military). In this important respect his action differed from the Law of November 1925, which made the wearing of hats compulsory for private persons as well as for public servants. Though the *fez* eventually became the universal head-dress of all Ottoman subjects, except the clerics of the several prevalent religions, in the course of the nineteenth century, its adoption by private persons appears to have been a voluntary process.

² The *qalpāq* also happened to suit Mustafā Kemāl Pasha (who was not indifferent to his personal appearance), whereas the *fez* happened to be unbecoming to him. Thus, the Ghāzi had a personal as well as a political reason for patronizing the *qalpāq*, and his patronage no doubt assisted materially in bringing the *qalpāq* into fashion.

become as other nations', that is, as the nations of the Western World. The *galpāq*, no less than the *fez*, marked off its wearers from the Western peoples who wore hats with brims and had inherited the earth; and in 1925 the Government of the Republic deliberately set itself to remove this symbolic barrier.¹

In May 1925 the Turkish Navy was re-equipped with caps of German naval patterns;² and, after this beginning, there was a rapid adoption of Western male head-gear by other public services and by private individuals.³ The decree of the 2nd September, 1925, afore-mentioned, made the wearing of hats compulsory for all civilian officials. Finally, in November 1925, the Assembly passed a Law⁴ making the wearing of hats compulsory not only for officials and for members of the Assembly itself but for all private citizens. There were only two dissentients, but one of these was General Nūru'd-Dīn Pasha, the deputy for Brūsah—a distinguished soldier who had been one of the first to join Mustafā Kemāl Pasha in 1919, and had played a leading part throughout the Anatolian War. Nūru'd-Dīn Pasha sought to prove that the law was unconstitutional, and pleaded that, whatever regulations might be imposed on officials, all other Governments—both in Europe and in Asia—allowed private citizens to wear what head-gear they pleased. Nūru'd-Dīn Pasha was overruled, but the incident produced disorders. In Constantinople there were demonstrations by students against Nūru'd-Dīn, while in the eastern provinces—both at Mar'ash in the south-east and at Sīvās and Erzerūm in the north-east—there were riots against the new law. The Government, which had only just succeeded in stamping out the Kurdish Revolt, took these riots very seriously—the more so since the disaffected population in this case was not Kurdish but Turkish, and was therefore indisputably actuated, not by any desire for national independence, but by a religious hostility to the secularization policy of Angora. The adoption of the hat was regarded as contrary to Islam for the specific reason that the Islamic ritual of prayer required the worshipper both to keep his head covered and to touch the ground with his forehead—two prescrip-

¹ The change of policy was abrupt; for when the writer of this *Survey* was in Turkey in April 1923 the *galpāq* still reigned supreme, and at Angora hats were in as bad odour as *fezes*—partly because political feeling was still strong against the Principal Allied Powers, and partly because, during the Allied occupation of Constantinople, and the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia, the members of the non-Turkish minorities had been wearing hats as a symbol of liberation from Turkish rule.

² *Oriente Moderno*, V, 6, p. 288.

³ *Op. cit.*, V, 7, p. 351; 9, p. 456.

⁴ Text in *op. cit.*, V, 12, p. 631.

tions which could not both be obeyed in any head-dress with a brim—as well as on the general principle that ‘he who imitates a people belongs to that people’.¹ Thus, the law of November 1925 was symbolic of the struggle between the secular Turkish national republic on the French model and the ‘counter-revolutionary’ forces of Islam, which were now fighting with their backs to the wall. For this reason the Government suppressed the disorders in the north-east with great severity. An itinerant ‘tribunal of independence’ was sent from Angora to Sīvās, Erzerūm, Rîzeh, and Kerāsünd; and it was reported that at least four persons were condemned to death and a larger number to terms of hard labour and imprisonment.²

The Turkish laws of September and November 1925 had a rapid repercussion in neighbouring ex-Ottoman countries. In Egypt³ the theological students of the Cairo Dāru’l-‘Ulūm (a ‘Modernist’ seminary founded in A.D. 1872) started an agitation, in January 1926, in favour of abandoning the traditional turban and caftan (*quftān*) of their profession for the *tarbūsh* (the Egyptian variety of the *fez*) and the Western coat, waistcoat, and trousers as worn by Egyptian civil servants and private persons of the Westernized *efendī* class. The ludicrous encounters which followed between the students and the police gave rise to a public controversy, in which Sa’d Pasha Zaghlūl, the Rector of Al-Azhar University, and the Chief Mufti of Egypt all declared against hats—Zaghlūl Pasha on the ground that traditional costumes were to be regarded as elements in national individuality, and the two ecclesiastics on the ground that the wearing of hats, so far from being a talisman of progress, was rather the symptom of a pathological mania for imitating the externals of a foreign civilization.⁴ The combined opposition of these political and ecclesiastical authorities was sufficient to quash the movement in Egypt for the time. On the other hand, no less a person than the ex-Grand Sanūsī presented himself *alla franca* from the neck downwards—with no vestige, except the turban, of his traditional costume—at the Cairo Caliphate Congress of May 1926.⁵

In Turkey a change in costume of still greater significance—and this from the practical as well as the symbolic point of view—was

¹ ‘Man yatashabbahu qawman, huwa minhum’.

² For the disorders in the north-eastern provinces and their suppression see *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, pp. 631–2, and VI, 1; p. 22.

³ For the hat controversy in Egypt see *op. cit.*, VI, 5, pp. 298–303. For the raising of the same question in Palestine see *op. cit.*, pp. 303–4.

⁴ The joint declaration by the Rector and the Chief Mufti (extracts in *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*) was really a reply to the action of the Turkish Government.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 267.

the unveiling of women. The seclusion of women, which had become a characteristic feature of Islamic life, seems to have been a legacy to Islam from the older civilizations of the Middle East and not a rule prescribed in the Qur'ān or the Traditions. Indeed, the women of the Prophet Muhammad's family had played a prominent part in the politics of their day; and the women of the Badawī tribes of Arabia had remained unsecluded from that day to this, as well as the women of several peoples which had been converted to Islam in comparatively recent times, like the Albanians. Thus a movement for the emancipation of women, if prudently and moderately conducted, was by no means bound to come into irreconcilable conflict with the *Sharī'ah*.¹ The movement for the emancipation of Turkish women had started after the Revolution of 1908, and had been hastened on by the War of 1914–18, during which the Ottoman Government, like other belligerent Governments, had been compelled to enlist women to perform men's work in order to release men for service at the front. Civil marriage, for instance, had been introduced in 1916 (though it was revoked, during the period between the Armistices of Mudros and Mudania, by Sultan Mehmed VI's reactionary Grand Vizier Dāmād Ferīd). In this, however, as in other fields, the Nationalists of 1919–25 went further than their predecessors. Civil marriage was reintroduced by the Government of the Turkish Republic as from the 1st September, 1926;² while polygamy was abolished, not by any *ad hoc* legislation but in consequence of the adoption of the Swiss civil code, which came into operation at an interval of six months after the passage through the Great National Assembly of the Law of the 17th February, 1926.³

Among the women of the *intelligentsia*, who had been educated in Western countries, or in Western educational institutions in Turkey such as the Constantinople College for Girls at Arnā'ūt Kōi, the process of social, as well as legal, emancipation was extra-

¹ The Islamic Lawgiver appears, like the Apostle Paul, to have commanded women to cover their hair, but to have said nothing about their faces.

² *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, pp. 371–2.

³ See *The Times*, 27th November, 1926. It would hardly have been possible to forbid polygamy by law but for the two facts that it had already become unfashionable among the upper class (apart from the Imperial Family, which was old-fashioned, but which had now been expelled) and that, for economic reasons, it had never been widespread among the poor. Legislation for giving women, and especially married women, legal control over their own property, which had been a prominent feature in the emancipation of women in the West, was less necessary in Islamic countries, since in this matter the status of women under the *Sharī'ah* had been comparatively advantageous. For the slower and less revolutionary progress of the emancipation of women in Egypt see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, pp. 339–42.

ordinarily rapid. The most distinguished exponent of the movement was a former student of this College, Khālideh Edīb Khānym, who made her name as an authoress and afterwards took an active part in the Anatolian War of 1919–22, sharing its hardships with her fellow nationalists of the other sex, and doing much by her example to inspire her countrymen and countrywomen with enthusiasm for the Nationalist cause. On the other hand, the circle within which this rapid and indeed revolutionary social change was taking place was still very narrow. It was practically confined to society of the upper and middle class in Constantinople, Angora, and Smyrna; and Western observers who travelled in the countryside of Central and East Central Anatolia during the years 1925 and 1926 reported that, while among the menfolk in the villages the working of the new Western leaven was already perceptible, the traditional subordination and effacement of the womenfolk showed no sign of change.¹

Among the women of the Turkish *intelligentsia* a landmark in the progress of emancipation had been the introduction of co-education in the University of Constantinople (owing to the natural unwillingness of the professors to deliver each lecture twice over to separate male and female audiences); and this was also a step towards the unification of the various educational systems which hitherto had existed in Turkey side by side and sometimes in conflict with one another.

There had been at least five distinct educational systems in the field. First, there was the traditional Islamic system—comparatively well-endowed by Pious Foundations (*Evqāf*)—which consisted mainly of *medresehs* or seminaries, where theological students studied the works of the medieval Islamic Schoolmen, and of *mektebs* or mosque schools for the children of the people. Originally, the curriculum in the *mektebs* had consisted almost entirely in learning by heart passages from the Qur'ān in a Classical Arabic of which the pupils did not understand the meaning; but in course of time this had been supplemented by elementary instruction in the reading and writing of Turkish and in other subjects, such as geography and arithmetic. Secondly, there were the schools maintained out of

¹ Among the rural population of Turkey the seclusion of women had never been carried so far as among the urban population of the well-to-do classes. Nevertheless, the observers in question prophesied that any attempt, on the part of the Angora Government, to enforce the emancipation of women in the rural districts by the same drastic methods which they had employed in forcing hats upon the men would raise a storm. At the time of writing the Government had been attempting to make the abandonment of the veil obligatory in the Vilāyet of Trebizond and in certain other districts, but had been compelled to abandon this experiment owing to the strength of the opposition which it encountered.

their own resources by the non-Turkish minorities—schools which were of ecclesiastical origin, but which had gradually adopted to a large extent the enlightened outlook and efficient methods of the modern West. Thirdly, there were institutions of secondary or even University standard which were maintained in Turkey by Westerners—in some cases by Western Governments, in others by Western monastic orders, and in others again by private Western philanthropists. These Western institutions—among which the French Catholic and American Protestant schools were in the front rank—probably offered to the people of Turkey and adjoining Near Eastern countries a better education than they could obtain in any native institutions. At the same time their ecclesiastical or political origin gave rise to a suspicion—even among Turks who appreciated their educational work at its full value—that they had the ulterior purpose of promoting in Turkey the interests of some particular foreign religion or foreign state. Fourthly, there were institutions which had been deliberately founded by the Ottoman Government on the Western model and which were paid for out of public funds. Since the reign of Sultan ‘Abdu’l-‘Aziz (1861–76), state schools, of three grades, had been established in the *chefs-lieux* of the various administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire: an ordinary primary school in the *chef-lieu* of every *qazā*, a higher primary school in that of every *sanjāq*, and a secondary school in that of every *vilāyet*. After the Revolution of 1908 the secondary schools were differentiated, like the primary, into two classes, and about twenty secondary schools of the higher grade were organized. These institutions—the most distinguished of which was the Galata Serai Lycée at Constantinople—satisfied the desiderata of Turkish Nationalists by supplying an effective Western education without being in foreign hands; but they were still inadequate in numbers to supply the country’s needs. The fifth system in the field was that of the Turkish private schools, among which the three classes of ordinary and higher elementary schools and ordinary secondary schools were represented.

Of the five groups of institutions here mentioned those formerly maintained by the non-Turkish minorities disappeared with the virtual disappearance of the minorities themselves from all territories of the Turkish Republic with the important exception of the Vilāyet of Constantinople. During the period under review the Angora Government set itself to increase the size, number, and efficiency of the state schools of the Western pattern, and at the same time to bring the private Turkish schools, the Islamic schools,

and the foreign schools under Government control. In the case of the Islamic schools this aim was carried into effect in the second of the three laws of the 3rd March, 1924.¹ The Islamic educational institutions which had formerly been controlled by the Commissariat for the *Sheri'eh* and *Evqāf* were transferred to the Ministry of Public Instruction; a theological faculty was organized in the state university of Constantinople; and after this the *medresehs* were abolished.² In the case of the foreign schools the Angora Government laid down the general principle that henceforth they should be subject to exactly the same regulations as the native schools, whether national or private.³ In particular they required that the Turkish language, literature, history, and geography should be taught in all foreign schools, for a prescribed number of hours per week, by Turkish teachers appointed by the Turkish Ministry of Public Instruction. They further prohibited the teaching of religious dogmas and the exhibition of religious emblems in foreign schools; and this prohibition, which was inspired by French precedents, brought the Government of the Turkish Republic into conflict with the Catholic Church and with at least two Catholic Governments—the Italian Government and the French Government itself, which had always exercised a traditional protectorate over Catholic institutions in the Levant, whatever its relations with the Catholic Church at home. The authorities of the French and Italian schools defied the law by declining to remove the crucifixes from their class-rooms; and, accordingly, the Turkish Government closed these schools on the 7th April, 1924. The disturbance to the educational life of Turkey was very great, since there were thirty-six French schools with 12,000 pupils in the Constantinople district, and twenty-five with 3,000 pupils in Anatolia. The French Government made an official protest, but this had no effect, and the conflict was finally brought to an end by the intervention of the Papal Nuncio at Bucarest, Monsignore Dolci, who went to Constantinople (where he arrived on the 26th August, 1924) on an official mission. As a compromise it was agreed that crucifixes should still be exhibited in schools or class-

¹ The text of this law is reprinted in the Appendix to the present volume.

² Vigorous protests against the abolition of the *medresehs* were made in the Assembly on the 17th April, 1924 (summary of the debate in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 5, pp. 297-9).

³ The application of this principle to the foreign schools in Turkey was a corollary to the abolition of the Capitulations. See the letters on the subject which were exchanged on the 24th July, 1923, at Lausanne between 'Ismet Pasha and the heads of the Allied Delegations (e. g. in *Cmd.* 1929 of 1923, pp. 231-3).

rooms exclusively attended by Catholic children, but not in mixed schools ; and on these terms all the French and Italian schools were reopened.¹

In Egypt, where Islam was more alive intellectually than it was in Turkey, and where from the outset the process of 'Westernization' had followed a less revolutionary course, there was not, during the period under review, a conflict between a militantly secular state and the whole Islamic order, but rather a conflict, within Islamic society itself, between the modernists and the reactionaries. This Egyptian battle was fought over two books : *Islam and the Foundations of the State : A Study of the Caliphate and Government in Islam* (*Al-Islām wa Usūlul-Hukm : Baḥthun fī'l-Khilāfati wa'l-Hukūmati fī'l-Islām*), published in 1925 by Shaykh 'Alī 'Abdu'r-Razzāq, a member of the faculty of Al-Azhar University and qādī of the *Shari'ah* court of first instance at Mansūrah ; and *An Essay on Pre-Islamic [Arabic] Poetry* (*Fī'l-Shi'ri'l-Jāhili*), published in 1926 by Taha Husayn Efendī, Professor of Arabic Literature in the Faculty of Letters of the University of Egypt. Taha Husayn Efendī applied Western methods of 'higher criticism', with devastating results, to what were traditionally supposed to be genuine relics of the earliest Arabic literature. Shaykh 'Alī 'Abdu'r-Razzāq attacked the traditional theocratic basis of Islamic society.² His thesis was that Muhammad's religious and political activities had nothing to do with one another ; that his government and his wars were purely mundane, like those of any other ruler ; that he never contemplated the Caliphate, and that there was no warrant in the Islamic religion for the doctrine that all Muslims ought to form a single political community under a single sovereign ; that Islam had nothing to do with political affairs ; and that in the political sphere Muslims were absolutely free, from the religious point of view, to reconstruct their institutions of government in accordance with the most recent and most approved experience of mankind. Upon the publication of this book the Rector of Al-Azhar, in virtue of powers conferred on him by an Egyptian law of the 13th May, 1911, arraigned Shaykh 'Alī 'Abdu'r-Razzāq before a disciplinary council ; and after a detailed exposition of the case on both sides this council, on the 12th August, 1925, unanimously condemned the Shaykh to expulsion from the ranks of the 'ulamā. In virtue of the Egyptian law above-

¹ For the history of this conflict over the crucifixes see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 2, pp. 92-4 ; 4, pp. 251-4 ; 8, pp. 483-4 ; 9, p. 457 ; 10, p. 609.

² For the history of the 'Abdu'r-Razzāq case see *Oriente Moderno*, V, 9, pp. 492-6, and 12, pp. 680-1.

mentioned this act of the disciplinary council of Al-Azhar made it incumbent on the Egyptian Minister of Justice to dismiss the Shaykh from his post as qādī. The sequel to the case, which passed at this point from the realm of Islamic theology into that of Egyptian party politics, has been dealt with elsewhere.¹

The events recorded in this section were all outward symptoms of the same process of mental change. To enter into a direct discussion of that change itself would be beyond the scope of the present Survey.

(f) THE CALIPHATE CONGRESS (*Mu'tamaru'l-Khilāfah*) HELD IN
CAIRO ON THE 13TH-19TH MAY, 1926.²

In Egypt, as in other Islamic countries, the first effect of the Turkish Law of the 3rd March, 1924, was to produce perplexity and divided counsels; but the authorities of the University-Mosque of Al-Azhar at Cairo—the most distinguished seat of theological learning in the Islamic World³—quickly adopted a definite policy. Thereupon the rank and file of the Egyptian 'ulamā fell into line. On the other hand, the Egyptian laity—including King Fu'ād, Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl (at that time Prime Minister), the *Wafd* as a party, and the Western-educated classes as a whole—held aloof throughout from these proceedings.

On the 12th March the Egyptian Association for Solidarity among the 'Ulamā published a proclamation⁴ to the Islamic World in which they declared that the action of the Turkish Government could not invalidate the allegiance (*bay'ah*) which the Society had telegraphed to 'Abdu'l-Mejīd Efendī on the 6th December, 1922;⁵ and, under the patronage of Prince 'Umar Tūsūn, a member of the Egyptian Royal Family who was a supporter of the Ottoman Dynasty, committees were formed at Cairo and Alexandria to advocate this point of view.⁶ On the other hand, the leading religious authorities of

¹ See below, p. 227.

² See *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1926 (2me trimestre), volume lxiv: Les Deux Congrès Généraux de 1926: Le Congrès du Khalifat (le Caire, 13-19 Mai, 1926) et le Congrès du Monde Musulman (La Mekke, 7 Juin-5 Juillet, 1926). Procès-verbaux réunis, analysés et traduits par Achille Sékaly. (Paris, 1926, Leroux.) In the present volume of this Survey the Mecca Conference is dealt with in Part III, Section (v) (d) below.

³ The prestige of Al-Azhar throughout the Islamic World before the invasion of Western thought resembled the prestige of the University of Paris throughout Western Christendom before the Renaissance and the Reformation. At the time of writing students still repaired to Al-Azhar from all parts of the Islamic World—particularly, perhaps, from the outlying fringes.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, p. 218.

⁵ See above, p. 23.

⁶ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, p. 222, and 5, pp. 292-3.

Egypt, who had refrained, in December 1922, from lending their names to the Egyptian '*ulamās*' declaration of allegiance to 'Abdu'l-Mejīd, met together, on the 25th March, under the chairmanship of the Rector of Al-Azhar, and published a decision in which, after reciting the traditional functions of the Caliphate, and in particular the exercise of temporal power, they declared that

the Caliphate of Prince 'Abdu'l-Mejīd was not a legal Caliphate, since the Islamic religion does not recognize a Caliphate in the terms which were laid down for him [by the Turkish Government] and which he accepted. Hence the allegiance [*bay'ah*] paid to him by Muslims was not valid in Islamic Law.

They concluded that the Islamic community was not bound to 'Abdu'l-Mejīd Efendī; and they announced that they considered it indispensable to hold an Islamic religious congress, to which representatives of all Islamic peoples should be invited, in order to consider upon whose shoulders the Islamic Caliphate ought to be placed. In view of 'the privileged position of Egypt among the Islamic peoples' they proposed that this congress should be held in Cairo, under the presidency of the *Shaykhu'l-Islām* (Chief Muftī or juris-consult on the *Sharī'ah*) of Egypt, in March 1925.¹

This decision was published in the names of the Rector of Al-Azhar, who was also President of the Establishments for Higher Religious Instruction in Egypt; the President of the Supreme Court of the *Sharī'ah* in Egypt; the *Shaykhu'l-Islām* of Egypt; the Vice-Rector of Al-Azhar; the Director-General of Establishments for Higher Theological Study; the rectors of those establishments; the heads of departments in Al-Azhar; and other eminent Doctors of the Islamic Law.

Meanwhile, Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl had declared that the Egyptian Government intended to maintain the strictest neutrality in regard to the Caliphate; King Fu'ād had announced that he took no personal interest in the matter;² and on the 18th March the Egyptian Ministry of *Awqāf* had prescribed a formula for the *Khutbah* in which the name of King Fu'ād was substituted for the traditional reference to the Caliph.³ 'In lay and political circles in Egypt the initiative taken by the '*ulamā*' was not received with much sympathy—largely owing to an impression that the intention

¹ For a French translation of the decision see *Revue du Monde Musulman*, num. cit., pp. 29-33; for an Italian translation, *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, pp. 223-6. An English translation is printed in the Appendix to the present volume.

² Sékaly, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, p. 240.

was to transfer the Caliphate to Egypt. . . . It was pointed out that the Ottoman Caliphate had always been an object of suspicion to the European Powers ; that the Powers regarded it as the centre of a movement which was dangerous to the security of their colonial possessions ; and that they had often made it the pretext of their hostility towards Turkey. Egypt, whose liberty was still in its infancy, had no interest in taking over from the Ottoman Empire this invidious role. Finally, it was argued that it would not always be easy to reconcile the Caliphate with the maintenance of a constitutional monarchy ; that cases might arise in which it would be difficult to demarcate the prerogatives of the Caliph and the King ; and that, on any hypothesis, the conception of a power which was spiritual and temporal in one might become an obstacle to the rapid evolution of the country along the path of modern civilization, and was, indeed, an evident anachronism.' ¹

Notwithstanding this lay hostility, and notwithstanding the protests of the Egyptian supporters of 'Abdu'l-Mejid Efendi,² the promoters of the Caliphate Congress held to their course. The Rector of Al-Azhar immediately appointed a permanent secretariat to perform the necessary work of preparation and organization ; ³ and invitations were issued. On the 17th January, 1925, however, the Administrative Council of the General Islamic Congress for the Caliphate (*Majlis Idāri li'l-Mu'tamari'l-Islāmīyī'l-'Ammāyī li'l-Khilāfah*) met again under the chairmanship of the Rector of Al-Azhar and decided to postpone the date of the Congress for a year,⁴ on the triple ground that the preparatory work had not yet been completed, that the Hijāz was in a state of war,⁵ and that Egypt had been plunged unexpectedly into a general election.⁶ At a further meeting held on the 3rd February, 1926, the Council fixed the 13th May, 1926, as the opening date, and appointed a committee to draft a fresh letter of invitation and a set of rules of procedure. The fresh invitation was duly issued,⁷ and the draft rules of procedure (which were modelled entirely on Western patterns) were approved by the Council on the 25th April.⁸ At this latter meeting of the Council the

¹ Sékaly, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

² See *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 5, p. 292.

³ Text of this order in *op. cit.*, IV, 4, p. 226, quoting *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo, 28th March, 1924.

⁴ Text of their decision in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, *num. cit.*, pp. 34-6. Cf. *Oriente Moderno*, V, 2, pp. 91-3.

⁵ See Part III, Section (v) below.

⁶ See Part III, Section (i), p. 225 below.

⁷ Text of letter in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, *num. cit.*, pp. 37-41.

⁸ Text of rules of procedure, as approved, in *op. cit.*, pp. 42-5.

agenda of the Congress was changed.¹ The purpose, as originally announced in the decision of the 25th March, 1924, had been to appoint a new Caliph. For this practical task there was now substituted a programme of six points which the Congress was to be invited to examine without itself taking action in regard to them.

1. The definition of the Caliphate and of the qualifications required in the Caliph.

2. Is the Caliphate a necessity in Islam ?

3. How is the Caliphate contracted ?

4. Is it possible at the present time to constitute a Caliphate which fulfils all the requirements of the *Shari'ah* ?

5. Supposing that the answer to the fourth point is in the negative, what action should be taken ?

6. Supposing that the Congress decides that it is necessary to appoint a Caliph, what steps should be taken to give effect to this decision ?

It was further decided that the delegates should only speak in their own names and not in the names of the peoples whom they represented.²

A protest against this restriction in the scope of the Congress was made by the Vice-Rector of Al-Azhar,³ but he did not prevail with his colleagues. The Administrative Council as a whole appear to have felt that the Congress had not obtained sufficient support in the Islamic World to invest any Caliph elected by the Congress with the necessary moral authority ; and meanwhile their position in Egypt had been shaken by the 'Abdu'r-Razzāq affair,⁴ which had provoked a violent controversy and had brought the authorities of Al-Azhar into bad odour with the Westernized elements in Egyptian society.⁵

As early as the 3rd April, 1924, the Chief Qādī of Transjordan, in a letter addressed to the Rector of Al-Azhar, had denounced the Congress as an innovation which was contrary to religion.⁶ Coming, as it did, from a supporter of King Husayn's candidature in a small and backward country, this protest had no great significance. It was more serious that the Central Committee of the Indian Khilāfat Conference and the Association of Indian 'Ulamā both declined the definitive invitation of February 1926 on the ground that the Congress was inopportune.⁷ Turkey naturally held aloof ; and the new

¹ *Revue du Monde Musulman*, foot-note on p. 42 ; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 263-4.

² *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, p. 264. ³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.* ⁴ See above, p. 80.

⁵ For Egyptian attacks on the Congress see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 256-60.

⁶ *Précis* of his letter in *op. cit.*, IV, 5, pp. 294-5.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, VI, 5, pp. 262-5.

Turkish Ambassador who arrived in Cairo on the 14th March, 1926, informed a representative of *As-Siyāsah* that the question of the Caliphate did not exist for his country.¹ As regarded the attitude of the Egyptian Government it was intimated that King Fu'ād neither desired the Caliphate for himself nor wished to see it imported into Egypt. It was further alleged that the Spanish Government had protested to the Egyptian Government because one of the parties invited to the Congress had been 'Abdu'l-Karīm; and that the Egyptian Government had replied that it had nothing to do with the Congress, which was entirely unofficial, but that, nevertheless, it had given instructions not to permit the entry into Egypt of any delegates whom 'Abdu'l-Karīm might send.²

The inaugural sitting of the Congress, which was duly held in Cairo on the 13th May, 1926, under the presidency of the Rector of Al-Azhar, was attended by Muslims from the following countries: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, the Dutch East Indies, the (Non-Federated) Malay State of Johore, British India, the Yaman, the Hijāz, Palestine, 'Irāq, and Poland. The Egyptian delegation, which was practically identical with the Administrative Council of the Congress, was the most able and authoritative, while in both respects the Palestinian delegation came second. Among the representatives of Libya was Sayyid Idrīsu's-Sanūsī.³ The Moroccan representative came from the Ghumārah country—at that time still at war with Spain and France under the leadership of the Rifi 'Abdu'l-Karīm.⁴ One of the representatives of 'Irāq was the Tunisian Nationalist 'Abdu'l-'Azīzu'th-Tha'ālībī Efendī, who at this time held a professorship in Baghdad.⁵ The British Indian representative attended in a private capacity.⁶ It will be seen that, while the Congress was attended by representatives of some of the most remote Islamic communities, such as those in Poland,⁷ the East Indies,⁸ and

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 262.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 263.

³ His presence elicited a protest from the Italian Government (*op. cit.*, p. 267), and it may have been owing to this that he withdrew from the Congress after the first sitting.

⁴ See Part II, Sections (v)–(viii) below.

⁵ See *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 7, pp. 431–4, for the text of an address on the Pan-Arab movement which Ath-Tha'ālībī delivered at Nāblus on the 5th June, 1924, and in which he advocated the method of action by congress. For Ath-Tha'ālībī's previous political career in Tunisia see pp. 176–80 below.

⁶ He was for some years Vice-Principal and Professor of Mathematics and Science at the Islāmiyah College, Peshāwar.

⁷ See *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, p. 273, for an account of the Muslim community in Poland given by their representative Ya'qūb Efendī Shenkovich.

⁸ The Muslim community in the Dutch East Indies had responded more enthusiastically than any other Islamic people to the decision of the 25th

South Africa,¹ some of the most powerful or most progressive peoples of the Islamic World were conspicuous by their absence. For example, there was no representative of either Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, the Najd, or the Muslim community in Russia.² Nor was the Muslim community in India adequately represented by a single individual attending in a private capacity, in the absence of delegates from the Indian Association of 'Ulamā, the Indian Khilāfat Conference or the All-India Muslim League. Further, none of the delegates were accredited by Governments. Nine out of the thirty had been directly invited by the Administrative Council in Cairo and had not come with any mandate, even of a non-official character, from their own countrymen. Finally, all except the Egyptian representatives, one of the Palestinian representatives, and the unrepresentative Indian member—that is, twenty-three out of the thirty—seem to have been persons no longer resident in the countries which they were supposed to represent.³ These facts obviously detracted from the authority and significance of the Congress. Nevertheless, the organization, however imperfect, of an Islamic Congress on the Caliphate Question under the auspices of Al-Azhar was in itself an event of historical importance.

At the first sitting of the Congress⁴ on the 13th May, 1926, which was mainly occupied with formalities, there was appointed, on the motion of the President, a First Committee of thirteen members (one for each country represented) to examine proposals and bring them before the Congress. At the second sitting on the 16th a Second and a Third Committee were appointed to report respectively on points

March, 1924. They had immediately resolved to send a delegation, consisting partly of Malays and partly of representatives of the Arab colony in the East Indies; they had resolved to organize a local preparatory congress of their own; and they had taken steps to educate their own people on the Caliphate Question (see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 12, pp. 727-8).

¹ The South African Muslims were partly descended from nineteenth-century British Indian immigrants and partly from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Dutch East Indian immigrants. The latter element was not of pure blood, but was mixed with European and Hottentot strains. All elements in the South African Muslim community ranked as 'Coloured People'—the intermediate caste among the three castes into which South African society under the Union was divided.

² In contrast to this the Turkish and Afghan Governments and the Russian Muslim community sent delegations to the Mecca Congress (see Part III, Section (v) (d) below). The non-representation of Persia at either congress was natural, since Persia was a Shi'i country. The Cairo Congress did, however, prevail upon the Persian Government to appoint an unofficial observer (*Revue du Monde Musulman*, num. cit., p. 73; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, p. 269).

³ *Revue du Monde Musulman*, num. cit., p. 48.

⁴ For the actual proceedings of the Congress see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 265-72, and *Revue du Monde Musulman*, num. cit., pp. 46-122.

1, 2, and 3, and points 5, 6, and 7 in the agenda of the 25th April, 1926.¹

The First Committee resolved by twelve votes to one (Ath-Tha'ālibī Efendī alone dissenting) to propose that the sittings of the Congress should be secret. It also resolved to propose that the Congress should record a formal protest against the bombardment of the Maydān quarter of Damascus by the French forces on the 7th May, 1926²—though this resolution was not passed without vigorous opposition from members who urged that intervention of this kind in current political affairs was beyond the scope of the Congress and would not raise but lower its prestige. The former proposal was rejected by the plenary Congress, which decided (on the 19th May, at its fourth and last session !) to admit a representative of the Egyptian Press Syndicate.³ The proposal to record a protest against the Maydān affair was adopted, though there was a sharp division of opinion on this question in the plenary sitting also.⁴

The Second Committee, after resolving to examine the three points submitted to it by reference to the opinions of the classical Doctors of the Islamic Law, to the exclusion of independent interpretation,⁵ presented a report⁶ which faithfully reproduced the academic expositions of Al-Māwardī and his brethren in matters on which there was no difference of traditional opinion, while in regard to matters on which the Doctors disagreed they were content to note their discrepancy without attempting to decide between them. They noted the fact of discrepancy in regard to three questions : Was it indispensable for the Caliph himself to possess the faculty of *Ijtihād* ? Was it indispensable for him to belong to the Quraysh ? Was it indispensable for him to be of good character ?

The reading of this report at the third plenary sitting of the Congress, on the 18th May, gave rise to an interesting debate in which the protagonists were Ath-Tha'ālibī Efendī and Shaykh Muhammadu'l-Ahmadīyu'l-Zawāhirī, the Director of the Religious Estab-

¹ See p. 84 above.

² See pp. 451-2 below.

³ *Revue du Monde Musulman*, num. cit., p. 98.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 98-100.

⁵ This distinction of methods was traditional in Islamic theological study. The passive reproduction of the opinions of the classical Doctors (corresponding to the Christian Fathers) was called *Taglid* ; the exercise of independent judgement in interpreting the *Shari'ah* was called *Ijtihād*. The same distinction existed in Jewry in the time of Christ, who drew attention to himself by speaking with authority (i. e. exercising *Ijtihād*) and not as the scribes (who were exponents of *Taglid*).

⁶ Text in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, num. cit., pp. 73-7.

lishments at As-Siyūt in Upper Egypt,¹ who had served on the Second Committee.

It is not sufficient [Ath-Tha'ālībī Efendī submitted] to examine the question from the purely theoretical point of view. Some account must be taken of the necessities of circumstances and places, of the influence exerted upon Islamic institutions by the policies of certain foreign Powers. . . . If you affirm principles which are not susceptible of application in our epoch, what will be the consequence ?

We have confined ourselves [Shaykh Zāwāhirī retorted] to investigating the principles admitted by the recognized doctrines of Islam. As for the application of these principles, it is for you to declare that that is beyond our competence. . . . It is dangerous for Islam to raise the question of the applicability, at one epoch rather than another, of the dispositions of the *Shari'ah*. We feel that the application of the general principles of religion ought to be subject to no exceptions ; and we consider that there is no occasion to establish new conditions in deference to the exigencies of the age.

It was noteworthy that in this debate Ath-Tha'ālībī Efendī was supported by Shaykh Asadu'sh-Shukayrī, one of the delegates from Palestine, who argued that *Ijtihād* was not extinct, and cited as an example a *fatwā* rendered by an ex-Shaykhul-Islām of Egypt, Muhammad Bakhīt (himself a member of the Congress), in which he had pronounced that photography did not break the commandment forbidding the representation of the human form. Shaykh Muhammad Bakhīt thereupon rose to confirm the survival of *Ijtihād*, and at the same time to explain it away by the proposition that 'in our times the *mujtahid*² can only arrive at the same deductions as the Ancients and would find himself unable to depart from what they had said or written'.³

In the fourth and last plenary sitting of the Congress, on the 19th May, the report of the Second Committee was adopted ; but the consequences foreshadowed by Ath-Tha'ālībī Efendī immediately became apparent when the report of the Third Committee on the last three points of the agenda was heard. The Third Committee, which had worked under the Chairmanship of Sayyid 'Abdu'l-Hamīdu'l-Bakrī, the Head of the Religious Fraternities in Egypt, advised that

¹ Shaykh Zāwāhirī belonged to the Shāfi'iyah School of traditional interpretation of the *Shari'ah*.

² *Mujtahid* (participle) = Exerciser of *Ijtihād* (infinitive).

³ Incidentally, Shaykh Bakhīt threw another apple of discord into the Congress by remarking that 'it would be impossible to maintain that the Caliphate is exclusively spiritual, as it has been said to be by the heretics'. When the minutes of the third sitting were read at the opening of the fourth, Ath-Tha'ālībī Efendī asked that the word 'heretics' should be expunged, but he was overruled.

the Caliphate according to the Islamic Law, fulfilling all the conditions laid down for it in the Scriptures, as summarized in the Report of the First Commission which has been approved at the fourth sitting of the Congress—the most important of the said conditions being ability to defend the possessions of the Faith in all Islamic countries and to put into execution the precepts of the Islamic Law—is incapable of realization at the present time, in view of the situation in which Muslims find themselves.

In reply to the question what action should be taken in this eventuality the Third Committee suggested that the Administrative Council of the Congress at Cairo should be maintained in being, on the understanding that it should establish branches in the several Islamic countries and should keep in touch with such branches with a view to convening successive congresses, as need might arise, to examine the question of the Caliphate and arrive at a decision in consonance with the dignity of the office.¹

This report damped the spirits of the Congress and was deprecated by Shaykh Zawāhirī as 'a funeral oration upon Islam'. The Shaykh exhorted his colleagues not to adopt a conclusion so discouraging to the Islamic World, and to assert instead that a Caliphate fulfilling all the prescribed conditions was still a possibility. On the motion of a Palestinian delegate the Congress decided not to communicate to the press a certain passage in the Third Committee's explanatory memorandum; and, on the motion of Shaykh Zawāhirī, it adopted the following order of the day:

The Congress has decided:

That the Islamic Caliphate in conformity with the prescriptions of the *Shari'ah* is capable of realization;

That it is the duty of Muslims in all parts of the world to prepare the ways and means for this and to take the necessary measures to this effect;

That it is desirable to avoid, in this regard, anything which might create division among Muslims;

That to this end it is indispensable that all the Islamic peoples should be represented adequately at an assembly—to be held in a country which shall be chosen by the delegates of the Islamic peoples—in which the delegates of the Islamic peoples shall meet to discuss the measures to be taken with a view to the establishment of the Caliphate fulfilling all the conditions prescribed by the *Shari'ah*;

That all the Islamic peoples are not completely represented at the present Congress;

¹ The memorandum in which the Third Committee set forth the considerations on which its report was based was the most interesting document produced by the Congress. For French and Italian translations of the text see *Revue du Monde Musulman*, num. cit., pp. 105–9, and *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 272–3 respectively. An English translation is printed in the Appendix to the present volume.

And finally

That this Congress makes an appeal to all the Muslims in the World and exhorts them not to neglect the question of the Caliphate, which is the soul and the manifestation of Islam, but to work together for the establishment of the Caliphate under the conditions indicated above, and thus to accomplish one of their essential duties.

This order of the day was adopted by the plenary Congress (Shaykh Muhammad Bakhīt alone dissenting), with the annotation that the delegates who had taken part in the present congress had expressed the desire that the next congress likewise should be held in Cairo.

Therewith the first Caliphate Congress broke up,¹ without fixing a date for the second. The able members of the Third Committee might console themselves for the rejection of their report with the reflection that possibly, after all, it was they who had said the last word in the oldest of all Islamic controversies.

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¹ The Congress declined, on the ground that this was outside its purview, to consider a motion, brought forward at the last moment by Shaykh Zawāhiri, for demanding the dismissal of Professor Taha Husayn (the author of the Essay on pre-Islamic Poetry, referred to in the preceding section) from his Chair in the University of Egypt.

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PART II

NORTH-WEST AFRICA (1920-6)

Introduction.

NORTH-WEST AFRICA or Al-Maghrib ('the West' of the Islamic World), together with the islands, seas, and steppes which it partly commanded, had repeatedly changed hands between conflicting civilizations.¹ Severed from Western Europe by the Mediterranean and from the Middle East and Tropical Africa by the Sahara it was itself virtually an island which served as a stepping stone between the larger regions around it. In climate and physiography its closest affinities were with the adjoining parts of Europe, with the inhabitants of which the modern populations of North-West Africa appeared to be more closely akin in physical race than with those of the other parts of the African Continent.² In civilization, on the other hand, North-West Africa, throughout recorded history, had been more closely and continuously connected with the Middle East; and, down to the period under review in this volume, European ascendancy there, though repeatedly asserted, had invariably proved transitory.

¹ See E. A. Freeman: *Historical Essays*, Third Series, x: *Sicilian Cycles* (2nd edition, London, 1892, Macmillan).

² Traces of a common racial name are preserved in different forms from widely separated dates in several languages (*Mashawasha* in Ancient Egyptian, *Maxyes* in Ancient Greek, *Byzac[ene]* and *Mazices* in Latin, *Amāzigh* in the modern Berber dialect of the Rif, and *Imōshaqh* in the language of the Tawāriq nomads of the Sahara); but though these traces thus appear in every part of North-West Africa, and this as far back as the thirteenth century B. C., it is impossible to say whether they represent the original name of one of the primitive stocks of the region, while it is certain that the population of North-West Africa is no less mixed than that of Europe. Though all existing elements (with the exception of a negligible infusion of negroes) belong to the White Race, they range, as in Europe, between the extreme types of blondes and brunettes. The Egyptian monuments of the thirteenth century B. C. represent the Libyans as a blond race; and according to Ch. Tissot (*Géographie de la Province Romaine de l'Afrique*, vol. i, p. 403), quoted by Th. Mommsen (*The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, English translation of 1886, vol. ii, p. 305), upwards of a third of the modern inhabitants of Morocco are blondes, the proportion rising as high as two-thirds among the Rifis domiciled in Tangier. Physically, therefore, the population of North-West Africa seems to show closer affinities with the population of Europe than with that of North-East Africa, notwithstanding the fact that the Berber language belongs to the Hamitic group, like Ancient Egyptian, Coptic, Galla, Somali, and other pre-Semitic languages of the Nile Basin and Somaliland, and that the Hamitic and Semitic groups themselves are traceable to a common root.

After having first been won for Oriental civilization by the Phœnician pioneers the region was conquered for Hellenism by the Romans ; but it was reattached to the Middle East by the Arabs, and thereafter—in spite of half-hearted lodgements on its coasts which were made by the Sicilian Normans in the twelfth century after Christ and by the Portuguese and Spaniards in the fifteenth and sixteenth—it remained on the whole singularly impervious to European penetration until the nineteenth century. Down to the close of the Napoleonic Wars the Barbary Corsairs took tribute from Western shipping in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and it was in reprisal for this piracy that an effective European penetration began again (after an interval of more than 1,100 years since the extinction of the Byzantine régime by the Arabs) with the French descent upon Algeria in 1830.

The lateness of this date may seem strange, considering that the nations of Western Europe had long since taken a firm hold of regions so far afield as India and the Americas, and considering further that North-West Africa, besides being so much nearer home, occupied a key position, commanding the Mediterranean water-route from Western Europe to the East as well as the Saharan overland-route from the southern shores of the Mediterranean to Tropical Africa. The truth is that, fully three centuries before France began to build up her North-West African Empire, the Spaniards and Portuguese had been on the verge of conquering Al-Maghrib—carrying their long-sustained offensive against Islam from the Iberian Peninsula across the Straits of Gibraltar—when they hit upon the easier alternative of outflanking it. Before they had conquered more than the nearest corner of Western Morocco the Portuguese reached Tropical Africa and the Indian Ocean by sea, and the conquest of the Atlantic deflected the remaining energies of the Peninsular peoples towards the New World. Thus Al-Maghrib obtained a respite from Western penetration because, for three centuries, it failed to maintain its normally commanding position. In the course of the nineteenth century, however, it was restored to that position by two events : the consolidation of a British Empire in India, which led to the reopening of the short cut from Western Europe to the East via the Mediterranean ; and the penetration of Tropical Africa by the West European nations (who, so long as India and the Americas had absorbed their energies, had been content to establish ports of call and shipment along the Tropical African coasts and to leave the interior to Muslim pioneers). These two events suddenly

brought North-West Africa back into the mid-stream of international affairs, and a West European intrusion immediately began—the lead, this time, being taken not by Spain or Portugal but by France, who established her empire simultaneously over Al-Maghrib and the nearest parts of Tropical Africa.

The fortunes of Al-Maghrib were now reversed. Instead of being the least westernized portion of the Islamic World she rapidly fell under Western ascendancy to a much greater extent than the Middle East—partly on account of her geographical proximity to Western Europe and partly because in Al-Maghrib Islamic civilization was comparatively weak and backward and therefore relatively less capable than elsewhere of holding its own against foreign penetration. During the half-century which ended with the coming into force of the Versailles Treaty on the 10th January, 1920, there seemed even less prospect of an Islamic revival in Al-Maghrib than in other parts of the Islamic World, and the region was the theatre of an international struggle, not between the West and Islam, but between the Great Powers of the West among themselves.

In the period under review North-West Africa continued to be a focus of international conflicts, but the scene underwent a striking change. With the total exclusion of Germany from Moroccan affairs, which was effected in the Versailles Treaty,¹ the Franco-German conflict, which had previously dominated the North-West African stage, was finally closed in France's favour. Italy, as the newly-established sovereign of Libya and the mother-country of the majority of the European settlers in Tunisia, might dream of eventually taking up Germany's role ;² Great Britain and Spain might resist, more or less effectively, the extension of French ascendancy over the Mediterranean coast of Morocco and over Tangier ;³ while Spain and Italy might hint at a *rapprochement* between the two weaker Latin Powers of the Mediterranean in demonstrations such as the Spanish Royal Visit to Italy in November 1923. Nevertheless it was evident that, as between the Powers of the West, the struggle for North-West Africa had been decided in favour of France ; and that if a Western dominion over North-West Africa were to be consolidated that dominion would be hers. At the very moment, however, when France triumphed decisively over her Western rivals, the general ascendancy of the Western world over Al-Maghrib was challenged—suddenly and unexpectedly—by the native peoples.

¹ Part IV, Section V, Articles 141–6.

² See Section (xi) below.

³ See Sections (i) and (ix) below.

The contemporary dual movement in the Middle East, in favour of the adoption of Western ideas and institutions but in revolt against political and economic control by Western Powers, had its counterpart in the Islamic West. The tribes of the Libyan hinterland proved themselves as unconquerable, on their own ground, as the tribes of Arabia; the Nationalist agitations in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria found an echo in Tunisia and Algeria; and in July 1921, when the militant resistance offered by the Turks, under Mustafā Kemāl Bey, to the Greeks and their Western patrons was reaching its climax, the Rifis, under 'Abdu'l-Karīm, struck the first signal blow in their war against the Spaniards and the French in Morocco.¹

From several points of view the successful uprising of the Rifis was a greater portent than that of the Turks. The Rifis were a smaller people, more ignorant than the Turks of Western technique and much less well versed in the Western arts of war and diplomacy; and at the same time they were challenging more formidable opponents. Spain—as a Western nation, twenty millions strong, with a great military past—was a more dangerous adversary for the Rif than Greece was for Turkey; and, after Spain, the Rifis had to deal with France, who, with her North-African Empire at stake, was bound to intervene in Northern Morocco much more vigorously than Great Britain intervened to avert or retrieve the Greek disaster in Anatolia.

From the year 1921 onwards the reaction of the native peoples of Al-Maghrib against Western ascendancy began to replace the rivalries of the Western Powers as the dominant issue in North-West African affairs.

(i) The Reaction of the North-West African Peoples against Western Ascendancy.

In order to appreciate the significance of this movement, which dominated the North-West African stage in 1925, two facts must be noted at the outset.

In the first place the reaction of the native peoples of Al-Maghrib against Western ascendancy originally declared itself, not against the French, who, from 1830 onwards, had taken the leading part in the Western penetration of the region, but against the Spaniards and the Italians, who stepped into the arena late in the day (in 1909 and 1911 respectively) and on sufferance from the leading

¹ See Section (v) below.

Western Powers. Italy and Spain were only permitted to gratify their imperial ambitions at the south-eastern and north-western extremities of Al-Maghrib, in districts which greater Powers did not covet for themselves—partly because the natural resources were too scanty and the inhabitants too warlike and partly because, in the case of the district which became the Spanish Zone of Morocco, the potential strategic value of the position was so high that no Great Power could afford to let it pass under another Great Power's control. Spain and Italy had not the strength of mind to reject the crumbs thus thrown to them from rich men's tables ; and, in the event, all parties suffered—the Great Powers for their selfishness and the lesser for their rashness—since the Italians and Spaniards rapidly incurred disasters which lowered the prestige and weakened the position in North-West Africa of the Western World as a whole, and which ultimately caused particular damage to France, who had acquired a far larger stake in the region than any other Western State.¹ The mountaineers of the Rif and the nomads of the Libyan hinterland, who proved formidable opponents for French and British troops when they came into collision with them, were more than a match for the Spanish and Italian armies, and they soon learnt Napoleon's secret of making war pay its own way by distraining upon their nominal protectors or sovereigns for arms, munitions, money, and all the elaborate equipment on which Western armies had learnt to depend in the War of 1914–18. Fitted out with this equipment, experienced in the art of war on their own *terrain*, and elated by their victories over the Spaniards, the Rifis ventured to turn their arms against the French ; and at the same time a Nationalist movement became perceptible among the more civilized populations of Tunisia and Algeria, who had long been living under the French dominion.

The second point to note is that this reaction against French ascendancy in North-West Africa did not break out (as might have

¹ There was a striking parallel here to the rise of Nationalism in South-Eastern Europe during the preceding century. At the close of the general war of 1792–1815 the whole of South-Eastern Europe was still under the dominion of the three Empires of the Hapsburgs, Romanovs, and 'Osmanlis. The first independent national states were created at the expense of the weakest of the three Empires—the Ottoman Empire—and it was only when it had secured a base of operations in former Ottoman territory that South-East European Nationalism became a menace to Austria-Hungary and Russia. Similarly, after the general war of 1914–18 the younger Nationalism of the North-West African peoples won its spurs in conflict with the Italians and Spaniards before it threw down the gauntlet to the far more formidable empire of France.

been expected) during the War of 1914–18, when France was fighting for her life on her own invaded soil in Europe. During the year 1914 the French occupied the Tāzā corridor between the two unsubdued highlands of the Rif in the north and the Atlas in the south-east of Morocco, thus linking up the lowlands along the Atlantic coast, which they had occupied effectively already, with their older dominions in Algeria and Tunisia. Throughout the European War Marshal Lyautey, the French Resident-General in Morocco, continued to increase the area of effective French occupation year by year (though naturally at a slower pace than before);¹ and meanwhile White African troops from Al-Maghrib, as well as Black African troops from the Western Sudan, fought loyally for France against Germany on the European Front, went into garrison in the Rhineland after the Armistice, and subsequently took part in the invasion of the Ruhr. Such attempts as the Germans made to undermine the loyalty of these Maghribis appear to have met with little success, notwithstanding the fact that Germany was the ally and France the opponent of the Ottoman Empire, which was at that time the leading Power in the Islamic World. It was not until after the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, that France began to encounter serious native opposition to her ascendancy in North-West Africa.²

(ii) The Genesis of the French, Spanish, and Italian Titles to Sovereignty or Control in North-West Africa.

Before tracing the course of this native opposition which declared itself ultimately against France, but first against Italy and Spain, it will be convenient to recapitulate briefly the genesis of the several dominions held by Western Powers in North-West Africa, as they existed at the beginning of the year 1920. For this purpose it is unnecessary to discuss the complicated and controversial history of the Franco-German diplomatic struggle over Morocco, since, under the Versailles Treaty (Arts. 141–6), Germany had been excluded, at least for the time being, from any participation in Moroccan affairs.

Before the 14th June, 1830, when the French troops landed on

¹ See I. Bowman: *The New World*, map on page 108 (2nd edition, London, 1924, Harrap). Between the 1st January, 1914, and the 1st July, 1917, the effectively occupied area was increased from 163,000 to 235,000 square kilometres (Foreign Office Peace Handbook, No. 101, *French Morocco*).

² Compare the experience of Great Britain in Egypt (*H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 193–205).

the Algerian coast, the only Western holdings in North-West Africa had been the four Spanish *presidios* of Ceuta (Sabta), Peñon de Velez de la Gomera, Alhucemas, and Melilla along the northern (that is, the Mediterranean) coast of Morocco. Two of these holdings were island rocks; Melilla, though on the mainland, was cut off from the interior by the mountains of the Rif; and even Ceuta was less favourably situated, as a base for the penetration of the Moroccan lowlands, than Tangier, Rabât or Casablanca. These Spanish holdings were mere relics of Spanish colonial policy in the sixteenth century after Christ, and it was not till 1909 that Spain, under the stimulus of French expansion in the vicinity, attempted to advance beyond them.¹

Between 1830 and that date the Western penetration of Al-Maghrib was conducted entirely by France. She conquered Algeria, up to the northern border of the Sahara, between 1830 and 1847. She established a protectorate over Tunisia (with the approval of the German and British representatives at the Berlin Conference of 1878²) by the Franco-Tunisian Treaties of the 12th May, 1881,³ and the 8th June, 1883⁴ (instruments which empowered France not only to take over the conduct of the foreign relations of Tunisia, but to occupy and administer the country). She began to occupy Morocco (from the Algerian border and from the Atlantic coast simultaneously) in March 1907, after the international Algeciras Conference of the 16th January–7th April, 1906; and her effective establishment in the lowlands of the Atlantic sea-board was completed by the occupation of Fez (Fās) in April 1911, and of Marrākish in September 1912.

The French occupation of Morocco (unlike the previous occupations of Algeria and Tunisia) gave rise to prolonged and often acute diplomatic controversies, and it was not till she had come to terms with Great Britain, Spain, and Germany that France was able to place her protectorate over Morocco on the juridical basis of a treaty with the Sultan. French commitments to Germany regarding Morocco having been liquidated in the Versailles Treaty (Arts. 141–6), the treaty obligations by which France was still bound during the period beginning on the 10th January, 1920, were briefly

¹ The Spaniards began to advance into the interior from Melilla in 1909 and from the Atlantic coast between Tangier and Al-'Arā'ish in 1911.

² As a *quid pro quo* Great Britain obtained French recognition for her occupation of Cyprus.

³ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxxii, 1880–1.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, vol. lxxiv, 1882–3.

as follows.¹ In a public Anglo-French Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco, which was signed on the 8th April, 1904, Great Britain, in return for corresponding French concessions in regard to Egypt, had recognized that it appertained to France to preserve order in Morocco and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, and financial reforms which that country might require ; but the scope thus given to France by Great Britain had been limited by certain conditions. Existing British treaty rights in Morocco were to stand ; there was to be no fiscal discrimination ; ‘ in order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar ’ a stretch of Moroccan coast, comprised between, but not including, Melilla on the Mediterranean and the right bank of the River Sabu on the Atlantic, was to remain unfortified ;² and France was to come to an understanding with Spain in regard to Spain’s Moroccan interests. In the third of the secret articles attached to this public declaration the Spanish Zone of influence was equated with the hinterland of the littoral which was not to be fortified, and it was stipulated that Spain would have to undertake not to alienate any of the territory thus placed under her authority, while in the fourth secret article it was agreed that the Anglo-French Declaration should stand, even if Spain declined to accede to it. Spain did, however, accede in a Franco-Spanish Declaration of the 3rd October, 1904 ; and, in a secret Franco-Spanish Convention of the same date, the limits of the future Spanish Zone in Northern Morocco were defined (Art. 2).³ In virtue of these understandings, and others to which Germany was a party, France and Spain began to occupy portions of their respective Zones—France in 1907 and Spain in 1909—though at these dates neither party was authorized to do so by any formal agreement with the juridical sovereign of the country. As far as France was concerned her occupation was given juridical sanction, *post eventum*, by the Franco-Moroccan Treaty signed at Fez on the 30th March, 1912, which not only placed France in control of the Sultan’s foreign relations, but gave her the initiative in introducing internal reforms ; empowered her to carry out the military occupation of Moroccan territory at her discretion ; and bound her to ‘ lend a constant support to his Sharifian Majesty

¹ For texts of the principal relevant diplomatic documents see Foreign Office Peace Handbook, No. 101, *French Morocco*, Appendix. The stipulations regarding Tangier are dealt with separately in Section (ix) below.

² With the express exception of the existing Spanish *presidios*.

³ And also, though less precisely, those of a Spanish Zone at the southwestern extremity of Morocco.

against any danger which might threaten his person or his throne, or which might compromise the tranquillity of his dominions'. This treaty was negotiated by the French Government with the legal sovereign of the whole of Morocco and without any express territorial limitations, except for a saving clause in regard to Tangier and a provision that the French Government should come to an agreement with the Spanish Government in regard to Spanish interests in Morocco. This provision was carried out by the signature of a new Franco-Spanish Convention at Madrid on the 27th November, 1912, the first article of which opened as follows :

The Government of the French Republic recognizes that, in the Spanish Zone of Influence, it appertains to Spain to watch over (*il appartient à l'Espagne de veiller à*) the tranquillity of the said zone and to lend her assistance to the Moroccan Government for the introduction of all administrative, economic, financial, judicial, and military reforms which it may need.

The Spanish Zone was to be administered by a Khalifah or representative of the Sultan of Morocco under the control of a Spanish High Commissioner (the respective attributions of these two functionaries being modelled on those of the Sultan and the French High Commissioner as laid down in the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of the 30th March, 1912). The Sultan's Government was to bear no responsibility for the Khalifah's administration. Spain undertook not to alienate any part of her Zone (Art. 5). The non-fortification of the littoral between Melilla and the River Sabu, and the special treatment of Tangier, were again provided for (Arts. 6 and 7) ; and the limits of the second Spanish Zone in the south-west were more precisely defined (Art. 3).

This agreement was evidently more advantageous to France than to Spain. It based the juridical position of Spain in the Spanish Zone, not upon a direct contract between the Spanish Government and the Sultan of Morocco, who was still the legal sovereign of the territory (as the position of France in her Zone was based upon the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of the 30th March, 1912), but upon a contract with a third party to whom the Sultan had given a power of attorney for that purpose. In other terms the Sultan had leased the whole of his territory to France and France had sub-leased a portion of it to Spain with his previous sanction. At the same time France had divested her protégé (and, by implication, herself) of responsibility for the administration of the sub-leased territory and had transferred this responsibility to Spain (at least, according

to one interpretation of the text of the first article of the Franco-Spanish Agreement of the 27th November, 1912).

This was the juridical position of Spain in Morocco at the beginning of 1920. It remains to recall how Italy acquired the title which she possessed at that date in Libya.¹

Having obtained the preliminary acquiescence of France and Great Britain in an eventual Italian occupation of the two Ottoman Vilāyets of Tripoli and Benghazi (Cyrenaica) as far back as the years 1901-2, Italy declared war upon Turkey on the 29th September, 1911, and landed troops on the Libyan coast on the 5th October. The Italian Government proclaimed the annexation of the two provinces in a royal decree of the 5th November, 1911; but, in the public peace treaty between Italy and Turkey which was signed at Ouchy on the 18th October, 1912, it was simply provided that the Ottoman troops and officials should evacuate the provinces, while, in the secret preliminary agreement signed at the same place three days earlier, the Ottoman Sultan, as Caliph, was allowed to retain the Muslim ecclesiastical patronage of Tripoli and Benghazi in his hands.² Thus no formal transfer of sovereignty was made on this occasion, and the Italian annexation remained a unilateral act of the Italian Government until Turkey expressly renounced the rights which she had retained in 1912 under Article 22 of the Lausanne Treaty, which was signed on the 24th July, 1923, and came into force on the 6th August, 1924.

(iii) The Reaction against the Italians in Libya.

The Italian landing on the Libyan coast on the 5th October, 1911, opened a new era in North-West African history. It was a patent act of aggression and it was committed at a time when the Islamic World was just beginning to reacquire a common consciousness (thanks to the new Western mechanisms of communication). Muslim opinion everywhere was aroused, and at the same time Turkey, the sovereign of the invaded provinces, quickly discovered that her most effective means of fighting the Italians was to arm and organize the native Arab and Berber population. The resistance thus aroused in an arid and inhospitable country was so vigorous that, from 1911 to the time of writing, the Italians never succeeded in completely pacifying their new dominion.³ The Sanūsīyah Religious Fraternity,

¹ See Foreign Office Peace Handbook, No. 127, *Italian Libya*.

² See Part I, Section (ii), p. 35 above.

³ See Foreign Office Peace Handbook, No. 127, for a more detailed account

which controlled the oases in the interior of Libya, entered the lists against Italy in 1914; and in the summer of 1915, after Italy's intervention in the Great War, the people of Libya, under Turkish and Sanūsī leadership, drove the Italians back to half-a-dozen points on the coast, the Grand-Sanūsī Ahmad himself taking up his quarters at the coast town of Sallūm, which had been the westernmost Egyptian post towards the Libyan border.¹ On the 14th April, 1917, British and Italian representatives signed with Sayyid Idrīs, the insubordinate lieutenant in Cyrenaica of Sayyid Ahmadu's-Sanūsī, two separate agreements² which restored peaceful relations between the two Powers and one faction in the Order without entering into the questions of sovereignty or frontiers.

Nevertheless, the resistance of the tribes in the interior was maintained, and continued after the termination of the General War. The Italian Government failed to bring them to terms by promulgating in 1919 new statutes for the two provinces, under which the inhabitants were to become Italian citizens and were to receive parliamentary institutions (though not full parliamentary self-government);³ and in February 1922 the Italians (who had hardly recovered any ground since the disasters of 1915) set out to reassert their authority by force of arms. The western littoral of Tripolitania was reconquered in April 1922; Gharian, in the immediate western hinterland, in November 1922; parts of the central littoral in February 1923; and the port of Misurata in March 1923. Yet the remainder of Tripolitania and the greater part of Cyrenaica was still unsubdued; in the autumn of 1923 contumacious tribesmen advanced to within fifteen miles of Misurata; the immediate hinterland of that port was only occupied at the close of the year;⁴ and the conquest of the Tripolitanian littoral was not completed until the occupation of Sirte on the 23rd November, 1924,⁵ though the oasis of Ghadamas, 500 kilometres south-west of Tripoli Town, at the junction of the Libyan, Tunisian, and Algerian borders,⁶ had been of the military operations between the 5th October, 1911, and the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918.

¹ For the readjustment of the Libyan-Egyptian frontier see Section (xii) below. Strictly, the name of the disputed town should be written Sullam, but it was pronounced Sallūm in colloquial Egyptian Arabic.

² Texts in Foreign Office Peace Handbook, No. 127, Appendix.

³ See C. Schanzer: 'Italian Colonial Policy in North Africa' in *Foreign Affairs of New York*, vol. ii, No. 3, 15th March, 1924; *Oriente Moderno*, Anno IV, p. 357. Down to the time of writing this option of acquiring Italian citizenship appears to have been taken up by very few Libyan Muslims.

⁴ The *Corriere della Sera*, 1st, 7th, and 12th January, 1924.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 26th November, 1924.

⁶ For the rectification of frontier between the Italian and French possessions

occupied on the preceding 17th February.¹ The military situation existing at the close of 1924 had not appreciably altered by the close of the year 1925.² At the latter date Ghât and Fazzân, in the more distant interior of Tripolitania, remained unoccupied, while in Cyrenaica, where desultory fighting had not ceased, the Italian troops were still confined to a few positions on the coast.³

The statute of 1919 relating to Cyrenaica had been repudiated by the Sanūsī and his adherents because it implied the assertion of Italian sovereignty; and this led, after long negotiations, to the replacement of the agreement of 1917 by a new agreement, which was concluded at Regima on the 25th October, 1920. Under this agreement Sayyid Ahmad was to evacuate Cyrenaica in return for an indemnity of 2,000,000 lire (gold) and for his recognition by Italy as the autonomous ruler, under Italian suzerainty, of the oases of Jaghbūb, Aujila, Jalu, and Kafarā. Though he duly received his money Sayyid Ahmad apparently did not carry out his part of the bargain, and in April 1922 he made common cause with the Tripolitani in arms against Italy, who recognized him as their Amīr in August.⁴ Thereafter he fled to Egypt, and in the spring of 1923 the Italians took the offensive and occupied his residence at Agedabia (Ajḍabīyah); but this success was neutralized by a disaster which overtook two Italian columns in June 1923, in an attempt to advance further into the interior, and the work of subduing Cyrenaica had to be started over again.

(iv) The Absence of Concerted Action among the Peoples of North-West Africa.

This failure on the part of Italy, after fourteen years of effort, to occupy effectively more than a portion of the territory in Libya of which she had nominally acquired the sovereignty, dealt the first serious blow to European prestige in this part of the Islamic World;

in North Africa by a Franco-Italian agreement of the 12th September, 1919, see the *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 360-1.

¹ The *Corriere della Sera*, 18th February, 1924.

² For an account of the campaigns of 1922 and 1923, as viewed from the Berber side, see the narrative of Signor P. Gherardi, an Italian national, who was a prisoner in the insurgents' hands from the 26th January, 1922, until the close of the following year. (Extracts and *précis*, in translation, in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, 7 bis, Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, July 1925, from the *Corriere di Tripoli*, issues of March 1924).

³ See F. Lo Bello: 'Les premiers dix ans de l'Occupation italienne en Cyrénaïque', extracts published (in translation) in *L'Afrique Française*, April 1925, from *La Rivista Coloniale*, January-February 1925.

⁴ Texts of their letter of recognition and Sayyid Ahmad's letter of acceptance (13th November, 1922) in Lo Bello, *loc. cit.*

but, by the end of the year 1921, the discomfitures inflicted on the Italian arms by the Libyans were eclipsed by the more sensational reverses which the Spaniards were suffering at the hands of the Rifis at the other extremity of North-West Africa. The activities of the Rifis and the Libyans had a common stimulus in the wave of revolutionary feeling which was passing at this time across the Islamic World and which was manifesting itself simultaneously in the Middle East. At the same time there is no evidence that the reactions of the various peoples of Al-Maghrib against Western domination were deliberately concerted. The inhabitants of this vast region were isolated from one another by many barriers. Apart from the linguistic division between the Arabic and Berber-speaking elements (a division which had relatively little political significance in a society which was hardly yet influenced by the Western conception of linguistic nationality, and in which Arabic was the universal language of administration and culture) there was the ancient estrangement of the nomad from the townsman and the agriculturist, and there was also a geographical differentiation between Morocco (the Islamic Maghribu'l-Aqsā or 'Far West') and the rest of North-West Africa. Unlike Algeria, Tunis, Tripoli, and Benghazi, Morocco had never been incorporated in the Ottoman Empire; and, without being sectaries, the Moroccans (including the Rifis) acknowledged as Caliph, not the Ottoman Sultan at Constantinople, but His Sharifian Majesty of Fez.

It was doubtless probable that a solidarity of feeling among the native peoples of Al-Maghrib would arise as France, who was now the mistress of the greater part of the region, consolidated her empire and improved its internal communications; but throughout the period under review the French hold upon the Tāzā corridor between the Atlas and the Rif, which linked the Atlantic lowlands of Morocco with Algeria and Tunisia, was still precarious, and the three French administrations in these three territories were still working not only on independent but on very different lines. The first co-ordinating conference between the Governor-General of Algeria and the Residents-General of Tunisia and Morocco was held at Algiers on the 7th-10th February, 1923, the second at Rabāt on the 7th-9th April, 1924, and the third on the 22nd-24th March, 1926;¹ but these conferences between French high officials still

¹ At the second conference customs duties, railways, the policing of the Sahara, and intellectual co-operation came under review. See *Le Temps*, 7th and 17th April, 1924; *The Times*, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 23rd April, 1924;

left a great gulf fixed between the French régimes in the three territories. In Algeria, and to a hardly lesser extent in Tunisia, the policy of France from the outset had been assimilation, and since 1881 the littoral of Algeria had been organized into three French departments ranking juridically as integral parts of France herself. In Morocco, on the other hand, a diametrically opposite policy had been initiated, and carried forward with remarkable success, by the brilliant French Resident-General, Marshal Lyautey. Marshal Lyautey took pains to preserve everything that was constructive in the native institutions of the country and to conduct the administration through the agency of the Sultan's Government at the centre and of the hereditary feudal magnates in the interior, especially in the more primitive south.¹ At a time when there was still so much local divergence in the North-West African policy of the paramount Power solidarity between the native peoples was not to be looked for; and thus the general revolutionary wave, which was affecting all these peoples in some degree, produced among them, at this stage, separate and unco-ordinated reactions.

(v) The Reaction against the Spaniards in Morocco (1909-25).

In 1898 Spain, who had been sinking under the weight of her colonial empire for the past three hundred years, was relieved, in spite of herself, of almost the last fragments of it by the United States in the Spanish-American War. Only six years later she took upon her shoulders fresh imperial liabilities under the Franco-Spanish Declaration and Convention of the 3rd October, 1904, in regard to Morocco;² and, as soon as she set out to occupy the new domain thus assigned to her, she found herself face to face with a people even less submissive than the Cubans and far more formidable in arms.

In order to trace the resistance which was encountered by the Spaniards in their Zone of Morocco from 1909 (when they began their attempt to occupy it) onwards, and which gathered momentum there until the French, in turn, began to feel its force in 1925, it is necessary to bear in mind the main topographical features of the country.

The entire western (Atlantic) littoral of Morocco, from the south-

L'Afrique Française, April 1924; *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 4 bis (Supplément to *L'Afrique Française*, April 1926).

¹ See a series of articles published in *L'Afrique Française*, October 1925, on the occasion of Marshal Lyautey's resignation.

² See above, p. 99.

western extremity, where the Atlas Mountains came down to the Atlantic, up to the threshold of the Straits of Gibraltar at Tangier, was fringed by lowlands ; but, north of the Wādī'l-Qūs (the 'River Lukkus'), these lowlands were only about twenty-five miles wide, and all the rest of the Zone assigned to Spain, extending eastward along the Mediterranean littoral to the Algerian frontier, was mountainous. This hill-country fell into two divisions : one range starting from the southern shore of the Straits, just west of Ceuta, and running southwards, roughly parallel to the Atlantic coast, up to the divide between the head-waters of the Wādī'l-Qūs and the Wādī Lau ; and the other range starting from the eastern edge of the Wādī Lau and sweeping thence eastwards in a shallow curve, conforming to the line of the Mediterranean coast, as far as the outskirts of Melilla. The stretch of coast which this easterly range enclosed was known at this time by the natives as the Rif or fertile country (a somewhat ironical name), and the westerly range as the Jibālah or mountain country. The Rif was inhabited by two groups of tribes : on the east the Rifis proper (the leading tribe among them being the Banu Wuryāghal in the immediate hinterland of the Spanish *presidio* on Alhucemas Island) and on the west the Ghumārah. The Ghumārah country was separated from the Jibālah by the line of the Wādī Lau. To the west of this the Jibālah was transversed by a route running southwards from Tatwān (Tetuan), on the left bank of the Wādī Martin six miles above its outflow into the Mediterranean, to Shifshāwan, near the head-waters of the Wādī Lau and only a few miles north of the imaginary line of demarcation between the Spanish Zone and the French. The Jibālah was further articulated, by the Tatwān-Tangier road, into the Jibālah proper, to the south of that line, and the country of the Anjarā and Hawz tribes, in the triangle between Tatwān, Tangier, and Ceuta. From Tangier another route, skirting the Atlantic coast and following the alignment of the future Tangier-Fez Railway,¹ ran through Al-'Arā'ish (Laraiche) and then across the Franco-Spanish border. It may be added that the border was only definite in this Atlantic lowland sector, where from 1911 onwards both the Spaniards and the French had been in effective occupation of their respective territories. Along the rest of its course the border was an imaginary line, described in the diplomatic documents in terms of unsurveyed physical features and unascertained tribal boundaries, and there was a considerable discrepancy between the *tracée* of the line as it appeared on Spanish

¹ See Section (ix) below.

and French maps respectively. The discrepancy was greatest in regard to the right bank or northern half of the basin of the River Wargha; and this was important, since the Wargha itself was a right-bank affluent of the River Sabu which—skirted, as it was, by the route from Rabât to Fez—lay in the heart of the French Zone.

The Spaniards, in setting out to occupy the Zone assigned to them, had to reckon with the character, not only of the country, but of its inhabitants.¹ While the peoples of the Jibālah and the Rif were alike in being warlike and freedom-loving there were important points of difference between them. For example, the tribes of the Jibālah had been Arabized, owing to their proximity to the centres of Islamic culture in the Atlantic lowlands, whereas the Rifis had retained not only their native Berber language, but also the racial name of Amāzigh,² the record of which in North Africa dated back, as has been mentioned above, to the thirteenth century B. C.³ During those centuries when Algeria, Tangier, and Spain formed part of the Roman Empire the Rifis not only maintained their independence but appear in the Roman annals as inveterate raiders of the Spanish provinces across the Straits.⁴ Their *de facto* independence was not diminished by claims to sovereignty over the Rif on the part of the Arab Caliphs, and of the various Islamic dynasties which followed the Caliphs in Morocco, down to the reigning house of the Filālī Sharīfs. At the same time the Rifis were not altogether out of touch with the world, for the very ruggedness of their country, by which their independence was safeguarded, compelled them, like many other mountain peoples, to seek a livelihood abroad. They were not only to be found as wage-earners in Tangier and the

¹ See Commandant M. Bernard: 'Les Tribus de la Zone nord et nord-ouest du Maroc' in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, Nos. 2 and 3 (Supplements to *L'Afrique Française*, February and March 1926); J. Dumaine, *Les Éléments du problème du Rif* in *op. cit.*, No. 2 bis (February 1926).

² The Romans latinized the name as Mazices.

³ See above, p. 92.

⁴ After the Rifis had begun to display their military prowess against Spanish and French troops, English and American antiquarians, informed of their 'Nordic physique', conjectured that they were descendants of the Vandals or the Visigoths, who had survived to cross swords once again with the descendants of the Roman provincials. In reality, neither the Visigoths nor the Vandals, nor the Romans before them, had ever set foot in the Rif. In Morocco the Romans never held more than the littoral of the Straits and the Atlantic lowlands from Ceuta to Rabât, while the Vandals and Visigoths had no holdings there whatever. Tangier and Ceuta were apparently in Roman hands when the Arabs reached the Straits in A. D. 711. (See Th. Mommsen: *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, vol. ii, pp. 321 and 324-5; T. Hodgkin: *Italy and her Invaders*, vol. ii, p. 233; and C. H. Becker in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. ii, p. 371.)

Atlantic lowlands of Morocco, but went annually to reap the harvest in Algeria.¹

The chief port of embarkation for these migrant Rifis was the Spanish *presidio* on the island of Alhucemas, at the mid-point of the Rif coast ;² and thus the tribe of the Banu Wuryāghal, on the mainland opposite Alhucemas—a tribe which was stronger and wealthier than its neighbours,³ because it possessed the only considerable pocket of fertile land in the Rif—was in closer contact than the rest of the Rif with regions under Western rule. This contact led to the discovery, by Western prospectors, that the Banu Wuryāghal district possessed mineral as well as agricultural resources ; and that discovery not only led to the usual competition between prospectors, but gave a potential value to the nominal political jurisdiction over the Rif which appertained to the Sultan of Morocco, in virtue of his traditional title, and to the Spanish Government, in virtue of the Franco-Spanish Conventions of the 3rd October, 1904, and the 27th November, 1912. The pioneer prospectors in the Banu Wuryāghal country were the German brothers Mannesmann.⁴ They entered first into direct relations with the head of the ruling family in the tribe, 'Abdu'l-Karīmu'l-Khattābī.⁵ Indeed, without the sanction of the tribal chief, who was the *de facto* local sovereign, they could not have prospected at all. At the same time they sought to strengthen their juridical position by securing a concession from the reigning Sultan of Morocco in October 1909 ; and after the Spanish Protectorate had been established juridically by the Franco-Spanish Convention of the 27th November, 1912, they tried to come to terms with Spain. Seeing that the Spaniards set store by their newly acquired political rights in Morocco, yet shrank from the formidable task of making their juridical authority effective in the Rif, the brothers Mannesmann proposed to the Spanish Government

¹ Statement by M. Painlevé in the French Chamber on the 28th May, 1925. M. Briand, on the same occasion, estimated the average annual volume of this seasonal immigration at 40,000 to 50,000 persons, while, on the 9th July, 1925, the deputy for Oran declared in the Chamber that in that very summer, when France and the Rif were at war, the number of Riffi harvesters in Algeria was greater than ever.

² M. Léon Rollin in *Le Temps*, 2nd June, 1925.

³ It was estimated that the Banu Wuryāghal accounted for 10,000 out of 30,000 households in the Rif proper (excluding the Ghumārah country), though they were only one of fourteen tribes or fractions of tribes domiciled in this territory (Bernard, *op. cit.*).

⁴ For the history of mineral prospecting in the Rif see *L'Afrique Française*, October 1921 ; *Le Temps*, 2nd June, 28th July, and 5th September, 1925 ; and the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20th June and 22nd September, 1925.

⁵ i. e. descendant of the second Caliph 'Umaru'bnu'l-Khattāb. The genealogy was no doubt fictitious.

that it should charter a company, to be promoted by them, and that this company should take advantage of the local goodwill which the brothers Mannesmann had already secured in order to open up the Rif and the Jibālah economically in agreement with the tribes themselves. This proposal was rejected by Spain; and on the 19th and 20th January, 1914, the Sultan of Morocco, acting on the initiative of France as protecting Power and in pursuance of Article 112 of the Algéiras Act of the 7th April, 1906, issued two *dāhirs* setting up an Arbitral Commission to settle disputed mineral claims through the whole juridical extent of his dominions.¹

The work of the Arbitral Commission was interrupted by the General War of 1914–18, and after being resumed in April 1919 was finally completed on the 1st June, 1922. The Mannesmann Concession was pronounced by the Arbitral Commission to be without legal validity—in respect of the Spanish Zone by a decision of the 29th February, 1920, and in respect of the French Zone by a decision of the 16th February of the same year.² Already, however, the Mannesmann brothers, convinced that the defeat of Germany in the General War had placed them at too great a disadvantage to carry on their Moroccan enterprises in their own right, had retired into the background, and their project was taken up by a Spanish industrialist, Señor Echevarrieta of Bilboa. Whether or not Señor Echevarrieta had an understanding with the Mannesmann brothers or had been made privy to the results of their researches, at any rate he inherited the goodwill of the Khattābī family, which they had first acquired. His agents, a Spanish ex-officer named Got, and a Moroccan named Idris b. Sa'id, were actually in negotiation with the then chief of the Banu Wuryāghal, the celebrated Muhammad 'Abdu'l-Karīmu'l-Khattābī, when General Silvestre started on his ill-fated march to Anwāl in July 1921; ³ and in January 1923 Señor

¹ For the history of this Arbitral Commission see *L'Afrique Française*, June 1922, and *Le Temps*, 5th September, 1925.

² Meanwhile it had been provided in Article 144 of the Versailles Treaty that mining rights which might be recognized as belonging to German nationals by the Arbitral Commission should be valued by the latter, and that these rights, like other German property in Morocco, should be treated on the general principles applicable under the treaty to German property abroad. Accordingly, the Arbitral Commission, having granted prospecting permits to thirteen German firms, made a valuation of six of them, but left the remaining seven unvalued, because they lay in an area in which the Sultan's Government had declined to guarantee the personal safety of foreign travellers, and were therefore somewhat nebulous assets. Since Spain was not a signatory of the Versailles Treaty, the Germans contended that the treaty did not apply to the Spanish Zone in Morocco without the Spanish Government's express consent.

³ See p. 115 below.

Echevarrieta himself negotiated successfully with Muhammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm for the ransoming of the Spanish prisoners.¹ His business plans, however, were upset by the breach between his own Government and 'Abdu'l-Karīm.²

Meanwhile, 'Abdu'l-Karīmū'l-Khattābī had come to the conclusion that his tribe possessed valuable economic assets and that, if they were to hold their own in negotiating with Western *entrepreneurs* for the exploitation of them, some members of the ruling family of the Khattābī must themselves acquire Western technical knowledge.³

Believing that he could not obtain his ends without the assistance of a European nation, he chose Spain, because she was the nearest and the likeliest to us in national character. He wished for union with her and was preparing for the acceptance of a true protectorate. This protectorate was to preserve to the Moroccans their usages, customs and laws. The military occupation was to place force at the disposal, and under the orders, of the native authorities.⁴

His first step was to send his younger son, Mahammad, to Malaga, to take a University course, and thence to Madrid, to study mining engineering. His elder son, Muhammad,⁵ who had studied the Arabic humanities at Fez, settled in the Spanish *presidio* of Melilla, where he became Qādī of the local Islamic community, editor of a newspaper called *El Telegrama del Rif*, and also, apparently, adviser on native affairs to the Spanish authorities. These good relations ceased, however, long before the Spaniards attempted the military occupation of the Banu Wuryāghal territory.

'Abdu'l-Karīm became disillusioned with the Spanish protectorate through his experiences in dealing with the officers by whom Spain was represented in Morocco. In 1915 he complained to the Spanish and Moroccan Governments and was told to place himself in the

¹ See p. 119 below.

² Thereafter, in the spring of 1925, it was rumoured that an Anglo-American group, headed by Mr. Otto Kahn, had approached the Spanish Government regarding a new project for a chartered company, which, if reported correctly, virtually reproduced the Mannesmann project of 1913 on a more ambitious scale. (*Le Temps*, 5th September, and the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* 22nd September, 1925.) The truth of the rumour was denied categorically by Mr. Kahn.

³ For the personal history of 'Abdu'l-Karīmū'l-Khattābī and his two sons, Muhammad, the elder, who made the family name of 'Abdu'l-Karīm famous in his own person, and Mahammad, the younger, see a remarkable interview with the two brothers published in the Spanish Journal *Libertad* by the editor, Señor Luis de Oteyza, who visited Ajdir in August 1922. See also *L'Afrique Française*, October 1921 and October 1923, and *Le Temps*, 2nd June, 1925.

⁴ Statement by Mahammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm to Señor de Oteyza.

⁵ 'Of the two sons, the elder is Muhammad and the younger Mahammad, quite distinct names in this country.' (Note by Mr. W. B. Harris.)

hands of General Jordana, the then Spanish High Commissioner (1915-18). The High Commissioner ordered the chief of the Banu Wuryāghal to pay his respects to him at Alhucemas. 'Abdu'l-Karīm refused, and then, on General Jordana's orders, his son Muhammad was arrested at Melilla and thrown into the prison of Cabrerizos. Here, according to his own statement, he remained for eleven months less two days in all, and for six months after he had been cleared, in a judicial inquiry by a Spanish judge, of charges relating to an affair which he had had with a Spanish captain of native police. His father waited until he was released, and until his brother had completed his studies at Madrid. Then, as soon as both his sons were safely back at Ajdir, he broke with the Spaniards. After this Mahammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm received letters from his educational directors at Madrid, inviting him to return, to which he replied by giving them an account of the situation—explaining that, unless the Spaniards changed their behaviour, there would be war, owing to the exasperation which prevailed, especially among the tribes which had already submitted to Spain. He concluded by asking that an able civilian should be sent out by the Spanish Government on a tour of inspection. To these letters he received no answer, but afterwards learnt that copies of them had been sent to the Spanish military commandants at Melilla and Tatwān, in whose eyes he was thenceforth a marked man.

When, in August 1920, the Spaniards occupied Tafarsit in the Upper Kert valley on the road from Melilla to Alhucemas Bay, 'Abdu'l-Karīm set out with a force to attack them; but he died on the march and his elder son Muhammad, who succeeded to the chieftainship of the Banu Wuryāghal tribe with the support of his younger brother Mahammad and of his uncle 'Abdu's-Salām, decided to stand on the defensive, while making ready to resist any invasion by the Spaniards of his own tribal territory. 'We waited absolutely quietly. We did not even enter into relations with the tribes which had submitted. We wished still to see whether peace was possible.'¹ The crisis came when the Spanish Commander in the Melilla sector, General Silvestre, undertook a further advance in 1921; but, in order to understand the disaster which followed, it is necessary to give a brief account of the Spanish attempts, down to that date, to extend Spanish rule from the *presidios* to the new Zone assigned to Spain in their hinterland.²

¹ Statement by Mahammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm to Señor de Oteyza.

² For Spanish policy and operations in Morocco from 1909 onwards see

The failure of Spain in Morocco was due not only to the character of the country and its inhabitants but to the condition of the Spanish people, who proved unequal to the task which they had undertaken. The ascendancy of the corps of officers, which overshadowed the life of the home country, was accentuated in the protectorate ; and, in striking contrast to their French colleagues in the adjoining Zone, the Spanish military leaders showed themselves incompetent to make either peace or war. They never rose to that conception of a protectorate which was dreamed of by the elder 'Abdu'l-Karīm and acted upon by General Lyautey (who would have made 'Abdu'l-Karīm into one of the corner-stones of the protectorate, had the Banu Wuryāghal district happened to lie in the French Zone). They conceived of their protectorate, not as a friendly co-operation between Spaniards and Moroccans for their common advantage, but as a Spanish dominion to be imposed upon the natives for the glory and advantage of Spain ; and, in attempting to impose it, the only peaceful methods which they evolved were the subsidizing of one native magnate to hold the rest in nominal allegiance to Spain (the policy of Generals Jordana and Burguete towards Raysūnī) or the fomenting of tribal feuds in order that Spain might divide and rule (the declared policy of General Berenguer, who was possibly the best Spanish commander and administrator in Morocco during the period under review).¹ Such poverty of statesmanship placed the Spaniards under the necessity of relying almost entirely on force ; and this was unfortunate for them, since they were certainly no less inferior to the French in arms than they were in diplomacy. The Spanish army was ill-trained and ill-organized ; and though it gradually provided itself with the elaborate mechanical equipment which had been evolved on the European fronts in the War of 1914-18 this ultimately benefited its opponents, who captured Spanish war material in large enough quantities to equip an army of their own. As regarded organization the Spanish forces in Morocco were divided into three commands (Melilla in the east, Ceuta on the Straits, and Al-'Arā'ish on the Atlantic coast) which

the monthly record in *L'Afrique Française* ; an admirable article by Commandant R. Messal entitled 'Le Drame d'Anoual : Le Général Berenguer, Commandant en Chef', in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 9 (Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, September 1923) ; General Berenguer : *Campanas en el Rif y Yebala, 1921-2 : Notas y documentos de mi diario di operaciones* ; and an article by M. Reginald Kann in *Le Temps*, 14th December, 1924.

¹ See the passage quoted by Commandant Messal from General Berenguer's book : *La Guerra en Marruecos*, which was published before he was appointed High Commissioner.

were not merely isolated from one another geographically but had independent relations with the Ministry of War at Madrid. Even General Berenguer, who on the 1st September, 1920, was appointed Commander-in-Chief in Africa in addition to the post of High Commissioner which he held already, announced four days afterwards that he proposed to leave the relations of the three commands as they were ; and, during the fateful year which followed, he failed—with disastrous results—to impose his own policy and strategy upon his subordinate, General Silvestre, who commanded at Melilla.¹

In setting out to occupy their Zone, under these unfavourable auspices, the Spaniards started from three bases : on the east from the ancient *presidio* of Melilla, whence they began their advance into the interior on the 25th September, 1909 ;² on the Straits from the ancient *presidio* of Ceuta, whence they advanced southwards along the Mediterranean coast to Tatwān in April 1911 ; and on the Atlantic littoral from the strip of coast between Al-'Arā'ish and the Tangier Zone, which they occupied in the summer of 1911. Their conquest of these patches of lowland was comparatively easy ; but they did not at first attempt to penetrate the Rif and they were baffled by the Jibālah. Here in September 1915 the then High Commissioner, General Jordana, abandoned force for diplomacy by entering into a somewhat humiliating compact with Raysūnī—a brigand of Sharifian lineage, who had originally taken up his quarters in this district in order to prey upon the wealthy Franks in the neighbouring port of Tangier and had carried on this business with such success that he had become an international celebrity.³ This attempt to control the Jibālah by proxy proved unsatisfactory, since Raysūnī, though well-connected, was neither a reputable character nor an hereditary chieftain like those in the highlands of the French Zone, through whom at this time Marshal Lyautey was

¹ This failure was partly due to technical deficiencies—General Berenguer appears to have had no general staff, and the means of communication between the three commands were inadequate—and partly to the extent to which discipline in the highest ranks of the army was vitiated by political and personal factors. General Silvestre appears to have been forced upon General Berenguer by influence and to have been actuated by rivalry towards his chief in conducting a forward policy at Melilla, when General Berenguer desired to concentrate all his strength on his own operations in the west. If General Berenguer failed to keep his subordinate in order, that was largely because General Silvestre was supported against his chief by private intrigue and public opinion at Madrid.

² *L'Afrique Française*, October 1921.

³ For the career of Mawlā'i Hāmidu'bnu Muhammadi'bni 'Abdi'llāhi'r-Raysūnī ('Raisuli') see the obituary notice in *L'Afrique Française*, May 1925.

working with such signal success. Accordingly General Berenguer, who succeeded General Jordana as High Commissioner in November 1918, reverted to a policy of military action. His plan was to concentrate his forces upon subduing one district after another, and to stand on the defensive on every sector except that on which he was operating at the moment, in order to avoid a dispersal of energies. As far as it lay with him he proceeded to execute this plan with ability and perseverance. After first subduing the Anjarā he broke with Raysūnī by causing the Sultan's Khalifah in the Spanish Zone to proclaim him an outlaw on the 5th July, 1919. On the 14th October, 1920, he occupied Shifshāwan; and, after thus isolating and encircling the Jibālah, he attacked Raysūnī himself in 1921. In operations carried out between the 25th June and the 16th July of that year he penetrated to within six kilometres of Raysūnī's stronghold of Tāzarūt, in the territory of the Banu 'Arūs tribe. At this point Raysūnī showed a disposition to treat, and General Berenguer gave him until the 22nd July to make a proposal. On that very date General Silvestre's army suffered a *débâcle* in the Melilla sector, at the hands of the Banu Wuryāghal under the leadership of Muhammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm; and when Raysūnī's letter reached General Berenguer he and his troops were already far away, trying to save what they could from the wreck.

While General Berenguer was executing, step by step, his plan of operations in the west, General Silvestre, in the Melilla sector, had been developing an ambitious project of his own which not only ran counter to the strategy of his chief but was bound to lead to war between Spain and the Banu Wuryāghal tribe—as it turned out, with disastrous effects upon the whole position of Spain in Morocco. In 1920 General Silvestre advanced one stage west of the line of the River Kert, occupying Dar Drius in May and Tafarsit in August. On this occasion he encountered no opposition from the Banu Wuryāghal, for reasons that have been explained above, and he at once began to put pressure upon General Berenguer to sanction his advancing a stage further. Eventually General Berenguer gave his consent against his better judgement, whereupon General Silvestre seemed to justify his importunity by winning in the space of a few weeks a series of successes which culminated, on the 15th January, 1921, in the occupation of Anwāl on the threshold of the Banu Wuryāghal territory.

At this juncture 'Abdu'l-Karīm sent emissaries to General Silvestre—first Señor Got and then one of his own tribesmen—

warning him to advance no further. Yet, although General Berenguer had informed General Silvestre on the 21st January that he was not to expect reinforcements, and although Colonel Moralès—the commandant of native police in the Melilla sector and a personal friend of 'Abdu'l-Karīm's—appears to have advised conciliation, General Silvestre returned a rough answer. Spain, he said, according to the Rifi envoy's own account of the interview,¹ had the power to go where she chose, and he himself had made up his mind to enter the territory of the Banu Wuryāghal, even if all the 'Abdu'l-Karīms in the world opposed him. He preferred entering by force to entering on conditions.

Without, apparently, consulting General Berenguer further, General Silvestre carried out his threat by occupying, on the 1st June, 1921, Mount Abaran, twelve kilometres in advance of Anwāl, in the range of hills which overlooked from the east the Bay of Alhucemas and the basin of Ajdīr—the heart of the Banu Wuryāghal country. On the same night the new post (which was garrisoned by about 250 men, of whom 200 were native troops) was violently attacked by the Banu Wuryāghal and carried by assault (the native troops deserting their officers and joining forces with the tribesmen). During the next eighteen days and nights the Banu Wuryāghal extended their attacks to a number of the Spanish posts in the area which had been occupied during the previous December and January. Their offensive was sustained with an intensity which was a new feature in Moorish warfare, and which presaged the great offensive against the French in 1925.² On the 19th July, when the post of Igueriben signalled a desperate appeal for water and ammunition, a relieving column, reinforced from the rear, failed to break through the besiegers' lines. Thereupon General Silvestre concentrated at Anwāl all the forces available in the Melilla sector and made a supreme attempt to break through to Igueriben on the 21st July; but again the Spaniards were repulsed by the Rifis, who had now regularly entrenched themselves. Then the evacuation of Igueriben was ordered; there was a *saufé qui peut* of the garrison, the officers committing suicide; and by the evening it became evident that General Silvestre's main force at Anwāl (which was as ill-chosen a position from the tactical point of view as it could possibly have been) was caught in a trap. During an agonizing night of indecision the commander lost control of the situation and the troops lost their

¹ Statement by 'Pajarito' to Señor de Oteyza. (See *L'Afrique Française*, August 1922.)

² See Section (vi) below.

moral; on the morning of the 22nd, under the menace of an immediate assault, General Silvestre gave the order for retreat; and there followed a catastrophe which reminds an English reader of Lady Sale's journal of the British retreat from Kābul in 1841. General Silvestre remained rooted to the spot, and his fate was never known. The Spanish column poured back along the road towards Melilla in ever-increasing demoralization, as all the native troops deserted and all the tribes rose in their rear—not only those which had submitted in 1920 and 1921, but tribes which had been conquered at the first advance in 1909. Of the 130 Spanish posts¹ between Anwāl and Melilla the majority were simply abandoned by their garrisons; the remainder were isolated, besieged, and forced to surrender. By the 25th the country up to the walls of Melilla was in hostile hands. On the 29th the remnants of the retreating column under General Navarro—after losing their last artillery, which was promptly turned against them—threw themselves into the fortified position of Mount Arruit, 40 kilometres from Melilla; General Berenguer, who arrived at Melilla on the 23rd, was impotent to relieve them; and on the 9th August General Navarro and his surviving troops capitulated to the local tribesmen and were handed over by them to 'Abdu'l-Karīm. (The body of Colonel Moralès was restored to his countrymen by the victors with military honours.) General Silvestre's entire army had ceased to exist, and at Melilla, before reinforcements arrived, only a few hundred men could be mustered to defend the *presidio*.² The moral defeat was even greater than the losses in munitions and men. No such disaster had been inflicted by tribesmen on an organized Western army since the defeat of the Italians by the Abyssinians at Adowa in 1896.³ From that moment onwards the Moroccan

¹ *The Times* (28th June, 1924) places the number as high as 142.

² The actual figures of the losses depend on those of the force as it had been before the disaster. The nominal strength of General Silvestre's command at that date was 20,301 Spanish troops and 3,784 natives (*L'Afrique Française*, September 1921); the actual strength on the 22nd July, 1921, is diversely reported as 588 officers, 16,581 men, and 3,592 animals and as 841 officers, 20,139 men, and 5,251 animals (see Commandant Messal, *loc. cit.*). The Spaniards themselves appear to have admitted officially the loss of 14,772 men, 29,504 rifles, 392 machine-guns, and 129 guns; and 'Abdu'l-Karīm collected altogether 570 prisoners.

³ For further light on the Anwāl disaster see the reports of the trials of Generals Berenguer and Navarro at Madrid in June 1924 (e.g. in *The Times*, 28th June, 1924) and the following records by participants: Lieut.-Colonel Perez Ortiz: *De Anual a Monte Arruit y diez y ocho meses de cautiverio: Crónicas de un testigo* (Madrid, 1923); Lieut. Casado: *Igueriben* (Madrid, 1923); 'N. G.': *El Pánico de Anual y el socorro de Monte Arruit* (Santander, 1924, Librería Moderna).

question overshadowed the life of Spain—draining her man-power, overwhelming her finances, and increasing the desire of the efficient and prosperous Catalans to sever their connexion with Castile.

‘Who devised the plans of the victory at Anwāl?’ an American journalist asked ‘Abdu’l-Karīm two years afterwards. ‘God,’ was the reply, ‘but I was there.’¹ In large measure the credit was due to the foresight of the victor’s father, ‘Abdu’l-Karīm the elder, in sending his sons to study Western civilization at first-hand. During their sojourn at Malaga, Madrid, and Melilla the two brothers had evidently discerned both the potentialities of Western mechanical technique and the inefficiency of the Spaniards in manipulating it. The fruits of his first and greatest victory taught Muhammad ‘Abdu’l-Karīm what strategy to pursue. The sinews of war could be torn from the Spaniards and turned against them; and, in fact, from this time onwards, the Rifis kept themselves supplied abundantly, at the Spaniards’ expense, with arms and munitions, telephones and typewriters, and other Western apparatus captured on the field of battle, and with money paid as prisoners’ ransoms. As ‘Abdu’l-Karīm went on from strength to strength it was perpetually rumoured that he was receiving surreptitious assistance in arms, money, and expert service from abroad—the press of each Western country accusing the nationals of other Western countries of being his purveyors. Down to the time of writing no substantiated evidence for any of these charges was forthcoming, and they were categorically denied by ‘Abdu’l-Karīm himself in his first official *communiqué*, which was received by the Tangier correspondent of *The Times* on the 12th October, 1924.² The ineptitude of the Spaniards and the force of character, ability, and training of the leaders of the Banu Wuryāghal sufficiently account for the events which followed. As a result of this first experience of crossing swords with Spain ‘Abdu’l-Karīm made up his mind on two points: he would repudiate the Spanish protectorate and stand out for absolute independence;³ and he would rally to his cause not only his own tribesmen, but all the peoples of the Rif and the Jibālah, in a national war.⁴

¹ *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 15th November, 1924.

² *The Times*, 13th October, 1924.

³ In the interview cited above, Muhammad ‘Abdu’l-Karīm said to Señor de Oteyza: ‘The Protectorate is a name for the process of trampling on our rights. As used by the Spanish Government, the word has no other sense.’—‘Then you want nothing less than independence?’—‘Nothing less.’

⁴ For first-hand accounts of interviews with ‘Abdu’l-Karīm see, besides the sources already quoted, *The Times*, 15th September, 1923, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th April, 1926.

If the full extent of their victory had been realized by the victors themselves the war might possibly have been ended at a blow by the capture of Melilla, which, for the first few weeks after the disaster, was virtually defenceless. As it was the Spaniards obtained a respite during which, being a nation of twenty millions, they were able to pour reinforcements of over 60,000 men into the threatened *presidio*, and on the 12th September, 1921, fifty-six days after the disaster, General Berenguer started a counter-offensive;¹ but it was not till the first week of November that the heights of Mount Gurugu, commanding Melilla from the south-west, were finally cleared of the enemy; and the line of the lower Kert River was not regained till the first week of December. Before the end of the year, however, the Spaniards had recovered the whole of the littoral between the mouths of the Kert and the Muluya, and on the 10th January, 1922—by which time there were not less than 150,000 Spanish troops on Moroccan soil—they reoccupied Dar Drius in the upper Kert valley. At this point the counter-offensive in the Melilla sector was arrested by General Berenguer, who reverted at the earliest possible moment to his original strategy of first pacifying the western sector. Yet here, too, the Spanish position had changed for the worse. Not only had Raysūnī slipped out of General Berenguer's grasp when he was on the eve of capture, but on the 21st October, 1921, a Rifi force, commanded by Mahammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm and equipped with captured Spanish artillery, attacked and beleaguered the Spanish posts on the line of communications between Tatwān and Shifshāwan. The Rifis received active support from Raysūnī's men, and it was not till the 19th November that these Spanish posts were finally relieved after long and heavy fighting.

In 1922 General Berenguer reverted to his original strategy of concentrating on the Jibālah,² and on the 12th May he succeeded in capturing Raysūnī's stronghold of Tāzarūt; but the Government now made him the scapegoat of the rising national resentment against the burden of Morocco, and on the 10th July he resigned.³ His

¹ For details of the following operations see *L'Afrique Française*, September, October, November, and December 1921.

² For the details of these operations, which began on the 19th December, 1921, and were resumed, after a break, on the 28th May, 1922, see the monthly records in *L'Afrique Française*.

³ On the 17th June, 1924, General Berenguer and his subordinate General Navarro (who had surrendered Mount Arruit, commanding Melilla, after holding out for twelve days in a desperate situation) were brought to trial at Madrid before the Supreme Court of Military Justice. On the 26th General Navarro was acquitted, but General Berenguer was sentenced to be struck off the active list 'for ineptitude'. This sentence appears to have been quite unjust and was

successor, General Burguete, deliberately undid his work. He immediately reopened negotiations with Raysūnī, in order to concentrate his military efforts on the Melilla sector against 'Abdu'l-Karīm. After negotiations which lasted from the 6th August to the 28th September, 1922, Raysūnī duly 'surrendered' on terms which left him master of the situation. The Spaniards evacuated Tāzarūt, made good the damage done during their military operations, and removed not only native but Spanish officials and officers who were displeasing to Raysūnī. At this price in the western sector General Burguete was able to resume operations in the Melilla sector in October; but though some further ground was regained in this difficult *terrain* the advance was checked by a reverse at Tīzī 'Azā ('Tizzi-Assa') which was a repetition of the Anwāl disaster on a minor scale.

Meanwhile, 'Abdu'l-Karīm had not only held his own against the Spaniards but had extended his authority from the district occupied by his own tribe, the Banu Wuryāghal, over the whole of the Rif and Ghumārah country; and thus, perhaps for the first time in history, the tribes of the Greater Rif, who had usually divided their energies between fighting one another and fighting their neighbours, were united under a single effective Government for a common purpose.¹ The capital of this new national state (for such it was in embryo) was established in the Banu Wuryāghal district—'Abdu'l-Karīm's home country—at Ajdir, a village on the mainland three miles distant from the Spanish island of Alhucemas (where, with artillery captured from the Spaniards themselves, the Rifis had bombarded and sunk a Spanish steamer discharging munitions, in reprisal for the Spanish Government's action in declaring a blockade of the Rif on the 18th March, 1922). In Alhucemas Bay, on the 27th January, 1923, Señor Echevarrieta, the Spanish industrialist who has been mentioned above, negotiated with 'Abdu'l-Karīm the release of the surviving prisoners from Anwāl for the sum of 4,137,000 pesetas (approximately £137,900) and in exchange for the Moroccan prisoners at Melilla, Ceuta, and Tatwān.² During the

rumoured to have been inspired by political motives (General Berenguer being in favour of a return to constitutional government). Next month the King restored General Berenguer to the active list and afterwards raised him to honour. (*The Times*, 28th June and 7th July; *Le Temps*, 1st July, 1924.)

¹ In 1922 'Abdu'l-Karīm sent a delegation to European countries to plead the cause of the Republic of the Rif. This Rif mission visited not only Paris but London (*The Times*, 5th August, 1922), but did not succeed in establishing official relations with either the French or the British Government. For their experiences in Paris see pp. 130–1 below.

² For details see *L'Afrique Française*, February 1923.

summer of 1923 'Abdu'l-Karīm pressed hard upon the Spanish lines in the Melilla sector. On the 15th July Don Diego Saavedra, the Secretary-General of the Spanish Zone, sent 'Abdu'l-Karīm a written offer of 'a kind of independence' under the protectorate of Spain and the suzerainty of the Sultan of Morocco. On the 24th 'Abdu'l-Karīm replied with a categorical refusal to recognize the Spanish protectorate and with an appeal to the doctrine of 'self-determination', which he believed to have been enshrined in the Versailles Treaty by European statesmen whose hearts had been made contrite by the lessons of the Great War.¹ This correspondence led to no result, and in 1924 the Spanish Directory, which had been brought into power on the 12th September, 1923, through a *coup d'état* by General Primo de Rivera, Marquis de Estella, had to face a more serious military crisis in Morocco than any which had occurred since July 1921.

In the first days of March 1924 the Rifis renewed their pressure on the Melilla front (where General Burguete's advance of the previous autumn had burdened the Spanish line with a dangerous salient at Tīzī 'Azā), and on the 26th June the Marquis de Estella announced, in a public speech at Malaga, that the Directory had decided to withdraw all outlying military posts and retire to the coast on both fronts.² Before the month was out 'Abdu'l-Karīm's forces were delivering an attack, in a new and unexpected quarter, against the Spanish posts along the line of the Wādī Lau, which covered the road from Tatwān to Shifshāwan in the western sector, and were inciting the tribes of the Jibālah, by precept and example, to rise and join them. Throughout July and August the Rifi pressure on the Wādī Lau line was maintained; and though the Spanish troops in the western sector were continually reinforced until, by the beginning of September, there were 100,000 of them there (60,000 of these being concentrated round Tatwān),³ by that date the Wādī Lau front had been broken; Raysūnī—who was handicapped by illness and whose star was sinking as 'Abdu'l-Karīm's rose—had failed to hold the Jibālah tribes;⁴ and the united tribesmen had cut not only the road from Tatwān to Shifshāwan (where a Spanish

¹ English translations of the texts of these two letters were published in *The Times*, 9th June, 1924. This exchange of notes appears to have been preceded in April 1923 by a secret interview at Ajdīr between the Spanish General Castro Girona and 'Abdu'l-Karīm (*L'Afrique Française*, June and July 1923).

² *The Times*, 30th June, 1924.

³ *Ibid.*, 6th September, 1924.

⁴ In spite or perhaps because of the fact that the Spaniards had made a fresh pact with him on the 23rd April, 1923 (*L'Afrique Française*, July 1923).

garrisons appear to have bought from the tribesmen the privilege of withdrawing by the surrender of their arms and munitions, sometimes with the addition of a heavy ransom in money.¹ When the withdrawal of 180 posts had been effected the troops at Shifshāwan began their retreat on the 16th November, and by the 12th December they had arrived in safety at a point five miles from Tatwān.² This closed an operation which undoubtedly strengthened the Spanish position from the military point of view, and the Marquis de Estella must be given credit for moral courage in carrying it through. The accompanying circumstances, however, were so damaging to Spanish prestige that, before the end of October, even the Anjarā tribe, in the Tatwān-Ceuta-Tangier triangle overlooking the Straits, began to be restive, and on the 12th December it rose and captured the Spanish post of Qasru'l-Saghīr (Alcazar Seguir) on the south coast of the Straits between Tangier and Ceuta.³ Thus, even before the new Spanish line was stabilized, a fresh revolt had broken out in its rear, and the Ceuta-Tatwān railway was seriously threatened. Nor did the withdrawal bring peace between Spain and the Rif any nearer. During the period while the withdrawal was taking place the Marquis de Estella appears to have dispatched two successive emissaries to the Rif (the second being Señor Echevarrieta, who had negotiated the ransoming of the prisoners in 1923) to offer the terms outlined in September, but on either occasion 'Abdu'l-Karīm was reported to have insisted upon withdrawal to the *presidios* and payment of reparation.⁴ The six months of active operations from June to December 1924 were officially reported to have cost the Spanish army a total of 21,250 casualties.⁵ During the first half of 1925 the Spanish Government attempted to realize those economies of life, money, and effort which it had hoped to effect as a result of

¹ *The Times*. 1st November, 1924. In the case of the post of 'Buharritz', where the garrison of 356 men capitulated on the 11th October at the end of a forty-one days' siege, when an attempt at relief had failed and the water-supply had been in the enemy's hands for a fortnight, the Spanish High Command at Tatwān were reported actually to have delivered, in advance, to the besiegers a number of new rifles equal to the number which the garrison possessed, because this was the only condition on which the besiegers would permit the garrison to retreat to Tatwān with their arms. (*Le Temps*, 12th December; *The Times*, 23rd October, 1924.)

² *The Times*. 13th December, 1924.

³ *Ibid.*, 28th October and 15th December, 1924.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 23rd November, 1924.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 6th March, 1925, quoting the Spanish *Boletín Oficial del Ministerio de la Guerra*. The figures were: 190 officers killed, 60 missing, 700 wounded; 3,800 soldiers killed, 2,500 missing or prisoners; 14,000 wounded: total, 21,250.

Meanwhile, 'Abdu'l-Karīm was consolidating his position in the Jibālah. The Jibālah tribesmen, though they had made common cause with the Rifis against the Spaniards, did not submit without a struggle to the discipline which 'Abdu'l-Karīm had already imposed on his own countrymen and which he now extended to them. In January 1925 there was an outbreak against the Rifi ascendancy in Shifshāwan,¹ but this was promptly suppressed, and the Rifis secured a loyal body of local adherents by confiscating the property of their enemies in the Jibālah and distributing it to others.² The incorporation of the Jibālah in 'Abdu'l-Karīm's dominions was sealed by the siege and capture of Raysūnī in his castle of Tāzarūt on the 25th–27th January, 1925.³ The treasure accumulated during a lifetime of remunerative lawlessness all passed into 'Abdu'l-Karīm's hands.⁴ Raysūnī himself was carried away captive to Ajdīr, where he died in April;⁵ and no other leader was left in Northern Morocco with either the prestige or the resources for maintaining a rival military establishment. The whole military and political strength of the Moroccan people in the Spanish Zone was thus concentrated in 'Abdu'l-Karīm's hands.⁶

An official statement of 'Abdu'l-Karīm's policy and peace-terms at this time—dated Shifshāwan, 28th January, 1925, and signed by 'Abdu'l-Karīm's brother, Mahammad, as Commander-in-Chief of the Rif and Jibālah forces—was received by private persons in England.⁷ In this document it was stated that the liberation of the Rif and the Jibālah was the sole object of the war; that when the war was over the tribesmen intended to devote themselves to internal reform and development; that they were willing to leave Ceuta and Melilla in Spanish hands but might change their mind on this point if the Spanish Government remained intransigent; that there were neither foreign officers nor Bolshevik agents in the country; that they wished to live on good terms with France and

¹ *The Times*, 11th and 13th January, 1925.

² *Le Temps*, 13th May, 1925.

³ For details see *The Times*, 30th and 31st January, 2nd February and 21st May.

⁴ For figures of Raysūnī's profits by ransoms and subsidies see the obituary notice in *L'Afrique Française*, May 1925. He had received £14,000 for releasing Mr. Perdicaris, an American millionaire who lived at Tangier, and £20,000 for Kā'id MacLean, the Scottish generalissimo of the Sharifian army; but he had refunded the latter sum to Sultan Mawlā'ī Hāfid, in consideration of his investiture with the government of the Jibālah tribes.

⁵ *The Times*, 14th February and 6th May, 1925; *Le Temps*, 25th April, 1925.

⁶ For a description of the machinery of government organized by 'Abdu'l-Karīm see *L'Afrique Française*, February 1926, pp. 100–1.

⁷ The text was published in *The Manchester Guardian*, 12th February, 1925.

with the authorities in the French Zone, if the latter showed the same spirit ; and that they had no intention of attacking the Tangier Zone or of interfering with its existing régime. ' The Rif bears no animosity against any of the European nations so long as its independent status shall be acknowledged by them.' They claimed to be capable of self-government. In building up a national state they proposed to combine the basic teaching of the Qur'ān with the best achievements of the West in science and industry.

Although these terms were far removed from any which Spain was yet prepared to consider the respective military commands appear to have negotiated in May 1925 for a truce on three conditions : the cessation of all hostilities ; the immobilization of the Spanish forces in their existing positions ; and the opening of neutral markets at three or more points near the Spanish lines. Before the month was out, however, these negotiations were broken off¹ because Spain had been drawn into the new conflict which had broken out meanwhile between the Rif and France.

(vi) **The Repercussion of Events in the Spanish Zone of Morocco upon the Situation in the French Zone (1924-5).**

Before considering the repercussion of 'Abdu'l-Karīm's victory over Spain in Morocco upon the policy and position of France, it may be well to draw attention to the difference between the Spanish and the French régimes. From the foregoing narrative it is evident that the Moroccan activities of the Spaniards during fifteen years had produced more disorder and suffering in the Zone assigned to them than had afflicted the inhabitants of that Zone before Spain had intervened. The results of contemporary French activities in the French Zone were of a different order. The French, likewise, employed methods of violence, and these were probably unavoidable in a country where violence had reigned from time immemorial ; but the coercive measures of the French were effective and therefore resulted, on the balance, in a notable gain for law and order. Among foreign observers there was a remarkable consensus of admiration both for the principles on which Marshal Lyautey's administration was based and for the skill and tact of the French Resident-General and his subordinates in applying those principles in practice. In fact, down to the spring of 1925 the French régime had an almost

¹ *The Times*, 22nd and 25th May, 1925. The report that negotiations had been taking place was borne out by a diplomatically worded statement which the Marquis de Estella published on the 25th May (*The Times*, 26th May, 1925).

unbroken record of success, notwithstanding the abnormal strain to which it had been subjected during the General War of 1914-18. It might conceivably be argued that Western ascendancy over non-Western communities was morally wrong, even at its highest level; or again that, apart from the moral question, the times had changed since the Great War and that the day of Western ascendancy was over, at any rate in the Islamic World. This latter proposition was to be put to the test by the struggle between France and the Rif, which began in the spring of 1925. The crisis, however, would hardly have arisen at this time or from this quarter but for the antecedent events in the Spanish Zone, for which France was only indirectly responsible, and over which she had had no opportunity of exercising control.

In the struggle between France and the Rif the immediate issues were military and political. Statesmen responsible for French policy in North-West Africa were convinced that if France failed to drive 'Abdu'l-Karim's forces out of her Zone and to chastise him for having invaded it this failure would be the beginning of the end of French ascendancy not only in Morocco, but in Algeria and Tunisia as well.¹ In the background, however, there was a further issue which was less precise but more profound.

The Rifis in the Spanish Zone of Morocco resembled their kinsmen, the Atlas tribes in the French Zone, in being Berbers who had not exchanged their native language for Arabic and had only been superficially affected by Islam. It is true that this relative imperviousness to Islamic influence was not due to conscious hostility towards it, but to the remoteness and the conservative temper of these highlanders and to their passion for political freedom, which had kept Islamic Governments, and therewith Islamic institutions, out of their country. If asked whether they were Muslims most Moroccan Berbers would have replied in the affirmative. Nevertheless, their tincture of Islam was less than skin-deep, and in effect these Berber peoples were primitive barbarians—the only members of the White Race who were still not yet definitively incorporated in either Western, Oriental Christian, or Islamic society. This circumstance had not escaped the attention of the French, who, at the time when they began their effective occupation of Morocco, were already concerned over the decline of their own population. Here was a vigorous and prolific race of White Men whom Islam had failed to appropriate after twelve centuries of opportunity. There was a feeling in France

¹ See M. Painlevé's repeated statements, quoted below on p. 133.

that the French Government had no call to accomplish for Islam what it had failed to accomplish for itself. In the already Islamized and Arabized portions of her Moroccan Protectorate France should scrupulously respect the civilization which she found in possession ; but she need not assist Islam to extend its domain, as the result of French sacrifices of blood and treasure, over White barbarians who were possibly capable of being turned into Frenchmen.¹

Naturally, the French Government made no official declaration of policy in this sense ; but on the 11th September, 1914, a few months after the French forces in Morocco had made their first contact with the Atlas mountaineers, Marshal Lyautey caused the Moroccan Government to issue a *dāhir* providing that districts with Berber customs should continue to be governed by their own customs and usages. This was a negative way of laying down that Islamic institutions, with their inseparable vehicle the Arabic language, were not to be imposed on the Berbers ; and, as one Berber community after another submitted, the French hastened to forestall the infiltration of Islamic culture by organizing Berber self-government under communal councils, an administration of justice under Berber customary law, and the beginnings of a secular education in which the teachers were either Frenchmen or Kabyles (Algerian Berbers) and the languages of instruction Berber and French but not Arabic. Here were potential Berber-French islands in the great Arabic-Muslim ocean of Al-Maghrib.

This French vision of the future was rudely disturbed by the career of 'Abdu'l-Karīm. In the Rif a Berber nationalism had been born, and whatever the outcome of the military struggle between the Rif and France might be the cultural side of 'Abdu'l-Karīm's movement was likely to react unfavourably upon French cultural policy in the Atlas—that is, upon the accomplishment of one of the objects which lay nearest to the heart of French administrators in Morocco.

The repercussion of events in the Spanish Zone upon the situation in the French Zone began to make itself felt during the year 1924.

By the beginning of that year the French had completed the effective occupation of the Wazzān district in the Atlantic lowlands adjoining the border of the Spanish Zone at its western extremity, while to the east they held the Tāzā corridor, which isolated the un-

¹ For the French point of view and the administrative action in which effect was given to it see M. Paul Marty : 'La Politique Berbère du Protectorat,' in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 7 bis (Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, July 1925).

subdued tribes of the Atlas, in their Zone,¹ from the unsubdued tribes of the Rif in the Spanish Zone.² During the three preceding years they had come so near to completing the effective occupation of the Zone assigned to them that they had reduced their forces in Morocco by 30,000 men.³ Between Wazzān and Tāzā, however, and immediately north of Fez, to which it was dangerously close, lay the unoccupied district of the Upper Wargha Valley, the northern half of which (as has been explained above)⁴ was debatable territory between the two Zones. At the beginning of the campaigning season of 1924 the French and Spanish High Commands in Morocco appear to have agreed upon a concerted and simultaneous advance, in this sector, up to the theoretical boundary between the two Zones, from the south and the north respectively,⁵ and the French duly carried out their part in the plan. Beginning operations on the 27th May they reached and crossed the Upper Wargha without encountering any serious opposition ; rapidly organized the newly occupied area with a view to defence against attacks from the north ; and, on the 25th July, drove back with loss a raiding party of about 1,200 Rifis who attempted a turning movement from the Upper Laban Valley.⁶

Meanwhile, on the 26th June, just a month after General Lyautey's operations had begun, the Marquis de Estella had announced his policy of withdrawing all outlying military posts and retiring to the coast ;⁷ in the Spanish Zone the offensive had been taken not by the Spaniards but by the Rifis ; and, in contrast to the reverse which the French had inflicted on them on the 25th July, the Rifis had gained against the Spaniards a series of important successes. This left the new French northern front unexpectedly exposed, and on the 30th July Marshal Lyautey made a public statement⁸ in which

¹ In 1925 the only remaining patch of unpacified territory in the Northern Atlas was the so-called 'Tache de Taza', immediately south of the Fez-Tāzā Railway.

² See *Le Temps*, 24th January, 1924, for an official retrospect of the situation in the French Zone at the close of 1923.

³ Statement by M. Painlevé in the Chamber of Deputies, 28th May, 1925.

⁴ See pp. 106-7 above.

⁵ This was stated by Marshal Lyautey in an interview which he gave to the Tangier correspondent of *The Times* on the 30th July, 1924, at Casablanca, when the Marshal was on the point of travelling to France on leave. In the debate in the French Chamber of Deputies on the 28th May, 1925, M. Painlevé cited a dispatch, asking permission to occupy the Upper Wargha line, which Marshal Lyautey had addressed to the French Government on the 22nd March, 1924.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 1st June and 31st July, 1924.

⁷ See p. 120 above.

⁸ In the interview with the Tangier correspondent of *The Times* mentioned above (see *The Times*, 1st August, 1924).

he explicitly denied that France harboured any ambitions in regard to the Spanish Zone and declared that he had always hoped to work hand in hand with the Spaniards, but remarked that their constant changes of policy rendered concerted action impossible, mentioned the fact that the French operations on the Wargha had been set in motion as part of a joint plan, recorded the failure of the Spaniards to do their part, and deplored their decision to withdraw to the coast. He pointed out that though the Rifis were raiding the French Zone, the French had no right to push their punitive expeditions into the Spanish Zone from which the raiders came, and that in these circumstances the failure of the Spaniards to pacify their Zone was bound to increase the military burdens of France in hers.

During the next month the situation of the Spaniards became so critical that the French decided to secure a still more favourable defensive line in anticipation of the possibility that the main strength of the Rifis might shortly be turned against them ; and accordingly, on the 3rd-5th September, two further advances were made—one in the Upper Wargha Valley and the other in the north-eastern corner of the French Zone, where it adjoined the Melilla Sector of the Spanish Zone and the French territory of Algeria.¹

In October Marshal Lyautey informed the French Government that it would be necessary to fortify the newly occupied positions north of the Wargha, and asked for reinforcements ; and on the 10th November, when the final Spanish withdrawal in the western sector was in progress, he made a second public statement,² in which he declared that the Rifis had encroached upon the still unoccupied northerly strip of the French Zone and were preaching rebellion among the tribes on the French side of the line. He intimated that France might decide to take the offensive against these interlopers with a view to driving them back across the Spanish border, and made an important announcement regarding the French view of Spanish treaty obligations.

It is the contention of the French Government that the Spaniards are under a distinct obligation to control and keep order in their Zone, and that failure to do so is not only contrary to their treaty engagements, but also places the northern districts of the French Protectorate in an impossible position on account of the adjacent and unrestricted state of anarchy existing on the Spanish side of the frontier.

¹ *The Times*, 8th September ; *Le Temps*, 9th September and 9th October, 1924, and 7th January, 1925.

² Again to the correspondent of *The Times* at Tangier, where he touched on his way back from France to Rabât.

He also expressed the opinion that the campaign in the Spanish Zone of Morocco was being watched with the greatest interest all over the Islamic World, and that the situation which had arisen there was a distinct menace to all Western Powers with Islamic interests—not only to France in North-West Africa but likewise to Great Britain.

Apparently the French Government contended that the word 'appartient' in the text of the first article of the Franco-Spanish Convention of the 27th November, 1912, which has been cited above,¹ implied an obligation, while the Spanish Government argued that it implied an exclusive right which Spain was at liberty to exercise or not at her discretion.² Up to the time of writing these two conflicting interpretations—the one imperative and the other permissive—had not been submitted to any international legal authority for an advisory opinion; but in the second week of December 1924 the French Ambassador at Madrid received instructions from the Quai d'Orsay to ascertain the views of the Spanish Government regarding the future control of that portion of the Spanish Zone which was in process of being evacuated by the Spanish forces.³ Meanwhile, the views of 'Abdu'l-Karīm regarding the control of the districts which the French had occupied in the course of 1924 were destined to have a greater practical influence upon the development of events in 1925. Some time between September 1924 and April 1925 he made up his mind to dispute the possession of this territory with France by force of arms.

Could war between France and 'Abdu'l-Karīm have been avoided? [the Tangier correspondent of *The Times* asked himself in retrospect on the 27th October, 1925.]⁴ The reply appears to be that at the moment when war broke out between the French and 'Abdu'l-Karīm, in the spring of this year, it was inevitable; but I am of opinion that, had the situation been made clear to the frontier tribes and, directly or indirectly, discussed with 'Abdu'l-Karīm himself during the six months which preceded the outbreak of war, and explanations given of French aims and intentions, it might have been avoided. War arose through unnecessary misunderstandings on both sides.

'Abdu'l-Karīm himself alleged that France had rebuffed overtures from him on two occasions. In 1923, he declared,⁵ his brother Mahammad had visited Paris and had seen M. Painlevé personally,

¹ See p. 100 above.

² See *The Times*, 11th November, 1924, for a clear *exposé* of these two conflicting interpretations by the Tangier correspondent.

³ *The Times*, 16th December, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 28th October, 1925.

⁵ In an open letter to the French Parliament published first in *As-Siyāsah* of Cairo and afterwards in *L'Humanité* of Paris (21st August, 1925). See

communicated with M. Poincaré indirectly and attempted to get into touch with other highly placed personages in the hope of bringing about an understanding between France and the Rif. On the French side M. Painlevé admitted¹ having had the interview and having reported it to M. Poincaré, M. Poincaré declared that he had no recollection of having had any dealings with Rifī emissaries in 1923, and M. Briand stated, in his capacity as Foreign Minister of the day, that there was no official record of any such dealings at the Quai d'Orsay.² It may be inferred that, on this occasion, French 'official circles' had deliberately avoided entering into relations with the Rifis—partly, perhaps, because they underestimated their political and military importance, but chiefly, no doubt, because 'Abdu'l-Karīm possessed no status in international law, but was technically a rebel against the Sultan of Morocco in a Zone of Moroccan territory which was under the protectorate of Spain, a Power friendly to France. According to Ibn Hājj Hātimī, who was Mahammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm's secretary on this mission to Paris, the emissaries were referred by the authorities in Paris to Marshal Lyautey.

In the second place, both the French and the Rifis agreed in stating that, in the spring of 1924, immediately after the French operations north of the Wargha had been started, an emissary from 'Abdu'l-Karīm arrived at Fez and was given an interview by Commandant Chastenot, the French director of military intelligence in Morocco.³ Out of deference to the treaties and to Spain Commandant Chastenot refused, apparently, to take official cognizance of the Rif or to enter into negotiations with representatives of the Rif for a delimitation of boundaries, but informed the emissary which tribes the French authorities regarded as falling within their Zone and the Spanish Zone respectively, and assured him that the French had no intention of trespassing beyond the limits thus indicated. Incidentally, he seems to have warned the Rifī emissary not to interfere with the

also a statement by Mahammad's secretary, Ibn Hājj Hātimī, who had been a member of the Rifī mission to Paris in 1923, in *Le Matin*, 3rd September, 1925.

¹ *L'Afrique Française*, August 1925.

² Statement in the Chamber of Deputies, 27th May, 1925.

³ See the statements from 'Abdu'l-Karīm and Ibn Hājj Hātimī, cited above; a reconstruction of the interview in *Le Matin*, 6th September, 1925; and a statement from Marshal Lyautey which M. Painlevé read to the French Chamber on the 27th May, 1925. The French sources imply or declare that the emissary was sent entirely on the initiative of 'Abdu'l-Karīm, while, according to Ibn Hājj Hātimī, he was sent at the suggestion of the French civil administrator of Taūirt.

Banu Zarwāl, over whom the French claimed jurisdiction, and also to have promised the Banu Zarwāl French support in resisting by force any attempt on 'Abdu'l-Karīm's part to exercise authority over them.

Whether or not 'Abdu'l-Karīm's decision to challenge France was provoked by an unfriendly attitude on the French side, his action in throwing down such a challenge to a new and far more formidable adversary before arriving at a settlement with Spain suggests that his head had been turned by his victory over an inefficient Western country, and that he did not realize the risks which he was incurring in entering the lists against the greatest surviving military Power in the Western World. At the same time he had positive reasons for making this new venture and rational grounds for expecting, if not to succeed, at least to escape the extreme penalties of failure.

To begin with he could not afford to let the Upper Wargha Valley remain in French hands without a struggle—and this on two accounts, one economic and the other political. The valley was 'the granary of the Rif', from which its people drew the margin of food-supplies which they could not raise in their own barren territory;¹ and at the same time the Upper Wargha tribes belonged to the Jibālah Confederacy. The northern members of this group had accepted 'Abdu'l-Karīm's rule in this very year 1924 because he had enabled them to liberate themselves from the Spaniards; but his prestige among these new adherents would remain precarious if he failed to liberate the remainder of their Confederacy from the domination of another Western Power; and he might even suffer in the eyes of his own people, since the Banu Wuryāghal, one of the Upper Wargha tribes, bore the same name as 'Abdu'l-Karīm's home tribe at Ajdīr.

This question of prestige had an even wider bearing. Since the discomfiture and withdrawal of the Spaniards 'Abdu'l-Karīm and France were left face to face as the two effective Powers in Morocco; and these two Powers could hardly live permanently side by side, dividing the allegiance of the tribes, since they represented irreconcilable forces—on the one side Western ascendancy, and on the other side the combating of Western ascendancy by Western weapons in native hands. Sooner or later the tribes would incline in a body

¹ The harvest of the Upper Wargha Valley seems partly to have found its way to the Rif as a result of systematic raids, which were annually conducted by the Rifis when the crops were ripe for the spoiler (see M. Maginot's statements in the French Chamber on the 28th May, 1925). At the same time, there was probably a certain amount of legitimate purchase, since the Rifis, like other highlanders, obtained funds by seasonal migrations, as wage-earners, to neighbouring regions (see pp. 107-8 above).

towards whichever force proved itself the stronger. Force had been the basis of political power in Al-Maghrib since time immemorial, and France and 'Abdu'l-Karim alike were ruling and extending their respective spheres of influence by force at the moment when they came into collision. This was common ground between the two parties, as was made clear, during the campaign of 1925, by M. Painlevé on several occasions, particularly in the debate of the 28th May in the French Chamber of Deputies.

The idea [he declared] which must be grasped by everybody before peace becomes possible is that, between the Wargha and Fez, though there may exist no natural obstacles, there stands France with all her forces. If there are Frenchmen who recoil from the responsibilities of such a policy, I ask them to measure with me the full consequences of their abdication. It is not only Fez that would have to be abandoned to this onslaught of Islamic fanaticism. It is the whole of Morocco, the whole of Algeria, the whole of North Africa.¹

Again, in a speech delivered on the 3rd August at Autun, he pronounced that while

it would be a crime to fight [in Morocco] an hour longer than necessary, nevertheless the dilemma is inexorable. We must either defend Morocco—I mean the Moroccan Zone assigned to our sphere of influence—or else abandon North Africa, and abandon it under what disastrous conditions, at the risk of what massacres! It would be the end of our colonial empire, the end of our economic independence, which is impossible without the colonies, the end of the prestige and influence of France in the world.

Indeed, from the moment when France and the Rif found themselves at war, the French Empire in North-West Africa was in jeopardy as seriously as the existence of the Hapsburg Monarchy in the Danube Basin had been placed in jeopardy by the outbreak of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia in July 1914.

On the other side, what was the apparent extent of the risks which 'Abdu'l-Karim was running? For victory he doubtless calculated upon the inadequate numbers of the French forces on the spot and upon the likelihood of widespread defections among the tribes behind the French lines in case he achieved striking initial successes. For avoiding the penalties of defeat he probably counted upon the war-weariness of France; upon her financial straits; upon the violent resistance of the Communists,² and the more staid but weightier

¹ In the same assembly, during the debate of the 23rd June, 1925, in defending the French Government's action in taking up 'Abdu'l-Karim's challenge, M. Painlevé repeated and elaborated this estimate of the situation.

² On the 20th September, 1924, M. Doriot, one of the leaders of the Communist Group in the French Chamber, sent a telegram to 'Abdu'l-

opposition of the Socialists, to a warlike policy ; upon the difficulties of the *terrain* which lay between the Upper Wargha Valley and his own home-country ; and finally upon the difficulties of the diplomatic situation in which France seemed likely to find herself, supposing she succeeded in delivering a counter-attack, so soon as her troops reached the indeterminate threshold of the Spanish Zone. This combination of geographical and diplomatic obstacles would make it extremely difficult for the French to track him to his lair between the mountains and the Mediterranean coast ; and, short of this, no partial victory in the field would save them from being morally the defeated party, for the world would have seen 'Abdu'l-Karīm defy the lightning and escape annihilation.

In the autumn of 1924 the French forces in Morocco stood at about 64,500 all told, including troops of both colours and units of the Colonial Army and the Foreign Legion as well as the French Army proper.¹ On the 11th and 21st December Marshal Lyautey twice urgently repeated his request for reinforcements to be sent, in two relays—the first to reach him in February and the second at the beginning of the campaigning season, between the 15th April and the 1st May. At the same time he announced his intention of standing strictly on the defensive. 'I rule out absolutely', he wrote to the French Government, 'all idea of setting foot in the Rif, which is a veritable wasps'-nest where we should have everything to lose. I rule out equally all idea of entering the Spanish Zone, as fixed by the treaties, at any point whatever.'²

In the Wargha sector that frontier, as described in the convention of the 27th November, 1912 (Art. 2), was to cut the river below its source, leaving the head-waters in the Spanish Zone, and, from the point of intersection westwards, was to follow the line of heights dominating the right (i. e. northern) bank, while also coinciding, as nearly as possible, with the northern boundaries of the riverain tribes. Since, however, this tract remained a *terra incognita* to both French and Spanish surveyors, the relation between the watershed (if that was meant by 'the heights') and the tribal boundaries was unknown, and the treaty frontier was therefore not a precise line

Karīm congratulating him on his victory over Spain and expressing the hope that, 'in liaison with the proletariat of France and of Europe he would carry on the struggle against all imperialisms, French imperialism included, until the complete liberation of the soil of Morocco.' The text of this telegram was recited by M. Painlevé in the Chamber on the 23rd June, 1925, and was not repudiated by M. Doriot, who merely corrected an error as to the date.

¹ *The Times*, 18th October, 1924.

² Statement in the Chamber by M. Painlevé, 28th May, 1925.

but a nebulous zone which could hardly fail to give rise to diplomatic complications if and when either party extended its effective occupation to the vicinity.

The watershed between the Wargha and the Mediterranean (whatever the intention of the Franco-Spanish Convention might be) was *de facto* in the hands of the Rīfis, while the French line cut across the succession of roughly parallel ravines and ridges which ran down, in a north-and-south direction, from the watershed to the river. Thus the French were facing up-hill, with a river at their backs ; and, though they had made good use of their time in building roads and bridges, the bridges might be carried away by floods or cut by hostile raiding parties, while the forts and blockhouses (of which the French, like the Spanish, line consisted) might be isolated and blockaded. When once the raiders had filtered through the fortified line they could raise the tribes in the rear (who would be impressed by their success and coerced by their presence) and could press on towards three objectives : Wazzān on the north-west, Fez in the centre, and Tāzā on the east.¹ Immediately south of Tāzā lay the so-called ' tache de Taza '—a block of unsubdued territory—and south of that, again, lay the much larger unsubdued area in the fastnesses of the Atlas range. If the Rīfis could capture Tāzā they would not only cut the railway linking Rabāt and Fez with Algeria, but might raise the Atlas tribes ; and then the French military cordon, at present lightly held, which gripped the Atlas like a vast horseshoe open only towards the south, might be quickened into an active military front. This would increase the military burden of France in Morocco immeasurably.

If the general strategic situation was thus in 'Abdu'l-Karīm's favour the tactical advantages were also on his side. The prospective scene of operations, like the adjoining parts of the Spanish Zone, was an arid treeless country, covered with a thorny undergrowth, broken up by ravines, and cursed with a scanty water-supply ; and this was almost an ideal *terrain* for the Rīfī forces, who were thoroughly at home in their native environment and at the same time had adopted such elements in the Western art of war as could be employed there to good purpose. Every Rīfī fighting-man was an adept at taking cover and, notwithstanding the brokenness of the country, he was disconcertingly mobile, since he lived in the open and

¹ Wazzān was important as a religious centre, Fez as the historic capital of Maghribu'l-Aqsā, and Tāzā as the connecting link between the effectively occupied part of the French Zone in Morocco and the rest of French North-West Africa.

carried no impedimenta except a handful of food, in the hood of his cloak, and his rifle and ammunition. With rifles, machine-guns, and small-arms ammunition the Rifis had supplied themselves abundantly at the Spaniards' expense; and, although the captured Spanish artillery was clumsily served and there was no air force on the Rifi side, these were luxuries and not necessities under the local conditions. On the other hand, the Rifi High Command had not only captured but learnt to utilize field telephones, and by means of these they were able to keep in touch with their widely-scattered and constantly moving units, and to execute concerted manœuvres over as wide a field as their opponents. They appear to have established district depots of rifles and ammunition, to which the tribesmen could be called up at short notice, fitted out, and then dispatched to any point where they were needed. The bulk of their forces was extremely fluid—the men being perpetually called up in relays and perpetually released (as far as the course of the campaign allowed) to work in the fields. Every tribe, however, appears to have been required to supply a permanent contingent, and the tribal levies were stiffened by a small standing army of regulars¹ (mostly drawn from 'Abdu'l-Karīm's own tribe, the Banu Wuryāghal of Ajdir) who were uniformly trained and equipped and were in receipt of pay and rations—in consideration of which they had to hand over their booty to the Government.

The Rifi tactics (which were directed by 'Abdu'l-Karīm's brother, Mahammad, the mining engineer, as Commander-in-Chief) were to send forward a screen of irregulars who filtered through the enemy's line and raised the tribes in his rear—if necessary by coercion. By this means the Rifi army grew like a snowball as it advanced, each tribe whose territory became the scene of fighting being called out *en masse*. The tendency towards desultoriness and incoherence, which was to be looked for in an army recruited in this way, was guarded against by placing all the tribal contingents under the command of regulars, but the main body of the regular troops was carefully husbanded and kept in reserve. Advancing behind the screen of tribesmen they dug themselves in, provided a support upon which the skirmishers could fall back, and resisted enemy counter-attacks in hand-to-hand fighting, with a tenacity which reminded their French adversaries of European warfare.²

¹ Estimated at from 6,000 to 10,000 men (*Foreign Affairs* of New York, January 1926).

² ' Marshal Lyautey has found himself in the presence, not indeed of highly scientific armies, but of a remarkable infantry, which is the equal

Within the limits of this survey it is impossible to trace the course of the Rifi offensive which opened on the 13th April, 1925, or its reaction upon the internal situation in France.¹ It can merely be noted that, for more than three months, adequate White reinforcements were not sent out from France, and the brunt of the fighting was borne by the handful of French troops already in Morocco ;² that the Rifis penetrated the French line and raised the tribes in the French army's rear ; and that the French fortified posts, which were thus cut off from their bases, had to be evacuated one after the other. The crisis was reached between the 26th June and the 6th July in the Tāzā sector, where the Rifis were attempting to break through to the 'Tache de Taza' and the Atlas.³ This attempt was eventually

of any infantry in the world in courage, character and marksmanship' (M. Painlevé in the French Chamber, 9th July, 1925). For accounts of the military organization and tactics of the Rifi forces see *The Times*, 19th May, 1925 ; *Le Temps*, 21st and 23rd May, and 22nd June ; three articles by M. Reginald Kann in *Le Temps*, 7th, 9th, and 13th August ; and an article by Signor Luciano Magrini in the *Corriere della Sera*, 30th August.

¹ In addition to the information in the daily press see *L'Afrique Française* for the excellent monthly summaries of events in the French and the Spanish Zones of Morocco, compiled by M. René Thierry and M. Léon Rollin respectively. *Procès-verbaux* of large portions of the Morocco debates in the French Chamber of Deputies on the 27th, 28th, and 29th May, the 16th and 23rd June, and the 9th July, and in the Senate on the 30th May and the 2nd July were printed in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, Nos. 6 and 7, which were published as supplements to *L'Afrique Française*, issues of June and July 1925.

² The French troops when the Rifi offensive opened appear to have numbered 72,500 in all (*Foreign Affairs* of New York, January 1926), but only five battalions of them were Frenchmen (M. Reginald Kann in *Le Temps*, 7th August, 1925), and the rest consisted of Maghribis and Senegalese and the non-French European troops of the Foreign Legion, of whom 40 per cent. may have been Germans and another 40 per cent. Russians (*Foreign Affairs*, *loc. cit.*). These aliens in the French service remained remarkably loyal under the severe test to which they were subjected, only one case of treachery among native African troops being officially reported.

'A post of which the garrison comprised about twenty native as well as two French artillerymen, a French sergeant and an Algerian sergeant, was encircled by the Rifis. After having suffered cruelly from thirst and seen the two artillerymen killed by the Rifi fire, the natives yielded to the temptation of giving in, killed the French non-commissioned officer, tied up the native non-commissioned officer, and surrendered to the Rifis. Gentlemen, this unique case offers a striking contrast to the innumerable distinguished actions accomplished by all these isolated posts on the Wargha.' (M. Painlevé in the French Chamber, 23rd June, 1925.)

An American observer, who had spent some months at the French front as a war-correspondent, related to the present writer a conversation which he had had with a German serving in the Foreign Legion. This German (an ex-officer in the German Army) admitted that some of his compatriots had deserted, but deplored their conduct—not because it was prejudicial to their French paymasters, but because it was unprofessional.

³ For an account of the battle for the Tāzā corridor see the Survey in *L'Afrique Française*, July 1925, and the dispatches (official and unofficial)

foiled after very severe fighting ; but the precautionary evacuation of European women and children from the town of Tāzā was admitted by M. Painlevé in the French Chamber on the 9th July, and on the night of the 29th July a Rifī raiding party actually succeeded in cutting, for a few hours, the railway between Tāzā and Garsif ('Guercif').

The battle for Tāzā gave a sufficiently lively shock to French public opinion to make it possible for the French Government to carry out drastic changes of *personnel* in high places and to provide for the immediate conduct of operations on a far larger scale than theretofore. On the 6th July General Stanislas Naulin was gazetted to the new post of *commandant supérieur des troupes du Maroc* ;¹ on the 17th Marshal Pétain arrived at Rabāt on a special mission ; on the 28th it was announced officially at Fez that the reorganization of the French forces (which had been worked out by MM. Naulin, Pétain, and Lyautey in consultation) had been completed ;² and for the next few weeks the situation remained more or less stationary while General Naulin was preparing to deliver a counter-stroke with greatly increased forces and with Spanish co-operation.

Meanwhile, 'Abdu'l-Karīm's military successes against France—maintained, as they had been, for three months continuously—were producing exhilaration throughout the Islamic World,³ particularly among Maghribī Muslims under French domination, and a corresponding degree of depression in France. The situation also offered the French Communist Party an opportunity for striking a blow at the French 'bourgeois' state by championing the Rifī cause, on that principle of a 'common front' between the Western proletariat and the non-Western subject peoples which was part of the fixed policy of the Third (Communist) International.⁴ Just as the Rifis might hope to

from Morocco of which extracts are there given. See also an article in the *Corriere della Sera*, 8th August, 1925, by Signor Luciano Magrini.

¹ Texts of the two decrees in the French *Journal Officiel*, 7th July, 1925. See further *Le Temps*, 8th July, for a public statement by M. Painlevé (who was careful to say that the appointment had been made in complete agreement with Marshal Lyautey) and for an account of General Naulin's career. He had had previous experience in both North-West Africa and Syria, but his relative youth (he was 55 years old !) gave colour to the rumour that he had only been appointed after Generals Weygand and Guillaumat had refused. On this see M. Painlevé's cautiously worded statement in the French Chamber on the 9th July.

² *Le Temps*, 29th July, 1925.

³ See extracts from the Egyptian press in *L'Afrique Française*, June 1925, pp. 310–11, and from the Arabic press, both Nationalist and Communist, and also from the French Communist press of Tunisia in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 6 bis (Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, loc. cit.).

⁴ See the *Survey for 1924*, Part I C.

raise their fellow tribesmen in the rear of the French army, so the French Communists might hope to arouse the French nation against the Moroccan War; for the French nation—which had recently strained all its moral and material resources to the uttermost in a life-and-death struggle on its own soil—had become extremely sensitive to further loss of life and expenditure of money in war, especially in a campaign overseas along the indeterminate border of a recently acquired protectorate. This sensitiveness increased when the Moroccan campaign of 1925 developed on lines reminiscent of the fighting on European fronts. The daily *communiqués* from the North Moroccan front evoked harassing mental associations which every Frenchwoman, if not every Frenchman, would fain have been spared; and thus, though the military situation, at least at certain moments, was critical enough, the nervous tension which it produced in France was even greater than it would have been under ordinary psychological conditions. The French Communist Party was quick to see and seize its advantage. M. Doriot's telegram of the 20th September, 1924, to 'Abdu'l-Karīm' ¹ was followed up in May 1925 by the publication of a manifesto, in the name of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party, in which the French Government was represented as the aggressor, and recognition of the Republic of the Rif and evacuation of the French Zone in Morocco by France were demanded.² Meanwhile, a Communist agitation had been set on foot among the French and other European colonists in Morocco.³ On the 31st May three residents of Casablanca were expelled from Morocco on the charge of having taken part in the activities of a Communist 'cell' which was said to have been founded in that place by an emissary of the French Communist Party during the preceding winter. The objects of this 'cell' were alleged to include both spying and propaganda. A few days later an official of the Residency was likewise expelled on the charge of having betrayed official secrets. During June two women and four men were arrested on similar charges at Marseilles, and others at Tours.⁴

Critical moments in this struggle on the French 'home front' were marked by the debates in the Chamber of Deputies on the 27th, 28th,

¹ See p. 133 above.

² Quoted in *Le Temps*, 15th May, 1925, from *L'Humanité*.

³ *L'Afrique Française*, May 1925, quoting a telegram of the 8th May from Rabât to *Le Matin*.

⁴ *L'Afrique Française*, June 1925; *The Times*, 3rd, 4th, and 8th June, 1925. See also R. Raynaud, 'La propagande communiste dans l'Afrique du Nord' in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 1 bis (Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, January 1926).

and 29th May, the 16th, 19th, and 23rd June, and the 9th July, in which the Government revealed its nervousness in regard to the trend of public opinion by emphasizing the defensive and pacific character of its policy.

(vii) **The Franco-Spanish Co-operation against 'Abdu'l-Karīm (1925).**

The Franco-Spanish agreements which were negotiated in July 1925 were a testimony both to the diplomatic maladroitness of the Rifi leader and to the effectiveness of his military pressure. Nothing short of acute military danger could have brought about that collaboration between the two European nations, which, up to that time, had been so thoroughly estranged in Morocco by mutual jealousies and recriminations that each had taken satisfaction in the misfortunes of the other.

The initiative was now taken on the French side in an unofficial visit which M. Malvy paid to Madrid in the third week in May. There he found both the Government and public opinion well-disposed towards the idea of co-operation;¹ for, while Spanish *amour propre* was consoled by the fact that a first-class military power like France was finding formidable adversaries in the tribesmen who had so deeply humiliated Spain, any feeling of satisfaction was tempered by a disquietude as to what might be 'Abdu'l-Karīm's next move if the French suffered a serious reverse, and also by a wish not to let slip a possible opportunity of enlisting France for the furtherance of Spanish aims in exchange for Spanish co-operation with France at a critical juncture. Accordingly an agreement was reached between the two Governments for a conference, to be held at Madrid; the plenipotentiaries duly met there on the 17th June; and their meetings lasted from that date to the 25th July.²

The proceedings of the Madrid Conference, which were at times delicate, were kept strictly confidential, and the texts of the several agreements which were concluded still remained unpublished at the time of writing—official information being confined to the summary which the Spanish plenipotentiary, General Jordana, gave to the press on the closing day. The first question taken up was that of collaboration in suppressing the contraband trade with 'Abdu'l-Karīm's country, and on the 24th June the signature was announced

¹ *The Times*, 19th, 23rd, and 26th May, 1925, and *L'Afrique Française*, May 1925.

² See *L'Afrique Française*, August 1925, where General Jordana's communiqué, given to the Press on the 25th July, 1925, is printed in full; see also *The Times*, 25th July, 1925.

of an agreement providing for the joint naval surveillance of the greater part of the Moroccan coast, including a section in the French Zone. Spanish warships were to receive facilities in certain Algerian ports and French warships in certain Spanish ports. This agreement was notified to the other Powers on the 26th.¹ It was supplemented by another agreement (signed on the 8th July) for the suppression of contraband by land, and this was supplemented in turn by a special agreement (signed on the 21st²), regarding surveillance in the International Zone of Tangier. This was the most difficult point in the negotiations, for Spain not only demanded the right to follow up parties of insurgents from her own Zone into the international territory, but seemed disposed to reopen the whole Tangier question, which had been closed diplomatically, after a long-drawn-out controversy, in the Tangier Convention of the 18th December, 1923.³ In declining to contemplate any modification of the Tangier Convention France appears to have been supported by Great Britain. In pursuance of Article 4 of the convention the British Government sent four torpedo-boat destroyers at the beginning of August to participate in the patrolling of the coast of the International Zone (though not of any other section of the Moroccan littoral).⁴ The Franco-Spanish agreement of the 21st July provided for a more effective control of the landward boundaries of the International Zone through an increase in the strength of the police force created under the 1923 convention—the additional expense to be borne by the two Powers concerned.

The above-mentioned agreements might be expected to prevent 'Abdu'l-Karīm from obtaining further supplies in any substantial quantities; but it was recognized that he depended much less upon the contraband trade than upon material captured from his opponents themselves, and that accordingly even an effective blockade would not break his resistance without active military operations. A military convention was therefore signed in which France and Spain granted one another the right of sending aeroplanes over their respective Zones and of following up enemy formations across the boundary between them; and a meeting between the Marquis de Estella and Marshal Pétain took place at Ceuta and Tatwān on the 27th July. The reciprocal granting of the *droit de survol* and *droit de suite* raised once more the question of where the boundary

¹ *The Times*, 24th and 27th June; *Le Temps*, 24th June, 1925.

² *Le Temps*, 22nd July, 1925.

³ See Section (ix) below.

⁴ Statement in the House of Commons, 5th August, 1925, by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

between the French and Spanish Zones lay,¹ and the French seem to have been in favour of an immediate delimitation of the still indeterminate sectors. In deference, however, to Spanish views, they contented themselves with a *modus vivendi* which laid down a provisional line for practical purposes, pending a definitive settlement when the territory through which the boundary ran should have been brought under effective occupation.

The most important of the Madrid instruments was the political agreement, signed on the 11th July,² in which the two Powers severally pledged themselves not to conclude a separate peace and laid down jointly the general terms on which peace would be acceptable to them.

It has been mentioned above³ that negotiations for a truce between Spain and the Rîf were reported to have been opened and then broken off in the third week in May—that is, about the time of M. Malvy's visit to Madrid. It may be inferred that the Spanish Government—which, with the tribes of the Jibālah still pressing upon Tatwān and the Anjarā still in revolt in the rear, was not obtaining as much alleviation as it had hoped from the withdrawal of the preceding year—divined the possibility of enlisting French efforts in order to end the war by a military decision, with very little additional military effort on the part of Spain. At any rate Spain agreed, as has been seen, to a conference in which the above-mentioned agreements for Franco-Spanish co-operation were concluded; and on the 25th May the Marquis de Estella officially denied that he was making peace overtures as distinct from 'taking political action'.⁴

On the other hand, on the 20th June, three days after the opening of the Madrid Conference, Señor Echevarrieta, furnished with instructions from the Spanish Government and from the Marquis de Estella, had another interview with 'Abdu'l-Karīm in Alhucemas Bay, and brought back propositions—which were, however, rejected by the Spanish Government on the 10th July.⁵ In June, too,

¹ For details see *The Times*, 10th July, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 13th July, 1925.

³ See p. 125 above.

⁴ *The Times*, 26th May, 1925.

⁵ *L'Afrique Française*, July 1925. Señor Echevarrieta refused to take with him a Spanish officer who was afterwards deputed to convey to Melilla the Franco-Spanish peace-terms of the 18th July (see below) for 'Abdu'l-Karīm's information. Since his imprisonment in Melilla, 'Abdu'l-Karīm had always insisted on dealing only with Spanish civilians. Señor Echevarrieta is reported thereafter to have refused an invitation from the Marquis de Estella to serve on the Spanish delegation at the Madrid Conference. According to *Le Temps* (25th June and 4th July, 1925) the

M. Gabrielli, the French administrator of Taïrirt, on the Tāzā-Wajdā Railway, was authorized by the French Government to accept an invitation from 'Abdu'l-Karīm to visit him at Ajdīr, 'on condition that he abstained from anything resembling peace-talk.'¹

While the Madrid Conference was still in session the question of peace-terms was raised by 'Abdu'l-Karīm. On the 21st July 'an outline for peace-terms between France, Spain, and the Rif' was circulated by an English friend of 'Abdu'l-Karīm's, Captain R. Gordon Canning. The territorial demands in this document were high,² but the economic offers were conciliatory and the political proposals diplomatic.

Early in July 'Abdu'l-Karīm also sent emissaries to Tangier, who apparently intimated to the French and Spanish Governments that 'Abdu'l-Karīm was disposed to treat for peace.³

On the 18th July the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries at Madrid signed the following memorandum,⁴ based on their political agreement of the 11th :

1. The French and Spanish Governments, acting jointly, are in agreement to assure to the tribes of the Rif and the Jibālah, who are concerned, as much autonomy as is compatible with the international treaties by which the Sharifian Empire is regulated ;

2. The two Governments are in agreement to open without delay joint negotiations with a view to re-establishing peace and inaugurating the new régime.

The essential points in the negotiations are the following :

1. Reciprocal release of prisoners ;

2. Reciprocal amnesty, full and complete, to take effect from the 1st January, 1921 ;

3. Definition of the régime of administrative autonomy ;

4. Determination of the territories which are to be placed under this régime ;

5. Fixing of the police effectives designed to ensure order and security in these territories ;

6. Commercial freedom⁵ shall be recognized and ensured in the said

question of developing the mineral resources of the Rif was again discussed between Señor Echevarrieta and 'Abdu'l-Karīm on this occasion.

¹ *L'Afrique Française*, August 1925. M. Gabrielli was in close relations with 'Abdu'l-Karīm because large numbers of Rifis passed through his district on their seasonal migration to reap the harvests of Algeria.

² The north bank of the river Wargha was to be the southern boundary of the Rif State, which was to include the whole of the Jibālah, Spain retaining nothing on the mainland save her original *presidios* of Ceuta and Melilla and the iron ore mines already in operation about 15 kilometres south of Melilla.

³ French official communiqués of the 5th and 14th August, 1925.

⁴ Text made public by M. Painlevé in a speech of the 3rd October (*L'Afrique Française*, October 1925).

⁵ Presumably this meant, not 'free trade', but 'the open door'.

territories, as far as may be compatible with the international treaties and especially with the international stipulations concerning customs questions ;

7. The traffic in arms and munitions remains prohibited ;

8. Designation of a sector of the coast which should be occupied peaceably by Spain upon the cessation of hostilities.

These terms—which, on territorial questions, diverged widely from those of ‘Abdu’l-Karīm, and on which the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries themselves were reported to have had some difficulty in agreeing¹—were not made public. M. Gabrielli at Taïrirt had been instructed, however, on the 16th to inform ‘Abdu’l-Karīm that the text would be obtainable, if he desired to consult it, from French and Spanish emissaries at Melilla, and these gentlemen, who received the text from their principals on the 20th, duly waited at Melilla from the 24th July to the 14th August.² Instead, however, of addressing himself to them ‘Abdu’l-Karīm wrote two letters to his own emissaries at Tangier for communication to the local French authorities. In these letters he expressed no desire to consult the Franco-Spanish terms but simply stated that, as a preliminary to any peace negotiations, he must receive an assurance that the independence of the Rīf would be recognized and that the negotiations would take place at Tangier. The documents were communicated on the 26th and the contents telegraphed to the French Residency at Rabāt.³ Receiving no reply⁴ the Rifi emissaries addressed themselves to the Marquis de Estella, who promptly invited them by telegram to visit him at Tatwān.⁵ Here they were hospitably entertained and held friendly conversations with the Marquis de Estella, the tenor of which they reported to Ajdir. They apparently left Tangier on the 29th July and returned on the 2nd August. The Marquis evidently communicated to them the substance of the Franco-Spanish terms, but the French Government denied that he had given them the text of the memorandum of the 18th July,⁶ and both Governments published *démentis* of the terms which the Marquis was reported in the press to have offered them.⁷ About a week later

¹ *The Times*, 6th July, 1925.

² Speech by M. Painlevé of the 3rd October, 1925.

³ *The Times*, 26th and 30th July and 4th August, 1925.

⁴ On the 30th and the 31st July the Quai d’Orsay denied any knowledge of ‘Abdu’l-Karīm’s letters (*The Times*, 31st July and 1st August, 1925).

⁵ For this incident see the telegrams from the Tangier correspondent of *The Times* which were published on the 30th July and the 1st, 3rd, and 4th August, 1925.

⁶ Communiqué of the 8th August, 1925.

⁷ French and Spanish communiqués of the 5th and 6th August respectively.

a more fully accredited envoy from 'Abdu'l-Karīm appears to have presented himself at Tatwān and again informed the Marquis de Estella that the recognition of the independence of the Rif was the necessary preliminary condition for peace negotiations.¹ On the 14th and the 15th August the French and Spanish respectively published notes² in which they declared that independence could not be accorded to the Rif and that the war must therefore go on ; and since 'Abdu'l-Karīm continued to pay no attention to the Franco-Spanish emissaries at Melilla the latter were instructed on the 15th August to withdraw.³

The counter-offensive was heralded by the return to Morocco of Marshal Pétain, who arrived at Casablanca on the 22nd August after conferring with the Marquis de Estella at Algeciras on the 21st. At this meeting the Marshal seems to have promised the Marquis to assist Spain to deal 'Abdu'l-Karīm a 'knock-out blow' by sending French forces to attack him in his home-country in the Spanish Zone, beyond the political limits assigned to France under the treaties—but this only on condition that the Spaniards performed certain specified military operations on their side.⁴ General Naulin, on the other hand, seems to have preferred the less ambitious but less hazardous course of acting independently of the Spaniards and concentrating French efforts upon the recovery of lost posts to the north of the Wargha. In the event there seems to have been a compromise—General Naulin's plan and the eastern part of Marshal Pétain's plan being both put into operation—but it is possible that the French counter-offensive was hampered by this division of aims under dual control.⁵ It was also handicapped by climatic conditions—the intense heat of the season at which it opened and the imminence of the autumn rains, which might be expected to bring operations to a standstill a bare month after they opened.

¹ *Le Petit Parisien*, 11th August ; French semi-official *communiqué*, 12th August, 1925.

² Texts in *L'Afrique Française*, September 1925 ; see also *The Times*, 15th and 17th August, 1925.

³ M. Painlevé, speech of the 3rd October, 1925 ; *Le Temps*, 21st August ; French semi-official note of the 21st August, 1925.

⁴ If the Spaniards marched upon Shiṣhāwan from Al-Qasr on the Wādī'l-Qūs, then a French column would advance upon the same objective from Wazzān. Again, if the Spaniards made a landing in Alhucemas Bay and simultaneously advanced upon Ajdir from the east along the Anwāl road (of evil memory), then a French column would attempt to join hands with them by advancing from Tāzā through Kifān up the valley of the M'sun and pushing across the watershed into the valleys running down northwards to the Mediterranean. (See *The Times*, 24th September, 1925.)

⁵ See *Le Temps*, 31st October ; *Le Matin*, 2nd November, 1925.

On the Wargha sector the French employed the tactics of contemporary European warfare. After an artillery preparation on the 10th September they launched their first attack on the 11th, and followed it up by a succession of short advances—isolating, encircling, and clearing up one *massif* after another.¹ On this sector the operations terminated and the troops took up a permanent line for the winter on the 27th October.² By that date the French had here recovered at many points the line which they had held before the opening of the Rifi offensive in April, while at one point they had advanced beyond it.³

More spectacular progress was made on the Tāzā sector, in execution of Marshal Pétain's plan of co-operation with the Spaniards. In spite of a Rifi diversion against Tatwān a Spanish expeditionary force succeeded, between the 11th and the 16th September, in landing on the Rif coast at a point west of Alhucemas Bay, and on the 2nd October they fought their way down into the plain of Ajdir.⁴ For the next few days it was a race between the French force advancing from Tāzā and the weather—the question being whether the French advance-guards would be able to join hands with the Spaniards coming from Melilla and Ajdir before the country became impassable.⁵ Notwithstanding the exertions of the French cavalry—who, on the 10th October, reached Sidī 'Alī'bu Raqbah, a point only about 40 kilometres from Ajdir by the military road which 'Abdu'l-Karīm had constructed—the junction had not been effected⁶ before the operations were brought to a standstill by the increasing rain.⁷ A week later the French cavalry were withdrawn from Sidī 'Alī to Sūqu's-Sabt, and the infantry to the watershed between the Rif and the Muluya Basin.⁸

¹ For details see *Le Temps*, 18th September, and *The Times*, 18th September, 22nd and 24th October, 1925.

² *L'Afrique Française*, November 1925.

³ On the other hand, they had failed to achieve General Naulin's ultimate object of encircling the southern Banu Wuryāghal and reducing them to submission. (*Le Temps*, 31st October, 1925.)

⁴ For details of the operations, with excellent plans and panoramas, see *L'Afrique Française*, September, October, and November 1925.

⁵ For these operations see *The Times* and *Le Temps* daily as well as *L'Afrique Française*, October 1925.

⁶ On the 6th October, French cavalry on the Tāzā sector did join hands at Sidī'l-Hasan with Spanish cavalry from the Melilla sector, but not with any Spanish troops from Ajdir.

⁷ On the 13th October it was announced semi-officially that the operations 'were regarded as virtually terminated' and that the next step was to isolate the several tribes in their respective fastnesses by establishing a series of 'watertight compartments' (*L'Afrique Française*, October 1925).

⁸ See *L'Afrique Française*, November 1925, for the official explanations of this withdrawal.

Marshal Pétain virtually admitted in an interview with a correspondent of *Le Matin*¹ that the weather had prevented his original plan from being carried to completion; but this season there was nothing more to be done; and, after presiding over a final Council of War at Fez on the 1st November, the Marshal returned to France. 'Abdu'l-Karīm, meanwhile, had moved his head-quarters inland and south-westward to Targist.

The foregoing account of the military operations of 1925 would be incomplete without some attempt to strike a balance of the situation at the close of the campaigning season.² In the first place, it is evident that both sides in turn had just failed to attain their objective. On the one hand, 'Abdu'l-Karīm, in his spring offensive, after forcing the line of the Wargha and reaching the gates of Tāzā, had failed either to enter Fez³ in triumph or to join hands with the Atlas tribes. On the other hand, the French and Spaniards, in their autumn counter-offensive, had failed either to destroy 'Abdu'l-Karīm's field army, or to cut his territory in half by occupying a continuous line from Tāzā to Ajdir, or to bring about any widespread defection among the tribes which paid him allegiance. In other words, no military decision had been reached and the struggle resolved itself into one of endurance, in which the prospects depended partly on the strategic situation, partly on the relative military strength and military exhaustion of the combatants, partly on their relative prestige among the tribes.

As regarded strategic positions nine French posts had been captured, thirty-two evacuated, and two blown up during the Rīfī offensive—that is, forty-three posts in all had been temporarily lost out of sixty-six. Of these twenty-one had been recovered in the French counter-offensive and a number of new posts established—particularly on the Tāzā sector, where the French had taken from the Rīfis the command of the watershed which covered the southern approaches to Ajdir. Incidentally, the Spanish expeditionary force had compelled 'Abdu'l-Karīm to evacuate his capital. On the other hand, Tatwān was still under Rīfī gun-fire;⁴ the Anjarā tribe in the Tatwān-Ceuta-Tangier triangle was still unsubdued, and so, on the French front, were the Aslās (who commanded the southern bank

¹ Quoted in *L'Afrique Française*, November 1925.

² See *Le Temps*, 23rd, 30th, and 31st October; *The Times*, 28th and 30th October, 1925.

³ 'Les pièces que nous avons entre les mains attestent que sa pensée était bien de se faire proclamer Sultan.' (Statement by M. Briand in the French Chamber on the 30th December, 1925.)

⁴ *Le Temps*, 22nd November, 1925.

of the Wargha at the point nearest to Fez) and the southern Sanhājah (who occupied the *massif* between the Wargha and the Laban commanding the weakest point in the French line). Thus, strategically, the close of the campaign left either party very much at the other's mercy.

As regarded relative military strength and military exhaustion 'Abdu'l-Karīm had started his offensive with 35,000 fighting men (25,000 from the Rif and 10,000 from the Jibālah) and, as the tribes in the invaded areas of the French Zone had come over to his side, his numbers were estimated by the French to have risen to nearly 100,000 at their highest.¹ Of his new adherents he had then lost about 20,000 fighting men as a result of the recovery of ground by the French and the consequent return of tribes or portions of tribes to their original allegiance. Yet he ended the campaign with a force of about 60,000 men—25,000 more than he had had at the beginning—and his nucleus of regulars, from 6,000 to 10,000 strong, which had hardly come into action, was intact.

On the French side, after the crisis in the Tāzā sector at the beginning of July, the army in Morocco had been tardily reinforced by eleven European French infantry battalions² and a number of artillery and technical units, in addition to reinforcements of native troops. When Marshal Pétain and General Naulin opened their offensive on the 10th September they had at their disposal seven divisions—two each on the three sectors of the front, and one (the Moroccan Division, recalled from the Rhineland) in reserve at Fez—and these seven divisions contained 114 battalions of infantry, 25 squadrons of cavalry, and 22 squadrons of aeroplanes (each consisting of six machines).³ On the 21st October M. Painlevé apparently informed the Finance Committee of the Chamber that the total number of effectives in Morocco on that date was 158,000.⁴ Of

¹ *Le Temps*, 31st October, 1925. According to a French semi-official review of the campaign of 1925, published in *Le Temps* on the 23rd October, 'Abdu'l-Karīm's forces during that season attained a maximum of 60,000 on the French front and 40,000 on the Spanish front, 60,000 of the total being Rifī, Ghumārah, and Jibālah tribesmen from 'Abdu'l-Karīm's own dominions and 40,000 insurgents from the invaded portion of the French Zone. An American student of the Moroccan War (in *Foreign Affairs* of New York, January 1926) estimated the maximum total strength of the Rifīs as low as 40,000 to 50,000. For an estimate of the numbers of the various elements on the Rifī side see also *Le Temps* of the 24th June, 1925.

² Statement by M. Painlevé in the Chamber, 3rd November, 1925; *Le Temps* and *The Times* (30th October, 1925) give the number of French battalions sent out as fifteen.

³ *Foreign Affairs* of New York, January 1926.

⁴ *L'Afrique Française*, October 1925.

these only 12,000 (i.e. about 7.6 per cent.) appear to have been Frenchmen.¹ Of the remainder 12,800 were non-French Europeans belonging to the Foreign Legion, while the other 133,000 were mostly natives of Al-Maghrib. In other words, the Maghribi troops serving in the French Army of Morocco constituted nearly 85 per cent. of the whole, and were more than double the number of their compatriots serving under 'Abdu'l-Karīm at the end of the campaign. The disproportion was increased again after this by the return to France of twenty-one battalions, including all the European French battalions which had been sent out during the campaigning season.²

The French casualties down to the 31st July were reported to be 1,285 killed and 5,306 wounded, and from the 1st August to the 15th October (covering the period of the counter-offensive) 891 killed and 2,991 wounded. During this latter period the total number of European French casualties was as low as 293.³ These proportions of French effectives engaged and casualties incurred, compared to native effectives and casualties, show that the native troops were being made to bear the brunt and that, in North-West Africa, France had become militarily dependent upon native manpower. This hazardous policy had been forced upon the French Government by French public opinion, which had become extremely sensitive to the blood-tax since the decline in the birth-rate of France had been accentuated by the terrible casualties of the General War of 1914-18. Even so public opinion remained restive, and North-West African service was becoming so unpopular that on the 20th September, 1925, the Government issued a decree making elaborate provision for the drafting by lot of the inconsiderable number of conscripts annually required for this service, and for exempting from it married men, orphans, and men who had had a father or two brothers killed in the General War.⁴

By the 21st October the total cost to France of the Moroccan campaign for the current year had risen to 950,000,000 francs,

¹ *Foreign Affairs*, loc. cit.

² M. Painlevé's statement of the 3rd November, 1925. The number of divisions was not decreased (see an account of the dispositions for the winter in *Le Temps*, 30th October, 1925). On the other hand, the total number of French effectives was reduced to 110,000. (For details see *L'Afrique Française*, November 1925; *Le Temps*, 22nd November, 1925.)

³ *L'Afrique Française*, October 1925.

⁴ *The Times*, 21st September, 1925. See Livy, Book xxxi, chapters 6-8, for the similar difficulty experienced by the Roman Government after the close of the Hannibalic War in obtaining drafts for overseas service. The Roman Government, like the French, sought to meet the difficulty by increasing the proportion of non-citizen troops in its foreign garrisons.

together with 400,000,000 francs' worth of war material borrowed from the home forces.

As for the Spaniards the permanent strength of their army in Morocco, on its reduced footing after the withdrawal of 1924, was 69,290 Spanish and 15,000 native regulars ; but reinforcements were sent out for the autumn offensive, and the number of additional troops had apparently risen to 35,000 by the beginning of October. At the close of the campaign Spain had 45,142 men in the Melilla sector, 40,516 in the Ceuta-Tatwān sector, 18,537 in the Al-'Arā'ish sector, and 14,000 on the Rif coast adjoining Ajdīr.¹ In the Spanish army, as contrasted with the French, the proportions of Europeans and natives were reversed, but this advantage was neutralized by the mediocrity of the fighting power of the Spanish soldier and the organizing power of the Spanish High Command when judged by French standards. In all there were 280,000 Franco-Spanish troops in line against 60,000 Rifis at the end of October.

As regarded the allegiance of the tribes, which was the political stake at issue in the military struggle, it was reckoned that about one half of those who had fallen away from the French since the opening of 'Abdu'l-Karīm's offensive had been brought back to their allegiance.² As far as this went the balance was in favour of 'Abdu'l-Karīm. On the other hand, he had not succeeded in his own wider project of raising a general revolt in the French rear, particularly in the Atlas.

The close of this critical year was signalized by the departure from Morocco of Marshal Lyautey, who sent in his resignation on the 24th September, 1925, and sailed from Rabāt for France on the 10th October.³ While, during the parliamentary debates of the previous summer, the Socialists had insistently demanded the substitution of a civil for a military Resident-General, Marshal Lyautey

¹ These figures are taken from *Foreign Affairs* of New York, January 1926. *Le Temps* of the 16th August, 1925 (before the reinforcements were sent), gives the numbers as 70,000 Spanish troops with 3,000 Spanish officers, 13,000 natives and 7,000 legionaries.

² For a detailed survey of the tribal situation at this stage see an article from Fez (apparently written on the 17th October) in *Le Temps*, 23rd October, 1925; see also an article by Monsieur R. Poulain in *Le Temps*, 31st October, 1925.

³ Marshal Lyautey had travelled to Paris to report towards the end of August, a few days after Marshal Pétain's arrival in Morocco, on the 22nd August, to direct the French counter-offensive. On this occasion his resignation had been foreshadowed in the press, but the Government had merely announced (on the 2nd September) that he would return to Morocco and then come home to report a second time in October. He had duly returned to Morocco in September (*L'Afrique Française*, September 1925).

himself had asked leave to resign, for reasons of health, as early as 1924 and 1923. Whether or not 'Abdu'l-Karīm was right in placing the blame for the outbreak of hostilities between France and the Rif on the Marshal's shoulders, there was little doubt that, when his work was seen in perspective, History would pronounce Marshal Lyautey to have been one of the greatest colonial administrators of his generation.¹ That work was hindered and imperilled by two external factors which were beyond his control—the General War of 1914–18 and the failure of Spain to pacify her Zone of Morocco during the years 1921–4. Nevertheless, his achievements under these adverse conditions won him the admiration, and his personality the affection, not only of his own countrymen in Morocco and at home, but of foreign residents and observers, foreign soldiers and administrators who could judge from their own experience, and, above all, of Moroccans of all classes—townsmen and tribesmen, Arabs and Berbers. In dealing with the people of Morocco his watchword was: 'The adversaries of to-day are the collaborators of to-morrow.' Free and friendly collaboration between Frenchmen and Moroccans for their common advantage was his ultimate aim throughout, and this was a notable departure from the traditions of French colonial policy in North-West Africa, which had been evolved in Algeria on a basis of native subordination to French domination and privilege. This new departure was due to Marshal Lyautey's personal initiative. He had been originally appointed to his post on the 28th April, 1912, just four weeks after the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of the 30th March, 1912, had placed the French Protectorate on a judicial basis. Thus the French Protectorate over Morocco had not yet existed apart from his administration of it, and this made his departure an event of more than ordinary significance.

(viii) The Collapse of 'Abdu'l-Karīm (1926).

Although the Rifi offensive and the Franco-Spanish counter-offensive had equally failed to bring about a military decision in the campaigning season of 1925, that failure was not equally serious for both parties. Nothing short of a swift and decisive victory could have counteracted the moral effect of the exhaustion which inevitably followed the almost superhuman military effort of the Rif against the combined forces of two vastly superior opponents;

¹ For an appreciation of the Marshal and his work see *L'Afrique Française*, October 1925, and *The Times*, 20th September, 1925. See also an interview with Marshal Lyautey himself in *The New York Times*, 10th March, 1926.

whereas France and Spain, though they both felt the strain of the Moroccan War severely, could afford, in partnership, to purchase a decision at the price of a further campaign. Thus, as the winter of 1925-6 wore on, the confidence of 'Abdu'l-Karīm, the *moral* of his tribesmen, and the loyalty of the other tribes under their hegemony steadily weakened,¹ while the confidence and determination of the French and Spanish Governments steadily rose. Moreover, the French Government was accurately informed by its military intelligence service of the true state of affairs in the enemy's camp,² whereas 'Abdu'l-Karīm appears to have buoyed himself up, almost to the last moment, with false hopes that the Communist Party would force the French Government to make an inconclusive peace or even that some other Power or Powers would intervene diplomatically at Paris and Madrid in order to bring about peace by mediation. Had 'Abdu'l-Karīm been as well informed of the internal situation in France or of the international position as the French were of his own affairs, he would probably have accepted the best terms that he could have obtained during the winter rather than abide the verdict of another campaign.

On the other side the increase of confidence was particularly perceptible in Spain. On the 16th October, 1925, immediately after the termination of the 1925 campaign, the leader of the Catalan Regionalist Party, Señor F. de A. Cambo, addressed an open letter to the Marquis de Estella, in which he preached the vanity of all 'imperialism' and urged the Government to take advantage of the feat of arms at Cedabilla Bay in order to make a dignified withdrawal from Morocco. On the 21st the Marquis, in an elaborately conciliatory reply, announced his intention of continuing with constancy—though with prudence—to act in concert with France, but endorsed Señor Cambo's judgement on 'imperialism', and concluded, in a burst of frankness: 'This Moroccan business, my dear friend, is a bad business.'³ Before the end of November, however, his attitude stiffened, and he now talked of overthrowing 'Abdu'l-Karīm, systematically disarming the tribes in the Spanish Zone, and then maintaining order in the Sultan's name through the agency of the tribal chieftains (a leaf taken from Marshal Lyautey's book).⁴ On the 2nd November the Marquis de Estella resigned the posts of High

¹ *Le Temps*, 13th December, 1925; *The Times*, 2nd January and 15th April, 1926.

² *L'Afrique Française*, June 1926, p. 341.

³ Text of both letters in *op. cit.*, November 1925, pp. 585-9.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, December 1925, pp. 659-61.

Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Morocco, which he had held since the 16th October, 1924, to General Sanjurjo.¹ On the 15th December, 1925, there was created a Directorate-General of Morocco and the Colonies under the immediate control of the Prime Minister,² and General Jordana was appointed head of the new organization.³

In the French Zone General Boichut was appointed to succeed General Naulin in the supreme command on the 28th December.⁴ The French had less reason than the Spaniards to force the issue with 'Abdu'l-Karīm to extremes. Almost all the tribes which the close of the 1925 campaign had still left under 'Abdu'l-Karīm's dominion lay in the Spanish Zone, so that the degree of autonomy to be accorded to them was immaterial to the French so long as they kept the peace and stayed within their borders. On the other hand, the close of the campaign had left the French army with a much longer front to hold than the Spanish—and this in the mountainous borderland between the two zones, far from the French base, where the troops were exposed to the rigours of a Moroccan winter.⁵ In a debate⁶ on Moroccan credits in the Chamber on the 30th December the Communists again delivered a violent attack on the Government's policy. Nevertheless, the French Government, like the Spanish Government, had made up its mind to secure a decision, though it might differ in regard to the precise terms of peace which that implied.

Pending the resumption of regular operations in the spring the French High Command carried on the struggle for the allegiance of the tribes by tactics borrowed from 'Abdu'l-Karīm himself. While the regular troops remained in their positions parties of Moroccan irregulars, recruited among tribes friendly to France, worked their way—under the leadership of French officers and with the support of French aeroplanes—into the territories of the recalcitrant tribes adjoining the French front and brought them, one after another, to the point of submission, which the French authorities allowed them to make on easy terms.⁷ The climax was the capitulation on the

¹ *The Times*, 3rd November, 1925.

² Text of the Royal Decree, with the Marquis de Estella's covering letter, in *L'Afrique Française*, January 1926, pp. 45-6. This decree was modified by another of the 4th January, 1926.

³ *The Times*, 21st December, 1925.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 29th December, 1925.

⁵ For the hardships which the French troops at first endured in winter quarters see *Le Temps*, 21st November, 1925.

⁶ Reported in *Reenseignements Coloniaux*, No. 1 (Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, January 1926).

⁷ Details in *L'Afrique Française*, January 1926, pp. 52-4.

23rd December of the Musbah fraction of the Sanhājah, whose territory had remained a dangerous unsubdued salient in the French line when the regular operations had ceased in October.¹ The Jāyā and the southern fraction of the Banu Wuryāghal—both seated on the middle course of the Wargha, dangerously near to Fez—capitulated before the end of January.² ‘Abdu’l-Karīm realized how serious for his cause these tribal defections were, and attempted to stem the tide by a succession of counter-raids in the ‘no-man’s land’ between the two fronts.³ In February this pressure on the Rifī side caused the French to evacuate the important post of Bibān;⁴ and on the 26th–27th of that month it culminated in a regular attack, by picked troops, on the territory of the M’tiwā tribe, north-west of the Musbah Sanhājah. The French reaction, however, was prompt and effective; and a counter-offensive launched on the 28th February and sustained until the 2nd March carried the French line at some points beyond its original positions, though on this occasion the Rifis fought with all their former stubbornness.⁵

Meanwhile, on the Spanish north-west front, the Anjarā tribe, in the Ceuta–Tatwān–Tangier triangle, began to come to terms in January, and their submission was completed on the 20th February.⁶ On the 7th March the Spaniards captured—though at a considerable cost in casualties—the artillery positions on the heights south of Tatwān from which the Rifis had been shelling that town for more than a year past with captured Spanish guns.⁷

The change of temper on both sides following the change in the military situation was indicated by the fate of a peace mission which was undertaken by an Englishman, Captain Gordon Canning, who

¹ *The Times*, 28th December, 1925; *Le Temps*, 5th January, 1926. The Musbah Sanhājah were required by the French authorities to comply with the following conditions: (i) To sacrifice one bull for every ten families; (ii) to undertake to provide labour (which was to be remunerated by the French) for repairing roads and tracks; (iii) to reconstruct without remuneration roads destroyed by the tribesmen themselves; (iv) to furnish 35 hostages as security for the safety of French troops in their territory; (v) to deliver one rifle and 300 francs per family within a week, and 12,000 francs immediately; (vi) to undertake to provide ‘friendlies’ (*partisans*) for future operations [against other recalcitrant tribes]. These conditions were duly fulfilled.

² *The Times*, 27th January, 1926; *L’Afrique Française*, February 1926.

³ *The Times*, 20th January and 9th February, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 15th February, 1926.

⁵ *Le Temps*, 5th March, 1926; *The Times*, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th March, 1926.

⁶ *The Times*, 18th and 19th January and 22nd February, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 8th and 9th March, 1926. For a description of the Spanish positions at Tatwān and Al-‘Arā’ish at the close of the winter of 1925–6 see *ibid.*, 29th and 30th March, 1926.

sympathized with the Rifis' struggle for independence,¹ and who had been instrumental in making public 'Abdu'l-Karīm's original peace terms of January 1925.² Towards the end of October 1925, immediately after the close of the 1925 campaign, Captain Canning had been received in Paris by the then Prime Minister, M. Painlevé, and had been authorized by him to proceed via Rabāt to the Rif³ in order to advise 'Abdu'l-Karīm to ask officially for the Franco-Spanish peace terms of the 18th July.⁴ This time 'Abdu'l-Karīm took the step which he had omitted to take in the summer; and on the 23rd December, 1925, Captain Gordon Canning arrived in Paris, via Rabāt and Marseilles, as the accredited bearer of an official request from the Rifi leader for the July peace terms,⁵ in the hope of obtaining an audience with the new Prime Minister, M. Briand. M. Briand, however, sent him word at Marseilles that he would not receive him; and when challenged in the Chamber on the 30th December by the Communist Deputy, M. Cachin, he not only admitted this but took the opportunity to foreshadow a new departure in policy. He described 'Abdu'l-Karīm's hold over the tribes as having been established solely by terrorism on the part of a well-armed nucleus of Banu Wuryāghal tribesmen. Now the tribes were seeking to escape from this tyranny. The frontier was being policed by the Moroccans themselves. During the past two months the French casualties had been reduced to a minimum. The improvement was incontestable.

Moreover, contacts are being made all this time with the tribes and negotiations are being pursued. We are not obliged to consider 'Abdu'l-Karīm as necessarily the person with whom we have to negotiate. . . . If he were able to say to-morrow, 'You see, the French have been obliged by the pressure of their public opinion to enter into relations with me; peace negotiations have begun,' he would obtain an im-

¹ Captain Canning acted, of course, as a private individual and not on behalf of the British Government. The French press (though not the French Government) freely accused him of being a 'concession-hunter' who was pursuing schemes for personal profit under the cloak of sympathy with 'a people rightly struggling to be free'. Captain Canning was reported to have committed the indiscretion of accepting part-payment of travelling expenses (which he afterwards refunded) from a certain Herr Hacklander, who was stated to be an associate of the brothers Mannesmann (see a telegram from *The Times* correspondent at Tangier in *The Times*, 30th January, 1926). There was no evidence, however, that Captain Canning's motives were less disinterested or less honourable than those of the English Philhellenes and Italophiles during the Greek War of Independence and the Italian Risorgimento.

² See p. 124 above.

³ *The Times*, 18th December, *The Manchester Guardian*, 31st December, 1925.

⁴ See p. 143 above.

⁵ The alleged text of a letter from 'Abdu'l-Karīm, of which Captain Gordon Canning was said to be the bearer, is printed in *Le Temps*, 23rd December, 1925.

mediate renewal of credit all round . . . and the result of the heroic efforts of our soldiers would have been compromised by our *maladresse*. . . . We are advancing not merely by military operations but thanks to conversations, which we propose to continue and extend. As successive families and tribes submit, we are giving them protection. . . . No one in this Chamber will demand of us that we should forcibly and arbitrarily bring under the crook of a shepherd like 'Abdu'l-Karīm communities which are beginning to desire separation from him.¹

On the 1st January, 1926, there was published in the French press an official letter from the Quai d'Orsay to Captain Gordon Canning, rejecting the request for an audience with M. Briand which he had made in a letter of the 27th. Thereupon, Captain Gordon Canning announced that 'Abdu'l-Karīm's offer to consider the July peace terms had lapsed,² and repaired to Tangier;³ but he left Morocco on the 4th February without being able to achieve anything further.⁴ The failure of Captain Gordon Canning's peace mission⁵ was followed on both sides by preparations for a fresh campaign in the spring. At Madrid, on the 6th February, a scheme of operations was drawn up in concert by Marshal Pétain and the Marquis de Estella.⁶ At the front, especially on certain sectors facing the French, the Rifis constructed elaborate entrenchments supported by 'dug-outs'. In one sector there were no less than three successive positions, each composed of several lines of trenches—an organization which bore 'a remarkable resemblance to that at which the French and Germans had arrived by the end of 1918'.⁷ Nevertheless, the failure of Captain Gordon Canning was reported to have lowered perceptibly the *moral* in 'Abdu'l-Karīm's camp and to have stimulated the

¹ M. Briand also took the ground that he could not enter into relations with Captain Gordon Canning without disloyalty to Spain. It was not easy to see the force of this argument, since the peace terms of the 18th July, 1925, which 'Abdu'l-Karīm was now prepared to accept, had been put forward by Spain and France jointly, and Spanish participation in the conversations which Captain Gordon Canning sought could have been arranged, had the French and Spanish Governments desired it. It was evident that M. Painlevé had not acted incorrectly in October, but that, before Captain Gordon Canning's return to Paris in December, M. Briand had changed the French Government's policy.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 31st December, 1925.

³ *The Times*, 11th January, 1926.

⁴ *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd February; *The Times*, 8th February, 1926. Captain Gordon Canning left Tangier on the advice of the British Consul General, whom he consulted on the point, but not under any pressure or compulsion (statement of the 4th February, 1926, in the House of Commons at Westminster, by the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs).

⁵ For the history of this mission see *Le Temps*, 15th, 18th, 23rd, and 25th December, 1925; *The Times*, 18th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 29th December 1925.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 21st June, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 11th May, 1926.

movement of defection ;¹ and 'Abdu'l-Karīm quickly made fresh overtures through other channels. On the 27th January, for example, he addressed a letter, declaring his readiness for peace, to the editor of *The Times*, which eventually reached its destination and was published in that journal on the 17th March ;² and he maintained a correspondence with the French administrator of Taūirt, M. Gabrielli.³ Towards the end of February he offered, through this latter channel, to allow his Spanish and French prisoners to communicate with their friends and to receive clothing, medicines, and provisions ;⁴ and in April a medical mission, commanded by M. Gabrielli himself, left Taūirt for Targist.⁵ This conciliatory gesture was accompanied by fresh suggestions for negotiation, and this time the French and Spanish Governments did not show themselves intransigent.⁶

On the 30th March a conference was held in Paris between MM. Briand (Prime Minister), Painlevé (Minister for War), Ponsot (Sous-Directeur des Affaires d'Afrique at the Quai d'Orsay), Steeg (Resident-General in Morocco), and Marshal Pétain ;⁷ and on the 5th April it was announced officially that the prospects of negotiation were considered favourable. On the 7th April M. Briand conferred with the Spanish Ambassador, Señor Quiñones de Leon ; and there was a Cabinet meeting at Madrid, at the close of which the Marquis de Estella announced that France and Spain were in complete agreement.⁸ On the 9th, after a further Cabinet Council in Paris, it was announced by the Quai d'Orsay that the French and Spanish Governments had decided to take up 'Abdu'l-Karīm's proposal to enter into negotiations and had appointed delegations which were to conduct pourparlers at Wajdā, about the 15th April, with 'representatives of the recalcitrant tribes of the Rif'. The names of the French, Spanish, and Rifi delegates were given. The three Rifi delegates named were Si Muhammad Azarqān, the brother-in-law of 'Abdu'l-Karīm and his 'Minister of Foreign Affairs',⁹ who was to

¹ *The Times*, 2nd January, 1926 ; *Le Temps*, 10th January.

² An English translation of the original Arabic text by the correspondent of *The Times* at Tangier is reprinted, from *The Times* of the 17th March, 1926, in the Appendix to the present volume.

³ See above, p. 143.

⁴ *The Times*, 4th March, 1926 ; *L'Afrique Française*, April 1926, p. 195.

⁵ *The Times*, 9th April, 1926.

⁶ For the origin of these negotiations see a dispatch from Wajdā to *Le Journal*, printed on the 14th April, and reprinted in *L'Afrique Française*, April 1926. For their subsequent course see *L'Afrique Française*, April and May 1926.

⁷ *The Times*, 31st March, 1926.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 8th April, 1926.

⁹ Azarqān had been personally instrumental in bringing the negotiations about (*Ibid.*, 15th April, 1926).

represent the Banu Wuryāghal, and Sī Muhammad Hitnī and Sī Ahmad Shaddī who were to represent the other tribes. On the 12th April it was further announced in Paris semi-officially that the principal conditions which would be presented at Wajdā by the French and Spanish delegates would be the recognition of the sovereignty of the Sultan by the tribes, their disarmament, and the withdrawal of 'Abdu'l-Karīm from the country. The tribes were then to be accorded a certain autonomy within the framework of the existing treaties, but were to have no direct relations with foreign Governments other than those of Spain and France in their respective zones. An Armistice was to be granted to the tribes at the price of military guarantees. There was to be an exchange of prisoners. Until the definitive conclusion of peace the French and Spanish preparations for the spring campaign were not to be suspended. These terms were inevitably more severe than those of the previous July, but they were interpreted next day by M. Painlevé as being 'not strictly conditions but bases for discussion', and they implied one substantial concession. In fact, though not in form, the French and Spanish Governments were waiving the important condition (foreshadowed by M. Briand on the 30th December) that there were only to be separate settlements with the several tribes and no comprehensive settlement with 'Abdu'l-Karīm, and were consenting to treat for a general peace with 'Abdu'l-Karīm's representatives.¹

The conditions published in Paris on the 12th April appear to have been communicated to Azarqān on the 11th and to have been accepted by 'Abdu'l-Karīm on the same day; but unhappily the negotiations went badly from the outset.² On the 18th April the Rifi delegation³ held a preliminary meeting with the French and Spanish delegations at Camp Berteaux (on the road from Taūirt to Targist). At this meeting the head of the French delegation, General Simon, who acted as spokesman on the French and Spanish side, informed the Rifis that negotiations regarding the political conditions

¹ On this point see *The Times*, 15th April, 1926. The formula that the second and third Rifi delegates represented the other tribes was a diplomatic fiction, for both of them appear to have been members of the Banu Wuryāghal and to have held positions of trust under 'Abdu'l-Karīm, and Hitnī appears to have been 'Abdu'l-Karīm's cousin. The purpose of the formula was to avoid any official recognition of 'Abdu'l-Karīm except as chief of the single tribe of the Banu Wuryāghal.

² For the first phase at Camp Berteaux see *The Times*, 28th April, 1926.

³ On the Rifi delegation Sī Muhammad Hitnī was replaced at the last moment by the qa'id Haddu, a Moroccan with a French education (*L'Afrique Française*, April 1926, p. 203).

could not be opened until after the fulfilment of certain military conditions, namely, the exchange of prisoners and the rectification of the Franco-Spanish front.¹ Azarqān demurred to these military conditions on the double ground that they were unacceptable in themselves and that they had been sprung upon him without warning;² and at his request the qā'id Haddu was conveyed to the Rif by aeroplane in order to lay the matter before 'Abdu'l-Karīm. On the 20th April instructions from 'Abdu'l-Karīm were received, and on the same day the Rifi delegation published a *communiqué* to the press,³ in which they declared that the political conditions put forward on the French and Spanish side would be acceptable with the following modifications. In place of the Franco-Spanish formula requiring acceptance of 'the situation resulting from the submissions [already made] to the Sultan' they proposed the formula 'recognition of the Sultan's temporal and spiritual authority'. In regard to the demand for the withdrawal of 'Abdu'l-Karīm they represented that an immediate withdrawal might throw the Rif into a disorder which would be contrary to the interest of all parties, and they suggested that the Amīr should abdicate spontaneously after a certain interval, and on the understanding that he should be allowed to retire to some other Islamic country. Disarmament should not preclude the maintenance of a local militia recruited among the tribes themselves. The exchange of prisoners should follow and not precede the conclusion of peace. The publication of this *communiqué* caused General Simon to protest against the practice of 'open diplomacy'; but the French and Spanish delegations, in their turn, now consulted their principals, and on the 26th April it was announced that the French and Spanish Governments had waived the preliminary military conditions which had been put forward on the 18th.⁴ On the same day the Rifi delegation, which had held another informal

¹ The French and Spanish military authorities apparently desired to advance to the line of the River Kert, in the neighbourhood of Sidi 'Alī'bu Raqbah, where their failure to effect a junction in the previous October (see p. 146 above) had left an awkward salient of unoccupied territory at the south-eastern corner of their line (*The Times*, 21st April, 1926).

² 'It is admitted in official circles here that they [the Rifi delegates] were not informed that this particular demand [for a rectification of the front] would be put forward.' (Telegram, dated the 20th April, 1926, from the Paris correspondent of *The Times*.)

³ Text in *Le Temps*, 22nd April, 1926. According to the special correspondent of *The Times* at Wajdā this *communiqué* was drawn up before 'Abdu'l-Karīm's instructions arrived (*The Times*, 21st April, 1926).

⁴ The Spanish Government appears to have agreed to this at the instance of the French Government, and somewhat reluctantly (*The Times*, 28th April, 1926).

meeting with the French and Spanish delegations on the 24th at Al-'Ayūn, proceeded to Wajdā, and the peace conference was formally opened in that place forthwith.

The Wajdā Conference was protracted from the 27th April to the 6th May, but as early as the 29th April a deadlock was reached—especially over the questions of disarmament and autonomy.¹ The Rifis insisted that their disarmament should be carried out by themselves under the supervision of French and Spanish control officers, and not by French and Spanish troops ; while they failed to comprehend the meaning of 'autonomy within the framework of the existing international treaties'—a failure for which they could scarcely be blamed, since the meaning was almost incomprehensible to the French and Spanish experts who expounded it to them.² The Rifi delegation requested time for another personal consultation with 'Abdu'l-Karīm, and on the 1st May the French and Spanish delegations acceded to this request, with the notification that, unless the original conditions of the 11th April were accepted in principle by the 6th May and all the prisoners liberated by the same date, the two Governments would resume their freedom of action on the 7th.³ Azarqān and Haddu immediately left for Targist and duly returned on the 5th ;⁴ but on the 6th, when the conference reassembled, it appeared that their instructions from 'Abdu'l-Karīm did not conform to the Franco-Spanish ultimatum ; the French and Spanish delegations broke off the proceedings after a quarter of an hour ; and the Rifi delegation left Wajdā again the same evening.⁵ The Franco-Spanish offensive began next day.

After an aerial bombardment on the 7th the French and Spanish troops advanced upon Targist on the 8th from two directions—from the line of the River Kert and from the positions held by the Spanish

¹ *The Times*, 1st May, 1926.

² On the negotiations at Wajdā see the Franco-Spanish official memorandum of the 1st May, published in *Le Temps*, 3rd May, and a statement by the qā'id Haddu, published in *L'Œuvre*, 1st May, 1926. The French and Spaniards censured the Rifis for refusing to liberate their prisoners forthwith. The Rifis did, however, offer to liberate forthwith the severely wounded or dangerously ill prisoners of war, as well as the women and children, and to give facilities for the dispatch of a medical mission (Franco-Spanish memorandum of the 1st May). Considering that, throughout the War, the French and Spanish Governments had remorselessly refused to allow doctors and medical supplies to enter the Rif for the benefit of the Rifi wounded, there was little justification for their complaint against the conduct of the Rifis in this matter.

³ *The Times*, 3rd May, 1926.

⁴ Between the Algerian port of Nemours and a point on the shore of Alhucemas Bay they were conveyed, both going and coming, on a French torpedo-boat destroyer.

⁵ *Le Temps*, 8th May, 1926.

expeditionary force in the hinterland of Cedabilla Bay.¹ This Spanish force had to overcome a resistance which cost it heavy casualties ;² but elsewhere the Franco-Spanish advance was practically unopposed, and the two converging forces made contact with one another on the 20th.³ Anwāl had already been entered by the Spaniards on the 18th,⁴ and on the 23rd Targist itself was occupied by French Moroccan irregulars.⁵ On the same day the Spanish High Commissioner, General Sanjurjo, demonstrated, by travelling overland from Ajdīr to Melilla, that the country between these points (including almost the whole territory of the Banu Wuryāghal) had been effectively conquered. On the same day, again, letters from 'Abdu'l-Karīm, suing for a suspension of hostilities, were conveyed to General Sanjurjo at Melilla and to M. Steeg at Fez ; but on the 25th these overtures were rejected,⁶ and on that day 'Abdu'l-Karīm delivered to the French officer commanding the detachment which had occupied Targist a second letter addressed to M. Steeg, in which he offered unconditional surrender. M. Steeg declined to treat with him until he had liberated his prisoners. The prisoners were accordingly delivered on the 26th, and at 5.15 a.m. on the morning of the 27th 'Abdu'l-Karīm himself rode into the French lines.⁷ He was received, by the express orders of General Boichut, with the traditional courtesy of the French army towards a vanquished enemy, and on the 29th he was conveyed to Tāzā.

The surrender of 'Abdu'l-Karīm was followed by a collapse of resistance everywhere. On the Tatwān front the offensive had at first been taken by the Rifis after the renewal of hostilities ;⁸ but in the Jibālah before the end of the first week in June the people of Shif-shāwan expelled 'Abdu'l-Karīm's representatives ;⁹ and, although the Jibālah tribesmen elected a new leader of their own a few weeks later,¹⁰ this did not portend a serious renewal of the struggle against the Spaniards in the still unconquered districts. Before the middle of July the Spanish forces had occupied the remainder of the Rīf proper and the whole of the Ghumārah.¹¹ On the 2nd August operations were opened against the Jibālah¹² and on the 10th these

¹ *Ibid.*, 10th May, 1926.

² *The Times*, 19th June, 1926.

³ *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 22nd May, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, 24th May, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 25th May, 1926.

⁶ *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 26th May, 1926.

⁷ For details see *The Times*, 27th and 28th May, 1926, and a narrative by the Marquis de Segonzac in *L'Afrique Française*, June 1926, pp. 284-7.

⁸ *The Times*, 18th and 19th May, 1926.

⁹ *L'Afrique Française*, June 1926, p. 340.

¹⁰ *The Times*, 22nd June, 1926.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 14th and 16th July, 1926.

¹² *Ibid.*, 4th August, 1926.

resulted in the occupation of Shifshāwan.¹ By the close of the campaigning season of 1926 the whole of the Spanish Zone of Morocco had been brought for the first time under effective Spanish control—except for a few roving bands of insurgents who were still at large in the Jibālah.² Within the same period the French made their position in their own zone doubly secure by practically wiping out the Tache de Taza.³

The political questions raised by the surrender of 'Abdu'l-Karīm and the submission of the tribes which had formerly followed his lead were dealt with in a Franco-Spanish Conference at Paris, which opened on the 14th June and resulted on the 10th July in the signature of a comprehensive agreement providing for the delimitation, on the ground, of the French and Spanish Zones as defined in the convention of the 27th November, 1912; for the maintenance, in concert, of naval supervision over the entire coastline of Morocco; and for military and administrative co-operation, on land, along the border. On the 13th July this agreement was confirmed by the signatures of M. Briand and the Marquis de Estella, who came to Paris in person for the purpose.⁴ It was also decided at the conference that 'Abdu'l-Karīm should be interned in a French possession, the Island of Réunion.

The consummation of Marshal Lyautey's work in Morocco, within a year of his retirement, was signalized by a state visit of the Sultan to France⁵ in July. Perhaps the greatest tribute to Marshal Lyautey's work, and the best assurance that it would not again be placed in jeopardy by upheavals in the Spanish Zone, was afforded by a decision, on the Spanish Government's part, to adopt—in substance if not in name—the Lyautey policy. This new departure was foreshadowed by the Marquis de Estella to the correspondent of

¹ *The Times*, 11th August, 1926; *Le Temps*, 13th August, 1926.

² See *The Times*, 13th December, 1926. The Spanish authorities announced that between May and December 1926 they had laid hands, either by capture or surrender, upon 30,000 rifles (half of that number being repeating rifles), 135 guns and 240 machine-guns in the conquered territory. They believed that very few rifles remained in the tribesmen's hands in the Rif, but not less than 10,000 in the neighbourhood of Shifshāwan in the Jibālah.

³ See the monthly chronicle in *L'Afrique Française* and an article in *Revue des Colonies*, No. 6, 1926; also *Le Temps*, 30th June and 15th and 19th July, 1926, and *The Times*, 29th June and 17th, 21st, and 24th July, 1926.

⁴ See *L'Afrique Française*, July 1926, pp. 383–4; *The Times*, 15th June and 14th July, 1926. The official communiqué giving a résumé of the terms of agreement is printed in *Le Temps*, 15th July, 1926.

⁵ *The Times*, 13th July and 9th August, 1926. The Sultan arrived in Paris on the 12th July and left France on the 7th August. On the 16th August he had a meeting in Paris with the Bey of Tunis.

from other parts of the country through the fact of its being the main, and indeed almost the only, point of contact between Morocco and the Western World.

Tangier was conquered in A. D. 1437 by Portugal and remained a Portuguese possession until 1662, when, together with Bombay, it was presented to King Charles II of England as the marriage-portion of Queen Catharine. Thus, when the British Government abandoned it in 1684 as not being worth the expense of maintenance, Tangier had been under Western government continuously for 242 years ; and it remained the seat of a Western commercial settlement like those successively established, at earlier and later dates, in certain ports of the Ottoman Empire, the Indian Peninsula, and China.

These Western commercial settlements had very different histories in different regions. In the Ottoman Empire, while the Western residents acquired those privileges of extra-territoriality, under the jurisdiction of their own diplomatic and consular authorities, which became known as the Capitulations, the territorial sovereignty of the Ottoman Government over Constantinople, Smyrna and the other *Échelles du Levant* remained intact. In India, at an early date, the several Western nations engaged in the overseas trade acquired *de facto* territorial sovereignty over the sites of their respective 'factories', and in the British case this sovereignty eventually expanded into an empire embracing the whole of India, save for the few enclaves where the sovereignty of France and Portugal over their own original settlements survived. In China a process parallel to that in India began after the Anglo-Chinese war of 1840-2. Hong-Kong was ceded by China to Great Britain in full sovereignty in January 1841 and the five territories leased by China to various foreign Powers in 1898 seemed also destined in the end to pass out of Chinese sovereignty completely.¹ On the other hand, at Shanghai, which was the most important of the Western commercial settlements on the Chinese coast, there was a development along different lines. At Shanghai, side by side with a specifically French settlement, there grew up an international settlement in which Chinese sovereignty was theoretically preserved intact, while in practice an urban zone, containing not only foreign residents but a much more numerous native population, was governed by municipal

¹ For the negotiations over these Chinese leased territories during the Washington Conference of November 1921-February 1922 see *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 456-66.

institutions which the foreign elements organized and controlled under the leadership of the consular body. The developments at Tangier resembled those at Shanghai (making due allowance for the small scale of affairs in Morocco as compared with China) more closely than those at any other port along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean coast-lines of the Islamic World.

At Tangier the sovereignty of the Sultan of Morocco became ineffective without any single Western Power taking over the territorial administration. The Western Governments compelled the Sultan to grant capitulatory privileges to their nationals resident in Morocco (which meant, in effect, at Tangier) on the Ottoman model.¹ In 1844, at a time when Islamic Governments were beginning to adopt the Western quarantine system, the Sultan officially handed over the control of public health to the local representatives of the Western Powers, and in 1879 he created an International Sanitary Council, consisting of the members of the diplomatic corps, with functions analogous to those exercised by the International Boards of Health which had been set up at Alexandria and in Constantinople in accordance with the International Sanitary Convention of May 1853. In 1892 the diplomatic corps, in its capacity as Sanitary Council, was given authority over the streets and markets of Tangier, with power to levy rates, and it delegated these new functions to a *Commission d'Hygiène et de Voirie*. This latter body was presided over alternately by the French and the Spanish Consul; and a *Règlement* of the 3rd March, 1903, provided that it should consist of twenty-six members, fourteen of whom were to be nominated and twelve elected from among the foreign residents. Of the nominated members, ten were to be selected by the foreign consulates, one Moroccan by the Sultan, two native Muslims by the local native authorities, and one Jew by the Grand Rabbi of Tangier. Of the elected representatives, not more than four were to belong to any one nation.

This was the situation of Tangier when the Moroccan Question arose.

Tangier was not mentioned by name in the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th April, 1904, or in the secret articles attached to it (though the port lay in that sector of the Moroccan coast which, under the seventh public article, was to remain unfortified). On the other hand, Article 9 of the secret Franco-Spanish Convention of

¹ Capitulations were granted in Morocco to France in 1630 and 1767, to Spain in 1767 and 1799, and to Great Britain on the 9th December, 1856.

the 3rd October, 1904, provided that 'The City of Tangier shall retain the special character which is given to it by the presence of the diplomatic corps and by its municipal and sanitary institutions'; and Article I of the subsequent secret Franco-Spanish Treaty of the 1st September, 1905, laid down that, in virtue of the above stipulation, the police of Tangier should be confided (for a first term of fifteen years) to a Franco-Spanish corps commanded by a Frenchman.

The status of Tangier was still further differentiated from that of other parts of Morocco by the work of the Algeiras Conference, as embodied in the General Act of the 7th April, 1906. In this instrument Tangier was not only designated as the seat of various new Moroccan institutions and public bodies which were set up under an international control to be exercised through the agency of the local diplomatic corps, but the municipal institutions of Tangier itself were developed further. For the upkeep and improvement of the city a specific share in the proceeds of the city house-tax was assigned to the Sanitary Council, which was to be responsible for the expenditure of this fund pending the creation of a municipal organization (Article 61, Paragraph 5); and the diplomatic corps was given a number of legislative and administrative powers to make these financial powers effective and to control the execution of public works. It was also given a control (which in this case was not very effective) over the local Franco-Spanish police force. The provisions of Articles 59-74, in which these powers were assigned, were only to be alterable by agreement between the diplomatic corps and the Sultan's Government (Art. 75).

A further secret Franco-Spanish Agreement regarding the police at Tangier and Casablanca was signed on the 23rd February, 1907.

In the Franco-German Agreement of the 4th November, 1911, under which Germany gave France a free hand in Morocco without any territorial reservations, Tangier was not mentioned; but the British Government, in acceding to this Franco-German Agreement in a note of the 14th November, took occasion to recall the exceptional character of Tangier, in the terms of the Franco-Spanish Convention of 1904, and to suggest that international agreements should be negotiated with a view to the definitive establishment of international control over Tangier and its municipal district.¹

¹ Further correspondence followed with the French Government, and the British Government did not finally adhere to the convention until an assurance had been received from the French Government, on the 21st November, that the terms of the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1904 relating to Tangier

In the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of the 30th March, 1912, by which the French Protectorate over Morocco was juridically established, it was provided that 'the city of Tangier shall retain the special character which it has been recognized as possessing and which shall determine its municipal organization' (Art. 1, Par. 4); and in the Franco-Spanish Convention of the 27th November, 1912, which was negotiated in pursuance of the foregoing Franco-Moroccan Treaty (Art. 1, Par. 3), it was not only laid down that 'the city of Tangier and its neighbourhood shall be endowed with a special régime, which shall be determined subsequently' (Art. 7), but for the first time the boundaries of the Tangier 'Zone'¹ were designated.

To this Franco-Spanish Treaty there was attached a protocol regarding the Tangier-Fez Railway, which provided that the enterprise should be put up to public tender, that 60 per cent. of the capital should be French and 40 per cent. Spanish, and that the seats on the Board of Directors should be allotted in the same proportion.

The draft of a Tangier statute which was to fulfil the terms of the two treaties of 1912 was prepared by an Anglo-Franco-Spanish Commission which sat at Madrid from March to June 1913;² but on several points it proved impossible to reconcile the French and Spanish points of view. In September 1913 the French Government made fresh proposals with a view to securing Spain's adhesion to the draft, but the exchange of views dragged on until it was interrupted by the outbreak of the General War of 1914-18.

Immediately upon the outbreak of war the French treated German nationals and German property in the French Zone of Morocco as if this had been French territory, and during the course of August they took similar measures in the Tangier Zone. On the 19th August the German and Austro-Hungarian representatives were given their passports and deported to Palermo on board a French cruiser; on the 27th August the Sultan's Nā'ib in Tangier gave notice to

would not be superseded as a result of the Franco-German Convention ('Le Gouvernement de la République ne se prévaut pas de ses accords avec l'Allemagne pour revenir sur la clause de la convention franco-espagnole de 1904 relative à . . . Tanger').

¹ The application to the Tangier district of the same word as was used to describe the French and Spanish spheres of influence in Morocco was not unimportant diplomatically. In Article 13, Paragraph 2, relating to the distribution of customs receipts between the three Zones, the Tangier Zone was referred to as 'the Internationalized Zone'.

² An Anglo-Franco-Spanish Commission had previously worked at the same task from June to September 1912, but had suspended its labours pending the conclusion of a Franco-Spanish understanding.

quit to other nationals of the Central Powers, resident in the Tangier Zone ; and by a decree of the Sultan, dated the 29th September, German and Austro-Hungarian property in Tangier was sequestered. In the diplomatic controversy with Germany which arose out of these proceedings the French Government maintained, in a verbal note of the 8th February, 1918, that, until the 'special régime' contemplated for Tangier had actually been introduced, the Tangier Zone remained an integral part of the Sultan's dominions and therefore subject to the French Protectorate. At the time Spain made no protest either against these French proceedings in themselves or against the theory on which they were justified by the French Government ; and when France emerged victorious from the General War she was in a distinctly stronger position at Tangier than she had been before.

On the 25th February, 1919, during the Peace Conference of Paris, M. de Peretti della Rocca, at that time *Sous-Directeur d'Afrique* in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, read before the Council of Ten a memorandum¹ in which he declared, with truth, that Tangier had remained in the condition in which the whole of Morocco had been before the signature of the Protectorate Treaty of 1912, described the draft international statute of 1913-14 as 'a dead letter', and proposed that the Algeciras Act should be 'suppressed' and that the Tangier Zone, 'which belonged to the French Protectorate in law, should be attached to the French Zone in fact'. These demands were not accepted either by the other Governments represented at the Peace Conference or by the neutral signatories of the Algeciras Act, and in the Versailles Treaty Tangier was not mentioned by name ; but in Articles 141-6 of the Versailles Treaty Germany was compelled to renounce all her rights and property in Morocco without qualification ; the Versailles Treaty was put into force, so far as it related to Morocco, as from the 10th January, 1920, by a decree of the Sultan dated the 11th January ; and France took action against Germany and German nationals in the Tangier Zone on this ground. On the 17th January, 1920, the Sultan's flag was hoisted over the German Embassy at Tangier ; by a decree of the Sultan dated the 30th August, 1920, German real and movable property in Tangier was liquidated ; and two decrees of the 9th January, 1920,² and the 11th January, 1920, which dealt respectively with the import of German goods into, and the settlement

¹ Text in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 7th July, 1923.

² Remodelled on the 8th August, 1922.

of German nationals in, the French Zone, were made applicable to the Tangier Zone subsequently.

The strength of the French position in Tangier lay in the fact that, since the conclusion of the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of March 1912, France was the *de jure* protectress of the Sultan throughout his dominions and the *de facto* mistress of the Sultan's Government at Fez, so that the Nā'ib (Lord-Lieutenant) and the Pasha (Governor-General) who represented the Sultan at Tangier were under French control; and this control gave France the means of gradually assimilating the Tangier Zone to her own Zone, so long as the indeterminate status of Tangier was not replaced by a statute investing it specifically with an international character. Thus time was on the side of France, while it was in the interest of Great Britain—who was unwilling to allow a port which occupied such a commanding position in respect of the Straits of Gibraltar to pass under another Great Power's control—to reopen the conversations of 1913-14 and bring about the negotiation of an international statute for Tangier as quickly as possible. This was really also in the interests of Spain, who could not seriously hope to secure acceptance of the thesis which she cherished in her heart, namely, that the Tangier district was a part of the Spanish Zone in which Spain was merely pledged to establish a special régime. Spain had never ventured to put this thesis to the test of action. On the other hand, she shrank from the formal renunciation of her pretensions which the negotiation of an international statute would involve—even though the internationalization of Tangier would likewise preclude its incorporation in the French Zone, which was a more imminent possibility. This rather weak and negative attitude of Spain was another point in France's favour.

The Tangier question was reopened as early as September 1920; but it was not until the 29th June, 1923, that Great Britain succeeded in bringing together in London a preliminary conference of British, French, and Spanish experts to discuss whether the calling of a definitive conference of the three Powers was possible. The main conference duly met in Paris on the 27th October, and, after laborious negotiations, a Convention for the Port of Tangier was signed by experts on the 11th December,¹ and a Convention regarding the Organization of the Statute of the Tangier Zone² by the diplomats on the 18th December, 1923.

¹ *Résumé* in *The Manchester Guardian*, 14th December, 1923.

² See the British White Paper *Cmd.* 2203 of 1924 for French and English

Under the convention of the 18th December, which was to run for twelve years from the date of ratification, the Tangier Zone was to 'be placed under a régime of permanent neutrality'.¹ Under authority delegated by His Sharifian Majesty the Zone was to 'possess the most extensive legislative and administrative powers', and this delegation of authority was to be 'permanent and general'.² As regards internal administration the native population and Muslim institutions were to be administered (Art. 25) 'by a Moroccan staff appointed directly by the Sultan and under the control of his agents'—that is, implicitly, under the control of France as Protecting Power. The Sultan was to be represented by a *Mandüb*, who was to administer the native population directly and preside over the International Legislative Assembly. This Assembly was to consist of twenty-six members, all nominated.³ Its enactments were to be subject to veto by a Committee of Control, composed of the consuls of the Powers which had signed the Algeciras Act, and the field of its legislative activity was restricted, for the first two years, by seventeen decrees and regulations dealing with the minutiae of municipal government (Art. 33), and in perpetuity by seven judicial codes,⁴ to be drawn up by the British, French, and Spanish Governments within three months of the signature of the convention. A Mixed Court of French, British, and Spanish magistrates was to administer justice, under these seven codes, to foreign nationals, and the Capitulations were to be abrogated. The decisions of the Assembly were to be carried out and the international administration directed

texts of the convention itself and French texts of the following annexes: (1) *Règlement de la Gendarmerie de la Zone de Tanger*; (2) *Projet de Dahir Chérifien organisant l'administration de la Zone de Tanger*; (3) *Projet de Dahir sur l'organisation d'une juridiction internationale à Tanger*. The Police Regulation was an elaboration of Article 47 of the convention. The *dähirs* were a translation into the form of Sultanic decrees of those provisions of the convention which concerned the internal régime in the Tangier Zone and not the relations between the signatory Powers.

¹ With the important exception that the area might be crossed in transit by troops proceeding to or coming from the French or Spanish Zones.

² In diplomatic matters, however, the Sultan was still to be represented abroad by France in respect of Tangier, as of his other dominions (in accordance with Art. 5 of the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of the 30th March, 1912) and Moroccan subjects of the Tangier Zone were also to be protected abroad by the French authorities (Art. 6).

³ Four French members, four Spanish, three British, two Italian, one American, one Belgian, one Dutch, one Portuguese—to be nominated by their respective consulates—and six Muslim and three Jewish subjects of the Sultan—to be nominated by the *Mandüb*, the three Jews being chosen from a list of nine names submitted by the Jewish Community.

⁴ Which might be abrogated or modified only by agreement between the French and Spanish Zones in Morocco and the Committee of Control (Art. 32).

by an Administrator, who for the first six years was to be a Frenchman with a Spanish and an English assistant-administrator and a French and a Spanish engineer (Art. 35).

This instrument, which had cost so much time and labour, was cumbrous and imperfect. The International Legislative Assembly, which was designed to confer self-government upon the native and foreign inhabitants, was in at least one respect less satisfactory than the *Commission d'Hygiène et de Voirie* which it replaced, since twelve out of the twenty-six seats in the older body had been elective, whereas all the members of the new body were to be nominees.¹ On the other hand, the separate administrative and judicial machinery which this shadowy autonomy involved was likely to place additional financial burdens upon the inhabitants' shoulders. As for the Powers France had failed to incorporate Tangier in her Zone; yet the preponderant position which she had secured in the administration caused the Spanish delegates to sign merely *ad referendum* and with sweeping reservations. Great Britain stood to gain most advantage, because her aims were the most negative; but her possible gain was contingent upon the statute coming into operation, and, at the moment of signature, this was far from being assured.

On the 9th January, 1924, the Spanish Directory handed to the French and British Embassies in Madrid a note suggesting certain modifications in the text of the convention as it stood, and apparently demanding, as compensation for the definitive exclusion of Tangier from the Spanish Zone of Morocco, the enlargement of those enclaves round the *presidios* of Ceuta and Melilla which were under direct Spanish sovereignty.² The French and British Governments went some way towards meeting these demands, and on the 7th February the same Spanish delegates who had signed the convention *ad referendum* at Madrid on the 18th December, 1923, signed it again, this time unconditionally, in Paris. On the same date the concessions made to the Spanish point of view were embodied in an exchange of notes between M. Poincaré and Señor Quiñones de León.³ The French Government agreed that, during the first term of twelve years, the existing Spanish ecclesiastical dignitaries at Tangier should not suffer by the change in the status of the Zone; that one

¹ In the case of the four French members to be nominated by the French Consul, it was afterwards arranged, by agreement between the local French community and their home Government, that the selection should be made out of a panel of sixteen persons to be elected by the community (*Le Temps*, 16th November, 1924).

² *The Times*, 10th and 17th January, 1924.

³ Text in *Le Temps*, 15th February, 1924.

of the senior customs officers should be a Spanish national ; that, as regarded the expulsion from Tangier of natives originating from the Spanish Zone,¹ it should be obligatory upon the simple demand of the Spanish Consul, on the understanding that these natives, while resident in the Tangier Zone, should not be withdrawn from the Mandüb's jurisdiction ; that the nomination of one native Muslim and one native Jewish member of the Assembly should be made by the Mandüb on the Spanish Consul's recommendation ; and finally, that the areas under direct Spanish sovereignty round Ceuta and Melilla should be enlarged so far as to include the springs from which these towns drew their respective water-supplies. Of these concessions that relating to the right of expulsion was the most important, since it safeguarded Spain against the danger that malcontents from her Zone might make Tangier their city of refuge and base of operations with the connivance of other Powers.

After the Spanish objections to the convention had thus been overcome ratifications were deposited by the three signatory Powers on the 14th May, 1924 ; but before the new régime could legally come into force the convention had to be recognized by the remaining Powers signatories of the Algeciras Act, except the Central Powers, who had been compelled to sign away their rights in the peace treaties—that is, by Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, and the United States—and the United States and Italy, the two most important of the parties concerned, both raised difficulties. The United States Government appears to have doubted whether the convention sufficiently safeguarded the principle of the Open Door, and to have hesitated to renounce its capitulatory rights before it had examined the Anglo-Franco-Spanish codes by which the new Mixed Court was to be governed.² Italy objected not so much to the substance of the convention as to the fact that her desire to take part in the negotiation of it had not been met by the three Powers immediately concerned. It might be pointed out that on the 28th October, 1912, Italy had concluded a treaty with France in which she had unreservedly granted France a free hand in Morocco in exchange for a similar French concession to Italy in regard to Libya,³ and further that Italy had not asked to participate in the Anglo-Franco-Spanish negotiations over Tangier in 1912 or in 1913-14. As a member of the victorious Entente, however, Italy

¹ See Article 29 of the convention for the provisions regarding expulsion.

² *The Times*, 14th July, 1924.

³ See E. Rouard de Card : *Traité et Accords concernant le Protectorat de la France au Maroc* (Paris, 1914, Pédone).

had become more exacting in her demands ; she regarded herself as being interested in Tangier in her capacity as a Mediterranean Great Power ; and she was annoyed to see her request rejected. She now took up the position that she had no wish to collaborate in the working of a statute which she had had no part in drawing up, but that she regarded the *status quo ante* at Tangier as being still in existence as far as Italy and Italian nationals were concerned. This official Italian attitude might be awkward in a practical way for Italian nationals on the spot, whose retention of their former privileges would hardly compensate them for standing outside the new organization of the Zone ; but it was still more awkward juridically for the three Powers who were signatories of the convention, since it confronted them with the alternative of either postponing the inauguration of the new régime indefinitely, or else inaugurating it on an unsound juridical basis and with the old régime remaining in force for one element among the inhabitants of the Zone.¹

The three Powers took the course of introducing the new régime, piece by piece, *de facto*. The French Administrator, M. Alberge, arrived in November 1924.² The Mandūb, Sayyidu'l-Hājj Muhammad abū 'Ashrīn, arrived from Rabāt and was officially inaugurated on the 1st December ;³ the 27th January, 1925, saw the first meeting of the Committee of Control—represented by the consuls of France, Great Britain, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands.⁴ (The two latter countries had by this time recognized the convention.) By the 1st February Spain had taken a number of steps which were necessary to further progress ;⁵ on the 6th February Italy accepted the harbour tariffs,⁶ which were duly introduced on the 14th and which disquieted the inhabitants of Tangier on account of the high rates at which they were fixed.⁷

The Legislative Assembly was opened by the Mandūb on the 16th February, twenty-one out of the twenty-six members being present,⁸ and within the first few weeks of its existence it asserted itself by defeating the Administrator on a financial question. On the 2nd March, at his first meeting with the Financial Sub-Committee of the Assembly, the Administrator had proposed that his

¹ On the difficulties created by the Italian attitude see *The Times*, 26th July, 1924.

² *Le Temps*, 15th November, 1924.

³ *The Times*, 2nd December, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2nd February, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 29th January, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 9th February, 1925.

⁷ *Le Temps*, 15th February ; *The Times*, 16th February, 1925.

⁸ The absentees were the Americans, the Italians, and the Portuguese.

own and his colleagues' salaries should be augmented by certain bonuses which were payable to officials in the French Zone. The Sub-Committee threw out these proposals; the Administrator re-introduced them in a modified form; and the Assembly itself rejected them on the 6th April by fourteen votes to five. It was noteworthy that the votes were not distributed on lines of nationality.¹

After repeated announcements and repeated delays the new statute was officially brought into force on the 1st June, 1925,² though the convention still remained unrecognized by Italy, the United States, and Portugal.³ Before the month was out the Mandüb had been presented with a petition, signed by about 800 members of the commercial and industrial population of all nationalities, demanding a revision of the economic clauses in the convention and the establishment of new autonomous institutions which would impose a less heavy financial burden upon the Zone.⁴ On the 2nd July this petition was reinforced by a general strike, and certain French shops which refused to close in sympathy had their windows broken, while the offices of one of the local French newspapers were wrecked.

The French element in the population was in favour of the statute for the political reason that it secured to their country the largest measure of control over Tangier which she could hope to obtain. The other foreign elements resented the increased financial burdens which the statute entailed, and the disturbances took the form of a conflict between the local French community and the Spanish, which was the largest element in the foreign population. From these disturbances of the 2nd July, 1925, the native population of the Tangier Zone studiously held aloof, and the Frankish rioters were dispersed without loss of life by the native police, reinforced for the occasion by a hundred armed tribesmen from the rural districts of the Zone, who had offered their services to the French police-commandant for the maintenance of law and order.⁵

¹ For the history of this controversy see *The Times*, 3rd, 20th, and 30th March and 7th April, 1925. On the 6th April the Administrator actually withdrew his proposals immediately before the vote was taken.

² *The Times*, 2nd June, 1925.

³ The failure of Portugal to recognize the convention had been due not to lack of the will to do so, but to the instability of successive Portuguese Governments.

⁴ *The Times*, 22nd June, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3rd July, 1925. The disorderly conduct of the Frankish population on this occasion was an ironical commentary on the perpetual prophecies of an attack upon Tangier by the Rifis. As a matter of fact, the only violations of the neutrality of the Tangier Zone which occurred during the period under review were committed by the Spanish military forces. For

(x) Nationalism and Reform in Tunisia and Algeria (1918-25).¹

Juridically, the relations between France and the peoples of Tunisia and Algeria during the period under review were an internal affair of France,² but a survey of the reactions of the peoples of North Africa against Western ascendancy would be incomplete if its horizon were confined to the boundaries of Morocco.

Tunisia and Algeria reacted differently from Morocco and from one another. They differed from Morocco in being exclusively under French control, and in having been under it continuously for nearly half a century and a century respectively. They differed from one another not only in respect of the age of the French domination but in their juridical, social, and cultural conditions. Juridically, Tunisia was a protectorate which had never lost its statehood, while Algeria was French territory, part of which was organized, like the French territory in Europe, into departments. Socially, they differed in the extent of Western colonization. In Algeria, by March 1921, there were 831,000 Western colonists out of a total population of 5,800,000, and of these some 400,000 were of French origin. In Tunisia, by the same date, there were 156,000 Western colonists out of a total population of 2,095,000 and those of French origin numbered only 54,500.³ Finally, the two countries differed culturally, inasmuch as Algeria was an outlying part of the Islamic World, in which Islamic society was hardly competent to hold its own against Western penetration out of its own resources, whereas Tunisia, which had been the point of contact between North-West Africa and the Oriental World since the time of the Phoenicians, not only had a cultural life of its own but also felt the influence of movements originating in the more advanced countries of the Islamic World.

Before the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1881 Western political ideas had already stimulated in Tunisia an abortive

the incident of November 1924 see *The Times*, 14th November, 1924, and for the incident of the 10th June, 1925, *ibid.*, 11th and 13th June, 1925. In reply to a Franco-Spanish proposal for the landing of French, Spanish, and British troops at Tangier to protect the Zone, the British Government declared itself unfavourable to the suggestion, and declined to participate in any military action on land. (Statement by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons on the 15th July, 1925.)

¹ For the French version of events see *L'Afrique Française*, *passim*; for the Tunisian version see *Oriente Moderno*, Anno III, No. 4, 15th September, 1923; article by E. Rossi, containing an interview with the founder of the Tunisian Constitutional Party, Ath-Tha'ālibī Efendī.

² For the juridical bases of the French ascendancy in Tunisia and Algeria see above, p. 98.

³ *Statesman's Year Book*, 1925.

attempt to introduce constitutional government ;¹ and after the General War of 1914-18 Tunisia reacted in sympathy with the Nationalist movement in Egypt—a country with which she was brought into close touch by community of language and geographical proximity. In Tunisia, as in Egypt, a Nationalist Party was organized which succeeded in rallying to itself almost the entire local Arabic press and the great majority of the native educated class ; and, as in Egypt, this organization, while powerless to impose its will upon the dominant Power by physical force, was successful in interposing itself between the foreign authorities and the native peasantry, who (wherever their true interests may have lain) instinctively ranged themselves behind leaders of their own nationality and culture against aliens and infidels.

The Tunisian Nationalists of the *Hizbu'l-Hurri'd-Dustūrī* (Constitutional Party) did not follow their Egyptian counterparts in demanding complete independence ; but on the other hand the juridical position of France in Tunis was stronger than that of Great Britain in Egypt, and the French were not prepared to go as far as the British in making concessions, so that, in effect, the gulf between the Nationalist demands and the dominant Power's point of view was equally great in both cases. The Tunisian *Dustūris*' demands were formulated in March 1920 in a programme of nine points.² They asked for a deliberative assembly composed of Tunisian and French deputies possessing equal rights and elected by universal suffrage, with complete financial control ; for a Government responsible to this assembly ; for the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers ; for the appointment of Tunisian candidates to all official posts which they showed themselves capable of filling ; for ' equal pay for equal work ' as between Tunisian and French officials in Tunisia ; for elective municipal councils ; for liberty of the press, of association and of institutions ; for compulsory education ; and for the participation of Tunisians in the acquisition of lands for colonization and of crown-lands (whereas the French régime had been concentrating its efforts upon planting these lands with French colonists). These demands were presented by two deputations to Paris, in June and November 1920, and by a further deputation on the 21st January, 1921, to a new French Resident-General in Tunisia,

¹ For the ideas of the Tunisian reformers in the eighteen-sixties see Khayru'd-Dīn Pasha : *Aqamu'l-Masālik fī Ma'rīfati' Hwālī' l-Mamālīk* (Constantinople, A. H. 1293 ; French translation : *Réformes nécessaires aux États Musulmans* (Paris, 1875, Dentu).

² Statement by Ath-Tha'ālībī in *Oriente Moderno*, loc. cit.

M. Lucien Saint, upon his arrival in the country. As an instalment of reform the French authorities created on the 24th April, 1921,¹ a Tunisian Ministry of Justice which was somewhat freer from French control than the previous judicial organization; but this was far from satisfying the demand for constitutional government, and in April 1922 the tension culminated in a crisis.

According to Ath-Tha'ālībī Efendī, the leader of the Tunisian Constitutional Party,² this crisis arose because the French Resident-General persuaded the Bey to grant an interview on the political situation and then caused to be published in the French press a version of this interview in which the Bey was incorrectly represented as having pronounced that a constitution was unnecessary. The Bey gave a *démenti* of this interview and asked the Resident-General to do the same. The Resident-General refused; and thereupon, on the 4th April, 1922, the Bey gave the Resident-General notice of his abdication. This last *démarche* was undoubtedly made, whatever the occasion of it may have been, and it placed the French authorities in an awkward position, since M. Millerand, the President of the French Republic, was on the point of paying a state visit to the Protectorate. The spread of the news among the population evoked mass demonstrations of loyalty to the Bey on the 5th, and on that date the Bey published a *démenti* of his alleged intention to abdicate. He did, however, present to the Resident-General a programme of the Constitutional Party's demands (the number of which had now risen from nine to eighteen) with an intimation that he would abdicate unless these demands were granted; and according to Ath-Tha'ālībī Efendī this ultimatum was sent after, not before, the *démenti* of the 5th. Whatever the truth on this point may be it is certain that the crisis lasted until the 15th, and that it was ended on that day by a military demonstration in the form of a state visit by the Resident-General, with an escort of French troops, to the Bey's palace.³ After this visit no more was heard of the eighteen demands for the time being, and there was a change of ministry—though here again there is a discrepancy between the French and Tunisian accounts of what happened. According to the French account⁴ the Bey dismissed certain Nationalist members of his entourage who were undesirable in the eyes of the French authorities, while, according to Ath-Tha'ālībī Efendī, the French demonstration

¹ *L'Afrique Française*, February 1922.

² See *Oriente Moderno*, *loc. cit.*

³ Compare Lord Allenby's similar visit to Zagh'lūl Pasha on the 22nd November, 1924.

⁴ *L'Afrique Française*, May 1922.

failed to deter the Bey from dismissing ministers who, in his opinion, had not supported him during the crisis loyally. In any case no incident occurred during the sojourn in Tunisia of M. Millerand, who arrived on the 27th April and whose arrival the *Dustūrīs* had hoped to forestall by a sensational demonstration of the Bey's sympathy with their cause. Although, however, their strategy failed on this occasion, it moved the French Government to introduce reforms which, while not radical, were comprehensive. On the 29th June, 1922, the new French policy was foreshadowed in a semi-official announcement;¹ and on the 4th and 5th July there was a debate in the French Chamber which ended in a vote to maintain in all circumstances the authority and rights of France in Tunisia, to encourage French colonization on the small and the medium scale (as opposed to the creation of *latifundia* owned by absentees), and to carry out broad measures of political reform.

The promised reforms were embodied in six Beylical decrees and one *arrêté* by the French Resident-General.² Three decrees of the 13th July, 1922, respectively instituted *Conseils de Caïdat* and *Conseils de Région* in Tunisian territory under civil control and laid down the constitution, attributes, and procedure of a *Grand Conseil de la Tunisie*; the Resident-General's *arrêté* dealt with the composition of the French section of the *Grand Conseil*; and three more Beylical decrees of the 14th July somewhat relaxed French administrative control.

As regards the legislative reforms the *Grand Conseil* marked in several ways an advance upon the previous *Conseil Consultatif*,³ but even in the new body the *Section Française* and the *Section Indigène* were normally to deliberate apart; they were forbidden to discuss resolutions of a constitutional and political order; and even in the field of finance their proceedings were kept under the close control of the French Government. In a subsequent Beylical decree provision was made against possible deadlocks between the two sections by creating a *Commission Arbitrale du Grand Conseil* out of the existing *Conseil Supérieur de la Tunisie*.⁴

¹ *L'Afrique Française*, July 1922.

² Texts in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 9 of 1922 (Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, September 1922).

³ The *Conseil Consultatif* had been created on the 22nd February, 1896, as an organ of the French community in Tunisia (the members being nominated as representatives of various economic interests and not directly elected by the French colonists), and had been enlarged on the 2nd February, 1907, by the addition of a *Section Indigène*. See G. Rectenwald: 'Les assemblées élues du protectorat français en Tunisie' in *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 6 of 1923 (Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, June 1923).

⁴ See Rectenwald, *loc. cit.*

The first elections to the *Conseils de Caïdat*, the *Conseils de Région*, and the *Grand Conseil de la Tunisie* were held in November and December 1922, and the first session of the latter body, which opened on the 11th December, 1922, passed off without incident, except for the expression, by some of the French elected members, of a feeling that the interests were still over-represented on the Council and that the elective element was inadequate.¹

The deeper dissatisfaction of the *Dustūrī* Party with these measures of reform seems to have found expression, not in the deliberations of the *Section Indigène* of the *Grand Conseil*, whose powers were strictly circumscribed, but in a *rapprochement* with the Communist element in the foreign population of the country. Tunisia was the principal point of contact of Al-Maghrib not only with the rest of the Islamic World but with Western Europe, and the European colonists, like the native inhabitants, were more susceptible here to outside influences than they were in Algeria. While the spread of Fascism among the Italian majority of these European colonists in Tunisia made them more difficult for the protecting Power to handle than ever,² greater disquietude was aroused by the spread of Communism among the French minority. The relations between the native Tunisian Nationalists and the local French Communists were discussed in the French Chamber as early as the debates of the 4th and 5th July, 1922.

The *Dustūrī* Party also opposed very strongly a French law of the 20th December, 1923, which offered French nationality to Muslim and Jewish Tunisians possessing certain qualifications. Their reasons were that acceptance of a Western nationality implied renunciation of certain vital Islamic principles and was tantamount to apostasy (a view which was undoubtedly in conformity with Islamic tradition); that though the law was theoretically permissive, the inferiority in status of Tunisian *vis-à-vis* French citizens would in practice make acceptance of the option compulsory; and finally that the law infringed the sovereignty of the Bey and therefore violated the treaty of the 12th May, 1881, on which the French Protectorate was founded.³

After M. Herriot's assumption of office in France on the 1st June, 1924, two out of the three opposition parties in Tunisia—the *Hizbu'l-Islāhī* (Reformists) and the Tunisian Branch of the French Socialist

¹ See *L'Afrique Française*, December 1922.

² See Section (xi) below.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, Anno IV, pp. 357 *seqq.* According to *Le Temps*, 27th November, 1925, only 395 Tunisian Muslims adopted French nationality between 1921 and 1925.

Party—more or less made their peace with the French Government. In June 1924 the *Dustūrī* Party sent a fresh delegation to Paris which put forward the original nine points once again. M. Herriot did not receive this delegation, but in the following October did receive a joint delegation from the other two parties which presented fourteen points covering the same ground as the *Dustūrīs'* nine.¹ In November M. Herriot, who was dependent on the Socialist vote in France, went some way towards meeting the demands of the joint delegation by appointing a consultative commission to 'study the measures which the French Government will find it possible to propose to His Highness the Bey in conformity with the dispositions of the treaties in force between the two countries'.² This commission held its first meeting on the 26th February, 1925.³ It was not well received in Tunisia, especially as it included no representatives either of the French colony or of the native population, and a rumour regarding certain of its conclusions caused some excitement in March 1925. Demonstrations were organized in the principal centres of the country on the 21st March, and a delegation representing all native Tunisian parties had audience of the Bey. A contributory cause of this excitement was the repressive action which had been taken earlier in the year against local journals and individuals suspected of Communism. The commission had completed its work and returned to France by the beginning of May 1926. It did not recommend any very far-reaching reforms, but confined itself mainly to suggesting improvements in the conditions of service, and reductions in the numbers, of the administrative staff.⁴ In accordance with the commission's recommendations, thirteen decrees, dealing with the numbers, method of appointment, salaries, &c., of the *personnel*, and standardizing conditions throughout the country, were issued on the 10th November, 1926, and were subsequently published in the *Tunisian Journal Officiel*.⁵

Meanwhile, in Algeria, reforms⁶ of a still more conservative character than those in Tunisia had been introduced, in this case on French initiative and not under the pressure of an organized political movement on the native side. Compulsory military service had been extended to the native population of Algeria in 1912; and

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, Anno IV, p. 778.

² *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 28th November, 1924.

³ *Renseignements Coloniaux*, No. 5 bis of 1925 (Supplement to *L'Afrique Française*, May 1925).

⁴ *Le Temps*, 6th May, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 25th November, 1926.

⁶ See V. Piquet: *Les Réformes en Algérie et le Statut des Indigènes* (Paris, 1919, Larose).

between the outbreak of the General War and the end of the year 1917 Algeria had furnished France with no less than 111,000 native troops and 44,000 civilian labourers.¹ A sense of gratitude, combined with a realization of the increased expectations with which these Algerian soldiers and workmen would return to their homes, had its effect upon French public opinion. On the 22nd February, 1918, before the end of the War, the question of Algerian reforms was debated in the French Chamber;² and steps were taken to equalize the burden of taxation as between natives and European colonists, to give the natives a share in the municipal government of places with a mixed population, to introduce the rudiments of local self-government in the purely native districts, and to enable natives of certain categories (particularly ex-service men) to obtain French citizenship without being compelled (as hitherto) to renounce the different 'Personal Statute' under which they lived as Muslims.

Whether or not these reforms were the cause the fact is certain that, during the period under review, Algeria was a comparatively tranquil spot in an agitated region, and that the native inhabitants of this French possession showed little sign of being affected either by the pacific efforts of their Tunisian neighbours to obtain constitutional government or by the military resistance which the free tribesmen of Morocco and Libya were making to the imposition of Western rule.

(xi) The Status of the Italian Settlers in Tunisia.

It has been mentioned above that in Tunisia the position of France as protecting Power was complicated by the presence of 101,500 non-French nationals among the European settlers in the Protectorate, as against only 54,500 persons of French origin. The complication was increased by the fact that in this non-French element there were no less than 85,000 Italians as against 13,500 Maltese and 3,000 others.³ The controversy between France and Great Britain over the Maltese residents in Tunisia has been recorded in a previous volume.⁴ At the time of writing the more serious controversy between France and Italy over the Italian residents remained unsettled.

The Italian colony in Tunisia was in an exceptional position, owing partly to its numbers and organization, partly to its proximity to

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

² *L'Afrique Française*, January-March 1918.

³ Figures of 1921, quoted in *Statesman's Year Book*, 1925.

⁴ *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 358-60.

the mother country,¹ and partly to the policy of the Italian Government and the sentiment of the Italian people concerning the Mediterranean in general and Tunisia in particular. Italy regarded herself as the Mediterranean Great Power *par excellence*, both because she possessed no coastline on any other sea and because she claimed to be in some peculiar sense the heiress of the Roman Empire. She also felt that, through having achieved her national unity so late in the day, she had been deprived of her fair share of dominion on the Islamic shores of the Mediterranean Basin. Hence her sensitiveness at being excluded from the negotiations of 1923 concerning Tangier,² and her still greater sensitiveness in regard to the French Protectorate over Tunisia and the Italian colony in that country. The Italians felt that Tunisia was the natural outlet for the overflow of Italian population, and that the flag ought to follow the emigrant. They had never reconciled themselves to the establishment of a French instead of an Italian protectorate over Tunisia in 1881³—an historical event which had doomed the Tunisian Italians to live under a foreign ascendancy, and which, by enabling France to create a naval base at Bizerta, had caused France instead of Italy to share with the sovereign of Malta the naval command over the passage between the Western and the Eastern Mediterranean.

The French, on their side, pointed out that in 1881 there had only been 11,000 Italians in Tunisia as against 7,000 Maltese; that the subsequent increase in the numbers of the Italian colony had taken place under the aegis of the French Protectorate; but that, while the Italian immigration had reached its maximum between 1891 and 1901, between 1906 and 1911 the Italians in Tunisia had only increased by 700 as against a French increase of 11,500.⁴ They also pointed out that Italy's susceptibilities in regard to Tunisia had received consideration from France in a series of international agreements which had preserved for the Italians in Tunis an exceptionally favourable status. After the General War of 1914–18 the French Government looked forward to assimilating the status of Italians in Tunisia to that of other non-French European settlers in that country, whereas Italy, with her particular grievance con-

¹ Of the 48,000 Italian residents in Tunisia in 1911 who had been born not in North-West Africa but in Italy, no less than 41,000 were Sicilians and 4,000 Sardinians (*L'Afrique Française*, February 1921).

² See Section (ix) above.

³ In 1869 Italy, as well as France and Great Britain, had been represented on the International Commission of Financial Control which was appointed in that year owing to the bankruptcy of the Tunisian Government.

⁴ Figures in *L'Afrique Française*, *loc. cit.*

cerning Tunisia still unappeased and her self-assertion stimulated by the wave of national self-consciousness which expressed itself in Fascism, was less inclined than ever to surrender any treaty rights by which her nationals in Tunisia were benefiting.

The Treaty of Bardo, by which the French Protectorate over Tunisia had been established on the 12th May, 1881, had safeguarded existing treaties between the Bey and other Governments, and the Italo-Tunisian Treaty of the 8th September, 1868, did not expire till 1896. Down to the latter date Italy surrendered nothing except her consular jurisdiction over her nationals in Tunisia—which she renounced in the Franco-Italian agreement of the 25th January, 1884, without prejudice to her other privileges under capitulations and treaties. On the 28th September, 1896, there were signed in Paris three Franco-Italian agreements: a commercial and navigation convention; a consular and settlement convention (*Convenzione consolare e di stabilimento*); and an extradition convention. The second of these instruments stipulated (Art. 13) that 'persons who shall have retained Italian or Tunisian nationality according to the laws of their country shall be regarded as Italian subjects in Tunisia and as Tunisian subjects in Italy', and an annexed protocol provided for the maintenance of the *status quo* in regard to Italian schools and other institutions in Tunisia.

This Franco-Italian convention, by exempting Italian residents in Tunisia from the operation of French or Tunisian nationality laws, enabled them to continue to take advantage of the custom, originally prevailing in Tunisia under the régime of the Ottoman Capitulations, that foreign residents and their descendants born and residing in the country should retain their foreign nationality from generation to generation indefinitely. Considering that, in 1911, nearly half the Italians then resident in Tunisia had been born in the country¹ the value of this customary privilege in the particular instance is evident.

The three conventions of the 28th September, 1896, were to remain in force until the 1st October, 1905, unless denounced before that date, or otherwise until one year after their subsequent denunciation by either party. From 1905 until the close of the General War of 1914–18 the state of the Moroccan question in particular and the international situation in general deterred the French Government from opening the door to a controversy with Italy; and when, on the 9th September, 1918, France did denounce the first and second

¹ *L'Afrique Française, loc. cit.*

conventions (though not the third), she proposed, and Italy agreed, that, when the year's grace had elapsed, the conventions should continue to be renewed by tacit consent for periods of three months, pending fresh negotiations. This remained the position down to the time of writing ; and, in consequence, the French and Tunisian decrees of the 8th November, 1921, regulating nationality in Tunis, which provoked the Anglo-French controversy above mentioned, did not affect the Italian settlers in the country.

Meanwhile, the acquisition of Libya by Italy in 1911-12 had been followed, on the 29th May, 1914, by the signature at Rome of a Franco-Italian agreement regarding the status of Tunisians in Libya and Italian colonial subjects in Tunisia.¹ In this instrument it was provided (Art. 2) that Italian colonial subjects in Tunisia and Tunisians in Libya should enjoy the same rights as co-religionists of theirs who were foreign subjects of the most favoured nation, except in judicial matters—in regard to which it was provided (Art. 3) that, for a period of five years, Italian colonial subjects in Tunisia were to be amenable to the same tribunals as their native co-religionists.

Other Italian interests in Tunisia—for example, equality of taxation for contracts for the sale of real estate, equality of status for Italian and French private schools, and equality of compensation to workmen for injury during employment—were secured in a Franco-Italian Agreement of the 12th September, 1919.

(xii) The Delimitation of the Frontier between Italian Libya and Egypt.²

The border between the North African province of Benghazi or Cyrenaica and Egypt lay in an almost waterless region sparsely occupied by nomadic tribes. The two countries were thus effectively separated by a natural frontier ;³ and so long as both of them were under the juridical sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire no diplomatic difficulties were created by the fact that the boundary had never been delimited. When, however, in the autumn of 1911 the Italians invaded the Ottoman provinces of Tripoli and Benghazi and declared a blockade of the coast as far east as the 27th degree of longitude

¹ Text in *Journal Officiel Tunisien*, 20th June, 1914. Ratifications were exchanged on the 16th June, 1914.

² See A. Giannini: 'L'Accordo Italo-Egiziano per le frontiere della Cirenaica' [with map] in *Oriente Moderno*, Anno VI, pp. 1-6 ; Fr. Meriano: *La Questione di Giarabub* (Bologna, 1925).

³ This natural frontier was in fact the dividing line between those two sections of the modern Islamic World which, in this Survey, are described as 'North-West Africa' and the 'Middle East' respectively.

east of Greenwich, the British Foreign Office was constrained to protest on behalf of Egypt, which was under British occupation, that the Egyptian frontier lay west of the port of Sallūm. Sallūm itself was then occupied by an Egyptian detachment, while the heights commanding it on the west were occupied by the Italians. The British Government afterwards notified Italy that the Egyptian frontier also ran west of the oasis of Jaghbūb, which lay about 100 miles S.S.E. of Sallūm in the Libyan desert, and which at that time was under the *de facto* rule of the Sanūsīyah Order.

In Article 13 of the treaty which was signed in London on the 26th April, 1915, by the representatives of Italy on the one side and of France, Great Britain, and Russia on the other, and in virtue of which Italy intervened in the War against the Central Powers, it was provided as follows :

In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.

As a result of the War all the former German colonies in Africa fell into the hands of the British Empire, France, and Belgium ; and, although it was decided that the new holders should not annex these territories but should administer them as mandatories of the League of Nations, it was recognized that Italy was entitled in the circumstances to put forward claims under the Article quoted above.

The Franco-Italian negotiations regarding the south-western hinterland of Tripoli and the Anglo-Italian negotiations regarding Jubaland have been dealt with elsewhere.¹ It remains to deal with the parallel negotiations regarding the frontier between Libya and Egypt, which Italy was able to include in her claim owing to the fact that Great Britain had declared a protectorate over Egypt on the 18th December, 1914—an act which evidently constituted Egypt a British colony within the meaning of Article 13 of the treaty of April 1915, until Great Britain recognized the independence of Egypt on the 28th February, 1922.

The oasis of Jaghbūb contained the tomb of Muhammad b. 'Alī As-Sanūsī, the founder of the Order which perpetuated his name ; and when the Sanūsīyah Fraternity entered the lists against Italy, and showed itself a formidable enemy on its own ground, as it did

¹ *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 360-1 ; *Survey for 1924*, pp. 463-71.

after the outbreak of the General War of 1914–18, it became a matter of some political importance for Italy to bring within the recognized frontiers of her North-African dominions a place which, though insignificant in itself, was one of the religious centres of the Sanūsī Power. The aggressiveness of the Sanūsīyah gave Great Britain a certain common interest with Italy in this quarter; and in an Anglo-Italian agreement of the 31st July, 1916,¹ Great Britain admitted in principle that the Libyan-Egyptian frontier was an open question in a clause declaring that 'the dispositions of this agreement do not prejudice the questions still to be settled in fixing the frontiers between Egypt and Cyrenaica—questions with regard to which the position of the contracting parties remains as before'.

In the International Committee on Article 13 of the London Treaty of the 26th April, 1915, which was set up during the Peace Conference of Paris in May 1919, the British representative, Lord Milner, was unwilling to abandon the Egyptian title to Sallūm, but offered to recognize Italian sovereignty over Jaghbūb.² In April 1921 a draft agreement embodying this offer of Jaghbūb to Italy, in return for a slight rectification of frontier in Egypt's favour in the neighbourhood of Sallūm, was presented by the British Foreign Office to Signor Scialoja; but the Italian negotiator had not submitted his counter-proposals before Great Britain recognized the independence of Egypt on the 28th February, 1922;³ and the British Government then informed the Italian and Egyptian Governments that the frontier question had become a matter for direct negotiation between them.⁴ The Egyptian Government had carefully held aloof from the previous Anglo-Italian negotiations. In June 1921, when the British Government had communicated to it the draft of April 1921 for its opinion, it had kept its own counsel;⁵ and it thus entered upon the negotiations with Italy with its hands free. The substitution of Egypt for Great Britain as the other party to the issue inevitably postponed the settlement of the Italian claim.

An Italo-Egyptian agreement⁶ regarding the minor question of the juridical status of Libyan residents in Egypt was signed at Cairo on the 14th April, 1923, ratifications being exchanged on the

¹ Text in Foreign Office Peace Handbook, No. 127, *Italian Libya*.

² *The Times*, 5th January, 1924.

³ The Italian counter-proposals seem actually to have been submitted to Great Britain in April 1922, a year after the British proposals had been presented (see *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th April, 1925).

⁴ *The Times*, 5th January, 1924.

⁵ *The Manchester Guardian* and *The Times*, 16th April, 1925.

⁶ *Précis* in the *Corriere della Sera*, 9th January, 1924.

30th December; but the frontier question remained in suspense, and meanwhile a controversy between the two Governments arose over the disposal of certain Tripolitan Nationalist leaders who had crossed the Egyptian frontier as refugees in November 1923. The Italian Government demanded that, as Italian subjects, these refugees on Egyptian soil should be handed over to the nearest Italian consul in virtue of the Capitulations. On the 14th February, 1924, the Egyptian Government refused, on the ground that these were political refugees and not criminals subject to extradition, as the Italian Government contended. Eventually the Italians abandoned their demand for extradition on condition that the refugees should be required to leave Egyptian territory immediately.¹

In the autumn of 1924 Italy consented to a further postponement of delimitation, on the understanding that a *modus vivendi* should be arranged for the supervision of the frontier; but the prolonged delay excited anti-Egyptian outbursts in the Italian press, to which the Egyptian press responded by allegations that Italy was on the point of seizing Jaghbūb by a *coup de main*. Early in the year 1925 the Italian Government intimated to the Egyptian Government its desire for a definitive settlement of the frontier on the basis of Lord Milner's offer to Signor Scialoja, and once more the Egyptian Government asked for delay in consideration of the internal political situation in Egypt. On the 13th April, 1925, the Italian Government reopened the question; and this time the Egyptian Government, after sending a commission of inquiry to the frontier zone, agreed, on the 18th May, 1925, that a Mixed Italo-Egyptian Delimitation Commission should be appointed.² On the 6th December, 1925, an agreement was at last signed at Cairo.³

Under this instrument⁴ Egypt recognized the sovereignty of Italy over Jaghbūb, while Italy ceded to Egypt the Ramlah wells north-west of Sallūm. The new frontier started from a point on the coast ten kilometres west of the northern extremity of Sallūm Bay, and ran thence in a southerly direction, approximately coinciding with the line of longitude 25° east of Greenwich. As in the Anglo-Italian agreement regarding Jubaland⁵ and the frontier agreements between Ibn Sa'ūd and the Governments of 'Irāq and Transjordan,⁶ the seasonal migration of nomadic tribes across the frontier in

¹ *The Times*, 16th and 25th February, 1924.

² *The Times*, 21st February, 16th April and 20th May, 1925.

³ *Ibid.*, 7th December, 1925.

⁴ French text in *Oriente Moderno*, Anno VI, 1, pp. 10-13.

⁵ *Survey for 1924*, pp. 463-71.

⁶ See pp. 343-5 below.

search of pasture was taken into consideration (this question and the question of the national allegiance of the local populations being left over for settlement by a Mixed Commission). The tax-free passage of caravans between Sallūm and Jaghbūb and freedom of access to the tomb at Jaghbūb for Muslim pilgrims were also guaranteed. Differences over the interpretation of the agreement were to be settled by arbitration.

While this agreement was received with satisfaction in Italy and Egypt, as putting an end to the friction between the two countries, it was less satisfactory to the inhabitants of Jaghbūb itself. So long as the frontier controversy between Rome and Cairo had remained unsettled the remote and diminutive oasis had been exempt from the rule of either party, and its handful of inhabitants were possibly unaware that their destiny was the subject of protracted negotiations between distant Powers. In February 1926, in virtue of the agreement of the 6th December, 1925, Jaghbūb was occupied by an Italian column.

PART III

THE MIDDLE EAST

(i) Egypt and Great Britain (1922-6).

IN the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*¹ the relations between Egypt and Great Britain have been dealt with from the declaration of a British Protectorate over Egypt on the 18th December, 1914, down to the unilateral renunciation of the Protectorate and declaration (with certain crucial reservations) that Egypt was an independent sovereign state, which was made by the British Government on the 28th February, 1922,² and was approved by Parliament on the 14th March. Since this act opened a new chapter it may be convenient, before continuing the narrative, to recall the main elements in the situation at that moment.

In the internal condition of Egypt during 1919 and 1920 a noteworthy feature had been the coexistence of exceptional economic and financial prosperity with exceptional political tension and disturbance, and this prosperity suffered only a temporary set-back from the world-wide economic depression of 1921.³ This was remarkable, considering that the main source of Egypt's increase in prosperity during and after the General War had been the increase in the amount and value of the exports of cotton, and that cotton prices fell from \$187 to \$18 a cantar between February 1920 and February 1921, while the emergency financial measures necessitated by this crisis reduced the Egyptian Government's general reserve fund from over £E17,000,000 on the 31st March, 1920, to only £E1,500,000 a year later. Nevertheless, both the quantity and the value of cotton exports began to rise again in 1922, and this recovery of the cotton market not only re-established the balance of trade in Egypt's favour in the same year but in the following year re-expanded the total volume of Egyptian trade to the highest level

¹ Vol. vi, pp. 193-205.

² The formal procedure was that the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Lord Allenby, addressed to Sultan Fu'ad a communication enclosing a declaration which the British Government were prepared to recommend for the approval of Parliament. Both documents were drafted in London (texts in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 1592 of 1922, pp. 28-30).

³ The following facts and figures are taken from the annual *Reports on the Economic and Financial Situation of Egypt*, published by the British Department of Overseas Trade.

previously attained. This economic revival was reflected in public finance. In the financial year 1921-2 an expected deficit of nearly £E2,000,000 was converted into a surplus of over £E4,000,000 on a budget of £E36,701,000; in 1922-3 an estimated surplus of £E2,000,000 grew to an actual figure of £E7,516,573 on a budget of £E33,630,000; in 1923-4 an estimated surplus of £E550,000 grew to nearly £E5,000,000 on a budget of £E34,905,000; and in 1924-5 the surplus realized was nearly £E6,000,000, while by the close of that year (31st March, 1925) the general reserve fund had risen to approximately £E24,000,000. These facts and figures are important because they show that in Egypt political troubles during the period under review cannot be traced to economic or financial stress, which in a large measure accounted for the contemporary political troubles in many European countries and in India. Another important aspect of this prosperity was the range of action which it gave to the Egyptian Government when, in consequence of the British declaration of the 28th February, 1922, it obtained a free hand in the internal administration of the country. In the field of education, for example, Egypt, almost alone among Islamic countries at this time, was financially in a position to adopt the methods and standards of the most progressive Western communities. The steps which were taken in that direction during the period under review fall outside the scope of this Survey;¹ but it may be noted that, in this and kindred spheres, Egypt seemed likely to hold that primacy in the Islamic World which in the political field was held by Turkey.²

¹ See *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 7, p. 466, for the number of Egyptian students in different European countries in May 1924 (totals of 280 students financed by the Egyptian Government and 1,204 studying at their own expense); and *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, and V, 8, pp. 434-6, for plans for the organization of a new Egyptian University on the Western model.

² It must be recorded that, even at the close of the period under review, the development of education in Egypt was still in its infancy. Only 5 per cent. was allotted to education in the budget estimates of 1924-5, and 5·8 per cent. in 1925-6; while, in the census taken on the 7th March, 1919, the proportion of illiteracy among the native Egyptian population was alleged to be 94 per cent. This was almost certainly a considerable over-estimate (see *Report on the Economic and Financial Situation of Egypt*, June 1925), yet even so the proportion was evidently so great as to render the satisfactory working of parliamentary institutions difficult. Considering how gradual, in the recent experience of the most progressive Western countries, had been the development of national education (the limiting factor being the training of teachers and not the possession of funds), it is not unfair to attribute the responsibility for this educational backwardness of Egypt to the British Government, which was the occupying or protecting Power in Egypt from the end of 1882 to the beginning of 1922, rather than to the Egyptian Governments which held office, under the new régime, in the years 1922-5. On the other hand, from 1919 onwards the Egyptian Nationalists did a serious disservice to the cause

As regards the political troubles in Egypt during the years 1919–21 the grievances which engendered them are fully and frankly set out in the report of the Milner Mission,¹ while the course of the troubles themselves has been described in the *History of the Peace Conference*. Briefly, Great Britain had easily maintained effective military control over Egypt—except for a few days in March 1919, when the provinces as well as Cairo were out of hand—but had not eradicated the disorder, which continued to manifest itself in riots and assassinations. More serious had been the British Government's failure, in its negotiations with successive Egyptian ministries, to reach an agreed settlement of the relations between the two countries. Even the most moderate and conciliatory Egyptian ministries had been unwilling² to enter into a treaty embodying the British Government's desiderata, and the British authorities on the spot had discovered by experience the moral and material difficulty of dispensing with an Egyptian ministry's co-operation. Unlike the Indian or the Sudanese Governments the Egyptian Government had not been created by Englishmen, but by Mehmed 'Alī, who had begun to substitute the Napoleonic French for the Ottoman Islamic system of absolute government more than half a century before the British occupation began. The infusion of British officials, though their numbers had been rapidly increased since Lord Cromer's retirement,³ and especially since the death of Sir Eldon Gorst, did not enable the British authorities to carry on the government of Egypt without regard to the Egyptians; and thus any Egyptian ministry, in spite of its military impotence, possessed a certain bargaining power in its dealings with the British High Commissioner at Cairo. At the same time Egyptian ministries of every complexion were subject, in the exercise of this power, to irresistible pressure from the political machine of the *Wafd*, which had been built up since the termination of the General War by Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl. The *Wafd* ('Delegation') had been constituted in order to lay the case of Egypt before the Peace Conference of Paris; the wave of actively anti-British feeling

of Egyptian education by deliberately drawing the schools and colleges into politics, and encouraging schoolboys and students to neglect their proper occupations in order to employ their energies in political agitation. For an Egyptian view of educational developments see Appendix VI, pp. 583–4 below.

¹ *Report of the Special Commission to Egypt (Cmd. 1131 of 1920)*.

² This unwillingness was partly due to conviction and partly to intimidation by the militant Nationalists. The relative influence of these two factors naturally varied with the individual concerned and with the situation of the moment.

³ *Cmd. 1131 of 1920*, pp. 8–9.

which had swept over the Egyptian people in 1919¹ had given the creators of the *Wafd* an opportunity to establish a permanent organization, amply endowed with funds, throughout the country ; and this organization, when once established, enabled those in command of it to mobilize Egyptian public opinion, to bring this opinion to bear on the Egyptian ministry of the day, and, by controlling the policy of the Egyptian Government, to embarrass the British authorities in Egypt and baffle the British Government's efforts to secure an agreed settlement on its own terms. The dominant personality in the *Wafd*, almost from the beginning, was Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl—a statesman whose work as Minister of Education had been commended by Lord Cromer, and a nationalist whose intransigent bearing in the crisis of 1919 made him a popular figure.² The deportation of Zaghlūl Pasha to Malta by the British authorities on the 8th March, 1919, had precipitated the Egyptian rising of the 10th March ; his release (at Lord Allenby's instance) had been one of the necessary preliminaries to the subsidence of the storm ; his conversations with Lord Milner in London during the summer of 1920, the results of which were embodied by Lord Milner in a memorandum of the 18th August,³ had perhaps brought England and Egypt nearer to an agreed settlement than they found themselves at any other moment during the period under review ;⁴ and his command of the *Wafd* organization, together with the hold which he possessed over the emotions of the Egyptian people, as the hero of their national cause, made him—at least until after the murder of Sir Lee Stack on the 19th November, 1924—the principal political force on the Egyptian side in the conflict of wills between Egypt and Great Britain. The pressure of Zaghlūl Pasha⁵ and the *Wafd* upon the Egyptian Government had created the *impasse* in Egypt—

¹ Before the War anti-British feeling in Egypt had been practically confined to the *intelligentsia*. During the War it spread among the fallahin for reasons which are frankly and fully set forth in the Report of the Milner Mission, but this new temper among the fallahin did not declare itself actively until after the Armistice.

² On the career of Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl and the history of the *Wafd* from 1919 to 1924 see four articles by Mr. Arthur Ransome in *The Manchester Guardian*, 30th and 31st March and 1st and 6th April, 1925.

³ Printed in *Cmd.* 1131 of 1920.

⁴ The responsibility for the breakdown of the Milner-Zaghlūl negotiations was shared by the British Government with Zaghlūl Pasha himself. Zaghlūl Pasha seems to have been personally in favour of a settlement, and he could almost certainly have carried the Egyptian people with him ; but, finally, he threw his weight into the scale against agreement.

⁵ Zaghlūl Pasha had returned to Egypt from his mission in Western Europe on the 5th April, 1921.

described in an official note by the four principal British advisers to the Egyptian Government¹—which led the British High Commissioner, Lord Allenby, to exert corresponding pressure in London, with the result that the British Government had reluctantly deferred the hope of negotiating a treaty, and had issued the unilateral declaration of the 28th February, 1922. While pressing this policy upon his principals Lord Allenby had implicitly acknowledged Zaghlūl Pasha's power—and at the same time stigmatized his intransigence—in another way, and had thereby still further increased Zaghlūl Pasha's prestige and popularity among the Egyptian people, when, after the outbreak of fresh disturbances, he arrested him and five of his colleagues on the *Wafd* on the 23rd December, 1921, under British martial law,² and conveyed them to Suez, whence they were deported in the following March to the Seychelles.³ The remaining seven members of the committee retorted by electing a series of substitute committees which were to step into their place successively as often as the acting members might be arrested and deported thereafter.⁴ Thus, the *Wafd* remained in action; but at the same time, though it was the dominant political force in Egypt, it was not the only party in the field.⁵

Among the inhabitants of Egypt themselves there was a national division between the vast majority of native Egyptians (both Muslims and Copts), of whom Zaghlūl Pasha himself was one, and the small but wealthy and influential governing class of 'Osmanlis (including the reigning house of Mehmed 'Alī), whose ancestors had settled in Egypt from Rumelia and Anatolia at various dates since the original Ottoman conquest of A. D. 1517. While these 'Osmanlis were becoming assimilated to the native Egyptians of the upper class many of them still spoke Turkish in their homes and privately regarded the native Egyptians as a subject-race. They took part in politics as individuals and not as a group, but on the whole their sympathies probably lay with the Liberal-Constitutional Party

¹ Printed in *Cmd.* 1592 of 1922.

² Egypt had been continuously under British martial law since the 2nd November, 1914.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 497 and 628; see also G. Kampffmeyer: 'Die Aegyptische Verfassung vom 19. April 1923; Arabischer und französischer Text mit einer Einleitung in die Verfassungsgeschichte Aegyptens' in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen*, Jahrgang xxvi und xxvii, Zweite Abteilung: *Westasiatische Studien* (Berlin, 1924, de Gruyter).

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 185.

⁵ For a survey of parties and classes in Egypt see M. M. Moreno: 'La situazione interna dell' Egitto dall' uccisione del Sirdar ad oggi' in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 5, pp. 225–34.

(*Hizbu'l-Ahrārī'd-Dustūriyyīn*) which was founded by an ex-Prime Minister, Adli Pasha Yakan, in opposition to the *Wafd*, on the 29th October, 1922.¹ The *Wafd* itself was supported, at least passively, by the mass of the native Egyptian Muslims, and there were not only Muslims but Copts among its active leaders. There was also, however, an older Nationalist Party (*Hizbu'l-Watanī*) which had been founded by Mustafā Kāmil on the 22nd October, 1907. At the time of the British declaration of the 28th February, 1922, which gave the Egyptians a free hand in the domain of internal self-government, the Nationalists were the only formally organized party, since the Liberal-Constitutional Party, as has been mentioned, was not founded until October 1922, while the *Wafd*, which had originated as a delegation, supported by an organization at home, for presenting the Egyptian case abroad, was not reorganized as a parliamentary party until the 26th April, 1924.² Meanwhile, both the *Wafd* and the Nationalist Party sent private delegations to present the Egyptian case at the Peace Conference of Lausanne (where the Egyptian Government did not desire to be represented, although the status of Egypt was on the agenda); and, on the 14th November, 1922, these two delegations drew up a common programme of action.³ Indeed, during the whole period under review the declared aims of the several parties were virtually identical, and were almost entirely concerned with the relations of Egypt to Great Britain, to the exclusion of internal questions.⁴ The bitter party feuds which nevertheless prevailed were due partly to disagreement regarding the methods by which the common aims should be pursued, but perhaps still more to personal rivalries.⁵

These parties obtained free play in the internal government of Egypt in consequence of the unilateral British declaration of the 28th February, 1922, which ran as follows :

Whereas His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign State ; and

¹ See *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 388, for their proceedings and programme on this occasion.

² *Op. cit.*, IV, 7, p. 467.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, II, pp. 432-3.

⁴ The main exception was that the *Wafd* and the Liberal-Constitutional Party supported the reigning Sultan Fu'ād, whereas the Nationalists were adherents of the ex-Khedive 'Abbās Hilmi, who, having remained in Constantinople and taken sides with Turkey when Turkey became involved in the War, had been deposed on the 19th December, 1914.

⁵ On Egyptian political parties in general, and their psychology and atmosphere, see Mr. Arthur Ransome in *The Manchester Guardian*, 9th and 16th February, 1925.

Whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire :

The following principles are hereby declared :

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

2. So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, martial law as proclaimed on the 2nd November, 1914, shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt :

(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt ;

(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect ;

(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities ;

(d) The Sudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreements the *status quo* in all these matters shall remain intact.

In the covering communication from Lord Allenby to Sultan Fu'ād 'the creation of a Parliament with a right to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible Government' was pronounced to be a matter for His Highness and the Egyptian people to determine ; and it was also declared that there was 'no obstacle to the re-establishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which will prepare the way for the creation of the diplomatic and consular representation of Egypt'.¹

The effect of the British Government's action was substantially to place the internal government of Egypt, but not of the Sudan, in Egyptian hands (subject to reservation (c)). On the other hand, in the field of foreign relations, the re-establishment of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs was little more than a form, and the designation of Egypt as an independent sovereign state a diplomatic fiction, in the light of reservations (a) and (b) and of the notification respecting the status of Egypt which British diplomatic representatives abroad were instructed² on the 15th March, 1922, to communicate to the Governments to which they were accredited. In this notification the British Government laid down that 'the termination of the British Protectorate over Egypt involves no change in the

¹ These two documents should be read in the light of the speech delivered by the then British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons on the 28th February, 1922.

² Text in *Cmd.* 1617 of 1922.

status quo as regards the position of other Powers in Egypt itself ' ; pointed out that the ' special relations ' between Great Britain and Egypt, ' long recognized by other Governments ', were defined in the British declaration recognizing Egypt as an independent sovereign state ; and issued a warning that they would not admit these relations ' to be questioned or discussed by any other Power ' and would ' regard as an unfriendly act any interference by another Power in the affairs of Egypt ' .

Although during the period under review the British Government never transgressed the terms of its own declaration of the 28th February, 1922, there was a latent contradiction in those terms themselves, since the ' sovereign independence ' proclaimed in the first clause, if intended in the ordinarily accepted sense of the phrase, was potentially cancelled by the reservations which followed. What Great Britain did concede forthwith to Egypt was a measure of internal self-government (though even this fell short of the measure at that time enjoyed by the self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth).¹ The extent to which the gulf between this limited autonomy and true sovereign independence was eventually to be bridged depended upon the conclusion of agreements which *ex hypothesi* were not by any means assured. It is only fair, however, to note on the other hand that an agreed settlement of the four outstanding issues, while not assumed, was by no means inherently impossible. On the British side the declaration of February 1922 was undoubtedly intended as a preliminary step in a constructive policy ; and this intention might have been realized but for such untoward circumstances as the attitude of Zaghlūl Pasha after his return to Egypt in September 1923, and the breach between King Fu'ād and Tharwat Pasha over the drafting of the Constitution, which resulted in Tharwat's fall, and which led the King to exert his political influence on the side of the *Wafd* in the first elections under the new régime.

Meanwhile, the ' sovereign independence ' of Egypt, like that of

¹ The British Government's reservation of its protectorate over Swaziland and Basutoland, when it gave Dominion self-government to the Union of South Africa, is not comparable to reservation (c) in the declaration of the 28th February, 1922, which applied, not to this or that enclave, but to the entire territory of Egypt. The chief difference, however, between Dominion self-government and that conceded to Egypt on the 28th February, 1922, was that in the Dominions British garrisons were maintained, if at all, by agreement between the United Kingdom and the Dominion concerned, whereas in Egypt the British Government continued, under reservation (a), to maintain a garrison of its own troops at its own discretion.

the neighbouring Arab states under 'A' mandates, was not a present fact but a formula which expressed the future intentions, in certain contingencies, of another party. This diplomatic draft upon the future seems, as things turned out, to have had an irritating rather than an assuaging effect upon Egyptian public opinion. At any rate it did not demonstrably contribute towards the improvement in the relations between the two countries which was perceptible during the next two and a half years—an improvement which was evidently due to the measure of internal autonomy which the British declaration did confer upon Egypt—nor did it eventually facilitate agreement on the four vital questions which had been left outstanding. On the other hand, it laid Great Britain open to undeserved criticism at the crisis created by the assassination of Sir Lee Stack on the 19th November, 1924, when the British Government took action against Egypt which, under the Covenant of the League of Nations, could not legitimately be taken by a Member State against another State—Member or non-Member—which was sovereign and independent in the usual meaning of those words.

Moreover, the sovereignty and independence of Egypt, as recognized by the British Government on the 28th February, 1922, was imperfect, not only in fact, but in international law, since at that date the sovereignty over Egypt still belonged juridically to Turkey. The Turkish sovereignty, originally established by right of conquest in A. D. 1517, had been defined in an annex to the London Agreement of the 15th July, 1840, between Turkey and four European Powers, and in subsequent *firmans* from the Ottoman Sultan—particularly those of the 13th February and the 1st June, 1841—and the juridical position had not been altered either by the British military occupation of Egypt in and after 1882, or by the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Turkey in 1914. Juridically, Turkish sovereignty over Egypt could only be terminated in a treaty signed and ratified by the Turkish Government. In the abortive Treaty of Sèvres, signed on the 10th August, 1920, Turkey was not only to renounce all rights and title in and over Egypt, but to recognize the British Protectorate which had been declared on the 18th December, 1914.¹ That treaty, however, never came into force, and Turkish rights over Egypt were not extinguished until the Treaty of Lausanne was signed by the Government of the new Turkish Republic on the

¹ Art. 101, supplemented by Arts. 102–12. In regard to the Sudan, Turkey was to recognize, in Arts. 113–14, the Anglo-Egyptian Conventions of the 19th January and the 10th July, 1899.

24th July, 1923, and ratified by the Great National Assembly on the 23rd August following.

The British declaration of the 28th February, 1922, preceded the meeting of the Lausanne Peace Conference on the 20th November of that year; and the British Government, conscious of the mistake which it had made in 1918, was this time desirous that the Egyptian Government should take part in the peace settlement. The Egyptian Government of the day, however, declined in advance, under the pressure of public opinion, to send a delegation to Lausanne;¹ and in the Lausanne Treaty the status of Egypt was dealt with in negative terms.

Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty. . . . (Art. 16.)

The renunciation by Turkey of all rights and titles over Egypt and over the Sudan will take effect as from the 5th November, 1914. (Art. 17.)

Any question arising from the recognition of the State of Egypt shall be settled by agreements to be negotiated subsequently in a manner to be determined later between the Powers concerned.² The provisions of the present Treaty relating to territories detached from Turkey under the said Treaty will not apply to Egypt. (Art. 19.)

These clauses merely extinguished the Turkish sovereignty over Egypt without transferring it either to Great Britain or to Egypt herself, and the two latter parties had still to settle between one another what the definitive status of Egypt was to be.

It remains to trace the relations between Great Britain and Egypt during the period under review. The status of the Sudan, which was one of the four points reserved for negotiation, is dealt with in a separate section below.³

The Egyptian Government did not commit itself to accepting the terms of the British declaration of the 28th February, 1922—the Prime Minister, Tharwat (Servet) Pasha, laid stress upon the

¹ For the joint programme of the unofficial delegations sent to Lausanne by two private Egyptian political organizations, the Nationalist Party (*Ḥizb al-Waṭanī*) and the party led by Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl (the *Wafd*), see p. 194 above. For an abstract of a memorandum presented to the Lausanne Conference by the combined delegations of these two organizations, see *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 498–502. For their protest against the terms of the treaty respecting Egypt see *op. cit.*, pp. 618–19.

² See, for example, the text of an agreement between the British and French delegations at Lausanne regarding Article 34 (nationality of inhabitants of ex-Ottoman territories) of the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923, respecting the nationality of Syrians and Lebanese resident in Egypt, in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 1947 of 1923.

³ See Section (ii), pp. 232–53.

unilateral character of the declaration in a speech delivered on the 27th March ¹—but at the same time it took the action for which the declaration had opened the way. On the 15th March Sultan Fu'ād proclaimed Egypt to be a state enjoying sovereignty and independence,² and gave formal expression to the new international status of the country by himself assuming the title of King (*Malik*) instead of Sultan.³ On the 15th April he promulgated a new dynastic law, in which the ex-Khedive, 'Abbās Hilmī, was explicitly excluded from the succession.⁴ Meanwhile, on the 3rd April, a commission for drafting a new parliamentary constitution was appointed by ministerial decree.⁵ This commission was boycotted by the Nationalist Party (*Hizbu'l-Watani*) on the ground that the Government ought, instead, to have summoned a constituent assembly; and thus, for the first time in many years, Egyptians found themselves divided politically on a purely internal question in which the relations of Egypt with the Occupying Power were not involved. Meanwhile, before the labours of this commission had resulted in the accession to office of an Egyptian ministry representing a majority in an elected Parliament, the Egyptian Government of the day concluded agreements with the British Government on two important matters, the abrogation in Egypt of British martial law and the retirement from the Egyptian service of foreign officials,⁶ of which the first had been raised explicitly and the second implicitly in the British Government's declaration.

The negotiations over the abrogation of martial law had several serious obstacles to surmount. In the first place, the political struggle of which Egypt had been the scene from 1919 onwards had produced an epidemic of political crime. There was a series of murderous assaults not only upon British residents of every class (including persons quite unconnected with politics, apart from being nationals of the Occupying Power), but upon Egyptian subjects who were regarded by the criminals as disloyal to the national cause or

¹ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, I, p. 679.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 648 and 677.

³ In Islamic international law the title *Sultan* implied a political authority delegated by a Caliph, whereas *Malik* implied a sovereignty exercised by a ruler in his own right. The Amir Husayn of the Hijāz had assumed the title of *Malik* on the 29th October, 1916. See p. 287 below.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, I, p. 765.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 763.

⁶ The most important of these foreign officials were of course British subjects, though the Egyptian public service still included eminent foreign officials of other nationalities, while the non-British elements were numerically strong in the less prominent ranks of the hierarchy. (Cf. foot-note on p. 220 below.)

who were obnoxious to them for partisan or purely private reasons. While the negotiations were actually in progress an attempt was made on the 15th July, 1922, against the life of a British officer, Colonel Piggott (this being the sixteenth attempt against the lives of British residents in Egypt since the end of 1921);¹ on the 12th August, 1922, a British official in the Egyptian service, Mr. T. W. Brown, was shot at while driving, three of his party being wounded and one killed;² on the 16th November, 1922, two distinguished members of the newly organized Liberal-Constitutional Party were shot at and wounded, one with fatal results;³ on the 27th December an English professor in the Royal Law School at Cairo, Mr. Robson, was shot dead in the street;⁴ on the 7th February, 1923, there was an attempt upon a British railway official, Mr. Ambler;⁵ and on the 12th and 27th February and the 4th March, 1923, bombs were thrown at groups of British soldiers in Cairo and the neighbourhood—one being actually thrown from an automobile into the General Head-quarters of the British Army of Occupation.⁶ These crimes not only aroused indignation in Great Britain and still stronger feeling among the British community in Egypt, who were personally threatened, but made it difficult for the British authorities to take the responsibility of surrendering their existing powers.⁷

British martial law was abrogated, nevertheless, in return for the simultaneous promulgation of an Egyptian indemnity act, by agreement between the two Governments in July 1923. Yet this statesmanlike achievement did not prevent the wave of political crime in Egypt from culminating in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in the following November.⁸

These crimes were condemned, though sometimes perfunctorily, in the Egyptian press; they appeared to be deprecated by Egyptian public opinion (so far as such existed); and no evidence was forth-

¹ *The Times*, 17th February, 1922.

² *Ibid.*, 14th August, 1922.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 435, quoting *Al-Akhhār*, 19th and 21st November, 1922.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 503.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 557.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 616–17.

⁷ See *The Times*, 3rd January, 1923, for resolutions passed on the 1st January at a meeting of British residents in Cairo; *ibid.*, 24th July, 1922, for Lord Allenby's protest to the Egyptian Government regarding the attempt against Colonel Piggott, and *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 503–4 (quoting *Al-Muqattam*, 3rd January, 1923), for his *communiqué* of the 1st January, 1923, to the Egyptian press regarding the murder of Mr. Robson.

⁸ The unsuccessful attempt upon the life of Zaghlul Pasha in July 1924 perhaps hardly falls into the same category as the other crimes mentioned; for, though the motive was political, the would-be assassin appears to have acted simply on his personal initiative and not as the agent of an organized gang.

coming that any of them were instigated deliberately by any member of any Egyptian Government.¹ On the other hand, the language of some of the Nationalist newspapers continued to be extremely truculent, and the recognized leaders of certain Egyptian political parties did not abstain from issuing general incitements to violence which, in the circumstances, involved them in serious moral responsibility and also made them liable to prosecution under British martial law. On the 25th July, 1922, the seven members of the *Wafd* who had not been deported in the previous December were arrested for issuing a manifesto of this character² and were sentenced by a British court martial to fines and imprisonment on the 13th August.³ All but one of them appear to have been released on the 14th November;⁴ but, on the 5th March, 1923, their *remplaçants* on the *Wafd* were arrested on account of a manifesto which they issued on the first anniversary of the British declaration of February 1922.⁵ These were replaced in their turn by others.⁶

Meanwhile, the negotiations for the abrogation of the state of siege went forward, and they were possibly assisted in their course by the British Government's considerate treatment of Sa'd Pasha Zaghlûl, who was removed from the Seychelles to Gibraltar in August 1922⁷ and was released at the beginning of April 1923 on a medical certificate.⁸

On the 5th July, 1923, there were published simultaneously a proclamation⁹ by Lord Allenby, abrogating British martial law in Egypt (with two saving clauses relating to cases actually *sub judice* and to the execution of the peace treaties, particularly as regarded the property in Egypt of ex-enemy subjects), and a decision¹⁰ of the

¹ See, however, pp. 222-5 below, for the legal proceedings after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, which retrospectively threw light on the instigation and authorship of the preceding series of crimes.

² *The Times*, 26th and 27th July, 1922.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 333-4.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 435, quoting the Egyptian press. The remaining prisoner, Fakhri Bey 'Abdu'n-Nûr, must have been released before the beginning of February 1923, since his name reappears among those of the group arrested on that occasion.

⁵ *The Times*, 6th March, 1923.

⁶ *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 617-18, quoting *Al-Akhbâr*, 8th March, 1923.

⁷ *The Times*, 6th and 7th September, 1922.

⁸ The British Government's order for Zaghlûl Pasha's release was dated the 28th March, 1923 (*Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 695). During his detention at Gibraltar an attempt was made to obtain a decree of *Habeas Corpus* in his favour. On the 29th September, 1922, the judicial authorities at Gibraltar gave an adverse judgement in regard to this application, and their judgement was upheld by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the 9th March, 1923 (*Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 335-6 and 696).

⁹ Text in *op. cit.*, III, 2, p. 119.

¹⁰ French text (from the *Egyptian Journal Officiel* of the 5th July, 1923,

Egyptian Council of Ministers advising King Fu'ād to approve a draft law promulgating an Act of Indemnity and a draft ministerial order of the Minister of Justice instituting a committee to deal with proposals for revising sentences passed on persons condemned by military courts set up under British martial law; and to authorize the Minister for Foreign Affairs to sign a note to Lord Allenby. The Act of Indemnity estopped the reversal by the Egyptian authorities of action taken under British martial law since the 2nd November, 1914. The revisionary committee was constituted of the (British) Judicial Adviser to the Egyptian Government, with a casting vote, the Vice-President of the Native Court of Appeal, and two Egyptian Judges of the Court of Appeal. The note to Lord Allenby communicated the two foregoing documents and contained assurances that the Egyptian Government would maintain in force the Act of Indemnity, 'which must be considered as forming an integral part of an agreement entered into with the Government of His Britannic Majesty'; that it would not expect the abrogation of martial law to apply to measures taken in respect of enemy property or to the execution of relevant provisions in the peace treaties; that it would respect the *status quo* existing *de facto* as regarded real estate occupied by the British military authorities since the 2nd November, 1914, subject to a future settlement by negotiation after the convocation of an Egyptian Parliament; that the revisionary committee should act only by a majority vote; and that any eventual change in its composition should be made only with the consent of the British Government. The British Government's agreement with and acceptance of the declarations contained in this note was conveyed to the Egyptian Government in the answering note of the same date from Lord Allenby.

Before the end of March 1923 the British military authorities in Egypt had already consented¹ not to proceed with the trial of those members of the *Wafd* who had been arrested on the 5th March. On the 14th May, 1923, there were set at liberty the seven members arrested on the 25th July, 1922; Fakhri Bey 'Abdu'n-Nūr was liberated on the 11th June, and on the same date two newspapers which had been suspended since the end of the preceding February were permitted to resume publication; another prominent supporter

No. 67), with English translation, of this decision and enclosures, and of an exchange of notes of the same date between the British High Commissioner and the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 1998 of 1923. See also *Oriente Moderno*, III, 2, p. 118.

¹ At the instance, it was reported, of the British Prime Minister.

of Zaghlūl Pasha, Shaykh Mustafā'u'l-Qāyātī, who had been in prison since the 5th January, was released on the 19th June; and those five companions of Zaghlūl Pasha who had been arrested on the 23rd December, 1921, and deported to the Seychelles, were set at liberty on the 1st June, 1923, and had returned to Egypt before the end of that month.¹ Thus the general abrogation of British martial law in Egypt, in agreement with the Egyptian Government, was preceded, on the British Government's part, by a series of specific acts of amnesty. On the other hand, a trial by British court martial of thirteen Egyptians accused of conspiring to murder British soldiers and officials closed on the 20th July with the pronouncement of five death sentences and five other sentences to various terms of hard labour and imprisonment; and though two of the death-sentences were commuted on appeal, the three others were upheld and carried out.² On the 8th February, 1924, ten days after Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl had been invited by King Fu'ād to form a ministry in accordance with the results of the first general election under the new Egyptian Constitution, the British Government renounced the procedure contemplated in the appointment of the revisionary committee and declared an amnesty for all prisoners condemned by British courts martial in Egypt, 'except those whose liberation was regarded as dangerous to public security in the unanimous judgement of the [British] High Commissioner and the Egyptian Prime Minister'.³

As regards the retirement of foreign officials in the Egyptian service⁴ the controversial question (which had already been raised in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations previous to the 28th February, 1922)⁵ was the scale of compensation; and on the 14th June, 1922, the Egyptian Government rejected proposals on this head which had been presented by Lord Allenby.⁶ The Egyptian Government's action was not unreasonable, since the proposals had been open to criticism as being excessive. During the next twelve months a *modus vivendi* was maintained between the Egyptian Government and the British High Commissioner for dealing with individual cases arising, until an Egyptian law relating to the conditions of service,

¹ For all the above facts see *Oriente Moderno*, III, 2, p. 121.

² *Op. cit.*, III, 4, p. 250.

³ *The Times*, 9th February, 1924.

⁴ For the proportion of British subjects among the foreign officials in the Egyptian service see p. 199 above and p. 220 below.

⁵ See the *résumé* in an interview given by the Egyptian Prime Minister of the day, Yahyā Ibrāhīm Pasha, at the beginning of December 1923 (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 1, 66, quoting *Al-Muqattam* of the 2nd December).

⁶ *The Times*, 15th June, 1922.

retirement and dismissal of officials, employees and agents of foreign nationality (Law No. 28 of 1923) had been drafted by the two parties in agreement.¹

This law applied to foreign officials (excluding ex-Ottoman subjects) employed by the Egyptian state or by Egyptian local authorities (but not to judicial officers, or to officials of the Public Debt, the Quarantine Service or the Municipality of Alexandria). Pensionable officials who had entered the service later than the 15th March, 1922, and non-pensionable officials who had entered later than the 31st December, 1920, were not entitled to benefit. Foreign officials who came within the scope of the law were offered two options for anticipating their contractual dates of retirement. The execution of the law was placed in the hands of a commission of eight high officials, nominated by the Prime Minister on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance, of whom four were to be foreigners and four (including the president) Egyptians. The beneficiaries under the law were to receive such pension or indemnity as would be due to them if they had retired or been dismissed owing to the abolition of their post or owing to illness, together with a special compensation (based on elaborate tables of age-factors and service-factors), as well as a repatriation allowance. From indemnities exceeding £E4,000 deductions were to be made on a progressive scale, in such a manner that no total sum should in any case exceed £E8,500. In a covering note of the 18th July, 1923, to Lord Allenby, the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs gave the assurance that the Egyptian Government considered the law, together with certain undertakings in the note itself (e. g. in regard to cases under the *modus vivendi*), as the expression of an arrangement between the two Governments, and that it would maintain the arrangement in force until it should have produced all its effects.

The first Parliament to assemble under the new Egyptian Constitution of the 19th April, 1923, appointed a committee on this law ; and on the 24th June, 1924, the *rapporteur* of this committee, while pronouncing in favour of the substitution of Egyptian for foreign officials and of the provision of credits for this purpose, called upon the Government to repudiate the law of 1923, to reopen negotiations, and to demand from the British Government a refund of indemnities already paid. In reply the then Prime Minister, Zaghlül Pasha,

¹ French text and English translation, together with notes exchanged between the British and Egyptian Governments, in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 1999 of 1923.

concurred in this protest but deprecated the reopening of the question ; and the credits for paying the indemnities under the law were voted by a large majority.¹

While the British and Egyptian Governments were engaged in the negotiations which resulted in the two agreements described above the commission for drafting the Constitution appointed by the Egyptian Government on the 3rd April, 1923, had been performing its task without any interference from the British High Commissioner except on one point in which the status of the Sudan was involved.² The report of a sub-committee appointed to lay down general principles for the Constitution and for the Electoral Law was published on the 21st May, 1922 ;³ and the Constitution itself was enacted by a Royal Rescript of the 19th April, 1923, and promulgated on the 21st.⁴ The Royal Decree ordering the first general election under the new Constitution was published on the 6th September ;⁵ Sa'd Pasha Zaghlül landed in Egypt on the 17th September in order to lead his party ;⁶ the elections⁷ resulted in the return on the 12th January, 1924, of 188 supporters of the *Wafd* and only 27 of other parties ; and, with this overwhelming parliamentary majority behind him, Zaghlül Pasha was invited by King Fu'ād on the 28th January, 1924, to form a ministry.⁸ He accepted on the same day, on the understanding that this acceptance should not be regarded as a recognition of ' any situation or any right which might be repugnant to the *Wafd* ', of which he remained president ; and he appealed to the results of the elections as a proof that the programme of the *Wafd* enjoyed the unanimous support of the Egyptian nation.⁹ The first session of the new Egyptian Parliament was opened on the 15th March, 1924.¹⁰

These events in Egypt prepared the way for a reopening of negotiations between the Egyptian and the British Governments

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, pp. 517-18.

² On this see Section (ii) below.

³ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 43-5, quoting from *Al-Akhhār* of the 21st May, 1922.

⁴ Text (in Arabic and French) in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen*, loc. cit.

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, III, 4, p. 246, quoting *Al-Ahrām*, 7th September, 1923.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 248.

⁷ Rather more than 60 per cent. of the primary electors recorded their votes (statement by the outgoing Prime Minister, Yahyā Ibrāhīm Pasha (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 1, pp. 66-7)).

⁸ *Op. cit.*, IV, 2, p. 82.

⁹ See *op. cit.*, pp. 121-5, for texts of Zaghlül Pasha's reply of the 28th January, 1924, to King Fu'ād, and of his speech of the 25th January, in which he declared his policy.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, IV, 4, pp. 269-70.

on the four questions which had been reserved in the British declaration of the 28th February, 1922. It was true that, in assuming office, Zaghlül Pasha had expressly retained a free hand, and that his political record since 1919 suggested that he would be intransigent. On the other hand, the British Government had conceded in advance that the eventual agreements should be concluded 'by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides'; and while it might prove even more difficult to agree with Zaghlül Pasha than with his predecessors in office, it was also clear that, if a settlement were arrived at with an Egyptian Prime Minister who was the head of an all-powerful political organization and who had an overwhelming parliamentary majority behind him, this would rest on much more secure foundations than an agreement with any Egyptian ministry which was agreeable to the British authorities rather than representative of the Egyptian people. Moreover, it was not unreasonable to calculate that, after his overwhelming victory in the elections, Zaghlül Pasha could afford to be less intransigent than if he had been less amply assured of popular support. If only he had the statesmanship, he presumably had the strength to make concessions to the British point of view which his weaker predecessors could not have contemplated, even supposing that they had been in favour of them on their merits. It was natural, therefore, that the reopening of negotiations should be considered on the British side; and Zaghlül Pasha, on his part, took the initiative in advocating this publicly. In a speech delivered three days before taking office, in which he hinted at the hopes aroused in his mind by the recent accession of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald to office in Great Britain,¹ he declared:

We, at any rate, are ready to negotiate, in a spirit of equity, with a view to arriving at an agreement which will guarantee the independence that we demand, while respecting such British interests as are reasonable and acceptable.²

This declaration was renewed—with an insistence that the negotiations should be free and unfettered, and a reference to the Sudan—in the speech from the throne at the opening of the Egyptian Parliament on the 15th March, 1924;³ and simultaneously Mr.

¹ On the 27th February, 1924, Zaghlül Pasha declined to protest against a declaration made by Mr. MacDonald in the House of Commons—to the effect that 'His Majesty's present Government regard themselves as bound by the Declaration to Egypt of the 28th February, 1922'—on the ground that neither Government was bound by the declarations of the other.

² *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 2, p. 124.

³ *Op. cit.*, IV, 4, p. 269.

MacDonald, in a telegram (couched in exceedingly friendly terms) which he addressed to Zaghlūl Pasha on this occasion, announced that the British Government was disposed to enter into negotiations with the Egyptian Government at any moment.¹ In April Mr. MacDonald wrote to Zaghlūl Pasha suggesting that he should visit London, for this purpose, at the end of June ;² but as the prospect of negotiations began to take more definite form an apprehension arose in Egypt that even Zaghlūl Pasha might purchase an agreement by compromise. This apprehension was temporarily allayed by a statement from the Prime Minister himself in the Chamber on the 10th May. He declared that he rejected the British declaration of the 28th February, 1922, not only as head of the *Wafd*, but as head of the Egyptian Government ; that Mr. MacDonald's invitation was entirely unconditional ; that his sole object was to obtain the independence of Egypt and the Sudan ; and that if there was no hope of that he would neither enter into negotiations nor remain in office ; and the Chamber responded by giving him an almost unanimous vote of confidence.³ The prospect was soon clouded, however, by the increasing tension in the Sudan ;⁴ and on the 28th June, in consequence of Lord Parmoor's declaration of the 25th in the House of Lords, Zaghlūl Pasha not only repeated in the Chamber the declaration which he had made on the 10th May, but actually placed his resignation in the hands of King Fu'ād.⁵ The King did what was expected of him by refusing to accept it, and two days later Zaghlūl Pasha reappeared in the Chamber as Prime Minister, with restored prestige,⁶ while Mr. MacDonald appears to have assured him once again that no conditions, either explicit or implicit, were attached to the proposal to negotiate ; that neither party would be compromised by listening to an exposition of the other's views ; and that the negotiations would be entered into on a footing of perfect equality.⁷ Nevertheless, on the 12th July, an attempt was made on Zaghlūl Pasha's life by an Egyptian medical student (who had returned home with this intent from Berlin and who declared himself a member of the *Hizbu'l-Watanī*), for fear that, in the forthcoming negotiations in London, Zaghlūl Pasha might betray the Egyptian cause.⁸ The slight wound which Zaghlūl Pasha received scarcely

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

³ *Ibid.*, 12th May, 1924.

⁵ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 30th June, 1924.

⁶ *The Times*, 1st July, 1924.

² *The Times*, 24th April, 1924.

⁴ See the following section, p. 245.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 4th July, 1924.

⁸ For this crime, and for the judicial proceedings that followed it, see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, pp. 527-9 and 553-4.

delayed his departure for Europe, while the outburst of public sympathy for him, which the incident evoked, strengthened his hands politically ; yet on the 29th August, after lingering for a month on the European Continent, Zaghlül Pasha simultaneously telegraphed to his Cabinet that he had renounced the idea of negotiations and hoped to return to Egypt on the 17th September, and wrote to Mr. MacDonald declaring that negotiations were now impossible, but that at the same time he held himself at Mr. MacDonald's disposal, since it might be possible to dispel the cloud hanging over Anglo-Egyptian relations. Mr. MacDonald responded on the 6th September¹ by inviting Zaghlül Pasha to meet him, on his own terms, in London towards the end of the month. On these terms Zaghlül Pasha accepted.² He arrived in London on the 23rd September, and engaged in 'conversations'—not 'negotiations'—with Mr. MacDonald on the 25th and 29th September and the 3rd October. These 'conversations' came to nothing, for, when Mr. MacDonald asked him to begin by stating freely and fully what were the modifications in the *status quo* in Egypt on which he intended to insist, he stated them as follows :

- (a) The withdrawal of all British forces from Egyptian territory.
- (b) The withdrawal of the financial and judicial advisers.
- (c) The disappearance of all British control over the Egyptian Government, notably in connexion with foreign relations, which Zaghlül Pasha claimed were hampered by the notification of His Majesty's Government to foreign Powers on the 15th March, 1922, that they would regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another Power.
- (d) The abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their claim to protect foreigners and minorities in Egypt.
- (e) The abandonment by His Majesty's Government of their claim to share in any way in protecting the Suez Canal.³

¹ Mr. MacDonald's letter was written from Geneva (where he was attending the Fifth Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations) to Zaghlül Pasha in Paris.

² For the history of the *pourparlers* leading up to his acceptance see *The Times*, 4th, 6th, 9th, and 11th September, 1924.

³ Quoted from Mr. MacDonald's dispatch of the 7th October, 1924, to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan respecting the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to Egypt and the Sudan (British White Paper, *Omd.* 2269 of 1924). The correctness of the account, given in this dispatch, of the London conversations does not appear to have been challenged by Zaghlül Pasha—except that he noted the omission, by Mr. MacDonald, of one of his demands, namely, that the position of the British representative in Egypt must be the same, in every respect, as that of any other foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Egyptian Government (*The Times*, 21st October, 1924).

These demands entirely ignored the existence of British interests in Egypt, and Zaghlūl Pasha does not appear to have put forward any suggestions for reconciling those interests with his own desiderata beyond that, after the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt, the defence of the Suez Canal might be entrusted to the League of Nations, instead of being left to Egypt alone.¹ On such terms there was no opening for further conversations, and Zaghlūl Pasha returned to Egypt without any common basis for negotiations having been found. Mr. MacDonald, however, had taken the opportunity to give Zaghlūl Pasha a frank exposition of the British point of view regarding both the Suez Canal and the Sudan. His declarations, on this occasion, regarding the Sudan, are dealt with elsewhere.² Those regarding the Canal—which were made to Zaghlūl Pasha on the 3rd October, after the question had been discussed on the 2nd at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, at which Lord Allenby was present—may be quoted here in the words in which they were afterwards summarized by Mr. MacDonald himself.

I raised the question of the Canal straight away because its security is of vital interest to us both in peace and in war. It is no less true to-day than in 1922 that the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt remains a vital British interest and that absolute certainty that the Suez Canal will remain open in peace as well as in war for the free passage of British ships is the foundation on which the entire defensive strategy of the British Empire rests. . . . The effective co-operation of Great Britain and Egypt in protecting those communications might in my view have been ensured by the conclusion of a treaty of close alliance. The presence of a British force in Egypt provided for by such a treaty freely entered into by both parties on an equal footing would in no way be incompatible with Egyptian independence, whilst it would be an indication of the specially close and intimate relations between the two countries and their determination to co-operate in a matter of vital concern to both. It is not the wish of His Majesty's Government that this force should in any way interfere with the functions of the Egyptian Government or encroach upon Egyptian sovereignty, and I emphatically said so.³

In the same review of the conversations Mr. MacDonald stated that he had by no means abandoned hope that, on further consideration, the basis of an agreement acceptable to both countries could be found; but he expressed the opinion that the attitude adopted by Zaghlūl Pasha had rendered such agreement impossible for the present. That attitude was illustrated by Zaghlūl Pasha himself in a speech delivered on the 20th October—the day on which he

¹ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

³ British White Paper, *Cmd.* 2269 of 1924.

² See below, p. 249.

landed at Alexandria.¹ He declared that he had returned 'without losing anything of Egypt's rights', and he quoted a proverb that 'no right is ever lost as long as there is some one claiming it'.

It may be inferred that, consciously or unconsciously, Zaghlūl Pasha set greater store upon maintaining the integrity of his programme on paper than upon the translation of any part of it into an agreement with Great Britain which would put the relations between the two countries on a stable basis.

The fact seems to be that, from 1919 onwards, Zaghlūl Pasha's action had been directed, not to arriving at the most satisfactory arrangement with Great Britain which might prove attainable, but to securing the greatest possible popularity among his own countrymen as the protagonist in an anti-British agitation. In this aim he had succeeded almost completely, as was demonstrated by his triumphant return from Europe after his negotiations with Lord Milner in 1920 and by the election results of the 12th January, 1924; but the very extent of his demagogic success involved him in a dilemma, owing to the action already taken by the British Government on the 28th February, 1922. The grant of internal self-government to Egypt automatically compelled the leader of the strongest Egyptian political party to abandon the easy role of agitator for the difficult role of statesman; and the policy to which he had committed himself irrevocably before the 28th January, 1924, fatally precluded him from entering upon the path of constructive statesmanship after taking office as Prime Minister. His overwhelming parliamentary majority was an expression of the national faith in his unconditional promises to achieve the impossible. As soon as ever he touched realities he found himself in immediate danger of forfeiting his popularity to some rival who was still free from the embarrassment of office and was therefore at liberty, as Zaghlūl Pasha himself had been for five years, to sign political cheques which could not be presented for payment. Yet the mandate which Zaghlūl had received in the elections was too potent to be ignored. With such a majority at his back, and such popular expectations of what he was to achieve, he could not simply take no action at all. The alternatives before him were either to confess that the expectations which he had himself aroused, and the demands which he had put into the mouths of his followers, were unattainable, and then to make the best terms that he could with the British Government, or else to ride for a fall.

¹ *The Times*, 21st October, 1924.

In choosing this second alternative—as he did in his conversations with Mr. MacDonald in London—he chose the course which was the less immediately damaging to his prestige at home. The enthusiasm with which he was greeted upon his return showed that his attitude of mind was shared by the majority of his countrymen ; yet that enthusiasm could not be expected to last unless he covered his retreat by striking out some other line of advance. A return to revolutionary action was confessedly impracticable. It was no longer easy to create anti-British disorders in Egypt now that the British authorities were in no way responsible for the maintenance of internal order ; and even if this had been practicable it would only have recoiled upon Zaghlūl Pasha himself, who had taken that responsibility upon his own shoulders.¹ A suggestion that some working compromise between the programme of the *Wafd* and the British declaration of February 1922 might be negotiated as the basis for a fresh *modus vivendi* met with no favour.² When the Egyptian Parliament reassembled Zaghlūl Pasha repeated, on the 15th November, his gesture of the 28th June, and announced his resignation.³ Once again this produced the desired revulsion of feeling in his favour, and on the following day the resignation was withdrawn ;⁴ but the relations between Egypt and Great Britain remained as they were. Zaghlūl Pasha was reduced to an inactivity which was not of the

¹ This confession was made on the 6th November, 1924, in *La Liberté* of Cairo, a journal which was believed to be an organ of Zaghlūl Pasha's Government (*The Times*, 7th, 8th, and 10th November, 1924).

² *La Liberté* of Cairo, *loc. cit.*

³ On this occasion Zaghlūl Pasha allowed it to be understood that his resignation was due to interference by King Fu'ād ; and a mob, led by one of Zaghlūl Pasha's supporters, assembled in the square before the Royal Palace, shouting 'Sa'd or Revolution'. This suggests that Zaghlūl Pasha may have contemplated distracting public attention from the failure of his policy towards Great Britain by setting on foot some kind of republican movement. Between his return from Europe and the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, Zaghlūl Pasha also made, or prepared to make, a number of ministerial changes with the general effect of increasing his personal hold over the Government. For instance, he appointed his own nephew, Fathu'llāh Pasha Barakat, to the Ministry of the Interior. He gave an under-secretaryship in the same Ministry to Mahmūd Efendī Naḡrāshī in place of 'Alī Jamālū'd-Dīn Pasha. He made Ahmad Efendī Māhir Minister of Education. He replaced Tawfiq Naṣīm Pasha by 'Alī Efendī Shamsī in the Ministry of Finance, and made his own great-nephew, Bahā'u'd-Dīn Barakat, under-secretary in the Ministry of Justice. It was reported that he was actually intending to appoint Dr. Shafiq Mansūr to the Directorship of the Department of Public Security. It will be noted that the last of the individuals mentioned in this note was afterwards convicted of participation in the criminal activities which culminated in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, and that two of the others were brought to trial on the same account.

⁴ *The Times*, 17th November, 1924.

masterly kind, but was eminently dangerous not only for him but for his country.

The danger lay in the fact that Zaghlūl Pasha could not immobilize the relations between Egypt and Great Britain. In discussing with him in London the question of the Sudan Mr. MacDonald had warned him that the *status quo* there was being undermined by the action of the Egyptians themselves ; and the whole situation created by the declaration of February 1922 was in fact precarious. While the sovereign independence which the declaration had conferred on Egypt might eventually be translated from shadow into substance if the agreements contemplated in the declaration itself were duly concluded, it was equally true that, if their conclusion were indefinitely postponed, some untoward event might take even the shadow of independence away from Egypt once again. That which one unilateral act of the British Government had established, another might undo, if serious provocation were given on the Egyptian side or if other new elements were introduced into the situation.

A new element quickly presented itself in the fall of Mr. MacDonald and the accession to office of a Conservative ministry in Great Britain, as a result of the General Election of October 1924 ; and, as early as the 19th November, a note ¹ was addressed from the Foreign Office, in the name of the new Secretary of State, to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, regarding the situation which would arise if the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes—which, by a resolution of the Assembly of the League, adopted on the 2nd October, was to be opened for signature not only by Members of the League but by all other states—were to be signed by Egypt. After citing the reservations in the declaration of the 28th February, 1922, and quoting a passage from the circular note addressed to foreign Powers on the 15th March, 1922, the British note of the 19th November, 1924, concluded with the following words :

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government are unable to admit that the Protocol, if signed by Egypt, will enable the Egyptian Government to invoke the intervention of the League of Nations in settlement of matters absolutely reserved by that declaration to the discretion of His Majesty's Government.

On the very day on which this note was dispatched from London to Geneva Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian Army and Governor-General of the Sudan, was fired at by assassins in Cairo, as he was driving through the streets from the

¹ Text in *The Times*, 5th December, 1924.

Egyptian War Office to his official residence.¹ Some twenty shots were fired in all,² and the Sirdar, his aide-de-camp, and his chauffeur were wounded. The assassins eluded pursuit. The Sirdar's wounds were mortal, and he died the day after.³

Upon the news of the outrage both King Fu'ād and Zaghlūl Pasha immediately expressed, in an official and public form, their horror at the crime and their sympathy for the victim of it. In the name of the Egyptian Government Zaghlūl Pasha pledged himself that he would leave nothing undone to bring the criminals to account and would inflict exemplary punishment on them when convicted. The Egyptian press, of all parties, wrote in the same strain, and the Egyptian public signified, in a passive way, that it shared the feelings of the press and the Government. There was no evidence that these expressions of Egyptian feeling, from the King and the Prime Minister downwards, were not sincere. On the other hand, Zaghlūl Pasha and his associates on the *Wafd* unquestionably bore a heavy, though (except in two cases)⁴ indirect, moral responsibility for the Sirdar's assassination. It was not as if this had been the first outrage of its kind. 'Between September 1919 and the 19th November, 1924, when Sir Lee Stack was shot, there were no fewer than 46 of these outrages—namely, 19 against British officers and men, 11 against civilian British officials, and 16 against Egyptian Ministers and other officials who were for co-operating with the British. Between December 1921 and December 1922 the average was about two per month, and . . . in these 46 outrages there were over 60 victims.'⁵

This long campaign of murder had followed the organized incitements to violence with which the *Wafd* had so inauspiciously started its career. That did not, of course, in itself prove that the outrages would not have been committed if the *Wafd* agitation had never taken place; and, as a matter of fact, the *post hoc propter hoc* inference was at least partly invalidated, in the course of the subsequent judicial proceedings,⁶ by evidence that Dr. Shafīq Mansūr, the leader of the gang of criminals by whom the campaign was conducted, had been implicated in outrages committed as far back as 1915 and 1910, before the *Wafd* was in existence. A graver count

¹ *The Times*, 20th November, 1924.

² An unexploded bomb was also found afterwards in the road, at the point where the shots were fired.

³ *The Times*, 21st November, 1924.

⁴ The two exceptions were Ahmad Efendī Māhir and Mahmūd Efendī Naqrāshī (see p. 224 below).

⁵ *The Times*, 27th December, 1924.

⁶ *The Times*, 3rd June, 1925.

against the *Wafd* was that they had not discontinued their incitements to violence after the murder campaign had begun, though that campaign can have left them under no illusion as to the encouragement which their preaching gave to the criminal activities of misguided individuals among their countrymen. The nature and extent of their moral responsibility under this head could not be better formulated than it had already been in a prophetic passage of Mr. MacDonald's dispatch of the 7th October.

As regards the Sudan, I drew attention to certain statements which His Excellency had made as President of the Council of Ministers before the Egyptian Parliament during the course of the summer. On the 17th May, according to my information, Zaghlül Pasha stated that the fact that a foreign officer was Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army, and the retention in that army of British officers, were inconsistent with the dignity of independent Egypt. The expression of such sentiments in an official pronouncement by the responsible head of the Egyptian Government has obviously placed not only Sir Lee Stack as Sirdar, but all British officers attached to the Egyptian Army, in a difficult position. I had also in mind that, in June, Zaghlül Pasha was reported to have claimed for Egypt complete rights of ownership over the Sudan and characterized the British Government as usurpers.¹

In the light of these facts it is interesting to recall the legal opinion which on the 24th January, 1924, had been given in general terms to the Council of the League of Nations by a special Commission of Jurists, appointed to consider certain questions arising out of the murder of General Tellini.² In answer to the question :

In what circumstances and to what extent is the responsibility of a state involved by the commission of a political crime in its territory ?

the Jurists made the following reply :

The responsibility of a state is only involved by the commission in its territory of a political crime against the person of foreigners if the state has neglected to take all reasonable measures for the prevention of the crime and the pursuit, arrest and bringing to justice of the criminal. The recognized public character of a foreigner and the circumstances in which he is present in its territory entail upon the state a corresponding duty of special vigilance on his behalf.

After the murder of Sir Lee Stack the British High Commissioner took action before it was possible to judge whether Zaghlül Pasha was honouring his pledge to bring the criminals to justice. On the other hand, Zaghlül Pasha and his fellow ministers were, to say the least of it, guilty of that neglect to take preventive measures which, in the opinion of the international jurists, would involve the Egyptian

¹ *Cmd.* 2269 of 1924.

² For the Janina murders and their sequel see *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 348-56.

state in responsibility for the political crime committed, on the 19th November, 1924, in the streets of Cairo. Moreover, the duty of special vigilance on Sir Lee Stack's behalf was pre-eminently entailed by his recognized public character as Sirdar and by the circumstance that he was present in Egyptian territory in that capacity.

It must be mentioned that, at the date of the crime against Sir Lee Stack, the two Egyptian officials upon whom, in other circumstances, immediate technical responsibility might have been presumed to rest—namely, the Commandant of the Cairo City Police and the Director-General of the European Section of the Department of Public Security—were both Englishmen. Considering the alienation of feeling at that time between British residents in Egypt, official and unofficial, and the Egyptian community, it was evidently difficult, if not impossible, for isolated Englishmen, however highly placed in the Egyptian service, to act effectively for the protection in Egypt of their own countrymen; and it need not be said that no shadow of blame for failure to prevent the crime attached to the two officials in question. Indeed, in their own considered judgement, it was even impossible for them to participate effectively in bringing the criminals to justice in the circumstances that then prevailed; and on the 20th November they addressed to the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Lord Allenby, a joint letter¹ in which they asked to be relieved from all responsibility for the conduct and results of the investigation into the crime.² They instantly assumed responsibility³ when Zaghlül Pasha resigned and a new Cabinet was formed by Ahmad Ziwār Pasha on the 24th November.⁴

The British Government, on its part, decided to take swift and vigorous action. The Cabinet held an emergency meeting on the 20th, while Sir Lee Stack was still alive.⁵ Upon the news of his death they gave orders for British naval and military reinforcements to proceed to Egypt and the Sudan forthwith. On the afternoon of the 22nd November Lord Allenby, in their name, presented two communications to Zaghlül Pasha.

The procedure adopted on this occasion was humiliating, in almost

¹ This letter was also signed by another Englishman who was chief inspector (and the only British official) in the Egyptian Department of Public Prosecutions.

² *The Times*, 22nd November, 1924.

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 23rd January, 1925.

⁴ See below, p. 225.

⁵ The Cabinet met in London at 4 p.m. The Sirdar died at Cairo just before midnight (*The Times*, 21st November, 1924).

every detail, to the Egyptian Government. The British High Commissioner's carriage was escorted through the streets of Cairo, not by the usual pair of military motor-cyclists, but by an entire regiment of British cavalry. Lord Allenby, who was accompanied by Mr. Clark Kerr, the Counsellor of the British Residency, was not wearing the formal dress which was customary at official interviews. When the *cortège* arrived at the offices of the Council of Ministers the regimental trumpeters received Lord Allenby with a royal salute, while the regiment, in drawing up, blocked the entrance to the Egyptian Parliament House. Lord Allenby read his communications aloud to Zaghlūl Pasha in English and immediately left, after depositing with him written copies in French.¹ The English texts of the two communications were as follows :

First Communication.

On behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government I make the following communication to Your Excellency :

The Governor-General of the Sudan and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, who was also a distinguished officer of the British Army, has been brutally murdered in Cairo.

His Majesty's Government consider that this murder, which holds up Egypt as at present governed to the contempt of civilized peoples, is the natural outcome of a campaign of hostility to British rights and British subjects in Egypt and the Sudan, founded upon a heedless ingratitude for benefits conferred by Great Britain, not discouraged by Your Excellency's Government, and fomented by organizations in close contact with that Government.

Your Excellency was warned by His Majesty's Government little more than a month ago of the consequences of failing to stop this campaign, more particularly as concerned the Sudan. It has not been stopped. The Egyptian Government have now allowed the Governor-General of the Sudan to be murdered and have proved that they are incapable or unwilling to protect foreign lives.

His Majesty's Government therefore require that the Egyptian Government shall :

- (1) Present ample apology for the crime.
- (2) Prosecute an inquiry into the authorship of the crime with the utmost energy and without respect of persons and bring the criminals, whoever they are and whatever their age, to condign punishment.
- (3) Henceforth forbid and vigorously suppress all popular political demonstrations.
- (4) Pay forthwith to His Majesty's Government a fine of £500,000.
- (5) Order within twenty-four hours the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and the purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army, with such resulting changes as shall be hereafter specified.

¹ The foregoing details are taken from *The Times*, 24th November, 1924. Compare the account, on p. 177 of the present volume, of the similar military demonstration made by the French Resident-General in Tunisia on the 15th April, 1922.

(6) Notify the competent department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated in the Gezira ¹ from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise.

(7) Withdraw all opposition in the respects hereafter specified to the wishes of His Majesty's Government concerning the protection of foreign interests in Egypt.

Failing immediate compliance with these demands, His Majesty's Government will at once take appropriate action to safeguard their interests in Egypt and the Sudan.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration.

Second Communication.

Sir,—With reference to my preceding communication, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty's Government, that their specific requirements respecting the Army in the Sudan and the protection of foreign interests in Egypt are as follows :

(1) The Egyptian officers and purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army having been withdrawn, Sudanese units of the Egyptian Army shall be converted into a Sudan defence force, owing allegiance to the Sudan Government alone and under the supreme command of the Governor-General, in whose name all commissions will be given.

(2) Rules and conditions governing the service, discipline, and retirement of foreign officials still employed by the Egyptian Government, and financial conditions governing pensions of foreign officials who have left the service, shall be revised in accordance with the wishes of His Majesty's Government.

(3) Pending the conclusion of an agreement between the two Governments regarding the protection of foreign interests in Egypt, the Egyptian Government shall maintain the posts of financial and judicial advisers and preserve their powers and privileges as contemplated on the abolition of the Protectorate and shall respect the status and present attributions of the European Department of the Ministry of the Interior as already laid down by Ministerial Order, and give due weight to such recommendations as the Director-General may make upon matters falling within his sphere.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration.

The Egyptian Government was given until 8 p.m. on the 23rd to comply.²

After conferring with his Cabinet and with King Fu'ād, Zaghlūl Pasha that evening laid the British note before the Egyptian Chamber in a secret session. The Chamber voted for accepting the first four and rejecting the last three of the British demands and commis-

¹ i. e. Jazīrah, as pronounced (with G for J) in the Egyptian vernacular.

² Compare the text of the Italian ultimatum of the 29th August, 1923, to Greece, following the murder of General Tellini (*Survey for 1920-3*, p. 348). The amount of the fine demanded was the same in both cases, Signor Mussolini's 50,000,000 lire being equivalent to £500,000 sterling at the then rate of exchange.

sioned the Cabinet to draft a reply in this sense. They accordingly drew up a note in which they once more expressed abhorrence of the crime but repudiated the imputations in the second and third paragraphs of the first British communication ; declared that the Egyptian Government's sole responsibility was to pursue the culprits, towards which, they claimed, rapid and efficacious measures had already been taken ; and based their rejection of the last three demands on the ground that these were all contrary to existing agreements or understandings. An hour and a half later Lord Allenby delivered a counter-reply in which he informed the Egyptian Government that the fine of £500,000, to which it had agreed, must be paid in by noon next day ; that the two rejected demands relating to the Sudan were being made the subject of direct instructions to the Sudan Government ; and that Zaghlūl Pasha would ' learn in due course ' the action which the British Government were taking in view of his refusal to comply with the demand regarding the protection of foreign interests in Egypt.¹ The £500,000 was duly paid over to the Residency at 11.30 next morning, the 24th. At midday Lord Allenby notified Zaghlūl Pasha that, in consequence of the non-acceptance by the Egyptian Government of the seventh British demand, British troops had been instructed to occupy the customs offices at Alexandria. Thereupon Zaghlūl Pasha tendered his resignation to King Fu'ād, who this time accepted it and entrusted the formation of a new Cabinet to the President of the Senate, Ahmad Zīwar Pasha.

The Alexandria customs offices were seized, without resistance, at 4 p.m. The same evening the Egyptian Senate and the Chamber approved the text of a protest addressed to the League of Nations and to all the Parliaments of the world.² This document³ characterized the steps taken by the British Government as acts of aggression ; accused the British Government of taking advantage of the assassination of the Sirdar in order to promote its imperialist ideas ; declared the British demands to be out of all proportion to the crime—particularly those regarding the Sudan ; and further argued that there was no relation between the crime and the British action in the Sudan and at Alexandria.

On the 25th November Lord Allenby and Mr. Kerr (this time in formal dress) called upon the new Egyptian Prime Minister ;⁴ and on the 26th Lord Allenby entered into discussions with him regarding

¹ *The Times*, 24th November, 1924.

³ Text *ibid.*, 27th November, 1924.

² *Ibid.*, 25th November, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 26th November, 1924.

the seventh of the British demands, which involved the recognition by the Egyptian Government of the powers and privileges of the Financial and Judicial Advisers and the autonomy of their offices ; the recognition of the status and powers of the Director-General of the European Section of the Department of Public Security and an undertaking to accept his recommendations in all matters appertaining to foreign subjects ; and the revision in certain most important respects of the conditions governing the terms of service, discipline, and retirement of foreign officials. The British terms on these three matters, though not the *fait accompli* in the Sudan,¹ were accepted by Ziwar Pasha's Government in an exchange of notes of the 29th November, and thereupon the British troops were withdrawn from the customs offices at Alexandria.²

As the result of the discussions³ the original British demand that the advice of the Financial and Judicial Advisers should be accepted *sans phrase* was replaced⁴ by the formula that the Egyptian Government would be expected seriously and sympathetically to consider any advice given by either of these officials within the limit of their respective duties, provided that such advice did not clash with the constitutional responsibility of Ministers. At the same time the Egyptian Government pledged itself to consult the Judicial Adviser on a number of specified categories of questions concerning foreigners and foreign interests in Egypt ; and both the Judicial and the Financial Adviser were to be autonomous in the sense that the estimates for their departments were to be kept separate from the general Budget, and that, within the limits of the Regulations, they were to be at liberty to deal entirely as they wished with their staffs.⁵

¹ For the repercussion of the murder of Sir Lee Stack upon the situation in the Sudan see the following section.

² *The Times*, 1st and 2nd December, 1924.

³ See *ibid.*, 2nd December, 1924. for a semi-official *résumé* of the terms of the settlement, from the standpoint of the British Residency.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3rd December, 1924.

⁵ In the semi-official *résumé* it was stated that 'the settlement re-establishes the powers and privileges of the Financial and Judicial Advisers which were agreed upon when the British Declaration of February 28, 1922, was issued, but of late, particularly under the Zaghlül Cabinet, were deliberately ignored'. In the text of the declaration these two officials were not mentioned explicitly, but their powers and privileges may have been held to be covered by reservation (c), in so far as it referred to the protection of foreign interests, since General Allenby, when referring, in his covering letter of the same date, to the abortive project for an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, had declared that the draft agreement between Great Britain and Egypt (which had been put forward by the British Government but had then just been abandoned) did not depart from the idea of placing in the Egyptians' hands the conduct of their own affairs, and that, 'in making provision for the presence of two British officials in the Ministries of Finance and Justice, it was not her

The European Section of the Department of Public Security was likewise to be entirely autonomous, and the Director-General of it was not only to represent and defend foreign interests at large (as the Financial and Judicial Advisers were to do), but was also to represent Great Britain in particular as the Power which had assumed protection of foreign interests in Egypt.¹

Another point in the settlement was that the options given, in the Egyptian Law of 1923, to foreign officials retiring before their contractual term were revised substantially in the officials' favour, and were at the same time thrown open to classes specifically excluded from the scope of the existing law—e. g. to foreign officials in the service of the Municipality of Alexandria.² Moreover, while the execution of the existing law had been under the control of a committee with an Egyptian chairman and an Egyptian majority, it was now handed over to a committee composed of the (British) Financial Adviser as Chairman, with one other foreign and one Egyptian member. In regard to a large number of 'hard cases' in which injustice was alleged to have been done deliberately, particularly under Zaghlūl Pasha's administration, the new Egyptian Ministry undertook to give due weight to the Financial Adviser's recommendations.³

Meanwhile, the text of the Egyptian Parliament's protest, in the intention to use these two officials for the purpose of intervening in Egyptian affairs; but solely in order to preserve the contact requisite for protecting foreign interests'.

¹ On the 7th September, 1926, a debate took place in the Chamber of Deputies on credits for the offices of the Judicial and Financial Advisers. See *Al-Ahrām*, 8th September, 1926.

² It was stated that at this time a majority of the foreign officials in the various services in Egypt were not of British nationality, and that a majority of those serving the Alexandria Municipality were Italians (*Résumé* of the settlement in *The Times*, 2nd December, 1924).

³ By January 1925 'over 1,000 foreign officials, or over half the total employed by the Egyptian Government in permanent posts or temporary posts assimilable thereto', had 'already retired since the first application of the Compensation Schemes of 1922', while a large number of the others had taken advantage of the new option to hasten the date of their departure (*The Times*, 20th and 21st January, 1925).

Towards the end of 1924 the position had been as follows:

Officials due to leave-in 1925	1926	1927
134	76	834

As a result of the fresh arrangement arrived at after the murder of Sir Lee Stack these figures subsequently read:

1925	1926	1927
793	87	171

It will thus be seen that a great majority changed from 1927 to 1925. These figures do not indicate the number of officials who actually left Egypt, as many were retained on contract.

concluding paragraph of which it had categorically appealed to the League of Nations to intervene, had been telegraphed to Geneva and had been transmitted by the Secretary-General of the League to the President of the Council; but, since it did not emanate from a Government, it was not circulated to States Members.¹ The Egyptian Government itself refrained from making any *démarche* at Geneva; and no State Member of the League attempted to take action on the Anglo-Egyptian conflict under Article 11 of the Covenant.² On the 3rd December, 1924, the British Government requested the Secretary-General of the League to circulate its note of the 19th November³ to all Governments to which the Geneva Protocol had been submitted;⁴ and in a public speech delivered on the same day⁵ the new British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Austen Chamberlain, declared the British Government's opinion and policy regarding the status of the League in the crisis which had arisen since the note of the 19th November was drafted.

I think it is quite clear that what has occurred in Egypt does not come within those provisions of the Covenant which invite or suggest the interference of the League. But the same respect and regard for the League has induced my colleagues to authorize my leaving England to attend the Council of the League, and on their behalf gladly to give the Council any information as to what has occurred or as to the reasons for the policy His Majesty's Government has pursued, if it would be of interest to them to receive such an account.⁶

On the 5th December this declaration was publicly supported⁷ by Lord Cecil, another member of the British Government who was at the same time one of the foremost champions of the League, not only in Great Britain but in the world; and, apart from the interested parties, there was almost a consensus among experts that, juridically, the Anglo-Egyptian conflict arising out of the murder

¹ *Le Temps*, 27th and 28th November, 1924. It was alleged that in the text, as originally transmitted telegraphically from Cairo to Marseilles, the sentence containing the appeal for the intervention of the League was omitted.

² See *The Times*, 1st and 2nd December, 1924, for rumours that the Persian delegate intended to act.

³ See p. 212 above.

⁴ *The Times*, 5th December, 1924.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 4th December, 1924.

⁶ On the 15th December, 1924, Sir Austen Chamberlain reaffirmed this opinion in the House of Commons.

There is nothing in the Covenant in any Article which either requires or suggests the interference of the League in such a matter as this. On the contrary, there is an article in the Covenant which recognizes just such special arrangements as exist between us and Egypt and excludes them from the general purview of the Covenant.

⁷ *The Times*, 6th December, 1924.

of Sir Lee Stack fell outside the purview of the League, for the *a priori* reason that it was not, in the technical sense, an international affair.¹

The proceedings for the investigation and punishment of the crime began with the arrest, during the night of the 26th–27th November, of three prominent Egyptian politicians: Makram Efendī 'Ubayd (a Coptic member of the *Wafd*), 'Abdu'r-Rahmān Bey Fahmī (a *Wafd* parliamentary candidate, who had been convicted by British court martial in 1920 and subsequently released under amnesty), and Mahmūd Efendī Naqrāshī (who had been Under-Secretary of the Interior in the Ministry which had resigned three days earlier).² Thirty-three other persons—among them Dr. Shafiq Mansūr—were

¹ This opinion was accepted by the British League of Nations Union, as advised by certain international lawyers (see a letter from the Chairman of the Executive Committee, Professor Gilbert Murray, in *The Manchester Guardian*, 19th December, 1924). In the *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée*, 1924, No. 6, there is a detailed and expert discussion of the problem by a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, Monsieur Ch. de Visscher, in which the same conclusion is reached. The ground for this opinion was not that Egypt, at that time, was not a member of the League (a fact which would not in itself have precluded some third party, which was a member, from drawing the Council's attention to the Anglo-Egyptian conflict under Art. 11 of the Covenant). Incidentally, the international status of Egypt, as determined provisionally by the British declaration of February 1922, was not a bar to the admission of Egypt to membership in the League, since Cuba (whose independence was limited by special relations with the United States which were not unlike those between Egypt and Great Britain) had been an original member, while the explicit requirement (Art. 1 of the Covenant) that candidates for subsequent admission should be fully self-governing states, dominions, or colonies had not prevented the admission of the Irish Free State. Even, however, if Egypt had been admitted previously to membership of the League, that would not have given the League a status in regard to those relations between Egypt and Great Britain which had been specifically reserved by the British Government in its declaration of the 28th February, 1922, and in its notification of the 15th March, 1922, to other Powers—so long as those reservations were maintained. As far as those reservations were concerned M. de Visscher points out that the British Protectorate over Egypt—which had been instituted on the 18th December, 1914, and had been recognized successively by France, the United States, Germany, Austria and Hungary before it was renounced, in other respects, by the British Government on the 28th February, 1922—still remained in force. On this premise he applies the principle that 'a state whose sovereignty is limited owing to the continuance of special relations uniting it to a state which has emancipated it cannot seek to escape from these relations by appealing to the dispositions of the Covenant. The *closed* character of these special relations is a residue of the Protectorate; and for this reason those relations themselves present the common characteristic of all relations between a superior and a subordinate state: they are of a constitutional and not of an international order'.

² These gentlemen were arrested by British military police, who handed them over to the Egyptian authorities on the 27th as a result of the new Prime Minister Zīwar Pasha's intervention at the British Residency. The British authorities in Egypt were stated at the time to have disclaimed responsibility for these arrests (*The Times*, 28th November, 1924).

arrested on the 28th.¹ The majority of these, including the three gentlemen first mentioned, were afterwards released on the ground that the evidence against them was insufficient.² More damning evidence—corroborated by attempts to fly the country and subsequent confessions—was obtained by an *agent provocateur* (who had himself been convicted of throwing a bomb at Sultan Husayn in 1915) against two students, and with this clue Dr. Shafiq Mansūr and five other persons were implicated.³ One of the students was identified by Captain Campbell, Sir Lee Stack's aide-de-camp, who had been wounded with him on the 19th November.⁴ Another of the prisoners confessed his complicity in nine of the murders, or attempts at murder, of a political character which had been perpetrated in Cairo since 1919.⁵ Eventually six persons were committed for trial on the charge of having taken part in the actual murder, and two others on the charge of having conspired with the six for the commission of the crime. Of the six, two were students and four employees in public services, and only one of them was over 22 years of age. The two charged with conspiracy were an official in the Ministry of *Awqāf*, Ahmad Ismā'il Efendī (aged 28) and a lawyer, Dr. Shafiq Mansūr (aged 47).⁶ Dr. Shafiq Mansūr was the only person of any prominence among them. He had been a *Wafd* parliamentary candidate.⁷

After being opened and adjourned on the 11th May⁸ the trial finally began on the 26th,⁹ with nine prisoners in the dock¹⁰ and three judges on the bench—the President and one of his colleagues being Egyptians and the third an Englishman, Judge Kershaw. The proceedings confirmed the confession of one of the prisoners by establishing that at least eight of the outrages committed since 1919 had been the work of one and the same organization, and brought out the fact that the leading spirit was Dr. Shafiq Mansūr, who had entered upon his criminal activities as far back as 1906.¹¹ On the

Ibid., 29th November, 1924.

Ibid., 15th December, 1924, and 12th January, 1925, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 23rd January, 1925.

³ For the antecedents and activities of this *agent provocateur*, Najīb Halbāwī, see *The Manchester Guardian*, 26th May and 10th June, 1925; cf. *The Times*, 3rd February, 1925.

⁴ *The Times*, 10th February, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 19th and 20th March, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 22nd April, 1925.

⁷ After his condemnation he was publicly disowned by Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl in a letter published in the London *Times* of the 10th June, 1925.

⁸ *The Times*, 12th May, 1925.

⁹ *Ibid.* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th May, 1925.

¹⁰ The ninth (a chauffeur who had been waiting to drive the assassins to safety) had been added after the first committal.

¹¹ *The Times*, 3rd June, 1925.

7th June the eight prisoners originally committed were sentenced to death ;¹ and, after the dismissal of an appeal on the 23rd July,² seven of the sentences were executed on the 23rd August, while one was commuted to penal servitude for life.³

While this first trial had been in preparation a further series of arrests and re-arrests had begun,⁴ which resulted, on the 10th February, 1926, in the committal for trial of seven persons of considerably greater standing, including not only Mahmūd Efendī Naqrāshī but Ahmad Efendī Māhir, who for a few weeks had been his colleague, as Minister of Public Instruction, in the Ministry which fell on the 24th November, 1924. Another of the prisoners was a diplomatist, another a professor in the Cairo Law School. The prisoners were accused of being implicated respectively in a number of crimes committed in 1922.⁵ The trial opened on the 29th March, 1926, before a court consisting of two Egyptian members and a British President, Judge J. F. Kershaw.⁶ Convictions were expected ; but on the 25th May the court, after sentencing to death one of the least prominent of the prisoners, Muhammad Fahmī Efendī 'Alī, acquitted all the others and ordered their immediate release. This judgement produced a sensation ; and a rumour that the British President of the Court had been outvoted by his Egyptian colleagues was confirmed by Judge Kershaw's resignation from the Egyptian Bench on the 2nd June, which he announced in a letter stating that, in the case of four of the persons acquitted, the verdict was so contrary, in his opinion, to the weight of evidence that it constituted a grave miscarriage of justice.⁷ On the same day the British Government presented a note to the Egyptian Government in which they reserved judgement in respect of the verdict ; declined to accept it as proof of the innocence of the four persons concerned ; and further reserved full liberty to take such steps as might prove necessary in order to fulfil their obligation to ensure the safety of foreigners in Egypt.⁸

Meanwhile, on the 25th May, the two acquitted ex-ministers had received a public ovation on their way from the Assize Court to

¹ *The Times*, 8th June, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 24th July, 1925.

³ *Ibid.*, 24th August, and *Le Temps*, 25th August, 1925.

⁴ *The Times*, 22nd May, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 11th February, 1926.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 30th March, 1926.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3rd June, 1926. On the 22nd June the General Assembly of the Native Court of Appeal decided, by a unanimous vote of the members present (among whom, however, none of the European members of the Appeal Court were included), to protest to the Minister of Justice against the terms of Judge Kershaw's letter of resignation, on the ground that they constituted an unauthorized disclosure of judicial secrets (*Ibid.*, 23rd June, 1926).

⁸ *Ibid.*, 23rd February, 1926.

Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl's house ; and the political effect of their acquittal was greatly increased by the fact that it was pronounced three days after a general election in which the *Wafd* had secured a decisive majority once again. The internal politics of Egypt—the relations of the several parties to one another and to the Crown—fall outside the scope of this Survey ; but the present narrative would be incomplete without a brief retrospective reference to the political vicissitudes which followed Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl's resignation on the 24th November, 1924, in so far as these events bore upon the relations between Egypt and Great Britain.¹

It has been mentioned already that when Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl resigned office on the 24th November, 1924, he was succeeded by Zīwar Pasha, and some account has been given of the new Egyptian Prime Minister's difficulties in negotiating with the representatives of Great Britain regarding the British Government's demands. He had an equally difficult internal situation to face, since the resignation of Zaghlūl Pasha had not affected the strength of the *Wafd* majority in the Chamber. On the 24th December Zīwar Pasha obtained a dissolution from King Fu'ād ; and in the general election that followed, in which all the non-*Wafd* parties joined forces, the *Wafd* majority appeared to have been reduced to vanishing point. Yet when the new Chamber met on the 23rd March, 1925, it elected Zaghlūl Pasha as its President by 125 votes to 85. Zīwar Pasha—who had formed a new anti-*Wafd* coalition ministry on the 14th March on the supposition that the elections had gone in his favour—offered his resignation on the same day, and obtained from the King, who refused to accept it, an immediate dissolution of the new Chamber as the alternative. A royal decree for holding a fresh general election was not signed till the 22nd February, 1926,² and, during the eleven months that intervened, the outstanding feature of Egyptian internal politics was an attempt on the part of, or on behalf of, King Fu'ād to reintroduce personal government behind a constitutional façade.

It will be remembered that, in February 1922, Great Britain had recognized, with certain important reservations, the sovereign independence of Egypt on the understanding that the vacuum created by the partial withdrawal of British control should be filled by an

¹ See M. M. Moreno : ' La Situazione interna dell' Egitto dall' uccisione del Sirdar ad oggi ', in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 5, pp. 225–34 ; the Cairo correspondent of *The Times* : ' Cross-currents in Egypt ' (*The Times*, 6th and 9th February, 1926).

² *The Times*, 23rd February, 1926.

Egyptian parliamentary constitutional régime. Undoubtedly this corresponded to the desires of the politically conscious portion of the Egyptian people ; but King Fu'ād—remembering the autocratic powers enjoyed by his ancestor Mehmed 'Alī and by successive members of the dynasty down to the deposition of his father, the Khedive Ismā'il, in 1879, which was followed by the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, and unmindful of the fate which had recently overtaken autocratic rulers in neighbouring Islamic countries who had sought to stem the tide of democratic ideas flowing in from the West—had not reconciled himself to exchanging the role of a British nominee for that of an Egyptian constitutional monarch. He had resisted the Constitutional Liberals while they were drafting the new constitution during 1923 ; and the sweeping victory of the *Wafd* at the first general election may have been partly due to the fact that the King had professed to lend them his support, in the expectation that they would prove more amenable than the Liberals to his wishes. This expectation was not realized during Zaghlūl Pasha's tenure of office in 1924 ; and King Fu'ād can hardly have been displeased when the crisis in the relations between Egypt and Great Britain, produced by the murder of Sir Lee Stack, brought about the fall of a national hero who had eclipsed his sovereign. Accusations of disloyalty towards the Crown, against the *Wafd* in general and Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl in particular, were promptly revived.¹

On the 10th January, 1925, a so-called ' Unionist ' (*Ittihad*) Party was founded—a party of ' The King's Friends ', in which the moving spirit was a young and adroit palace official, Nash'at Pasha—and the president of this party, a former Prime Minister, Yahyā Ibrāhīm Pasha, who was *persona gratissima* at Court, entered Zīwar's Government of March 1925 as Minister of Finance.

On the 20th May, 1925, it was announced by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons that the British Government had accepted the resignation of Lord Allenby and that Sir George Lloyd had been appointed to succeed him as British High Commissioner in Egypt.² Lord Allenby left Cairo for England on the 14th June ;³ Lord (formerly Sir George) Lloyd did not arrive in Egypt till the 20th October. Meanwhile, at the beginning of July, Zīwar Pasha

¹ See *The Times*, 3rd and 24th January and 25th May, 1925 ; *The Manchester Guardian*, 7th and 12th January and 26th March, 1925.

² For speculations regarding the reasons for Lord Allenby's retirement see *The Manchester Guardian*, 21st May, 1925.

³ See *The Times*, 20th June, 1925, for a review of his six years' tenure of the High Commissionership since April 1919.

had gone to Europe for a cure, leaving Yahyā Ibrāhīm Pasha as acting Prime Minister; and, under this régime, Nash'at Pasha succeeded in imposing a Palace Government upon the country. On the 5th September the Minister of Justice, 'Abdu'l-'Azīz Pasha Fahmī, who was the President of the Liberal Party, was dismissed from office by royal decree on the ground that he had failed to execute the judgement which had been pronounced by the disciplinary court of Al-Azhar University against the modernist 'ālim Shaykh 'Alī 'Abdu'r-Razzāq.¹ This dismissal led to the resignation of three Liberal Ministers, including Ismā'īl Pasha Sidqī—the strongest personality in the Government, who, though formerly a strong supporter of Zaghlūl Pasha, had become a protagonist in the campaign against him at the beginning of the Zīwar régime. Thus the *Ittihād* Party, which in effect meant Nash'at Pasha, was left in sole possession of the field; but the ejected Liberals now once more made common cause with the *Wafd*, and on the 21st November the *Wafd* and Liberal members of the Chamber which had been dissolved on the 23rd March met in Cairo and denounced the Government for violating the Constitution. On the 10th December King Fu'ād removed Nash'at Pasha from the post of Director of the Royal Cabinet²—apparently at the instance of the new British High Commissioner, Lord Lloyd—and on the 22nd February he signed a decree for the holding of a general election under Zaghlūl Pasha's electoral law of 1924.³ In these elections the Liberals, the *Wafd*, and the Nationalists made common cause; and the polling, which took place on the 22nd May, resulted in the return of 142 representatives of the *Wafd*, 28 Liberals, 5 Nationalists, 18 Independents, and 7 Unionists.⁴ The party of 'The King's Friends', which had been the creation of Nash'at Pasha, thus collapsed with his downfall, and the *Wafd* found itself by far the strongest party in the new Chamber. The *Wafd* majority, however, was not so overwhelming this time as it had been after the general election of 1923; and Zaghlūl Pasha's first intention was to refrain from taking office himself and to leave it to his Liberal ally, 'Adlī Pasha, to form a coalition ministry in which the *Wafd* would have a numerical preponderance correspond-

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 9, p. 495. The case of Shaykh 'Alī 'Abdu'r-Razzāq, which was thus exploited in the field of Egyptian party politics, had a wider interest which has been discussed above (see pp. 80-1).

² *The Times*, 11th December; *Le Temps*, 13th December, 1925.

³ *The Times*, 23rd February, 1926.

⁴ This was the official return on the 26th May, 1926, when a rebalot was due in ten constituencies, while in the three frontier constituencies the polling had not yet taken place (*The Times*, 27th May, 1926).

ing more or less to its strength in the Chamber. Considering his experience in 1924 and the tragic and catastrophic circumstances in which his tenure of office had ended this decision was wise; but after the acquittal, recorded above, of the two ex-Ministers on the 25th May, which was a sensational indication that the *Wafd* had recovered its ascendancy in the country, Zaghlūl Pasha suddenly changed his mind; and this, following the acquittal of the two ex-Ministers and four of their fellow prisoners, threatened to precipitate a fresh crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations. On the 30th May Zaghlūl Pasha called on the British High Commissioner¹—apparently at the High Commissioner's instance—and the Egyptian situation was considered at a special meeting of the British Cabinet on the 31st May.² This was followed on the 2nd June by the resignation of Judge Kershaw and the presentation of the British note;³ but on the 3rd June the tension was relaxed by a declaration on the part of Zaghlūl Pasha, at a luncheon given in his honour by the Coalition deputies, that he had changed his mind once again.⁴ On the 6th June King Fu'ād, on Zaghlūl Pasha's advice, sent for 'Adli Pasha, who formed his ministry on the same day, with three Liberal members, one independent, and six representatives of the *Wafd*. Ziwar Pasha resigned on the 7th, and the Chamber was opened on the 10th.⁵

This *dénouement* appears to have been due to the influence tactfully but firmly exerted by Lord Lloyd.⁶ The British High Commissioner might fairly claim that he was morally justified in putting pressure upon Zaghlūl Pasha, considering that the general election itself, and the application of the 1924 electoral law, had both been due in part to pressure which Lord Lloyd had placed successively upon King Fu'ād and Ziwar Pasha, in addition to the pressure exercised by Egyptian public opinion.⁷ In fact, the *Wafd* in large measure owed to Lord Lloyd's championship of constitutional government in Egypt their own return to power, and he might reasonably demand of Zaghlūl Pasha that he should not make such use of this power as to place Egypt and Great Britain at logger-

¹ *The Times*, 31st May, 1926.

² *Ibid.*, 2nd June, 1926.

³ See p. 224 above.

⁴ *The Times*, 4th June, 1926.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7th, 8th, and 11th June, 1926.

⁶ Lord Lloyd's representations to Zaghlūl Pasha were apparently reinforced by representations from Zaghlūl Pasha's own colleagues on the *Wafd*, who had become alarmed at the possible consequences of his taking office, in view of the British Government's attitude in the matter.

⁷ Ziwar Pasha's own electoral law had aroused widespread resistance not only in the Senate but among the village headmen, 36 of whom had been prosecuted for refusing to put it into effect (*The Times*, 4th January and 9th February, 1926).

heads again. Thus another crisis in Anglo-Egyptian relations was surmounted, and this in a manner which was not discreditable to either party. Nevertheless, it was, at best, a negative and ephemeral achievement which left the Anglo-Egyptian problem as far from a definitive solution in June 1926 as it had been on the morrow of the British declaration of the 28th February, 1922. The new Chamber showed its temper by electing Zaghlūl Pasha to be its President ; and the Liberal minority, by which the new ministry was headed rather than controlled, differed from the *Wafd* merely in its methods of action and not in its declared aspirations, as far as the relations between Egypt and Great Britain were concerned. The speech from the Throne which was read in the Chamber on the 10th June, 1926, contained the following passage :

The Government particularly concerns itself to establish between the British and Egyptian nations and their respective Governments mutual confidence and cordial relations, and to prepare an atmosphere of good understanding which will permit Egypt to enjoy complete independence. The Government considers that the measures taken in the Sudan cannot impair Egypt's legitimate claims, which remain what they were, and will do all that is possible to reach in this connexion a solution giving Egypt satisfaction.

The tone of this pronouncement was conciliatory ; yet at the time of writing there was no sign that either party was more willing than before to make concessions ; and without substantial concessions on both sides there could hardly be an agreed settlement of the four points which, more than four years earlier, had been reserved by the British Government for free negotiation. This deadlock was the nemesis of errors on both sides. The demagogic violence of Zaghlūl Pasha and his supporters had led up to an unintended but tragic and disastrous climax in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. Thereafter, the severity of the terms imposed upon Egypt in Lord Allenby's ultimatum—especially in several points which might reasonably be regarded as irrelevant to the crime by which the ultimatum had been provoked—proved fatal to those Egyptian statesmen who had shown the patriotism and the courage to take on their shoulders the burden of office in that inauspicious hour. In forcing Zīwar Pasha and his colleagues to accept the terms of the ultimatum with little alleviation the British authorities were forcing them to commit political suicide, and were thus unintentionally paving the way for that return of the intransigent forces to power which was accomplished in the renewed victory of the *Wafd* at the elections of 1926.

Meanwhile, the relations between the two countries continued to be

governed by the unilateral British declaration of the 28th February, 1922, to Egypt, and by the notification of the 15th March, 1922, to other Governments.

These two documents [Sir Austen Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons on the 15th December, 1924] are the charter of our position in Egypt to-day. They are the basis and the hope of the policy of His Majesty's Government. Our position is special, and a special position carries with it necessarily special obligations. Our interests are peculiar and vital. They are important to all the world, but vital to the interests of the British Empire. What is it, then, that we ask of the Egyptian Government? His Majesty's Government have no desire to interfere with the independence so recently granted to Egypt. What we require of the Egyptian Government is that they should work with us and not against us. What we ask of them is that they should discharge in Egypt the duties which are incumbent on any Government in its own territory, and for the performance of which we have made ourselves responsible, and that they should accept loyally and frankly, as the basis of their independence, the conditions which are attached to its grant in the Declaration.¹

In Egyptian eyes, however, the British declaration had bestowed the name of sovereign independence upon Egypt with one hand and withheld the substance with the other. At the time of writing the standpoints of the two parties remained as far apart as ever.

*Note on Constitutional Developments in Egypt, 28th February, 1922,
to 31st December, 1925.*

The constitutional history of Egypt falls outside the scope of this Survey, and for the constitution of the 21st April, 1923, and its antecedents since 1866, the reader may be referred to an analysis by A. Giannini in *Oriente Moderno*, III, 1, pp. 1-22; to a retrospect by the same writer in *op. cit.*, III, 6, pp. 329-38; and to an essay on the constitutional history of Egypt, followed by Arabic and French texts of the Constitution of the 21st April, 1923, by G. Kampffmeyer in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für Orientalische Sprachen*, Jahrgang xxvi und xxvii, Zweite Abteilung: *Westasiatische Studien*. The text of the electoral law of the 30th April, 1923, is printed in *Oriente Moderno*, III, 2, pp. 66-77; and the text of the electoral law of the 29th July, 1924, modifying the above, in *op. cit.*, IV, 9, pp. 535-9. The elections of March 1925 were held partly in accordance with the first and partly in

¹ Sir Austen Chamberlain continued as follows:

I draw a great distinction between what it is necessary for us to require in relation to the Sudan, where, as I said, our obligations are direct and immediate, and what it is desirable we should require in regard to Egypt. In the Sudan we must have power to fulfil our obligations. In Egypt all that we desire is that the Egyptian Government should do their duty, and if they are willing to do that they will find no better, no firmer, and no more loyal friends than the Government and the people of this country.

The status of the Sudan is dealt with in the following section.

accordance with the second of these two laws (*op. cit.*, V, 1, p. 38). In April 1925 a commission was appointed to draft a new electoral law (*op. cit.*, V, 4, p. 210), and this (third) law was promulgated on the 8th December, 1925 (text in *op. cit.*, VI, 1, p. 66). On the 18th September, 1923, the first Egyptian diplomatic representatives abroad were nominated by King Fu'ad (*op. cit.*, III, 5, pp. 314-15). Fourteen Egyptian consulates were created on the 6th November, 1923 (*op. cit.*, III, 7, p. 459). A law of the 20th October, 1925 (*op. cit.*, V, 11, p. 567), regulated the diplomatic career; and a law of the 29th October, 1925 (*op. cit.*, V, 11, p. 572), dealt with political associations.

An unintended effect of reservation (b) in the British Government's declaration of the 28th February, 1922, was seen in the omission from the Egyptian Constitution of the 21st April, 1923, of those provisions for a minimum representation of minorities which had existed in the Constitution of the 1st July, 1913. A proposal for the reproduction of such provisions was rejected by the Constitution Commission on the 25th August, 1922 (*op. cit.*, II, pp. 331-2), after the Coptic community itself had already pronounced against it in a representative meeting held at Cairo on the 20th May (*op. cit.*, II, pp. 44-5). The politically minded Copts appear to have felt that, in view of the British reservation respecting the protection of minorities, the invidiousness of any special constitutional provisions in their favour would outweigh any benefits which they could expect to receive from them.

It may be noted that the Copts were a community wholly resident in Egypt, scattered throughout the country, and speaking the same language as the majority of the population. There was no Coptic state or nation outside Egypt to which they desired to belong, or which desired, on its side, to acquire their allegiance. Consequently, their presence did not constitute a danger to the integrity of the country, and in these circumstances they were not in acute need of protection against persecution on the part of their Muslim fellow countrymen. So far from being disloyal to the National cause the Copts took a prominent part in the leadership of the *Wafd* during the period under review.

By the terms of the Constitution of the 21st April, 1923, all Egyptians were to be equal before the law, without distinction of race, language, or religion (Art. 3). Liberty of conscience was to be absolute (Art. 12). The state was to protect, in conformity with established usages in Egypt, the free exercise of every religion or belief, on condition that public order and morality should not be impaired (Art. 13). There was to be freedom of teaching, subject to the same two reservations (Art. 17).

On paper these guarantees were amply sufficient, but their effectiveness evidently depended on the general spirit of the nation and the general sense of public opinion in this matter. In the Sub-Committee of the Constitution Commission Article 13 aroused lively opposition on the clerical side, and the reservation 'in conformity with established usage in Egypt' was a concession to conservative Islamic feeling (*Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 332; III, 1, p. 7). In an interview on the subject of minorities, given during the general election, Sa'd Pasha Zaghlul took his stand on the principles laid down in the Constitution (*op. cit.*, IV, 1, p. 62, quoting *La Bourse Égyptienne* of Cairo, 5th December, 1923). The Jewish community in Egypt concurred with

the Copts in accepting these principles and renouncing any claim to special representation. At the same time one of their leaders pointed out that, in these first elections held under the new Constitution, Jewish candidates had not received from their Muslim co-religionists the number of votes which they might reasonably have expected (*op. cit.*, IV, 1, pp. 62-3, quoting an interview given to *L'Imparziale* of Cairo, 8th December, 1923, by J. E. de Picciotto Bey).

(ii) The Status of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1922-5).

The Sudan, which was the subject of the fourth reservation in the British Government's declaration of the 28th February, 1922, consisted principally of the ex-Egyptian dominions in the Nile basin,¹ above (that is south of) Egypt itself, which had been reconquered by Great Britain and Egypt jointly, in the campaigns of 1896-8, from the Khalifah of the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad, who had led a successful revolt against Egyptian rule in 1881-5.² The northern boundary of the Sudan had been drawn at the 22nd parallel of latitude in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of the 19th January, 1899, which placed the Sudan under an Anglo-Egyptian condominium.³ The southern boundary, dividing the Sudan from the British Protectorate of Uganda, had been drawn provisionally along a line running roughly east and west from Lake Rudolf to the White Nile a little to the south of the 5th parallel (north).⁴ The international frontiers on the east and the west had been fixed by treaties with Italy and Abyssinia and with the Congo Free State and France

¹ Sūdān (an Arabic plural from the root s-w-d) simply means 'The Blacks', and the name properly applied not only to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in the Nile basin, but to the entire northern fringe of Tropical Africa from the Senegal and the Niger to the Upper Nile and the Red Sea.

² An enclave round Suakin (Sawākīn) on the Red Sea coast had never fallen into the Mahdists' hands.

³ The easternmost sector of this boundary was modified by *arrêté* in 1902. This latter line represented the tribal boundaries, whereas the political frontier fixed in 1899 was an arbitrary line.

⁴ In Lord Cromer's Report for 1901 (dated February 1902) it was stated that the southern frontiers of the Sudan were still undefined and that Gondokoro was taken as the northernmost station of Uganda and Mongalla as the southernmost station of the Sudan on the east bank of the Nile. This was repeated in the Report for 1902 (written in February 1903). In the Report for 1913 (dated March 1914) it was mentioned that, by arrangement with Uganda, a delimitation of territories had taken place, and that only financial considerations prevented the Sudan Government from establishing an effective administration in the districts between the Khor Yabus and Lake Rudolf and from occupying the Bouna Plateau, but that the Government had posts at Akobo and Nasser. In April 1914 an exchange of territories was effected by which the Sudan was extended southwards to Nimuli, thus giving control of the whole stretch of the White Nile navigable from Khartum, while Uganda received in exchange an area of some 4,000 square miles west of the Nile which had previously formed part of the Lado enclave.

respectively.¹ The effective occupation of the territory comprised within these limits had been completed by the extension of the Sudan Government's authority over Darfūr in 1916. In 1922 the Sudan thus comprised all that part of the Nile basin which did not fall within Egypt, Eritrea, Abyssinia or Uganda. The extreme north-and-south extension of the country, from the point where the White Nile entered it to the point where the united river passed over into Egypt, was scarcely less than the extension of the United States from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border west of the Great Lakes ; and the area of the Sudan was approximately equal to that of the Mississippi basin west of a line joining Chicago and New Orleans.²

In the climate, population, and civilization of this vast area there were sharp local contrasts. The southern provinces, with their abundant rainfall, fell within Tropical Africa, while the middle and northern provinces were part of that arid zone, stretching from the Atlantic to Peking, which separated Europe from the other principal regions of the Old World. The southern provinces, again, were inhabited by negro peoples in a primitive stage of pagan culture,³ while the middle and northern provinces were inhabited by Arabic and Hamitic-speaking Muslims—Hamitic dialects predominating between the Nile and the Red Sea, and Arabic elsewhere. This Muslim population was divided (as in other countries lying in the arid zone) into stock-breeding nomads on the steppes and a sedentary population in the rare towns and patches of irrigated land. The sedentary Muslims possessed the ordinary culture and institutions of a rather backward Islamic country. At the time of writing this Islamic

¹ The boundary between the Sudan and Eritrea was fixed by agreements with Italy of the 7th December, 1898, the 1st June, 1899, and the 16th April, 1901, by a declaration of the 22nd November, 1901, and by an Anglo-Italian-Abyssinian agreement of the 15th May, 1902. The frontier with Abyssinia was determined by an Anglo-Abyssinian treaty of the 15th May, 1902 (see Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, 3rd edition, vol. ii). The frontier between the Congo Free State and the Sudan was fixed by a treaty of the 9th May, 1906, and in accordance with this treaty the Congo Free State transferred to the Sudan Government in 1910, six months after the death of King Leopold, the Lado enclave, on the west bank of the White Nile, which the Congo Free State had been allowed to occupy and administer while the rest of the Sudan was in the Mahdists' hands. For the defining of the boundary between French Equatorial Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan see *Survey for 1924*, pp. 471-2.

² See the map on p. 64 of I. Bowman, *The New World* (second edition, London, 1924, Harrap).

³ See in *The Times*, 28th August, 1924, a letter by Mr. E. Grove, a former administrator of a district in the tropical part of the Sudan, who emphasizes the cultural and ethnological as well as the climatic contrast between the two parts of the country. See likewise Sir L. Stack's *Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1923* (Cmd. 2281 of 1924), pp. 5-6.

culture was dominant in the Sudan, in spite of the partly British régime which had been in force for more than a quarter of a century ; and it was showing a tendency to spread, together with the Arabic language, up the Nile and its tributaries. On the other hand, the internal resources of the tropical provinces were richer ; and if and when Tropical Africa came to be exploited intensively, through the operation of Western enterprise, organizing ability, and scientific knowledge, it was conceivable that the centre of gravity in the Sudan might shift southwards.¹ During the period under review the potential cotton lands on the border line between the tropical and arid zones were the main focus of economic interest and activity in the country.

The four principal links between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Egypt were community of religion (Islam), community of language (Arabic), the geographical and economic bond created by the Nilotic river-system, and a political connexion which was older than the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899. It may be noted that all these links were stronger in the case of the northern and middle provinces than in that of the tropical south. The strongest link of the four was the Nile water, which was equally vital for the existing irrigation of Egypt and for the potential irrigation of the Sudan.² The water question, and the closely allied question of the extension of cotton-growing in the Sudan, were such important factors, during the period under review, in the relations between Great Britain and Egypt that they are dealt with separately below.³ The secure possession of a sufficient supply of Nile water was as important for Egypt as security of transit through the waterway of the Suez Canal was for the British Empire ; and the Egyptians were as sensitive in regard to the control of their water-supply by a foreign Power as the British were regarding any foreign command of the sea.⁴ Just as the British had

¹ On the 25th June, 1924, Lord Raglan stated in the House of Lords that the negro inhabitants of the southern provinces constituted considerably more than half the total population of the Sudan.

² The bond created by the Nilotic river-system was chiefly important in relation to the supply of water for irrigation. The utility of the Nile as a highway of communication between the two countries was seriously impaired by the cataracts and by the roundabout course of the river between Atbarah and Wādī Halfah. Except in the immediate vicinity of the Nile the two countries were isolated from one another by a broad zone of absolute desert.

³ In this place it may merely be pointed out that the White Nile water was less important than the Blue Nile water for the fertilization of Egypt (at any rate until the *Sadd* of the Bahru'l-Ghazal and Upper White Nile regions were removed or circumvented), and that therefore, even from this point of view, Egypt was less dependent upon the tropical provinces of the Sudan than upon the sovereign state of Abyssinia.

⁴ See Sir Murdoch MacDonald's speech in the House of Commons on the 10th July, 1924.

found it difficult to reconcile themselves to equality of naval strength, even with a friendly maritime Power,¹ so the Egyptians disliked sharing with another people the control of the Upper Nile, and were distraught at the prospect that this control might pass into non-Egyptian hands exclusively.

This feeling in Egypt regarding the Nile water was not only genuine but ancient, deep-seated, and widespread; and the leaders of the Egyptian national movement rightly placed the water question in the forefront of their controversy with Great Britain over the Sudan. Their case was less strong when they turned from economics to politics and attempted to buttress their own claim to exclusive dominion in the Sudan upon history. In the long historical life of the Nile basin the political dissociation of Egypt from the countries of the Upper Nile had been at least as frequent a phenomenon as the political union of the upper and lower sections of the valley.² Culture had travelled up the Nile more readily than sovereignty, and while the Sudan had successively adopted from the lower valley the civilizations of Ancient Egypt, Christendom, and Islam, the periods when Egypt had ruled the Sudan—or the Sudan Egypt—had been rare and short. Even cultural influences had sometimes made a long halt at the frontier. For instance, while the valley below Aswān had been conquered by the Muslims in the seventh century after Christ, Nubia had remained until the fourteenth century a Christian Kingdom, over which the Muslim rulers of Egypt exercised only a lax and intermittent suzerainty. In the fourteenth century Christian Nubia was submerged politically by nomadic Arab tribes which had gradually filtered southward through Egypt and which found the steppes of Darfūr and Kordofan a congenial country; and in the fifteenth century by negro tribes which pressed up from the tropical south and became converts to Islam.³ Yet the replacement of

¹ See *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 490-9, for the history of the Five Power Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, which was signed in Washington, D.C., on the 6th February, 1922.

² For the history of the Sudan see Lord Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, vol. ii, chapters 33 and 60; E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Egyptian Sudan, its History and Monuments* (London, 1907, Kegan Paul, 2 vols.); L. J. Morié, *Histoire de l'Éthiopie*, vol. i (Paris, 1904, Challamel). For the infiltration of the Arab tribes from the north see C. H. Becker, *Zur Geschichte der östlichen Sudan*, in *Der Islam*, I, p. 153 (Strassburg, 1910, Trübner), and H. A. MacMichael, *History of the Arabs in the Sudan* (Cambridge, 1922, University Press, 2 vols.). For the spread of Islam see Sir T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam* (second edition, London, 1913, Constable), pp. 109-13.

³ At the time of writing the pre-Arab and pre-Negro stratum of the population, apart from the Hamitic-speaking nomads between the Nile and the Red Sea, was represented by the completely Islamized and partly Arabized

Christianity by Islam was a very gradual process ; and the introduction of Islam did not bring with it any marked increase of intimacy in the political relations of the Sudan with Egypt, though Egypt was the quarter from which Islam had entered the country. The Sudan was never effectively occupied by the Mamlūk Sultans of Egypt. The Ottoman conqueror of Egypt, Sultan Selim I, sent a force of Bosnian troops up the Nile in 1520 ; and for the next three centuries the descendants of these European Muslims maintained themselves, in virtual independence of the Ottoman Empire, in the section of the valley between the First Cataract at Aswān and the Third Cataract a little below (i. e. north of) Dongola.¹ The first 'Osmanlī who not only invaded but held and administered the Sudan was the most celebrated of the Pashas of Egypt, Mehmed 'Alī. He conquered Sannār and Kordofan in 1820 and founded Khartūm in 1822 ; and his successors in the Pashalyq of Egypt extended at least their nominal authority over an area in the Upper Basin of the Nile which approximately coincided with the area, at the time of writing, of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, before their rule above Wādī Halfah was extinguished by the revolt of the Mahdī Muhammad Ahmad in 1881-5.

Thus the Sudan and Egypt were united politically for a period of sixty years. It may be noted that the factor which first enabled Mehmed 'Alī and his successors to annex the Sudan was the introduction of Western technique and Western experts into their administrative system. Mehmed 'Alī would hardly have been more successful than previous Muslim rulers of Egypt in annexing the Sudan if he had not remodelled his army and other branches of his government, however imperfectly, on Western lines. On the other hand, the disaster in which this policy of expansion in the Sudan eventually came to grief may partly be attributed to the fact that it was beyond the strength of a Government whose home territory, Egypt, was itself in the throes of Westernization, to administer satisfactorily, at the same time as Egypt, a vast colonial empire with difficult problems of its own. The principal reason, however, why Egyptian rule in the Sudan ended in disaster was the moral failure of the Egyptians to realize their responsibility towards the more backward peoples of their Sudanese provinces. Most Egyptian conscripts regarded service in the Sudan as penal servitude, and most

Barābarah (Berberines) in the Nile Valley between the First and Fourth Cataracts (that is, in Upper Egypt and in the Wādī Halfah and Dongola provinces of the Sudan) and by the pagan tribes of the Nuba mountains, in the angle between the White Nile and the Bahrū'l-Ghazal, south of Kordofan.

¹ Budge, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 207-8.

Egyptian officers and officials as an exile only redeemed by legitimate and illegitimate opportunities of making money. The memory of Egyptian misrule in the Sudan outlasted, in the minds of the Sudanese, the more barbaric tyranny of the Mahdist régime ; and this memory was one of the important factors in the situation during the period under review.

A second point to note is that Mehmed 'Ali conquered the Sudan as a subject and a representative of the Ottoman Sultan ; so that, although the initiative and ability required by the enterprise were supplied by Mehmed 'Ali himself and the material resources by Egypt, the juridical effect was to add a number of new provinces, in the Upper Nile basin, to the Ottoman Empire. On the 13th February, 1841, when the Sultan signed a *firmān* making the Pashalyq of Egypt hereditary in the family of Mehmed 'Ali, he simultaneously signed a separate *firmān*¹ in which he conferred the government of the Sudan upon Mehmed 'Ali for his lifetime only ; and though, in subsequent *firmāns*, the Sudan was included in the hereditary dominions of the Khedivial dynasty, the juridical sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan over the Sudan, as well as Egypt, was still asserted.² Juridically, this situation was not modified by the evacuation of the Sudan in 1881-5, nor by the Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of the country in 1896-8, and thus Ottoman sovereignty over the Sudan still subsisted in theory when the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement regarding the Sudan (to which the Ottoman Government was not a party) was signed on the 19th January, 1899. The fact that the British Government signed this agreement with the (at that time) non-sovereign Egyptian Government, and not with the suzerain of Egypt, may have constituted a legal flaw ; yet in ignoring the Ottoman Government and placing the reconquered Sudan under an Anglo-Egyptian condominium the agreement of 1899 conformed to the facts of the case.

Ottoman sovereignty over the Sudan had indeed never been more than nominal, since the very Pasha of Egypt who conquered the Sudan had also made his pashalyq independent of Constantinople *de facto*. The Ottoman Government had contributed nothing either

¹ Text in G. Nouradounghian, *Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman*, 1300-1902 (4 vols, Paris, 1897-1903), vol. ii, no. iii.

² See J. Cocheris, *Situation internationale de l'Egypte et du Sudan* (Paris, 1903). For example, the *firmān* of the 7th August, 1879 (text in Nouradounghian, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 226) contained the following clause : 'The Khedive shall not, under any pretext or motive, abandon to others, in whole or part, the privileges accorded to Egypt which are confided to him, and which are an emanation of the natural rights and prerogatives of my Imperial Government, nor any part of the territory.'

to the original conquest of the Sudan by Mehmed 'Alī or to the joint reconquest of the country by the British and Egyptian Governments. Towards this joint effort Great Britain contributed, first, the financial and administrative reconstruction of Egypt herself, without which Egypt could not have embarked on any fresh enterprise beyond her own borders; secondly, the reorganization of the Egyptian army, which enabled it to co-operate with British troops in stopping the advance of the Mahdists at Wādī Halfah and eventually taking the offensive against them; thirdly, the planning and direction of the campaigns of 1896–8; fourthly, the reinforcement of the Egyptian army (now itself reorganized under British leadership) by units of the British army, which bore the brunt of the fighting in these decisive campaigns;¹ and fifthly a financial contribution, which covered about one-third of the total cost of these campaigns, amounting to just over three-quarters of a million pounds sterling.² Egypt, on her side, contributed financially rather more than two-thirds of the total cost of the campaigns (which amounted to not more than £2,500,000 sterling all told), and the greater part of the man-power—in the combatant ranks as well as in the Labour Units—though the military value of this Egyptian man-power was largely dependent upon British leadership and reinforcement. Egypt also provided the historical title on which the subsequent condominium rested; and Egyptians might fairly claim that if the Sudan had not been conquered by an Ottoman Pasha of Egypt in 1820, and if Egypt herself had not come under British control in 1882, Great Britain would have had to compete for a footing in the Sudan with the other European Powers which engaged in the 'scramble' for Tropical Africa.

These facts were not unfaithfully reflected in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of the 19th January, 1899.³ This instrument gave 'effect to the claims which have accrued to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by right of conquest, to share in the present settlement and future working and development of the . . . system of administration and legislation' (in the Sudan, within the boundaries which have been described already) by the following provisions. The British and Egyptian flags were to be used together throughout the Sudan (Art. 1).⁴ The supreme military and civil command in the Sudan was

¹ The Egyptian casualties in these campaigns were very light.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 21st July, 1924; *The Times*, 14th August, 1924.

³ English text in *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1898–9, vol. xci.

⁴ In the original instrument this and the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals (Art. 8) were made not to apply to Sawākīn,

vested in one officer, termed the Governor-General, who was to be appointed by Khedivial decree on the recommendation of the British Government and to be removable only by Khedivial decree on the recommendation of the British Government¹ (Art. 3). This Governor-General was invested with full legislative power (Art. 4); and, unless promulgated by him, no Egyptian legislation was to apply to the Sudan (Art. 5). Alien residents in the Sudan were not to enjoy special privileges (i. e. there were to be no Capitulations) (Art. 6). There were to be no import duties on goods entering the Sudan from Egypt (Art. 7). The jurisdiction of the Egyptian Mixed Tribunals was not to extend to, or to be recognized in, the Sudan (Art. 8). The previous consent of the British Government was to be required for the appointment in Sudanese territory of consular officers by other Governments (Art. 10). The Slave Trade was prohibited² (Art. 11), and the Brussels Act of the 2nd July, 1890, regarding fire-arms and alcoholic liquors was to be stringently enforced (Art. 12). The Sudan was to remain under martial law at the Governor-General's discretion (Art. 9).

Under the condominium established by this agreement the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (as it had now become) was administered and reconstructed. To this joint work of peace, which followed the joint reconquest, Great Britain contributed not only the successive Governors-General but the small picked body of highly responsible civil servants,³ who gave the new administration its character through the influence of their personalities upon their Egyptian and Sudanese subordinates and upon the populations which they governed. The British Government also maintained one British infantry battalion and a small detachment of garrison artillery at Khartūm,⁴ and paid £200,000 per annum⁵ towards the total annual expenditure

but the status of Sawākīn was assimilated in all respects to that of the rest of the Sudan in a supplementary agreement of the 10th July, 1899.

¹ From the signature of the agreement down to the assassination of Sir Lee Stack the person appointed as Governor-General of the Sudan was not only always a senior officer in the British army, but was also always appointed concurrently as Commander-in-Chief (Sirdar) of the Egyptian army.

² During the period of sole Egyptian rule in the Sudan the Egyptian Government had at first condoned the participation of its own soldiers and officials in the Slave Trade. Afterwards it had made sincere though never completely successful attempts to suppress the Slave Trade in the Sudan by employing General Gordon and other Westerners to put it down.

³ On the British civil servants in the Sudan see an article by Mr. Arthur Ransome in *The Manchester Guardian*, 11th May, 1925.

⁴ Statement by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons, 18th February, 1925.

⁵ *The Manchester Guardian*, 2nd July, 1924. This was partly set off by the annual contribution of £150,000 which the Egyptian Government made

of £1,200,000 on the joint military occupation. Egypt, on her side, made contributions which, while of less effect upon the character and standards of the Sudan Government than the British contributions, were at least as indispensable to its efficient working and maintenance. For example, Egypt supplied all but the highest and the lowest public employees; for, although the Sudan Government made praiseworthy and increasingly successful efforts to train the Sudanese themselves to public service in the army and in the civil administration,¹ the level of culture in the Sudan was so low at the time of the reconquest that a civilized government could not have been organized without the importation of an Egyptian as well as a British personnel; and even at the time of writing, when the Egyptian military units had been evacuated from the Sudan, a strong contingent of Egyptians was being retained in the civil administration because their services were still indispensable. Equally indispensable was the annual financial contribution from the Egyptian Treasury to cover the deficits which arose in the Sudan Budget during the first thirteen years of the new Sudan administration. During the years 1899 to 1912 inclusive Egypt contributed a total of £E5,353,215 under this head,² and from 1899 to the evacuation of the Egyptian units at the close of 1924 she contributed another annuity of £1,000,000 (that is five-sixths of the total) towards the joint military expenditure in the Sudan of the two parties to the condominium. In addition, she made advances to the Sudan Government for capital expenditure on such public works as railway building or the construction of Port Sudan, which was stated to have amounted, merely for the years 1901 to 1909 inclusive, to £E4,378,000.³

towards the cost of British garrisons in Egypt and the Sudan (the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, *loc. cit.*).

¹ See *Omd.* 2281 of 1924, p. 6, for the progress made in the training of the Sudanese themselves, down to the end of the year 1923. In this matter the Sudan Government might claim to have anticipated, in its practice, the ideal of the 'A' type of mandate as laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations. In pursuance of the preamble to the agreement of 1899, which contemplated an administration under which due allowance should be made for the backward and unsettled condition of large portions of the Sudan and the varying requirements of different localities, the Sudan Government made steady efforts to foster local self-government, not only among the sedentary Muslim populations of the northern and middle provinces, but among the nomadic tribes of the steppe and the primitive negro populations of the tropical provinces (*op. cit.*, pp. 6-7).

² Statement by the Egyptian Minister of Finance on the 12th May, 1924, in answer to an interpellation in the Senate (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 7, pp. 460-1).

³ Statement by Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy in the House of Commons, 10th July, 1924. A writer in *The Times*, 14th August, 1924, estimates the total contribution of Egypt to the Sudan from 1899 to that date (excluding, presumably, the military annuity) at £7,000,000 sterling.

The Sudan [Lord Curzon declared in the House of Lords on the 25th June, 1924, in commenting on a speech by Lord Grey of Fallodon] would be bankrupt at this moment if it were not for the financial expenditure undertaken by Egypt. If you go to the point of saying that Egypt has no connection with the Sudan at all except that of water, and you eliminate Egypt from any voice or share in the administration at all, the Sudan would be quite unable, in the existing conditions, to pay its own way.

As regards irrigation the Egyptian Department of Public Works were responsible in all matters relating to the supply and distribution of the waters of the Nile.¹

The agreement of 1899, under which the above-mentioned contributions to the government and development of the Sudan were made respectively by the two parties to the condominium, was still in force at the time of writing. The fourth reservation in the British declaration of the 28th February, 1922, left it intact, while contemplating that it might be modified as the result of future negotiations; and although the British Government, by unilateral action, radically altered the *de facto* régime in the Sudan after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, it did not attempt to alter the juridical basis (embodied in the agreement of 1899) on which the Government of the Sudan rested. The political situation, however, had already been altered—first, insensibly and undesignedly but profoundly, by a steady increase in the preponderance of the leading partner in the condominium, as the Sudan was gradually reconstructed under British management; and then, radically, by the emergence of a militant Nationalist movement in Egypt in 1919. From that time onwards Egyptian political leaders of all parties insistently demanded the integral incorporation of the Sudan in a sovereign independent Egyptian state; and in the Sudan itself a number of individual Egyptians—some of them locally resident officials in the Sudan Government's service, and others private persons operating from Cairo—started an anti-British agitation which, while it did not affect the condominium at law, made it almost unworkable in practice within less than five years.

This Egyptian demand for the Sudan was based partly on the previous political relations of the several parts of the Nile basin which have been discussed above; partly on the geographical unity of the basin as a single hydrographical system; and partly on certain

¹ Statement in the House of Commons, on the 19th February, 1925, by the Foreign Secretary, referring to the period before the War of 1914-18. At that time the principal posts in the Egyptian Department of Public Works were occupied by British nationals.

economic considerations, such as the allocation of Nile water for irrigation and the provision of future outlets for Egypt's dense and increasing agricultural population, which are dealt with separately below.¹ Egyptian national feeling in regard to the Sudan was further irritated by the habit into which Englishmen, even in high places, had fallen of thinking, speaking, and acting as though the Sudan were not subject to an Anglo-Egyptian condominium but were an integral part of the British Empire;² and this irritation was not unreasonable. Indeed, far-sighted Egyptians were not so much irritated as alarmed; for they saw that this habit of speech and action, however trivial a matter in itself, was the external expression of an inward change in the British attitude and feeling with regard to the Sudan since the time when the agreement of 1899 had been drafted. The British nation were proud of the remarkable constructive work which had been accomplished in the Sudan, on British initiative and under British direction. They were convinced, and not without reason, that the Sudan would never have been either reconquered or reconstructed by the Egyptians if Great Britain had not intervened. With some justice, they attributed the appalling condition of the Sudan under the Mahdist régime—to which the history of the country under the subsequent dispensation offered such a brilliant contrast—to the previous Egyptian misrule, which had precipitated the Mahdi's revolt. They were aware that Mahdism was only the climax in a series of miseries which had begun to descend upon the Sudan from the moment when Mehmed 'Alī conquered the country. They were familiar with the sinister part which the Egyptian authorities, at least in the earlier years of their uncontrolled domination in the Sudan, had played in relation to the Slave Trade. In speculating as to what would happen in the Sudan if the

¹ For a discerning analysis of the Egyptian point of view in regard to the Sudan see an article by Mr. Arthur Ransome in *The Manchester Guardian*, 13th May, 1925; see also extracts from *Al-Akhbār* of Cairo, 26th November and 2nd December, 1923, in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 1, pp. 68-70. For an adverse review of the Egyptian claim see *The Times*, 18th July, 1924 (an article from the Khartūm correspondent, with an interesting ethnological sketch-map of the country).

² e. g. it was stated that the Egyptian Government had asked the Governor-General of the Sudan how the Sudan had come to be represented at the British Empire Exhibition at Wembley without the Egyptian Government being consulted. Lord Allenby was said to have replied on Sir Lee Stack's behalf that Great Britain would have no objection if the Sudan participated in an Egyptian exhibition without consulting the British Government (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, p. 525). This ironical answer brought out the essential inequality of the Anglo-Egyptian partnership in a manner that was likely to irritate Egyptian feeling still further.

existing British control were withdrawn, British observers readily persuaded themselves—and they had strong grounds for doing so—that Egyptian rule would revert to its previous standards, and that sooner or later, but inevitably, it would be brought to a violent end by a rising of the Sudanese, like that which terminated the first Egyptian domination in the ‘eighteen eighties’. With this picture of the situation deeply impressed upon their minds, Englishmen tended to regard the well-governed and increasingly prosperous Sudan of the twentieth century as their exclusive creation and therefore their exclusive affair,¹ to minimize the quantitatively greater (though qualitatively subordinate) contributions which Egypt had made to this achievement, to ignore the vital economic interest of Egypt in the Upper Nile Basin (an interest which was much larger than Great Britain’s), and to brush aside Egypt’s historical title. Thus Englishmen were as deeply shocked and exasperated when the Egyptian claim was presented in an extreme and militant form, as Egyptians were when they found this claim dismissed off-hand by Englishmen as preposterous. All the elements of misunderstanding and bitterness, in regard to this question, existed on both sides in 1919, and in five years they combined to produce violent and tragic consequences.

After the British declaration of the 28th February, 1922, the question of the Sudan was raised in the drafting of the Egyptian Constitution. As early as May 1922 the former Egyptian Prime Minister, Husayn Rushdi Pasha, read to a meeting of the Egyptian Drafting Commission a project for a new Anglo-Egyptian Convention which covered the fields of irrigation² and economics, as well as finance and administration, and which would have had the effect of greatly increasing the Egyptian and diminishing the British control over the Sudan as compared with the *status quo*.³ On the 15th May, 1922, a report that the Sudan was to be mentioned in the Egyptian Constitution was the subject of a question in the House of Commons at Westminster. In the draft of the Constitution, as it had taken shape by the beginning of 1923, the Sudan was in fact dealt with in two articles—the first providing that the King should bear the title of ‘King of Egypt and the Sudan’, and the second that the

¹ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th May, 1925, for an amusing description, by Mr. Arthur Ransome, of the Anglification of certain externals of life in the Sudan, in sharp contrast to the Frenchified aspect of Egypt, where the beginnings of French influence dated back to the French military occupation of A. D. 1798–1801.

² See Section (iii) below.

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th May, 1922.

Constitution was not to apply to the Sudan, which was to have a separate régime, 'although it forms an integral part of the Egyptian Kingdom'.¹ On the 2nd February the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Lord Allenby, demanded that the Egyptian Government should consent, within twenty-four hours, to delete all reference to the Sudan from the draft.² The Egyptian Prime Minister, Tawfiq Nasīm Pasha, was ready to agree provisionally, on the understanding that the final decision should be taken by the Egyptian Parliament when it assembled. On the 5th February, before the British Government had replied to this suggestion, Tawfiq Nasīm Pasha resigned.³

In the speech from the Throne at the opening of the first Egyptian Parliament on the 15th March, 1924,⁴ the hope was expressed that the national aspirations regarding Egypt and the Sudan would be realized through negotiations with Great Britain; on the 24th the Chamber voted (though against the wishes of the Ministry) for the appointment of a standing committee on the Sudan;⁵ and during the next two months the Sudan was the subject of a number of parliamentary questions.⁶ On the 4th June the Egyptian Minister to Great Britain, 'Izzat Pasha, maintained the Egyptian claim to the Sudan, in a public speech at Manchester,⁷ mainly on the ground that control of the Nile water was equivalent to control of Egypt herself. In the Egyptian Chamber, on the 7th June, Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl—in reply to a question asking why the Sudan Budget had not been submitted to the Egyptian Parliament⁸—asked for a free hand to conduct his impending negotiations⁹ with the British Government and declared that these negotiations were the only

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 556–7, quoting *Al-Akhhbār* of Cairo, 30th January, 1923; pp. 559–60, quoting *Le Temps*, 31st January, 1923.

² *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 557, quoting *Al-Ahrām*, 6th February, 1923.

³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, quoting *Al-Ahrām*, 8th February, 1923.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, IV, 4, p. 269, quoting *Al-Akhhbār*, 15th March, 1924.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 274–5.

⁶ e.g. on the 21st April, 1924, General Mūsā Fu'ād Pasha asked whether Egyptian troops were employed in the Sudan on railway construction, and received an affirmative answer. On the 12th May the same deputy asked a number of questions relating to administration and finance; and on the 13th April the Minister of Labour, in reply to another deputy, made a statement in the Chamber on Sudan irrigation.

⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th June, 1924.

⁸ The Parliamentary Committee on the Sudan had discovered that in February 1910 the Egyptian and Sudan Governments had agreed that the Sudan Budget should be submitted to the Egyptian Government every November, to be verified and controlled by the Egyptian Minister of Finance, but that this arrangement had not been carried out since 1918 (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 7, pp. 473–4).

⁹ See above, pp. 206–9.

means which the Egyptian Government possessed of attempting to attain its aspirations.¹ On the 19th, however, he declared in the Chamber that the Sudan was an indivisible part of Egypt and that the Sudanese regarded the Egyptians as brothers;² and on the 23rd he added that Egypt would not relinquish any of her rights in the Sudan, and that he would open his forthcoming 'conversations' in London with a demand for the complete evacuation of the Sudan by the British.³ On the same date, the British Prime Minister, Mr. MacDonald, refused in the House of Commons to make any anticipatory statement on the Sudan question.⁴

At this moment the centre of action shifted to the Sudan itself. In November 1922 there had been founded in Cairo a 'National Egyptian League for the Defence of the Sudan', which claimed to have been commissioned by a large number of Sudanese notables representing the principal tribes of the northern and middle provinces.⁵ Thereafter there was organized in Khartūm a 'White Flag Society',⁶ with the programme of uniting the entire valley of the Nile with Egypt in a single independent state. This society was reported to be financed and directed from Cairo, but there were native Sudanese among its members as well as Egyptian residents in the Sudan—official and unofficial. The Sudanese members, some of whom were former students of Gordon College, were reported to have been partly recruited from ex-officials with an incomplete or ill-assimilated Western education who had been dismissed for corruption or other misconduct.⁷ On the 12th June, 1924, an Egyptian official in the Sudan, Zaynu'l-Ābidīn 'Abdu's-Salām Efendī, started from Khartūm in order to convey to King Fu'ād messages of loyalty sent in the name of the Sudanese people; but both he and a Sudanese sympathizer, who was travelling in disguise,⁸ were arrested at Wādī Halfah and sent back.⁹ Demonstrations organized, upon their enforced return to Khartūm, by the leader of the White Flag Society,

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 7, p. 473; IV, 8, p. 515; *The Times*, 10th June, 1924.

² *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, p. 517.

³ *The Times*, 24th June, 1924.

⁴ *The Times*, loc. cit.

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 435-6, quoting the Egyptian Press.

⁶ So called because their flag showed in red, on a white ground, the entire Nile basin united under Egyptian sovereignty.

⁷ *The Times*, 11th July, 15th August, 25th September, and 16th October, 1924. Such persons might desire to see the existing régime replaced by a weaker and laxer Egyptian administration.

⁸ Natives of the Sudan might not travel to Egypt without written permission from the Sudan Government.

⁹ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, p. 523.

'Alī 'Abdu'l-Latīf Efendī, were answered on the 22nd June in Omdurman (Umm Durmān) by counter-demonstrations of loyalty to the existing régime ; and the two incidents aroused lively comment in the Egyptian Chamber on the 19th and the 23rd.¹ On the 24th there were disorderly anti-British and pro-Egyptian demonstrations in both Omdurman and Khartūm, and on the 25th there was a riot in Khartūm, in which 'Abdu'l-Latīf Efendī was arrested.²

These events led to a debate on the Sudan, on the 25th June, in the House of Lords at Westminster, in which Lord Grey of Fallodon and Lord Curzon of Kedleston took part, while the Lord President of the Council, Lord Parmoor, made an emphatic statement of policy on behalf of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's Government.

I want to say, in absolutely definite language, that His Majesty's Government is not going to abandon the Sudan in any sense whatever. It recognises the obligations which have been taken towards the Sudanese, and it regards those obligations as of a character which this Government could not abandon without a very serious loss of its prestige in all these Eastern districts.

Lord Parmoor also emphasized the continuity of policy, regarding the Sudan, as between the British Government of the day and its predecessors in office, by quoting and reaffirming two passages from a speech which Mr. Lloyd George had delivered on the 28th February, 1922, the date of the British unilateral declaration. In one passage the former Prime Minister had declared that His Majesty's Government would never allow the progress which had already been made in the Sudan, and the greater promise of future years, to be jeopardized. In the other he had ruled out any change in the status of the Sudan which would 'in the slightest degree diminish the security' for the British capital which had already been invested in Sudanese development.

There were immediate protests and demonstrations in Egypt, and on the 29th June Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl offered his resignation to King Fu'ād—though he did not press it when it was refused.³

On the 10th July the debate in the House of Lords was followed by a debate in the House of Commons, in which the principal aspects of the Sudan question were discussed. The discussion, as far as it related to irrigation and cotton cultivation, is dealt with elsewhere.⁴

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, pp. 516-17.

² *The Times*, 25th June, 7th and 11th July, and 13th August, 1924.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, p. 424.

⁴ See p. 264 below.

On the political aspect, a clear pronouncement was made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.

The position of the Sudan in relation to Egypt and ourselves has fundamentally changed on account of the recognition of the independence of Egypt. . . . The position I have always taken up is, let us negotiate as quickly as possible. But I have said this : while the negotiations are pending, neither Egypt nor ourselves ought to destroy the *status quo*. That must be honourably understood.

Meanwhile, the White Flag Society were reported to have received, on the 28th June, instructions from Cairo to start a campaign of violence ;¹ and outbreaks followed which (if this was their origin) were flagrant breaches of the reasonable condition which the British Prime Minister had laid down.

On the 9th August Egyptian and Sudanese cadets from the Khartūm Military School marched with arms and ammunition through the streets of the town and visited, among other places, the prison in which 'Abdu'l-Latif Efendī was serving a sentence of three years for sedition.² This outbreak was mastered without bloodshed ; but on the same date (the 9th August), at the railway junction and depot of Atbarah, some soldiers of an Egyptian Railway Battalion in the service of the Sudan Government mutinied and committed wholesale sabotage on Government property for three days in succession. Reinforcements of British troops arrived, and on the 11th the mutineers were induced to return to barracks, where they were surrounded by a cordon of Arab mounted rifles belonging to a Sudanese unit of the Egyptian Army. Later in the day, the mutineers attempted to break the cordon by force, and the mounted rifles fired (though no order to fire was given by the Sudanese officer in command, who, in the subsequent official inquiry, was cleared of all blame in the matter). There were twenty casualties (four of them fatal) among the railwaymen, and two boys who happened to be in the barracks at the time were slightly wounded.³ 'No British troops were present at the time of the firing by the Sudan Mounted Rifles, which apparently occurred without orders and under extreme provocation.'⁴

¹ *The Times*, 11th July, 1924. The instructions were said to have been transmitted by Egyptian employees of the Sudan Government Telegraph Service.

² *Ibid.*, 11th August, 1924.

³ For the facts, see *communiqués* of the 12th and 13th August and 2nd September, 1924, from the British Residency at Cairo (in *The Times*, 13th and 14th August and 3rd September); and the Egyptian Government's *communiqué* of the 15th August (in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 9, p. 556). For further details, see *The Times*, 25th September, 1924.

⁴ British *communiqué* of the 12th August, 1924.

At Port Sudan, on the 10th August, twenty or thirty men of the Egyptian Railway Battalion also broke barracks, under the leadership of an Egyptian post-office official who had been suspended from his duties. They attempted to attack the local Arab police, with whom they were at feud; but, by the foresight of the authorities, the police had been confined to barracks, where their native officers successfully kept them in hand, and the demonstration came to nothing. There were minor disturbances at Omdurman on the 16th, Port Sudan on the 18th, and Khartūm on the 19th and 20th;¹ but British naval and military reinforcements rapidly arrived in Egypt and the Sudan,² and the disorder subsided.

In regard to the events at Atbarah, the Egyptian Government's *communiqué* of the 15th August mentioned that British reinforcements had arrived on the scene and that afterwards 'the troops' had opened fire—thus giving the erroneous impression that the troops in question were British. The British Acting High Commissioner at Cairo, Mr. Clark Kerr, protested against this on the same day.³ On the 16th a junior official of the Egyptian Legation in London presented at the Foreign Office a note of protest at the British Government's action in the Sudan during the disturbances.⁴ On the 17th the Egyptian Government published a second *communiqué* on the events at Atbarah, in answer to the British protest of the 15th, but this second note was likewise in some respects equivocal.⁵

On the 15th August it was announced⁶ that mixed Anglo-Egyptian military courts of inquiry had been appointed. Thirteen men of the Egyptian Railway Battalion were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment by an Egyptian court martial sitting at Atbarah; and the whole battalion was evacuated from the Sudan to Egypt before the end of the month.⁷ At Port Sudan the ring-leader of the outbreak of the 10th August, and several of his followers, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on the 23rd September;⁸ and at Khartūm sentences of imprisonment on twenty-

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 9, p. 559.

² *The Times*, 14th, 18th, 22nd, and 25th August, 1924.

³ *Ibid.*, 18th August, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 19th August, 1924. The British Government replied in a note of the 29th August (*ibid.*, 30th August, 1924).

⁵ *The Times*, *loc. cit.* It subsequently appeared that, at the time when the *communiqué* of the 15th was drafted, the Egyptian Government was already exactly informed of the facts (*ibid.*, 19th August, 1924).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 16th August, 1924.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 27th August, 1924.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 24th September, 1924.

eight civilians¹ and cadets, concerned in the demonstration of the 9th August, were pronounced on the 15th November.²

These events in the Sudan raised the issue to which Mr. MacDonald had referred in the House of Commons on the 10th July, and the British Government proceeded to take action on this broader question. On the 15th August Mr. Clark Kerr presented to the Egyptian Government, simultaneously with his protest against the Egyptian *communiqué* regarding events at Atbarah, a note³ from the British Government intimating that, in virtue of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899, Great Britain considered herself responsible, through the Governor-General, for the maintenance of order in the Sudan, and intended fully to support him in any measures which he might consider it necessary to take. This intimation was repeated in the note of the 29th August,⁴ and it was followed up⁵ by a circular from the Acting Governor-General, in which 'certain officials, especially in the younger and lowest grades', were censured for 'continued want of discipline and grave dereliction of duty', and were warned that 'unfaithful servants are subject to dismissal and other disciplinary punishments, even when they do not go so far as some who have actually offended against the penal code'. During the first week in September, fifteen persons connected with the White Flag Society, including a number of officials, were arrested by the Governor of Khartūm Province in Khartūm and Omdurman. Five of these were Egyptians and ten Sudanese.⁶

The general issue of the future of the Sudan was raised in a still sharper form in the conversations⁷ between Mr. MacDonald and Sa'd Pasha Zaghlūl in London on the 25th and 29th September and the 3rd October, and in his dispatch of the 7th October⁸ the British Prime Minister gave the following public warning to the Egyptian people and Government :

The duty of preserving order in the Sudan rests in fact upon His Majesty's Government and they will take every step necessary for this purpose. Since going there they have contracted heavy moral obligations by the creation of a good system of administration ; they cannot allow that to be destroyed ; they regard their responsibilities as a trust for the Sudan people ; there can be no question of their abandoning the Sudan until their work is done.

His Majesty's Government have no desire to disturb existing arrangements, but they must point out how intolerable is a *status quo* which

¹ On the arrest of these civilians, see below.

² *The Times*, 17th November, 1924.

³ *Ibid.*, 2nd September, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 4th and 8th September, 1924.

⁵ See pp. 207-9 above.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 18th August, 1924.

⁷ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

⁸ *Cmd.* 2269 of 1924.

enables both military and civil officers and officials to conspire against civil order, and unless the *status quo* is accepted and loyally worked until such time as a new arrangement may be reached, the Sudan Government would fail in its duty were it to allow such conditions to continue.

His Majesty's Government have never failed to recognise that Egypt has certain material interests in the Sudan which must be guaranteed and safeguarded—these being chiefly concerned with her share of the Nile water and the satisfaction of any financial claims which she may have against the Sudan Government. His Majesty's Government have always been prepared to secure these interests in a way satisfactory to Egypt.

This warning was translated into action, upon the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, in the fifth and sixth demands of the British ultimatum of the 22nd November, 1924, the text of which has been quoted above.¹ The sixth demand, relating to Sudan irrigation and its sequel, is dealt with elsewhere.² The fifth was that the Egyptian Government should

order within twenty-four hours the withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers and the purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army, with such resulting changes as shall be hereafter specified.

In the second note, presented simultaneously, the British Government's specific requirements under this head were laid down as follows :

The Egyptian officers and purely Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army having been withdrawn, Sudanese units of the Egyptian Army shall be converted into a Sudan defence force, owing allegiance to the Sudan Government alone and under the supreme command of the Governor-General, in whose name all commissions will be given.

It has been recorded above³ that the British demands regarding the Sudan were among those which the Egyptian Government rejected, and that on the 23rd November, upon receiving the Egyptian Government's reply to the British ultimatum, Lord Allenby informed the Egyptian Government that instructions were being sent to the Sudan Government to put these demands into effect on their own account. The evacuation from the Sudan of Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army was started, on orders from the Acting Sirdar, on the 24th November,⁴ and was completed by the 4th December.⁵ The Egyptian Artillery at Khartūm refused to leave without orders from King Fu'ād, but the necessary orders were immediately sent and obeyed.⁶ On the 27th November, however, two platoons of the 11th Sudanese

¹ See pp. 216–17.

³ See p. 218.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5th December, 1924.

² See below pp. 264–6.

⁴ *The Times*, 27th November, 1924.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 28th November, 1924.

Infantry at Khartūm broke barracks ; and, after they had obstinately refused to return to duty, British troops opened fire on them. The fire was returned by the mutineers with rifles and machine guns. Next morning the Army Hospital, in which the main body of the mutineers had established their centre of resistance, was destroyed by artillery, and the mutineers, who fought to the last man, were annihilated. In this fighting three British officers (two holding commissions in the British and one in the Egyptian Army) and four other ranks were killed, ten other ranks were wounded, and one private was slightly wounded among the loyal Sudanese troops.¹ At a court martial held in Khartūm on the 3rd December four officers of the 11th Sudanese involved in the mutiny were sentenced to death, and three of the sentences were confirmed and executed.²

The inauguration of the Sudan Defence Force formed from the Sudanese units previously belonging to the Egyptian Army was announced by the new Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Geoffrey Archer, on the 17th January, 1925.³ Ziwar Pasha's Government

¹ *Ibid.*, 1st December, 1924, and 20th February, 1925. The mutineers appear to have acted under incitement from Egyptian officers and in the belief that the Egyptian Artillery would support them. During the August disorders, attempts were reported to have been made by the organizers to tamper with the 9th Sudanese Battalion at Omdurman (*The Times*, 25th September, 1924), but nothing had come of this. On the other hand, at Malakal, in the White Nile Province, on the 22nd and 25th September, four soldiers and four battalion clerks of the 12th Sudanese had been arrested and sentenced for making political demonstrations (*Ibid.*, 2nd October, 1924).

² *Ibid.*, 6th December, 1924.

³ See *ibid.*, 20th February, 1925, for details regarding the institution of the force. The British High Commissioner in Egypt is reported to have informed the Egyptian Prime Minister on the 26th January, 1925, that the cost of the Sudan Defence Force would be borne by the Sudan Government. On the 12th March, 1925, Ziwar Pasha wrote to the High Commissioner, recalling the circumstances in which the Egyptian units of the Egyptian Army had been withdrawn from the Sudan and the reservations regarding Egypt's rights which had been made at the time, and stating that the Egyptian Government had decided to allocate the residue of the Budget of the Ministry of War for 1925-6, after defraying the expenses of the army in Egypt, to the financing of the Sudan Defence Force. Ziwar Pasha added that the intention of this decision was to show the Government's interest in the defence of the Sudan. The sum allocated in that year's Budget for the Sudan Defence Force was £E750,000. The total credit for the Ministry of War was £E1,782,652. The High Commissioner replied on the same date (12th March, 1925), merely acknowledging receipt of the above communication and stating that he had informed His Britannic Majesty's Government of the wishes of the Egyptian Government. The Egyptian Budget for 1925-6 was never submitted to Parliament. In the Budget for 1926-7, which was under consideration by Parliament at the time of writing, the same sum was allocated to the cost of the Sudan Defence Force. There was a debate in the Chamber of Deputies on the 6th September, 1926 (see *Al-Ahrām* of the 7th September, 1926, and *The Egyptian Gazette* of the 8th). As a result of the debate, the credit was approved with reservations.

protested against the British Government's action in this matter, and put on record the opinion that the formation of a separate Sudan Defence Force could neither prejudice the settlement of the definitive status of the Sudan, which was reserved for future negotiations, nor weaken the indissoluble links uniting the Sudan with Egypt.¹

The British Government's policy regarding the Sudan, as determined by the crisis which the assassination of Sir Lee Stack had precipitated, was set forth on the 15th December, 1924, in the House of Commons, by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Austen Chamberlain : ²

His Majesty's Government have direct responsibility to the people of the Sudan. We are there as trustees. It was owing to our action that that country was reconquered, after it had been lost to Egypt by the Mahdist revolt, following on fifty years of Egyptian misrule and oppression, and when we by agreement admitted Egypt to condominium, we at the same time told the Sudan that never again would they go back to the domination of Egypt. We are there as trustees, and we insist that we shall have there for the future whatever authority is necessary in order to discharge our duty and our responsibilities to the people whom we govern. We have no desire to terminate the condominium. If, as I hope and believe, the new and friendly [Egyptian] Government will work with us, the condominium will exist and continue, and we will recognise it and be loyal to it, but we must, after our past experience, take the powers which are necessary and without which we cannot discharge the duties for which we are liable.

In the same speech, Mr. Chamberlain explicitly rejected the suggestion that Great Britain should seek a mandate for the Sudan from the League of Nations.

The moment we seek a mandate for the Sudan, there is an end to the condominium. The policy of His Majesty's Government is to preserve the condominium, to let it continue in the interest of this country and of Egypt, and we ask Egypt itself to accept, as the Government of Zagh'lul Pasha would not accept, and which was the suggestion of my predecessor, the necessary conditions of a joint administration and a joint rule.

The British Government's policy was thus to maintain, if possible, the juridical *status quo* in the Sudan, pending the negotiations contemplated in the declaration of February 1922 ; and already, on the 4th December, when the new Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Geoffrey Archer, had been appointed, the appointment had been made by the King of Egypt on the British Government's recommendation, in conformity with the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899.³

¹ *The Times*, 26th January, 1925.

² Mr. Chamberlain's statement in regard to the Nile water is dealt with elsewhere (see p. 265 below).

³ *The Times*, 5th December, 1924.

At the same time, the British Government indicated clearly that even the juridical maintenance of the condominium was dependent upon loyal co-operation on the Egyptian side; and in practice the evacuation of the Egyptian troops and the creation of the Sudan Defence Force had altered the situation materially to Egypt's disadvantage. On the 30th December, 1924, the Council of the 'Ulamā of the Sudan met at Omdurman under the presidency of the Muftī and decided to discontinue the mention of the King of Egypt's name in the Friday prayer, and to return to traditional usage by mentioning, instead, 'the Caliph of Islam'.¹ The British view (which Mr. MacDonald held in common with Mr. Chamberlain)² was that, in so far as a *de facto* change in the Sudan, detrimental to Egypt, had taken place, this was the unavoidable result of illegitimate action which had been taken, in spite of repeated warnings, by the Egyptians; and, further, that it depended on the future action of the Egyptians whether the *de jure* position of the Sudan under the agreement of 1899 and the declaration of 1922, which was still intact, could be maintained.

(iii) The Allocation of the Nile Waters.

It has been mentioned already that, during the period under review, the politically conscious elements in the Egyptian people felt the same sort of anxiety regarding the control of the Nile water by any foreign Power as the British people felt regarding foreign control of the Suez Canal or of other strategical positions affecting the command of the sea. This anxiety was due to several factors which were all of comparatively recent occurrence in Egyptian history.³ The first factor was that, since the time of Mehmed 'Alī, Egyptian agriculture had ceased to be solely dependent (as it had always been before) upon the Nile flood, which no engineer could cut off,⁴ and had come to rely in addition upon irrigation from the

¹ That is, without specifying the individual who was regarded as the lawful holder of the title.

² See *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th November, 1924, for a speech delivered on the 28th by Mr. MacDonald to his constituents at Port Talbot. Mr. MacDonald, like Mr. Chamberlain, spoke of Great Britain's position in the Sudan as a trusteeship, the execution of which the Egyptians were deliberately hampering; and he likewise expressed the opinion that this could not go on. If Egypt did not care to carry on the joint trusteeship the time would come sooner or later when we should have to say to Egypt: 'Really, if you cannot help us, you must go.'

³ See the illuminating analysis by Sir Murdoch MacDonald (formerly Adviser to the Egyptian Department of Public Works) in the House of Commons at Westminster, 10th July, 1924.

⁴ Even if works of sufficient size and strength to hold up the flood could have

summer water-supply, the volume of which could easily be controlled from the Sudan.¹ The second factor was that, since the reconquest of the Sudan in 1896-8, the upper basin of the Nile, for the first time in history, had come under the partial but paramount command of a civilized Power, other than Egypt herself, which possessed the skill and resources to control the Nile water, and which might desire to promote the economic development not only of Egypt but of the Sudan. This situation was created by the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium over the Sudan in 1899. Its importance was increased by the fact that Great Britain was a cotton-manufacturing country, and that certain parts of the Sudan, as well as Egypt, were capable, under irrigation, of producing good cotton of the Egyptian variety. It became acute when a world shortage of raw cotton declared itself after the termination of the War of 1914-18. A third factor was the increase of population in Egypt under the British occupation. This increase had begun in response to successive extensions of cultivation in Egypt itself; but by the close of the year 1924 it was estimated that out of a total potential area of 7,000,000 faddāns, 5,200,000 were under cultivation already, and that, at the average rate of increase of the Egyptian population during the previous forty years,² the remaining 1,800,000 faddāns would be taken up within the next thirty years.³ For the possible future overflow of the Egyptian population, after the limit of cultivation in Egypt itself had been reached, the line of least geographical resistance would be the Sudan. The Sudan, to the Egyptian mind, was an annex of Egypt which should be utilized in Egypt's interests; and the instinctive Egyptian policy towards the Sudan might perhaps be stated not unfairly in these terms: that the economic develop-

been constructed on the Blue Nile, they would rapidly have been choked by the silt which, in flood time, the Blue Nile water carried in suspension and deposited as soon as the current slackened pace.

¹ In the House of Commons on the 10th July, 1924, Mr. Ormsby Gore pointed out that, at that time, not one drop of water from the Nile reached the Mediterranean in the months of May, June, and the early part of July. Every drop that could be provided was used up in Egypt, and dams had to be erected across the mouths of the River Nile in summer to prevent the sea going up. In the same debate, Sir Murdoch MacDonald pointed out that even the Aswān dam did not enable Egypt to store, in her own territory, more than, on an average, a quarter to a third of the normal summer supply. In 1916-17, when the Nile was exceptionally low, the total summer supply did not suffice for the needs of Egyptian irrigation. At that date, of course, there was not yet any artificial storage of water in the Sudan for the use of either the Sudan or Egypt.

² Of course the assumption that this rate of increase would be maintained might be falsified.

³ *The Times*, 3rd December, 1924.

ment of the Sudan should be postponed until that of Egypt had been completed ; and that thereafter the Sudan should only be developed so far as this could be done without detriment to Egyptian interests and primarily as an outlet for any overflow of the Egyptian population.¹

After the reconquest of the Sudan, the control of the Nile water above and below Wādī Halfah was placed exclusively in the hands of the Irrigation Service of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works. At that time this arrangement was reasonable, since the Nile water was then utilized almost wholly by Egypt, while the Sudan was derelict and depopulated.² The fact that some of the leading officials in the Egyptian Ministry were British was a guarantee that this control would not be exploited unfairly by Egypt to the Sudan's disadvantage. During the five years following the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium over the Sudan, a comprehensive reconnaissance of the Upper Nile basin was made by Sir William Garstin, the Under-Secretary of State for Public Works in Egypt. In the resulting official reports almost all the major problems were discussed which were subjects of controversy between that date and the time of writing, and almost all those schemes for irrigation works were sketched out which were executed, wholly or partly, in the course of the same period.³ In a covering letter of the 22nd April, 1904, to Sir William Garstin's third report, Lord Cromer remarked that, broadly speaking, the whole plan was based on the principle of utilizing the waters of the White Nile for the benefit of Egypt and those of the Blue Nile for the benefit of the Sudan⁴—a formula which, when once enunciated, exerted an important influence upon successive proposals and negotiations. Effect was immediately given to a recommendation by Sir William Garstin, in the same report,⁵ that a separate Sudan Branch should be organized in the Irrigation Service of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works ; but the execution of

¹ At the time of writing, this desire to dispose of the Sudan as an outlet for a possible overflow of the Egyptian population was not much in evidence in Egypt, whereas the fear that Sudanese cotton would compete detrimentally with Egyptian cotton in the Lancashire market was strongly pronounced. On the whole the Egyptian attitude towards the Sudan was negative and repressive.

² *Cmd.* 2165 of 1904, p. 164.

³ *Report on the Sudan* [Egypt No. 5 of 1899] ; *Report as to Irrigation Projects on the Upper Nile* [Egypt No. 2 of 1901] ; *Despatch from H.M. Consul-General and Agent at Cairo, inclosing a report by Sir William Garstin on the Basin of the Upper Nile*, *Cmd.* 2165 [Egypt No. 2 of 1904]. Annexed to *Cmd.* 2165 of 1904 there is a report upon Lake Tsana and the rivers of the Eastern Sudan by Mr. C. E. Dupuis of the Egyptian Irrigation Service.

⁴ This was based on Sir W. Garstin's own observations on p. 165 of his report.

⁵ pp. 162-3 and 180-1.

irrigation projects in the Sudan had to wait until a land survey and registration of ownership had been carried out, the skeleton of a railway system constructed, and the annual deficit in the Sudan Government Budget overcome, and also until the best methods of cotton cultivation under local conditions had been ascertained by experiment. These conditions had all been realized by 1913,¹ and during that year, under the impulsion of Lord Kitchener, the then British Agent-General in Egypt, the Sudan Government, in co-operation with the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, put in hand one of Sir W. Garstin's projects—namely that for irrigating the Sudanese Jazīrah² with gravitation water to be obtained by constructing a barrage across the Blue Nile in the neighbourhood of Sannār.

The execution of the scheme was delayed by the General War of 1914–18; but, on the basis already laid down in 1913, negotiations between the Sudan Government and the Plantations Syndicate were continued, and they resulted in the signature of a definitive agreement on the 17th October, 1919. Under this agreement—which was to run for ten years in the first instance, with a contingent right, on the Syndicate's side, to a renewal for four years longer—the Government was, at its own cost, to give the Syndicate possession of the lands comprised in the scheme and to construct the works necessary for carrying the scheme into effect, except for works of subsidiary canalization. The Syndicate, under the Government's control, was to manage at its own cost³ the letting of the lands and the cultivation by the tenants (including the giving of technical assistance and the provision of loans at the Syndicate's discretion). Two-thirds of each holding were to be planted with fodder and grain crops for the tenant's own consumption, tax-free. The remaining third was to be

¹ Sannār had been connected with Khartūm by railway by 1910; the survey and land settlement had been substantially completed by 1912; the annual Budget of the Sudan had been made to balance without a grant in aid from Egypt by 1913. Local experiments in cotton cultivation by irrigation (with water supplied by pumping stations) had been started in the Jazīrah at Tāyibah in 1911 and at Barakat in 1914 by co-operation between the Sudan Government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate, Ltd., which, since 1905, had been working a concession in the Berber Province, under different technical conditions (see *Omd.* 2171 of 1924 [Sudan No. 1], *Correspondence respecting the Gezira Irrigation Project*).

² Jazīrah (pronounced Gazīrah in the Egyptian dialect) is the Arabic word for island which is also loosely applied to peninsulas and mesopotamias—e. g. to the country between the Tigris and Euphrates north of Baghdad, or to Greater Arabia, up to the line of the Euphrates and the Mediterranean (Jazīratu'l-'Arab). The Sudanese Jazīrah was the mesopotamia between the White and Blue Niles.

³ The Sudan Government was to make an advance to the Syndicate for the construction of certain permanent works.

planted with cotton, and the gross profits of the cotton crop were to be divided between the tenant, the Syndicate, and the Government in the proportions of 40, 25 and 35 per cent. respectively.¹ The Government obtained possession of the lands, under an Ordinance promulgated on the 20th October, 1921,² in which it took power to rent them compulsorily from the owners,³ at an annual rent of ten piastres per faddān. In addition to receiving rent, owners thus deprived temporarily of the use of their land were given the first claim to take up holdings, as nearly as possible equivalent to their own properties, in the area as redivided for irrigation, on yearly cultivating tenancies, with a right of renewal if they complied with the specified conditions. In the event, every owner who applied was allotted a tenancy, and very few tenants were subsequently struck off as unsatisfactory ;⁴ but these applications did not exhaust the area available.⁵ The contract for constructing the dam across the Blue Nile at Makwār and for the main canalization was given by the Sudan Government to Messrs. Pearson. The cost of this work, and the advance made to the Syndicate for certain permanent works of its own, were financed by three Sudan Government Loans, issued in five instalments between October 1919 and November 1924.⁶ Messrs. Pearson's work was completed, according to contract, in July 1925; irrigation was commenced on the 15th of the same month; and in the first season tenancies were allotted for 240,000 faddāns (80,000 of them under cotton) out of 300,000 faddāns (100,000 of them under cotton) contemplated in the scheme.⁷

¹ The existing local custom was that 50 per cent. of net profits should go for labour and half for provision of water. The 60 per cent. of gross profits which, under the agreement of the 17th October, 1919, were to be paid by the tenant to the Syndicate and the Government, represented this 50 per cent. of net profits plus rent and taxes (*Cmd.* 2171 of 1924, p. 45).

² Text in *Cmd.* 2171 of 1924, pp. 52-7.

³ Lands required for permanent works were to be expropriated compulsorily in full ownership at a price of £E1 per faddān.

⁴ List of those struck off in *Cmd.* 2171 of 1924, pp. 51-2.

⁵ Nevertheless, the compulsion thus applied to the native owners aroused considerable criticism. See *Cmd.* 2171 of 1924, and *The Times*, 15th May, 1925.

⁶ Raised under a British 'Government of the Sudan Loan Act' of 1919, under which the interest on the bonds was guaranteed by the British Government; under the British 'Trade Facilities and Loans Guarantee Act, 1922'; and under the British 'Trade Facilities Act, 1924' (see *Cmd.* 2281 of 1924, *Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of the Sudan in 1923*, pp. 65-7; and *Cmd.* 2544 of 1925: *Report for 1924*, pp. 75-7.) In the end the British Parliament authorized a guarantee for Sudan Government loans up to a total of £E13,000,000 (*The Times*, 21st January, 1926).

⁷ For further details regarding the Jazīrah irrigation scheme see *The Times*, 24th November and 3rd December, 1924; *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th February, 1925 (interview with Lord Stanley after a visit to the Sudan).

Although the Jazīrah Scheme had been initiated by the Sudan Government, and although the contracts for its execution had been not only negotiated by the Sudan Government but financed by it, with the British Government's backing, the control of the Nile waters in the Sudan as well as in Egypt still remained vested, in 1919, in the Irrigation Service of the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works, and the Jazīrah Scheme was included in a comprehensive set of proposals put forward at that time by the Egyptian Ministry.¹

Simultaneously with the putting in hand of the Jazīrah Scheme, under which Blue Nile water was to be drawn off for irrigation in the Sudan, a scheme was initiated—in this case at the Egyptian Government's and not at the Sudan Government's expense—for the construction of another dam at Jabal Awliyā on the White Nile, about forty miles above Khartūm, which, although it lay in Sudanese territory, was intended to store water for use, not in the Sudan, but in Egypt.²

The Egyptian Ministry's proposals also included a barrage at Nag Hamadi in Egypt, which was an exclusively Egyptian concern, and a second dam on the Upper Blue Nile, above Makwār, which was to store water partly for the Sudanese Jazīrah but partly for Egypt as well.³

Another scheme for the cultivation of cotton by irrigation in the Sudan, which had been proposed originally by Mr. Dupuis and incorporated by Sir W. Garstin in his report of 1904,⁴ related to the utilization of the flood water of the River Gash in the Kassalā Province. The works required were much less elaborate and costly than those in the Jazīrah; but a necessary preliminary to the execution of this scheme was the linking up of Kassalā by railway with some point on the Atbarah–Port Sudan sector of the Sudan State Railways. For these separate purposes, a Kassalā Railway Company⁵ and a Kassalā Cotton Company were formed, and the scheme was launched by a series of interlocking agreements between these two companies,

For a description of the construction of the Makwār dam see Mr. Arthur Ransome in *The Manchester Guardian*. For the opening of the works see *The Times*, 19th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd January, 1926.

¹ The technical design for the Jazīrah Scheme, as well as for the other proposals, was made by Sir Murdoch MacDonald, the then adviser to the Egyptian Ministry (*The Times*, 30th December, 1920).

² *Ibid.*, 3rd December, 1924; statement in the Egyptian Chamber on the 13th April, 1924, by the Minister of Public Works (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 7, pp. 470–1).

³ *The Times*, 30th December, 1920.

⁴ *Cmd.* 2165 of 1904, p. 165.

⁵ The construction of the railway was financed under the British 'Trade Facilities Act'.

the Sudan Government, and the Sudan State Railways.¹ The whole of the preference shares and just under 50 per cent. of the ordinary shares of the Kassalā Cotton Company were subscribed by the Sudan Plantations Syndicate;² and the agreement between the Company and the Government followed the same lines as that between the Syndicate and the Government which has been described above.³ The railway reached Kassalā on the 21st April, 1924; and, on the 1st July following, the Cotton Company took over from the Government, in accordance with the agreement between them, the existing irrigated areas in the Gash Delta.⁴

The Gash Scheme did not affect Egypt, since the water of the Gash did not in any case flow into the Nile but lost itself in the desert, so that the volume of Nile water in Egypt could not be diminished by the utilization of the Gash water for irrigation in the Sudan. On the other hand, the Gash took its rise in the Italian Colony of Eritrea, and the Eritrean authorities had initiated an irrigation scheme in their own territory, which included the erection of a dam across the Gash at Tessenei, about twenty-five miles above Kassalā. The necessary adjustment between Eritrean and Sudanese interests was secured through a joint investigation by the respective experts of the two parties, which resulted in the signature of a joint report on the 25th November, 1924. On the basis of this experts' report, the Governor of Eritrea and the Acting Governor-General of the Sudan met at Khartūm on the 12th December, 1924, and arrived at an agreement, which was embodied in an exchange of letters of the same date.⁵ The Eritrean Government agreed to a specific limitation of the amount of water to be taken off at Tessenei, while the Sudan Government agreed, in return, to pay the Eritrean Government 20 per cent. of its annual receipts under the Gash Scheme in excess of £50,000. The Italian irrigation works at Tessenei were completed in

¹ Agreement of the 5th December, 1922, between the Government and the Railway Company; agreement of the 7th December, 1922, between the State Railways and the Railway Company; agreement of the 27th February, 1923, between the Government and the Cotton Company.

² Prospectus of the Kassalā Cotton Company, advertised in the London Press in January 1923.

³ In the Kassalā Scheme the tenant was to receive 50 per cent. of the proceeds of all crops grown in the concession area, less certain charges, while the other 50 per cent. was to be divided between the company and the Government on a scale graduated according to the volume of production.

⁴ *Cmd.* 2544 of 1925, p. 6. For further information see the Directors' Reports for the years ending on the 31st December, 1923, 1924, and 1925; and *The Times*, 24th April, 1924.

⁵ Italian and English texts in *Cmd.* 2472 of 1925. See also *Cmd.* 2544 of 1925, p. 6.

the summer of 1926, and irrigation was actually started there on the 22nd July of that year.¹

The question between the Eritrean and the Sudan Governments concerning the utilization of the waters of the River Gash, which flowed from the one territory into the other, reflected in miniature the similar question between the Sudan and the Egyptian Governments concerning the waters of the River Nile; but in the latter case, unhappily, agreement proved far more difficult than in the former.

The opposition to the utilization of Nile water for irrigation in the Sudan was based partly on economic and technical grounds and partly on political.

On the economic side it was pointed out that, whereas in Egypt irrigation had 'been resorted to when no more cultivation could be done without its aid, in the Sudan the Makwār dam was projected long before the rain-growing possibilities of the Sudan had been fully exploited'.² It was argued that rain-grown cotton had been a staple crop of the Sudan in the past; and that, at the time when the irrigation works were being executed, the cultivation of rain-grown cotton was extending, under Government encouragement, very fast, 'without showing the slightest sign of being restricted by lack of land with suitable rainfall'.³ Moreover, this line of development might appear to possess a double advantage over the other. It not only involved no interference with the natural life of the local population and no limitation of their initiative and independence; it also involved no conflict over Nile water rights between the Sudan—or British commercial interests in the Sudan—and Egypt.

To the first point it might be replied that irrigation-grown cotton was a much more valuable crop than rain-grown cotton, and that, under the irrigation schemes, a share in the increased value of local production, arising out of the change from rain-growing to irrigation, accrued to the native cultivators.⁴ On the question of the economic interests of Egypt, the proposals put forward in 1919 by the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works were violently denounced by Sir William Willcocks (the designer of the Aswān dam) and Colonel Kennedy. On the 10th January, 1920, the Egyptian Government appointed a

¹ *The Times*, 25th July, 1926.

² Mr. Arthur Ransome in *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th May, 1925.

³ Mr. Arthur Ransome, *loc. cit.*

⁴ These two points are noted by Mr. Arthur Ransome, *loc. cit.* On the respective advantages of the two crops from the points of view of the native cultivators and the Manchester manufacturers see Lord Stanley in *The Manchester Guardian*, 28th February, 1925.

Commission to report upon the Ministry's proposals in their technical aspect, and also upon the allocation of the increased water-supply as between Egypt and the Sudan and upon the apportionment of the costs of the proposed works, and of the Commission's inquiry, as between the two countries.¹ After hearing Sir William Willcocks and Colonel Kennedy the Commission dismissed their charges against the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works in general and against Sir Murdoch MacDonald, the Adviser on Irrigation, in particular ; and they approved the Ministry's proposals, including the Jazīrah and the Jabal Awliyā schemes.² This part of the report was unanimous, but the American member presented a minority report on the several questions of allocation.³ The other two members declared themselves unable to suggest a precise allocation of the increased supply of water. As regarded the apportionment of costs, they recommended that the Sudan Government should pay for the Makwār dam and the Egyptian Government for the Jabal Awliyā dam, and that the Upper Blue Nile dam should be built and paid for by Egypt in the first instance, but that the Sudan, when it began to take water from it, should pay a share of the cost in proportion to the water received. All three members, however, were in substantial agreement that, in order to deal with the interpretation or application in practice of suggestions relating to the allocation of water and apportionment of costs between the two countries, a permanent board—consisting of two members representing Egypt and the Sudan respectively, with an independent chairman—should be set up, and that all differences of opinion should be referred to it.

Meanwhile, the irrigation proposals, besides precipitating a controversy between two distinguished experts of British nationality, had aroused strong feeling among Egyptian nationalists, who were

¹ The Commission consisted of a nominee of the Indian Government (chairman), a nominee of Cambridge University, and a nominee of the United States Government. A judicial member (an English judge of the Egyptian Mixed Courts) was added on the 24th March, 1920. The secretary was a British official in the Egyptian Ministry of Education.

² In July 1920, after the Commission had presented an interim report, proceedings for criminal and seditious libel were instituted in the Consular Court at Cairo against Sir William Willcocks and Colonel Kennedy. The parties were committed for trial on the 2nd July, 1920 ; the case was opened on the 24th January, 1921 ; the accused were found guilty on the 11th March, and sentence was passed on the 16th April. Sir William Willcocks had accused Sir M. MacDonald of having altered certain gauge-readings, having suppressed certain material documents, and having lowered a gauge with intent to mislead the public in respect of his proposals. Both the Commission and the Court found that these charges had no foundation whatever (*The Times*, 1st and 3rd July, 1920, and 18th April, 1921).

³ For a précis of the majority report see *The Times*, 30th December, 1920.

at that time particularly embittered against Great Britain ; and, in order to assuage this feeling, Lord Allenby, the then British High Commissioner at Cairo, made in February 1920 a spontaneous declaration that, for the time being, the amount of land to be irrigated in the Jazīrah would be limited to a maximum of 300,000 faddāns.¹ This was the amount actually contemplated in the first instance under the Jazīrah Scheme (though no figure had been explicitly mentioned in the agreement of the 17th October, 1919, between the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and the Sudan Government). The declaration involved, however, an important potential sacrifice of Sudanese interests, since the total area capable of irrigation in the Jazīrah was estimated to be 3,000,000 faddāns.

On the 25th May, 1921, the Egyptian Government decided to suspend operations on all irrigation works in the Sudan (while conserving work already done), pending an agreement regarding the political status of the Sudan with Great Britain. In case the Sudan Government should decide to continue the execution of the Jazīrah Scheme (which it was already financing independently) on its own responsibility, the Egyptian Government made two reservations : the area to be irrigated was to be limited to the 300,000 faddāns already agreed upon, and the definitive decision, on the Egyptian side, regarding these works was to be reserved until the conclusion of the impending Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. Thereupon, the Governor-General of the Sudan telegraphed to the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works that he proposed to proceed with the Jazīrah Scheme ; the Egyptian Government disclaimed responsibility but lodged no protest ;² and the scheme was executed, as has been described above.

In the project for a Sudan Convention between Egypt and Great Britain, which was read to the Egyptian Constitution Drafting Commission by Husayn Rushdī Pasha on the 13th May, 1922,³ it

¹ *The Times*, 24th November, 1924. See the following passage in Lord Allenby's *Reports on the Finances, Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Soudan for the Period 1914-19* (Cmd. 957 of 1920), p. 102 :

Further study of the scheme in view of the altered conditions attributable to the war showed that the area to be irrigated had to be increased to make the scheme a financially safe enterprise for Government, and at the same time not to be too large for the population and resources available. These considerations fixed the area to be irrigated at 300,000 feddans instead of the 100,000 feddans originally contemplated.

² See *The Times*, 1st June, 1921 ; and a statement in the Egyptian Chamber on the 13th April, 1924, by the Minister of Public Works (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 7. pp. 470-1).

³ *The Manchester Guardian*, 15th May, 1922.

was proposed that the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works should be invested with complete control of the Nile waters ; that a Sudan Irrigation Service should be maintained, but with narrowly limited powers ; that the quota assigned to the Sudan should be distributed by the Egyptian Irrigation Service ; that the Jazīrah Scheme should be executed by the same authority ; that the maximum of 300,000 faddāns should not be exceeded for twenty years ; and that the Sudan should draw no water whatsoever from the White Nile and its tributaries until Egypt had satisfied her own needs and given her authorization.¹

On the other hand, Husayn Rushdī Pasha followed the 1920 Commission in proposing a permanent board of three members (one representative each of Egypt and of the Sudan under a neutral chairman) ; the same proposal was advocated in the British House of Lords, on the 25th June, 1924, by Lord Grey of Fallodon, and in the House of Commons, on the 10th July, 1924, by Commander Kenworthy and Sir John Marriott ; and it was carried further by Mr. Dupuis of the Egyptian Irrigation Service, who, in a report presented in 1923, suggested the negotiation of a Nile Convention between Egypt and the Sudan and the creation of a ' Nile Commission ' representing all states interested in Nile Waters.² Mr. Dupuis's suggestions were criticized in the Egyptian Press because they implied that Egypt and the Sudan were separate and independent countries, and that the Nile was an international river like the Danube.³ Possibly such implications were present at this time in the minds of British statesmen, who unanimously rejected the Egyptian contention that, politically, the Sudan was, or ought to be,

¹ It may be noted that Husayn Rushdī Pasha was demanding for Egypt hardly more than Sir W. Garstin had declared to be her due in the following passage of his third report (*Cmd.* 2165 of 1904, p. 163) :

Should it be decided to form an Irrigation Service in the Sudan it is absolutely necessary that it should be entirely controlled by the Ministry of Public Works in Egypt, and that it should in fact form a branch of that department. This is imperative. The work of such a service will be of a purely technical nature and, moreover, will involve the construction of works which must, more or less, interfere with the supply of the Nile. The control of the flow of this river must remain always and absolutely in the hands of one authority. There can be no question of a divided authority in such an important matter, and there can be no two opinions that such control should be vested in the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works. Doubtless, the Government of the Sudan will be the first to admit this and the last to desire that any other arrangement should be made. It will be, however, in the interests of both Egypt and the Sudan that this should be clearly laid down and fully understood.

² *Oriente Moderno*, III, 2, p. 123. Presumably Uganda and Abyssinia, as well as Egypt and the Sudan, were to be represented on such a commission.

³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

an integral part of Egypt, but who were also unanimous in conceding that, irrespective of the political status of the Sudan, Egypt ought to receive a secure guarantee of her water-supply. In the House of Commons on the 10th July, 1924, Lord Winterton suggested that such a guarantee should be given by the British Government, Mr. Ormsby Gore that it might be either British or international; and in the same debate the then Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, made the following declaration:

I give my word and the Government guarantee, and I am glad that I can also give the House of Commons guarantee after the speeches I have listened to, that we are prepared to come to an agreement with Egypt on this subject which Egypt itself will accept as satisfactory. That agreement will be carried out by a proper organization as to control and so on, and under it all the needs of Egypt will be adequately satisfied. The Egyptian cultivator may rest perfectly content that, as the result of the agreement which we are prepared to make, the independence of the Sudan will not mean that he is going to enjoy a single pint of water less than if he had it and was himself working it.

From the economic point of view this declaration might have been regarded by the Egyptians as satisfactory; but by this time the controversy had shifted almost entirely from economic on to political ground.

In the British ultimatum to Egypt of the 22nd November, 1924, after the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, there appeared the following clause:

His Majesty's Government therefore require that the Egyptian Government shall: . . . (6) Notify the competent department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated in the Gezira from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise.

It has been mentioned elsewhere¹ that this was one of the demands that the Egyptian Government rejected, and that thereupon they were informed by Lord Allenby that the Sudan Government had been instructed to take action in the matter on its own account. This demand was subjected to prompt and vigorous criticism in Great Britain, on the triple ground that it was irrelevant to the assassination of Sir Lee Stack (that is, to the occasion of the ultimatum), that it was an unwarrantable repudiation of a pledge, and that it was likely to alienate the mass of the Egyptian peasantry, as well as the leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement, from Great Britain, and to confirm the conviction in Egypt that there could be no adequate guarantee for Egyptian rights to Nile water

¹ See p. 218 above.

without exclusive Egyptian political control over the Sudan.¹ In regard to this demand, the then Foreign Secretary, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, made a virtual recantation in the House of Commons on the 15th December, 1924. He declared that 'the intention . . . to starve Egypt into submission by thirst' . . . never entered the mind of Lord Allenby nor the minds of His Majesty's Ministers at home'; and he apologized for the phrasing of the demand 'in quite unlimited terms' on the ground of the hurry in which the ultimatum had necessarily been drafted. He concluded with the following overture:

If we have a friendly Egyptian Government to deal with, who, on their side, are loyal to the conditions on which our co-operation is based, we shall invite them to join us in an inquiry as to what water is available for the Sudan after making full allowance for Egypt, and we shall propose to them that the Chairman of that Commission, on which Egypt and the Sudan are respectively represented, shall be drawn from an entirely neutral source.²

This was followed on the 26th January, 1925, by an exchange of letters at Cairo between the Egyptian Prime Minister, Ahmad Zīwar Pasha, and Lord Allenby.³ Ahmad Zīwar Pasha invited the British High Commissioner to reconsider the question of irrigation in the Jazīrah and to revoke the instructions given to the Government of the Sudan. Lord Allenby replied that the British Government, 'however solicitous for the prosperity of the Sudan', had 'no intention of trespassing upon the natural and historic rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile'; and that, in giving instructions to the Sudan Government, His Majesty's Government had intended that they should be interpreted in this sense.

Moved by these considerations and in proof of their intentions, His Majesty's Government are disposed to direct the Sudan Government not to give effect to the previous instructions as regards the unlimited development of the Sudan Jazīrah mentioned in the Note of November 23, on the understanding that an expert committee composed of

¹ These points were made on the 28th November, 1924, by the then leader of the opposition in Great Britain, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in a speech to his constituents at Port Talbot (reported in *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th November, 1924). Mr. MacDonald was careful to record his own belief that a larger area in the Sudan than 300,000 faddāns could in fact be irrigated without in any way affecting the necessary water-supply for Egypt; but he pointed out that the Egyptians did not believe this, and that, by the withdrawal of Lord Allenby's pledge, their disbelief would be confirmed.

² This was a return to the policy which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had put forward in his speech in the House of Commons on the 10th July, 1924, and again in his speech at Port Talbot on the 28th November, 1924.

³ Texts in *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th January, 1925.

Mr. J. J. Canter Cremers, chairman, who was chosen by agreement between the two Governments,

Mr. R. N. McGregor, British delegate,

'Abdu'l-Hamid Sulaymān Pasha, Egyptian delegate, who has been selected by the Egyptian Government

shall meet not later than February 15 for the purpose of examining and proposing a basis on which irrigation can be carried out with full consideration for the interests of Egypt and without detriment to her natural and historical rights. It is understood that the Committee will present its report by June 30.¹

The Commission duly met and was on the point of completing its investigations and preparing its report by the date stipulated, when its work was interrupted by the illness and death of its neutral president, Mr. Cremers.² In February 1926 the British and Egyptian Governments agreed that the two other members should resume their examination and present their report, and in the March of the same year a report was stated to have been signed by them unanimously.³

Another symptom of a *détente* in the controversy over the Nile waters was a decision taken in May 1925 by the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works to resume operations on the Jabal Awliyā dam immediately—on a modified plan which had been suggested by Mr. C. E. Dupuis in 1923.⁴ On the 13th June, expenditure both on the Jabal Awliyā dam in the Sudan and on the Nag Hamadi barrage in Egypt was approved by the Egyptian Cabinet,⁵ and the necessary technical preliminaries to calling for tenders were put in hand.⁶ In April 1926 a conference was held at Cairo between the British High Commissioner in Egypt Lord Lloyd, the financial secretary of the Sudan Government Sir George Schuster, the Irrigation Adviser to the Sudan Government and Sudan representative on the Nile Waters Commission Mr. McGregor, and Ziwar and Sirri Pashas representing the Egyptian Government, regarding the compensation to be paid by Egypt to the inhabitants of the White Nile Province of the Sudan

¹ Quoted from *The Manchester Guardian*, 27th January, 1925. Mr. Cremers was consulting engineer to the Dutch Ministry of Waterways and Dutch Delegate on the Central Commission of the Rhine. Mr. MacGregor was the Superintending Engineer of the Punjab. 'Abdu'l-Hamid Pasha Sulaymān was a professional engineer who had spent almost the whole of his career in the Egyptian Irrigation Service, had been for some time Minister of Public Works, and was at that time General Manager of the Egyptian State Railways.

² *The Times*, 20th February, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 20th February and 22nd March, 1926. The contents of this report had not yet been made public at the time of writing.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 19th May, 1925. For further details see *ibid.*, 5th June, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 15th June, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 24th February, 1926.

up-stream from Jabal Awliyā, whose lands would be inundated by the raising of the level of the river in order to store additional water for Egyptian irrigation. The Sudan Government proposed to transfer the population (numbering over 100,000) which would lose its livelihood to an area of 170,000 faddāns in the Jazīrah,¹ and to irrigate this area by bringing water from the Blue Nile. In principle, it was recognized that Egypt ought to bear the cost of an operation which was necessitated solely by Egypt's need for a dam at Jabal Awliyā; but on this occasion no decision could be taken because the Egyptian Government had not yet accepted the Nile Waters Commission's report, which had been in its hands since the 23rd March.² At the beginning of August it was announced that the credits voted in June 1925 for the Jabal Awliyā dam had been withdrawn from the Egyptian Budget for the current year, in order to give time for a fresh study of the whole question by a new Egyptian Minister of Public Works.³

It was evident that, the greater the volume of Nile water that could be made available for the aggregate needs of Egypt and the Sudan, the less acute would become the controversy over its allocation as between the two countries; and, even after the Jabal Awliyā and Makwār schemes had been put in hand, the possibility remained of further storage higher up the two main branches of the river—on the White Nile by eliminating the wastage caused by the Sadd in the Mongalla Province of the Sudan, and by regulating the outflow from the Great Lakes in the British Protectorate of Uganda; and on the Blue Nile either by constructing an Upper Blue Nile dam in Sudanese territory in the neighbourhood of Rosaires or else by regulating the outflow from Lake Tsana in Abyssinia.⁴ At least two of these possibilities involved other countries besides the Sudan and Egypt; and in the case of the Tsana project, though in 1904 Mr. C. E. Dupuis had reported favourably upon it from the technical point of view, both Sir William Garstin and Lord Cromer had preferred the technically less satisfactory alternative of a Rosaires barrage because this would avoid political complications with Abyssinia.⁵ Nevertheless, in the tripartite agreement between Great Britain, France, and Italy respecting Abyssinia, which was signed in London

¹ This area was, of course, distinct from the 300,000 faddāns already provided for under the Jazīrah Scheme described above.

² *The Times*, 24th April, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 2nd August, 1926.

⁴ All these possibilities had been discussed in Sir W. Garstin's third report (*Cmd.* 2165 of 1904).

⁵ *Cmd.* 2165 of 1904, pp. ix and 161.

on the 13th December, 1906,¹ the three parties agreed (Art. 4), in the event of the *status quo* in Abyssinia being disturbed, to act together in order to safeguard, among other things, 'the interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin, more especially as regards the regulation of the waters of that river and its tributaries'. In 1915 a joint Egyptian, Sudanese, and Abyssinian Commission made further studies of the lake;² and in 1920-1 another mission was sent to the spot by the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works. The report of this mission³ confirmed, in general, the original report of Mr. C. E. Dupuis.

Meanwhile, the respective interests or desiderata of Great Britain and Italy in Western Abyssinia had been the subject of negotiation between the Governments of those two countries. In 1919 Italy recognized 'the predominating interests of Great Britain in respect of the waters of Lake Tsana', and offered Great Britain her diplomatic support in order that she might obtain from Abyssinia the concession to carry out the necessary engineering works and the right to construct and maintain a motor road between Lake Tsana and the Sudan, on condition that Great Britain should support Italy in seeking from Abyssinia the concession for a railway across Abyssinian territory between Eritrea and Italian Somaliland to the west of Addis Abeba,⁴ and that she should also recognize an exclusive Italian economic influence in the west of Abyssinia and in the whole of the territory to be crossed by the above-mentioned railway, and should promise to support with the Abyssinian Government all Italian requests for economic concessions regarding the Italian zone. The British Government did not entertain this offer at the time; but eventually they entered into a compact on this basis⁵ in notes exchanged between the two parties at Rome on the 14th and the 20th December, 1925.⁶ It was agreed that 'the necessary identic

¹ Text in Foreign Office Peace Handbook No. 97, *Abyssinia*, Appendix xi, pp. 114-17.

² *The Times*, 10th February, 1926.

³ *Report of the Mission to Lake Tsana, 1920-1*, by G. W. Graham and R. P. Black, published by the Ministry of Public Works, Egypt (Cairo, 1925, Government Press).

⁴ The latter proviso was necessitated by the terms of the tripartite agreement of 1906, under which the Addis Abeba-Jibuti railway zone had been reserved for France.

⁵ In the agreement of the 14th and the 20th December, 1925, Great Britain's promise to recognize an exclusive Italian economic influence in the west of Abyssinia, and to support with the Abyssinian Government all Italian requests for economic concessions in the above zone, was contingent upon the British Government's having first obtained the Lake Tsana Concession from the Abyssinian Government with Italian support.

⁶ English and Italian texts in *Cmd.* 2680 of 1926. For a commentary on this agreement see *The Manchester Guardian*, 20th April, 1926.

instructions should be sent to the British and Italian representatives in Ethiopia to concert for common action with the Abyssinian Government in order to obtain that the concessions sought respectively by the two parties should be granted simultaneously'. It was further understood that neither Government should relax its diplomatic efforts at Addis Abeba so long as either of the desired concessions had not been obtained. The Abyssinian Government retorted to this Anglo-Italian Agreement, which had been made above its head, by bringing it to the attention of the League of Nations and asking for the League's opinion upon it.¹

Thus the question of the Nile waters, which from 1899 to 1913 had been a technical matter for discussion between the British experts and officials at that time in control of both Egypt and the Sudan, had become by 1926 a subject of political controversy, not merely between the British and Egyptian Governments in the peculiar relations which subsisted between them, but also in that field of juridically international affairs with which the League of Nations was concerned.

(iv) The Egypto-German Treaty of the 16th June, 1925.

In the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, by Germany and the Allied Powers, the relations between Germany and Egypt had been entirely recast, but this without the participation of the Egyptian Government, which was not a party to the treaty. Germany recognized a British Protectorate over Egypt as from the 4th August, 1914, and renounced the régime of the Capitulations in Egypt (Art. 147). In separate articles, all existing treaties and agreements between Germany and Egypt were abrogated—likewise as from the 4th August, 1914 (Art. 148); and it was further laid down that, until an Egyptian law of judicial organization establishing courts with universal jurisdiction came into force, provision should be made, by means of decrees issued by the Sultan, for the exercise of jurisdiction over German nationals and property by the British consular tribunals (Art. 149). At the same time, the Egyptian Government was to have complete liberty of action in regulating

¹ Statement made in the House of Commons at Westminster on the 26th July, 1926, by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in answer to a parliamentary question. For the admission of Abyssinia to membership in the League of Nations see *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 394-6. The political sequel to the Anglo-Italian Agreement of the 14th and the 20th December, 1925, will be dealt with separately elsewhere.

the status of German nationals and the conditions under which they might establish themselves in Egypt (Art. 150).

The situation created by the Versailles Treaty was rendered obscure by the British Government's action in renouncing the British Protectorate over Egypt on the 28th February, 1922, while reserving the question of the protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and informing other Governments that the termination of the Protectorate involved no change in the *status quo* as regarded the position of other Powers in Egypt. Did the provisions of the Versailles Treaty regarding relations between Germany and Egypt stand and fall with the first of these provisions—that is, with the recognition by Germany of the British Protectorate over Egypt? It might be argued that this recognition alone had entitled Great Britain to conclude an agreement with Germany concerning Egyptian affairs without Egypt being a party to the transaction.

This question was raised in 1923, when the German Government requested the Egyptian Government to permit the return of German nationals to Egypt, and inquired what their juridical position would be.¹ Negotiations between the two Governments followed, and these eventually resulted in the signature of a treaty on the 16th June, 1925.

In this instrument² the Egyptian Government delegated provisionally to the German Government the right to apply to German nationals in Egypt the jurisdiction of German consular tribunals in all matters in which such tribunals had been competent before 1914. This delegation of powers was to terminate, however, so soon as a new Egyptian judicial organization applying to all foreigners resident in Egypt should come into force. The Egyptian Government also reserved the right of subjecting German nationals to the jurisdiction of Egyptian courts in certain penal matters—particularly such as affected the internal or external security of the Egyptian State or such as might involve German nationals employed in any of the Egyptian public services.

The first result of this treaty was the trial in Egypt, by a special court sent out from Germany, of two German nationals charged with having murdered Gabriel Tawfiq Bey Karām, a British subject resident in Egypt and of Egyptian origin, in January 1923. These two persons had been extradited to Egypt and detained there pend-

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, III, 5, pp. 315–16.

² For a summary of its provisions see the Cairo *Imparziale* of the 17th June, 1925, quoted in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 8, pp. 426–7.

ing the conclusion of the Egypto-German negotiations. The trial opened in Cairo on the 2nd February, 1926, and ended on the 6th in the sentencing of both the accused parties to imprisonment for life.¹

(v) **The Resurrection of the Wahhābī Power in the Arabian Peninsula and the Fall of the House of Hāshim.²**

(a) **THE EFFECTS IN ARABIA OF THE GENERAL WAR OF 1914-18.**

IN the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris* an account has been given³ of the negotiations between the then Amīr of Mecca, the Hāshimī Sharif Husayn b. 'Alī, and the British Government in 1915; Husayn's revolt against the Ottoman Government in 1916;⁴ the commitments of the British Government to Husayn and to his son the Amīr Faysal down to the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918; and the influence of these commitments upon the subsequent course of events in Palestine, Syria, and 'Irāq.⁵ In another section of the present volume,⁶ the history of those former Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire which were placed under French and British mandates is taken up at the several points where the *History of the Peace Conference* breaks off. The present section is concerned with the affairs of the Arabian Peninsula, which scarcely entered into the Peace Settlement following the General War of 1914-18, but which had undergone new developments of international importance by the time of writing. The resurrection of the Wahhābī Power was the outstanding feature in the new situation; and therefore the career of the Wahhābī ruler 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. 'Abdi'r-Rahmānī's-

¹ See *The Times*, 2nd and 9th February, 1926; the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th February, 1926.

² See British Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, vol. i (issued for official use in 1916; published without alteration in 1920 by H.M. Stationery Office); and Foreign Office, Historical Section, Peace Handbook No. 61, *Arabia* (published 1920).

³ Vol. vi, Part III A.

⁴ In this place it is only necessary to recall the fact that the understanding on the strength of which Husayn revolted against the Turks in 1916 was embodied in a rambling correspondence, in which the parties failed to reconcile their standpoints on a number of important matters, and not in any diplomatic instrument which both parties had signed and ratified. Between the receipt of the first overtures from Husayn in July 1915, down to the extinction of the Hāshimī Power in the Hijāz through the capitulation of Jiddah and the abdication of King 'Alī b. Husayn in December 1925, the British Government never succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Hāshimī Government. This failure, which was mainly (though not altogether) Husayn's fault, turned out to be Great Britain's good fortune.

⁵ Vol. vi, Part III B. and C.

⁶ Section (vii) below.

Sa'ūd of Najd has been taken as the guiding thread in the maze of Arabian politics.

Like Husayn the other Arab rulers in the Ottoman sphere in the Peninsula who revolted against the Turks during the War of 1914–18 all gained their independence.¹ On the 3rd November, 1914, Shaykh Mubārak of Kuwayt received from the British Government—on the condition, which he promptly fulfilled, that he should co-operate in the capture of Basrah—an assurance that Kuwayt should be recognized as an independent principality under British protection. The independence of the Idrīsī Sayyid of Sabyā (in the 'Asīr), 'within his own domain', was guaranteed by Great Britain in a treaty signed on the 30th April, and ratified on the 6th November, 1915. The independence of Ibn Sa'ūd was recognized by Great Britain in a treaty signed on the 26th December, 1915, and ratified on the 18th July, 1916. Under the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, the Turks were required to evacuate the positions which they still held in the Arabian Peninsula—that is, Medina and the Yaman—and in the first article of the National Pact of the 28th January, 1920, they voluntarily renounced their title to sovereignty over any part of the Peninsula by explicitly recognizing the independence of ex-Ottoman territories inhabited by Arab majorities. This unilateral renunciation was confirmed by international agreement in the Treaty of Lausanne, which drew the southern frontier of Turkey far to the north of the northernmost fringes of Peninsular Arabia. It may be added that, in Article 10 of the secret Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916, the parties pledged themselves—subject to a possible rectification of the frontier of the Aden Protectorate—not to acquire and not to consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula, and not to consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast or on the islands of the Red Sea.² In a subsequent interchange of views, the French Government recognized that, in the Arabian Peninsula, Great Britain possessed 'special political interests'. Thus one effect of the War of 1914–18 was to eliminate the Turks from Arabia and to extend the British sphere of influence over the whole Peninsula. The War also had a profound effect

¹ At the time of writing the independence thus gained had not been lost by any of their number except Husayn himself, who abdicated in October 1924, and saw the Hāshimī Kingdom of the Hijāz extinguished in December 1925.

² This provision reappeared in the abortive secret agreement of the 17th August, 1917, between Great Britain, France, and Italy.

upon the power, policy, and mutual relations of the Arab rulers themselves.

While the victorious as well as the vanquished European belligerents had emerged war-weary and impoverished from their life-and-death struggle, the Arab tribesmen had been profiting, as they had done thirteen centuries earlier, after the War of A. D. 608–28, by the strife and ruin of the civilized world. In 1914–18 the Arabian Peninsula had lain on the outermost fringe of the war-zone and had been physically unsuitable for the employment of those intensive and devastating methods of warfare which had been developed on the Western Front. Accordingly, in Arabia, the belligerents had simply sought to cover their flanks by hiring Arab rulers to fight their battles for them in the Arab way. The Arabs' price had been high, and—with the barbarian's instinctive suspicion of the devices of civilization, which in this case was fully justified by the event—they had insisted on being paid in gold, cash down, by all parties.¹ King Husayn of the Hijāz received from the British Government a subsidy of £200,000 sterling a month from the time of his intervention in the War down to the 1st February, 1919 : and though, during the next twelve months, the payments were successively diminished until they ceased altogether, the cost to the British Treasury of this single subsidy was £1,200,000 during this final year,² and must have amounted to about £6,000,000 from first to last. The Amīr Ibn Sa'ūd, who was paid at the more modest rate of £5,000 a month, had received £232,908 sterling by the 28th February, 1922,³ and was still being subsidized on the same scale in the following November.⁴ Indeed Ibn Sa'ūd received £50,000 sterling in the financial year ending the 31st March, 1924, and it was not till the latter date that British subsidies to Arabian princes ceased altogether.⁵ During the War British gold also flowed into the coffers of the Idrīsī,⁶ and Turkish gold into those of the Imām and

¹ The Albanians, who also fought as mercenary irregulars on both sides during the War of 1914–18, likewise insisted upon being paid in gold, with the strange result that, during the years immediately following the Armistice, Albania and the principalities of Arabia were the only countries in the Old World where a gold currency was in circulation.

² Official statement made in the House of Lords by the Earl of Crawford on the 28th February, 1922, in answer to a parliamentary question.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Official statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. Ormsby-Gore on the 28th November, 1922, in answer to a parliamentary question.

⁵ Statement by the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons on the 24th March, 1924, in answer to a parliamentary question.

⁶ Treaty of the 30th April, 1915, Article 7.

Ibn Rashīd.¹ In almost every case these gifts of gold were accompanied by gifts of modern rifles and any other kind of Western military equipment which could be brought into play in the Arabian theatre of war ; and sometimes skilled instructors in the use of these new-fangled weapons were placed at the service of the Arab chiefs by their respective patrons among the principal belligerents. The Arab chiefs, whose adherence to this side, or that, was largely decided by the fact that their local Arab rivals were taking service with the opposite party, employed their subsidies in conducting, at their respective patrons' expense, those operations which in any case they would have undertaken against one another under the ordinary conditions of inter-Arab warfare.²

Since the conventions of warfare between Arab chiefs in the twentieth century resembled those observed by Italian condottieri in the fifteenth century, the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula, in striking contrast to those of the European Continent, emerged from the General War of 1914-18 more prosperous and more vigorous than they had entered it.

The principal specific effects were to enhance the political power of the rulers, through whose hands the foreign gold and arms were dispensed to the tribesmen ; to increase the tribesmen's military experience and efficiency at a very low relative cost in devastation and casualties ; and to stimulate their minds and implant in them a restless appetite for fresh adventures by bringing them into sudden contact with the great world which had hitherto lain beyond their horizon. Arab forces played a sensational part in the final campaign in which Field-Marshal Allenby broke the Turkish Army and at one stroke conquered Syria up to the Amanus ; an Arab prince, the Hāshimī Amīr Faysal b. Husayn, ruled for nearly two years at Damascus, and, when evicted by the French, obtained through the good offices of his British patrons a second and less

¹ During the War the British Government made efforts to extract from Arabia some fraction of the gold which it was reluctantly pouring into the Peninsula by enticing the Arabs to exchange it again for Indian manufactures ; but the Arabs preferred to use the metal otherwise—for example, as material for chased dagger handles.

² For example, the battle of Turabah between Husayn and Ibn Sa'ūd in May 1919—which was fought at a time when both combatants were receiving gold and arms from the British Government (Husayn through the Foreign Office and Ibn Sa'ūd through the India Office) and when their common patron was engaged at the Peace Conference of Paris in an attempt to restore peace to the world—arose over a local boundary dispute between the two parties in which their rival prestige and ambitions in Arabia were involved, and which they would have decided in any case by the ordeal of battle.

precarious throne at Baghdad ; and another Arab prince, Faysal's brother 'Abdu'llāh, was installed at 'Ammān as ruler of Transjordan.¹

In these respects the external conditions for an outburst from Arabia, which had existed in the seventh century, were reproduced in a large measure in the twentieth, and at the same time the internal conditions of the Peninsula developed on remarkably similar lines. The secret of political union in Arabia was the propagation of a common religious faith, which alone could overcome the disruptive influence of the nomadic tribal life imposed by the physical environment. Under the economic and social conditions of nomadism, where the margin of subsistence was often a minus quantity, every tribe's hand was against every other's ; and though the Badu and the oasis-dwellers were economically interdependent, the unifying effect of this interdependence was narrow in its range. The largest natural political unit in Arabia was the single oasis or group of oases exercising a loose and fluctuating authority over the particular tribes which, in the annual orbit of their migration in search of pasture, repaired regularly to that oasis or group for the exchange of commodities with its inhabitants.² The crux of empire-building in Arabia was to bring two or more oasis-units, with their respective tribal spheres of influence, into political union ; and this could only be done through some unifying force, like theocracy, which was strong enough to overcome tribal antipathies and affinities. The Arabs of the seventh century had been able to take advantage of the opportunity beyond their borders because empire-builders had arisen at the critical moment who knew how to overcome tribal particularism by the solvent of religious faith ; and the two theocratic principalities of this kind which had arisen simultaneously in the Najd and the Hijāz had been amalgamated into a single Arabian state by the triumph of the Prophet Muhammad's first successor over the Prophet Maslamah. Among the independent states which emerged out of the former Turkish sphere of influence after the War of 1914-18—the principalities of Mecca, Sabyā, San'ā, Riyād, Kuwayt and Hā'il—no less than four were of the theocratic order ; and

¹ Faysal's Arab Kingdom of 'Irāq and 'Abdu'llāh's Arab Amirate of Transjordan were not unlike the Arab principalities of the Banu Ghassān at Bosrā and the Banu Lakhm at Hīrah, whom the Roman and Persian Governments respectively established as wardens of their Arabian marches during the last phase before the great Arabian explosion of the seventh century after Christ.

² The political authority conferred by the possession of an oasis was often held by tribal chiefs who had made a permanent residence there.

during the next seven years one prince, the Wāhhābī Imām Ibn Sa'ūd, succeeded in dominating his neighbours and recreating something like that Arabian unity which the Prophet of Islam and his first successor had created between the years 622 and 633.

Of the four theocratic princes of 1918 the Idrīsī Sayyid Muhammad b. 'Alī of Sabyā was the great-grandson of Sayyid Ahmadu'l-Idrīsī of Fās (Fez) in Morocco—a Muslim reformer who had started a specific religious school (*tariqah*), had initiated the founder of the Sanūsīyah Order in North Africa, had preached at Mecca, and had finally settled at Sabyā, where his religious prestige enabled his descendants to acquire political power. Muhammad b. 'Alī, the reigning member of the house in the fourth generation, had studied at the university-mosque of Al-Azhar in Cairo and in the Sanūsī oasis of Kafarā in the Libyan desert, before he settled down in Sabyā and turned his attention to politics.¹

The Zaydī Imām Yahyā b. Muhammad of San'ā traced his descent from the Prophet through Fātimah and 'Alī, and was regarded by his Zaydī co-religionists—from whom he lived apart, in a studied seclusion—as a semi-sacred being. By the terms of an agreement negotiated with him in 1911 by 'Izzet Pasha and confirmed by a *firman* from the Sultan in 1913, his political authority had been recognized by the Ottoman Government in all those parts of the Yaman plateau where the Zaydī form of Shi'ism prevailed, so that his principality had as explicit a religious basis as the Idrīsī's.²

The Wāhhābī Imām 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. 'Abdi'r-Rahmānī's-Sa'ūd was descended from Muhammadu's-Sa'ūd, the petty chieftain of Dara'iyah in south-eastern Najd who, about the year A. D. 1759, had placed his secular arm at the service of the religious reformer Muhammad 'Abdu'l-Wāhhāb.³ By thus identifying themselves with the religious movement of Wāhhabism,⁴ the House of Sa'ūd had

¹ See the Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, pp. 33 and 40-1; and *Oriente Moderno*, Anno II, p. 620, quoting from *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, 14th February, 1923.

² Admiralty Handbook, pp. 35-6 and 160-5; H. St. J. B. Philby, *The Heart of Arabia* (London, 1922, Constable), vol. ii, p. 64.

³ *Vivit* A. D. 1698/9-1792.

⁴ For the special tenets of the Wāhhābīs see an interview given on the 12th June, 1926, by the then Wāhhābī qādī of the Hijāz, 'Abdu'llāh b. Bulayhid, to a correspondent of the Cairo journal *As-Siyāsah* (extracted from *As-Siyāsah* of the 26th June, 1926, in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, pp. 337-9). The Wāhhābīs were orthodox Sunnis of the Hanbalite *Madhhab* (rite)—the strictest and least widely followed of the four orthodox *Madhāhib*. They were puritanical in regarding as idolatrous the cults of saints at shrines and tombs and the invocation of saints to intercede with God on behalf of the worshipper.

been enabled to acquire political mastery over the greater part of the Arabian Peninsula between 1759 and 1810 ;¹ and, a century after the first Wahhābī Empire had fallen, the constructive force of the hereditary creed had assisted a scion of the House of Saʿūd, the Imām ʿAbdu'l-ʿAzīz, to build up between 1901 and 1925 a second empire which, at the time of writing, he had expanded almost to the limits that had been reached by his ancestors.

The mission of Muhammad ʿAbdu'l-Wahhāb had been to preach a return to the strictest form of Sunnī orthodoxy, represented by the legal school of Ahmad b. Hanbal ; to protest against the accretions of superstitious observance with which the primitive faith and practice of Islam had been overlaid ; and to purify Mecca, and any other cities and settled provinces of the Ottoman Empire upon which he could impose his will, from idolatrous practices like the cult of the Black Stone and from the filthy devices of the Franks, such as the smoking of tobacco.

In ʿAbdu'l-ʿAzīz b. Saʿūd's principality, as it emerged from the War of 1914-18, the religious and secular organizations were inextricably bound up together.

From [his predecessors'] failures ʿAbdu'l-ʿAzīz ibn Saʿūd culled the secret of success, and proceeded with characteristic courage and rapidity to put his theories to the test of experiment by laying at Artāwiyah, an insignificant watering-place on the Kuwayt-Qasīm track, the foundation-stone of a new freemasonry, which, under the name of Ikhwān or the 'Brothers', has in the course of a decade transformed the character of Badawī society and caused a flutter of anxiety throughout Arabia. The Ikhwān movement, which is nothing but a Wahhābī revival in an intensified form, is the result not of accident but of a well-considered design, conceived with no less a purpose than that of remedying the shortcomings of the Arab race, of checking before it is too late the insidious processes of decay, and of rebuilding on the wreckage of past prosperity a better and more permanent structure than the old one. . . . [Ibn Saʿūd] found his country devastated by war and civil strife—in ten years he has founded twice that number of colonies² to repair the damage, and no year passes but he adds to their number. He recovered the heritage of his ancestors with the help of a handful of adventurers—his new colonies are but cantonments of his standing army of 30,000 men or more, and every man-child born therein is a recruit to his forces from the day of his birth. He found the Badu homeless, poor, without religion, and cursed with a tribal organization which made united action impossible and strife inevitable—in the new colonies he has settled them on the land with the fear of God and the hope of Paradise in their hearts, substituting the brother-

Philby, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. xvi-xvii.

² Some of these are Artāwiyah, Ghatghat, Daklṇah, Dāhinah, Mubā'idh, Furaythān, Sājir, Dhaba'ah, Silh wa Ruwayghib, Sayh, Khuff, Rayn, Nifi.

hood of a common faith for that of a common ancestry, and thus uniting in common allegiance to himself as the vicegerent of God elements hitherto incapable of fusion. At the same time he has made war unsparingly on the old tribal practices, the old game of raid and counter-raid is forbidden in his territories, and many a tribe has felt the crushing weight of his wrath for transgression of his laws; peace reigns where peace was known not before, and it is only on the borders of Wahhabiland that it is disturbed by foreign alarms and excursions.¹

This description of the theocratic principality of Riyād from the hand of an admiring English observer, who crossed Arabia from coast to coast and traversed Ibn Sa'ūd's dominions in every direction in A. D. 1918, might have been written of the more celebrated principality which the Prophet Muhammad built up, on similar foundations, round Medina between A. D. 622 and 632.

The fourth principality of a religious complexion which figured on the map of the Arabian Peninsula in 1918 was the Kingdom of the Hijāz, whose sovereign, Husayn b. 'Alī, belonged to the 'Abā-dilah branch of the Hāshimī House in the Prophet's tribe of the Quraysh. Although their holy lineage was better authenticated than that of the Idrīsī or the Zaydī Imām, neither Husayn nor his predecessors had laid claim to any personal sanctity. For the rulers of the two Holy Cities of the Hijāz, whose inhabitants lived by exploiting the pilgrim traffic and were by-words for corruption throughout the Islamic World, saintly professions would have been too incongruous to be entertained. Nevertheless, the secular authority of the Sharifian Amīrs of Mecca rested upon the twofold religious prestige of their own pure descent and of the Holy Cities which were under their hereditary wardenship, and their principality must therefore be reckoned in the theocratic class.

Of these four principalities the Idrīsī's was of little account. 'As for the Idrīsī', King Husayn telephoned to a representative of the British Government in 1916, 'he is a man who is not recognized by any one to be anything. He has made himself Shaykh and has landed in some places which were not ruled by any one.' The Imām of San'ā was a greater Power; but he had been placed in an awkward position by the defeat of his friends the Turks and by his estrangement from his British neighbours at Aden; his authority was not recognized by the non-Zaydī tribes in his own country, the Yaman; and the situation of the Yaman in a corner of the Peninsula, while

¹ Philby, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 299-300. The whole of the passage from which the above quotation is taken should be read by any one who wishes to understand the structure and character of the Wahhābī State.

screening it from the aggression of other Arabian Powers, almost precluded it from extending its own political ascendancy far beyond its borders. The only possible aspirants to Pan-Arabian dominion, in the twentieth century as in the seventh, were the rulers of the Hijāz and the Najd ; and in 1925, as in 633,¹ their struggle for supremacy ended in the complete destruction and incorporation of the one Power by the other—though this time it was the Hijāz that succumbed, while Ibn Sa‘ūd the Wahhābī avenged the *manes* of the Prophet Maslamah upon the House of the Prophet Muhammad.

At the same time the northern outposts of the rising Arabian Empire began to encroach upon the borders of ‘Irāq and Syria.² The Wahhābī raiders in Transjordan were as roughly handled by British troops in August 1924 as the first Islamic raiders in the same region had been handled by the Romans at Mu’tah in A. D. 629. Yet, behind the imposing military force of the mandatory Powers, the Muslim majority of the population in Palestine and Syria was seriously disaffected. The patronage of Zionism by Great Britain and the creation of the Great Lebanon by France had estranged the Muslim, Druse, and Orthodox Christian communities in Palestine and Syria from their new Western rulers perhaps as deeply as their Monophysite forefathers had been estranged from Rome by the Imperial patronage of the Melkhites and by the Monothelete compromise of Heraclius. By the time when Ibn Sa‘ūd had freed himself from all embarrassments towards the south-west through the retirement of King ‘Alī b. Husayn from the throne of the Hijāz and the entry of the Wahhābī forces into Jiddah on the 19th December, 1925, he had already signed at Haddah, on the 2nd November, an agreement with a British representative in which the frontier between the Najd and Transjordan was carried north-westwards to a point not more than sixty miles distant from the south-eastern corner of the French mandated territory in Syria. In that corner of Syria lay the Jabalū’d Durūz ; and by November 1925 the Jabal had for three months been the focus of a rising against the French which was rapidly spreading northwards and westwards.³

It remains to trace the antecedents of this situation by recording the rise of the House of Sa‘ūd and the fall of the House of Hāshim.

¹ The Battle of ‘Aqrabā, in which Khālid, the general of the first Caliph Abu Bakr, overthrew the prophet-prince of Yamāmāh, was probably fought about a year after Muhammad’s death (see C. H. Becker, *Islamstudien* (Leipzig, 1924, Quelle und Meyer), vol. i, pp. 73–6.

² This is dealt with separately in Section (vi), pp. 330 *seqq.* below.

³ See Section (vii) (e), pp. 416–39 below.

(b) THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE NAJDĪ-HIJĀZĪ WAR OF 1924-5.

The history of the Āl Sa'ūd had been romantic, and even in the annals of Arabia there had been few examples of such unexpected, rapid, and extreme fluctuations of fortune as had fallen to their lot.¹ The Muhammadu's-Sa'ūd, who became Muhammad 'Abdu'l-Wahhāb's convert about the year 1759, had begun as the master of a single castle. In the might of Wahhabism his successors in the second and third generations had sacked the Shi'ī holy city of Karbalā, on the outskirts of 'Irāq, in 1801, and had conquered Mecca in 1803 and Medina in 1804. Having thus swiftly raised themselves to be masters of almost the whole of Arabia, they were as swiftly overthrown by the Pasha of Egypt, Mehmed 'Alī, who, in successive campaigns from 1810 to 1818, not only drove them out of the Hijāz but besieged and captured Dara'iyah, carried the reigning Sa'ūd captive to Cairo, massacred the Wahnābī doctors of the law, and left the sect and dynasty no corner in Arabia which they could call their own. About 1842, when a decree of the European Powers had deprived the Pasha of Egypt of his holdings in Asia, the grandson of the Wahnābī prince who had been taken prisoner by the army of Mehmed 'Alī, having escaped from his Egyptian captivity, re-established the rule of his House in their homelands, with a new capital at Riyād; but this was only a partial recovery. The Turks occupied the province of Al-Hasā, along the coast of the Persian Gulf, in 1871; and a family quarrel in the House of Sa'ūd over the succession to the diminished Wahnābī principality, which broke out in 1882, enabled the rival House of the Āl Rashīd, from the Jabal Shammar, to seize Riyād and annex the dominions of the Āl Sa'ūd to their own about the year 1885.² 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, who was destined to achieve the true resurrection of the Wahnābī Power, started life as a landless refugee at the court of Shaykh Mubārak of Kuwayt.

The first attempt to recover their ancestral principality which 'Abdu'l-'Azīz and his father 'Abdu'r-Rahmān made with Shaykh Mubārak's support in 1899 or 1900 was defeated by Ibn Rashīd with much slaughter; but in the winter of 1900-1 'Abdu'l-'Azīz marched secretly upon Riyād with 200 men and seized the city by

¹ For the previous history of the Sa'ūd family and the Wahnābī Movement, and for the personal career of 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, see the Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, pp. 354-6; *L'Asie Française*, November 1924; *The Times*, 12th January, 1926; and, above all, Philby, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

² Philby, vol. i, p. 100.

a *coup de main*.¹ What he thus recovered, he held ; and from that date to the time of writing he had steadily gained territory and never lost it. In 1904 he held his own against Turkish troops which had been sent to Ibn Rashīd's assistance ;² in 1906 he deprived Ibn Rashīd of the Qasīm,³ and in 1910 he held that ancestral province against a joint attack by the reigning Ibn Rashīd⁴ and the Sharif of Mecca ;⁵ in the latter year he founded his *Ikhwān* and laid out their first colony at Artāwīyah ;⁶ in May 1913 he conquered Al-Hasā from the Turks ; and on the 15th May, 1914, he signed a treaty with the Ottoman Government. These last two events were of great moment in 'Abdu'l-Azīz b. Sa'ūd's career, for in extending his authority to the shores of the Persian Gulf he was brought into

¹ See Philby's vivid description (vol. i, p. 101), which he had heard from 'Abdu'l-'Azīz's own lips, of 'Abdu'l-'Azīz and his fifteen chosen companions, with whom he had stolen into the heart of the city at dusk, drinking coffee and reading the Qur'ān all night, while they waited to fall upon the Rashidian governor at dawn.

² Philby, vol. i, p. xx.

³ *loc. cit.*

⁴ His predecessor, who was a namesake of 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, had been killed in battle between the Rashidian and Sa'udian forces in 1910 (*The Times*, 12th January, 1926).

⁵ Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, p. 110.

⁶ See the passage quoted from Philby on p. 277 above. These permanent colonies of *Ikhwān*, which Ibn Sa'ūd planted in order to hold together his expanding dominions, may be compared with the permanent military cantonments of the early Arab Caliphate, such as Kūfah and Basrah, Fustāt and Qayrawān. In fact, they appear to have been called by the same name of *amsār* (plural of *masr*). An interesting account of Ibn Sa'ūd's colonization policy is quoted in *Oriente Moderno* (Anno IV, Nr. 10, pp. 641-2) from *Al-Akhhār* of Cairo (10th August, 1924). The policy seems to have had the double object of supplying the Wahhābī ruler with a standing army of fighting-men who owed allegiance to himself and not to their tribes, and of converting pastoral Badu into sedentary cultivators.

'The Government of Najd is taking great pains to diffuse in the heart of the tribes the pure teachings of religion purged of superstition, in order to reduce the nomads to a sedentary life and teach them agriculture. Considerable results in this sense have already been achieved. The tribes addicted to brigandage have been reduced to a sedentary life and are living in regularly laid out settlements (*amsār ma'mūrah*) and busying themselves with agriculture and trade. In addition, all the Badu now conform to the practices and precepts of Islam. The 'Ajman tribe, who were notorious as disturbers of the peace in the territory of Al-Hasā, have now built themselves fixed habitations at Sarār(?) and Haqyīdh(?); the tribe of Mutayr, who are famous for their intractability, have surrendered themselves to a peaceful existence and are living partly at Qaryah—a place which for three years was in dispute between Najd and Kuwayt—while the greater part of them are resident at Artāwīyah ; part of the tribe of Harb is living at Artāwīyah and part at Dakhnah in the territory of Qasīm ; a great part of the tribe of 'Utaybah are resident at Ghatfat in southern Najd, and the greater part of the Shammar are resident in the neighbourhood of Hā'il. The number of *mahjar* or places into which the Badu have come to settle is about sixty, so that now only a few nomadic tribes are left.' (N.B.—These last two statements are almost certainly exaggerations.)

contact with the British Empire, which had kept the peace on the waters of the Gulf for the past hundred years.

At the moment when Ibn Sa'ūd seized Al-Hasā from the Turks, Great Britain was negotiating with Turkey for a convention which was duly signed on the 29th July following; and this convention assigned all those territories, both on the coast and in the interior of the Peninsula, which were then in the hands of Ibn Sa'ūd *de facto*, to the Ottoman sphere of influence. This conjunction of events placed the British Government in an awkward position; but they were released from it by the intervention of Turkey in the General War, when Ibn Sa'ūd, on his part, recognized that by taking sides with Great Britain he would be able to secure his independence *de jure* as well as *de facto*. After more than fourteen months of negotiations, a treaty was eventually signed on the 26th December, 1915, and ratified on the 18th July, 1916.¹

In this instrument,² which was still in force at the time of writing, the British Government took note that Najd, Hasā, Qatīf and Jubayl, with their ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf, were the ancestral dominions of Ibn Sa'ūd; and it recognized Ibn Sa'ūd as the independent ruler of them and the absolute chief of their tribes. The succession was to pass to his descendants, and the individual successor was to be selected by the reigning prince, with the proviso that he should not be a person antagonistic to the British Government in any respect (Art. 1). In the event of aggression by any foreign Power against the territories of Ibn Sa'ūd, the British Government was to aid Ibn Sa'ūd at its discretion if it had not had a previous opportunity of intervening diplomatically (Art. 2). Ibn Sa'ūd pledged himself not to enter into relations with any foreign Power other than Great Britain (Art. 3) and not—without the British Government's consent—to alienate or lease any of his territories or grant concessions to any other foreign Power or its nationals (Art. 4). He further pledged himself (Art. 4) to follow Great Britain's advice unreservedly provided that it were not damaging to his own interests—a condition which might be regarded as almost cancelling the commitment! He undertook to keep open within his territories the roads leading to the Holy Places and to protect pilgrims on their passage to and from the Holy Places (Art. 5). He also undertook to refrain from all aggression against or interference with the

¹ On the British side the negotiations were conducted, and the treaty was signed and ratified, by the Government of India.

² See *Oriente Moderno*, Anno V, Nr. 3, for an Italian translation of the Arabic text published in *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo, 17th February, 1925.

territories of Kuwayt, Bahrayn, and of the Shaykhs of Qatar and of the 'Umān coast¹ who were under the protection of, and in treaty relations with, the British Government (Art. 6). The two parties agreed—though without indicating any time-limit—to conclude a further detailed treaty (Art. 7). Presumably this was to deal, among other things, with the delimitation of Ibn Sa'ūd's territories and the territories of the Gulf Chiefs, which, in previous articles (Arts. 1 and 6), had been left over for subsequent settlement.

Even after the conclusion of this treaty with Great Britain, Ibn Sa'ūd refrained from taking a direct part in the campaign against the Turks. One reason for this was geographical, for, after the British conquest of Basrah on the 21st November, 1914, Ibn Sa'ūd, unlike the Amīr Husayn of the Hijāz, was no longer in immediate contact with Turkish military forces. Another, and possibly stronger, reason was that Ibn Sa'ūd's two principal Arabian rivals, the Amīr Husayn and Ibn Rashīd, happened to take opposite sides—a situation which inclined Ibn Sa'ūd towards *de facto* neutrality. Indirectly, he did assist his British patrons to a slight extent by holding in play the Turkish partisan Ibn Rashīd, who was his hereditary enemy; and the fact that he had entered into treaty relations with Great Britain did restrain him until after the termination of the General War from striking a mortal blow at his Hāshimī rival, who in 1916 had intervened in the War on the British side. Indeed, the officials of the India Office, had they been driven into a corner by infuriated British tax-payers, might have represented with some plausibility that in purchasing Ibn Sa'ūd's benevolent neutrality at £5,000 sterling a month they had made a better bargain than their colleagues at the Foreign Office who had contracted to pay £200,000 a month of the tax-payer's money for Husayn's military co-operation.² Later on, they could have pointed out that the imminent expiration³ of the subsidy was reflected in

¹ The rulers of these principalities were commonly known collectively as 'the Gulf Chiefs'.

² In fairness to all parties, it must be noted that King Husayn could, and did, render much more substantial assistance (military as well as political) to the Allies during the War of 1914-18 than Ibn Sa'ūd. It has been pointed out to the writer that, from first to last, the military operations of the Hijāzī army accounted for 65,000 Turkish troops, at the cost of less than £100 a head of subsidy, whereas, in the British army's operations against the Turks, each Turkish casualty or prisoner cost from £1,500 to £2,000.

³ On the 25th July, 1923, Mr. Ormsby-Gore had stated in the House of Commons, in answer to a parliamentary question, that British subsidies to Arab rulers would come to an end with the current financial year, and that this declaration applied particularly to Ibn Sa'ūd.

Ibn Sa'ūd's intransigence during the Kuwayt Conference of the 17th December, 1923–12th April, 1924,¹ and that the actual cessation of payment on the 31st March of the latter year was followed in less than six months by the Wahhābī invasion of the Hijāz. In the meantime, Ibn Sa'ūd busied himself with Ibn Rashīd, and did not take the offensive against Husayn until he had settled accounts with his nearer enemy.

An inconclusive battle at Jarrah² between the Sa'ūdian and Rashidian forces on the 24th January, 1915, was followed by desultory hostilities, until General Allenby's crowning victory and the signature of the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, deprived Ibn Rashīd of Turkish support. He promptly took cover by placing himself under the suzerainty of King Husayn, but his new patron proved a broken reed. In the summer of 1921 Ibn Sa'ūd's chief captain, Faysalū'd-Dawish, attacked the Jabal Shammar in force; defeated the reigning Amīr 'Abdu'llāh b. Mit'abī'r-Rashīd, in a series of engagements until he forced him to surrender; and thereafter defeated in the field the Amīr's cousin, Muhammad b. Talālī'r-Rashīd, and drove him behind the walls of Hā'il. Early in November 1921, Hā'il surrendered after a two months' siege; the surviving members of the House of Rashīd were carried captive to Riyād; and their dominions were annexed to those of Ibn Sa'ūd.³ The conqueror, who in the meantime had been proclaimed Sultan of the Najd,⁴ acted with statesmanlike moderation. While a small garrison of Wahhābīs was posted in the citadel of Hā'il, the governorship of the Jabal Shammar was conferred upon Ibrāhīmu's-Subhān, the head of a family which had served the Rashīds as wazīrs and was related to them by marriage; and matrimonial alliances with both the Āl Subhān and the Āl Rashīd were contracted by 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd and his son. In their exile at Riyād, the fallen Rashīds were treated with honour.

As for the House of Hāshim, whose fall was to follow, King Husayn was partly a victim of circumstances but still more of his

¹ In this conference at least equal intransigence was, of course, shown by King Husayn, and this at an earlier and more decisive stage. See p. 340 below.

² *The Times*, 12th January, 1926.

³ See *Report on 'Irāq Administration, October 1920 to March 1922* (London, no date, H.M. Stationery Office); and *Oriente Moderno*, Anno I, p. 559, quoting (at second hand) from *Al-Awqāfu'l-'Irāqīyah* ('The 'Irāq Times') of Basrah.

⁴ This style and title were recognized officially by the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq on the 22nd August, 1921 (*Report on 'Irāq Administration, October 1920 to March 1922*, p. 119).

own folly. This may seem a harsh judgement upon an old man of distinguished, if eccentric, character, who sincerely regarded himself as a trustee of the Arab national cause, and who, though he may have been unable mentally to dissociate that cause from his personal ambitions, undoubtedly damaged his personal interests in holding out intransigently for Arab rights outside his own dominions. Yet it was an act of folly to break with the Turks without first having negotiated with Great Britain a definite treaty like that upon which Ibn Sa'ūd had insisted ; for in the long correspondence between the then British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry M'Mahon, and Husayn, which had preceded Husayn's revolt in June 1916, neither party had left the other under any misconception regarding the profound divergence of their views and intentions on a number of important questions—for example, the French claims in Syria. Husayn might still legitimately resent the manner in which the principal Allied Powers eventually disposed of Syria and Palestine in the Peace Settlement. He might reasonably regard the French conquest of the interior of Syria in July 1920 as a violation of his understanding with Great Britain in the spirit if not in the letter ;¹ and the British Government's commitment to the Zionists, which was later in date than their commitment to Husayn, could only be reconciled with the former, even juridically, by some rather fine-drawn legal arguments.² It was not unreasonable, though perhaps it was impolitic, that Husayn should record his protest against all this by refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles or to sign the Treaty of Sèvres—refusals for which he paid in receiving no invitation to the Conference of Lausanne. Again, it did credit to his heart, if not to his head, that, when Great Britain eventually opened *pourparlers* with him, on her own initiative, for a bilateral treaty, his intransigent opposition to the Syrian and Palestinian mandates caused the negotiations to break down, in spite of earnest

¹ Husayn was progressively embittered by learning the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (which were not communicated to him by the British Government but were published by the Bolsheviks from the archives of the Imperial Russian Government at Petrograd), by the discovery that the agreement was to be executed to the letter (save for modifications which benefited the British and the Zionists but not the Arabs), and by the overthrow of the Amīr Faysal's Arab national state in the interior of Syria. King Husayn had hoped that this Syrian state would be a bar to the execution of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and that it would then serve as a support to its parent-state, the Hijāz, in the struggle for ascendancy in Arabia between the Hijāz and the Najd. When this hope was destroyed by the destruction of the Arab national state of Damascus in 1920, King Husayn lost his head and thereafter ceased altogether to behave as a responsible statesman.

² See p. 361 below.

and patient endeavours on the British side to carry them to a successful conclusion. Yet this intransigence loses something of its moral force through having been displayed by Husayn with equal intensity in controversies in which he had not so good a case and in which the issue was not the Arab national cause but solely his personal ambition. It was a moral fault, as well as a fatal error of statesmanship, that while, through his intransigence towards Great Britain, he left himself without any contractual claim to British assistance in case of need, he was not only intransigent but provocative in his behaviour to his Arabian neighbours—particularly towards Ibn Sa'ūd, who in himself was a greater power than Husayn and who had taken care, at the outset, to place his own relations with Great Britain on a firm foundation.

Husayn's attitude towards his Arabian neighbours, while chiefly due to his own character, is partly to be explained by the circumstances in which his revolt against the Turks took its rise. Under the Ottoman régime, he had been styled Amīr of the Hijāz—a style which accurately described his political status and the territorial extent of his authority—yet, from the beginning of his negotiations with Great Britain in 1915, he presented a claim for the independence not only of the Hijāz but of all the Arab countries in Asia; and though he declared that he was not putting forward personal demands, a personal pretension based on this wider claim was the cause of his eventual undoing. The truth appears to be that at that date Husayn was genuinely negotiating as the mandatory of a secret Arab Nationalist Committee at Damascus (which was subsequently discovered and broken up by the Turkish authorities before the negotiations came to an end and the Hijāz revolted), and that instructions from this committee were the origin of those territorial claims which Husayn put forward in regard to Arab independence in 'Irāq, Palestine, and Syria. At the same time, the Arab area for which Husayn claimed independence also included the entire Arabian Peninsula except the British Aden Protectorate, and here he had no title whatever to speak on behalf of his fellow-rulers or their subjects, either in the Ottoman or in the British Zone. The Arab rulers in the British Zone, for example the Gulf Chiefs, were in direct treaty relations with Great Britain already, and in the Ottoman Zone the Idrīsī had just signed the treaty of the 30th April, 1915, while Ibn Sa'ūd was in course of negotiating the treaty which has been described above. Accordingly, the British pledge to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the

limits proposed by Husayn was not only made subject to certain modifications and conditions on account of French claims on Syria, but was given expressly without prejudice to existing British treaties with Arab chiefs; and, even apart from these specific limitations, there was no implication that, in other portions of the area, Arab independence should be interpreted as the rule of the Amīr Husayn. Nevertheless, Husayn, without consulting the British Government, caused himself to be proclaimed 'King of the Arabs' by the notables of Mecca on the 29th October, 1916, and he had himself crowned with the same style on the 4th November following.¹

These pretensions of King Husayn and the decidedly provocative manner in which he attempted to assert them were particularly unwise at a time when the Hijāz was menaced by the resurrection, in the Najd, of a militant Wahhābī power. It is true that, as between King Husayn and Ibn Sa'ūd, there was provocation on both sides; for, although Ibn Sa'ūd did not strike home in the Hijāz until he had disposed of Ibn Rashīd and had ceased to receive a British subsidy, he was preparing the ground during the intervening period by a systematic campaign of Wahhābī proselytization along the eastern borders of the Hijāz—a campaign directed from Riyād with the political object of undermining the authority of the Hāshimīs and extending the influence of the Āl Sa'ūd. The critical point was Khurmah, an oasis three days' journey east of Tā'if on one of the principal routes between Riyād and Mecca. In 1917, after a majority of the people of Khurmah had been converted to Wahhabism, the chief of the oasis, the Sharīf Khālīd b. Lu'ayy, who had been originally appointed to his position by Husayn and owed him allegiance, ejected or made away with the recalcitrant minority of his subjects and seceded to Ibn Sa'ūd.² In these circumstances the statesmanlike course for King Husayn would have been to maintain a strictly 'correct attitude' himself and to rely for eventual redress upon the good offices of the British, who were the patrons and paymasters of both the disputants. Instead, King Husayn embarrassed

¹ Notwithstanding the fact that, on the 30th October, the text of the treaty of the 26th December, 1915, between Great Britain and Ibn Sa'ūd had been communicated to him by a British representative. The British and French Governments did not recognize this style, which involved a territorial as well as a titular pretension, and they therefore simply substituted the title *malik* for *amīr* and addressed Husayn thenceforward as 'King of the Hijāz'.

² His secession was partly due to a personal quarrel between himself and King Husayn (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, pp. 646-7, quoting *Al-Muqattam*, 14th September, 1924.)

the British Government and precipitated a conflict in Arabia by marching out to occupy Khurmah in June 1918, when the struggle between the principal belligerents in the Great War was at its crisis on the Western Front. Three skirmishes, in which the Hijāzīs were worsted, ensued in spite of the British Government's utmost efforts to restore the peace between its two protégés; and while the European Peace Conference was sitting in Paris the tension in the heart of Arabia grew until it discharged itself, in May 1919, in a nocturnal battle at Turabah, about forty miles south-west of the disputed oasis. In this battle the Hāshimī Amīr 'Abdu'llāh b. Husayn (afterwards Prince of Transjordan) was completely defeated, leaving (it was reported) some 4,000 or 5,000 dead upon the field. Ibn Sa'ūd refrained from following up his victory, but Turabah as well as Khurmah remained in his hands, and the heart of the Hijāz thenceforth lay open to Wāhhābī invasion.¹ During the decisive struggle between Ibn Sa'ūd and Ibn Rashīd in 1921 Husayn exhorted his protégé to resist, and promised him military support which never arrived. The same year he took the same course with the House of 'Ā'id, who ruled in the interior of the 'Asīr where the Idrīsī had not succeeded in establishing his authority, with the result that the Āl 'Ā'id challenged the Wāhhābī power and were bloodily defeated. In both cases Husayn's letters of incitement fell into Ibn Sa'ūd's hands.² In the spring of 1922 the Hijāzīs appear to have retaken Turabah and defeated a Wāhhābī force in the neighbourhood of Khaybar;³ but the Wāhhābīs occupied Turabah again a few months later,⁴ and desultory hostilities continued until Ibn Sa'ūd struck his blow in the autumn of 1924. By that time the Hijāz had become completely defenceless through the defection to Ibn Sa'ūd of the leading Badawī tribes of the country, particularly the Harb and the 'Utaybah, whose chiefs had been alienated by the stoppage of their subsidies from King Husayn, consequent upon the stoppage of King Husayn's subsidy from Great Britain.

So far from being sobered by this imminent menace on his eastern border, King Husayn proceeded to alienate his remaining friends. His intransigence towards Great Britain has been explained above, and he could hardly be blamed for being on bad terms with the Turks, the French, and the Indian Muslims (who had denounced him as a traitor to the cause of Islamic solidarity);⁵ but he had no

¹ For the above events see Philby, vol. ii, pp. 168-9.

² *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, p. 647.

³ *Op. cit.*, I, p. 762.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 246.

⁵ See Part I, Section (ii), p. 47 above.

excuse for making himself unpopular with the Pilgrims, on whom the livelihood of the Hijāz depended, or for picking a quarrel with the Egyptian Government, whose goodwill was more than ever valuable to the Hijāz now that Egypt had seceded from the Ottoman Empire.

Since the birth of Islam the Hijāz had never found herself able to stand alone ; for Mecca and Medina, as the Holy Cities of a world religion, had grown in population out of all proportion to the local needs and resources of the country. Thus, under the Islamic dispensation, the only course open to the Hijāz was to exploit her religious prestige by making a profit out of the Pilgrims and by obtaining subsidies from foreign Governments. The General War and the change of régime in the Hijāz seriously diminished the Pilgrim Traffic ; yet, even so, it was estimated (though this figure must not be taken as authoritative) that, on the eve of the Wahhābī invasion of 1924-5, the average annual number of Pilgrims was 120,000 and that they spent in the Hijāz, on the average, £25 (Egyptian) per head.¹ Nevertheless, experience showed that the Hijāz could not live exclusively by the Pilgrim Traffic without exploiting the Pilgrims to such a degree as to endanger the continuance of their visits ; and since no responsible Government in the Hijāz could contemplate killing the goose which laid the golden egg, it was almost indispensable that the profits of the Pilgrim Trade should be supplemented by a foreign subsidy. The handsome Turkish subsidy which King Husayn had forfeited by his revolt in 1916 had been replaced by a British subsidy for the time being ; but, for a non-Muslim Power, this charge was neither a tribute to piety nor a necessity of state, but a temporary expenditure for a specific military purpose ; and, as has been mentioned, the British subsidy came to an end in February 1920.

In these circumstances a statesman at Mecca might have induced Egypt to step into the breach. It is true that Egyptian public opinion started with a certain prejudice against King Husayn—partly because he had thrown in his lot with Great Britain during the General War, and partly because, in the Peace Settlement, so primitive an Arab country as the Hijāz had obtained its independence *de jure* as well as *de facto*, whereas Egypt, who not unreasonably regarded herself as the foremost Arab country, was still very

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 4, quoting from *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, 28th February, 1925. It was noticed that Pilgrims had almost ceased to come from Turkey, even when communications had been reopened after the Lausanne settlement. On the other hand, the Javanese Pilgrims had risen to 50,000, spending an average of £E50 per head.

far from the goal of her national aspirations. On the other hand, Egypt had been the traditional patroness of the Hijāz before the Ottoman conquest in A. D. 1517;¹ the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire had left vacant a role which, traditionally, had invested any Islamic Government which assumed it with the moral leadership of the Islamic World; and Egypt, who had emerged from the General War of 1914–18 with her material prosperity greatly enhanced and her political ambition reawakened, had both the means and the incentive to resume, as far as the special position of Great Britain in Egypt allowed, those relations with the Hijāz which the loss of Egyptian independence in A. D. 1517 had interrupted. The possibility that the mantle of the Ottoman Empire might eventually descend upon Egypt was indicated, after the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate on the 3rd March, 1924, by the consensus of the Islamic World that the Caliphate Conference should be held in the Egyptian capital and by the prompt installation at Cairo of the organizing committee.² Thus, during the post-war period, an honorary patronage of the Holy Cities might have been of considerable value to the Egyptian Government; and, though at this time the relations between Egypt and Great Britain would probably have precluded Egypt from giving the Hijāz either military or even direct political support, King Husayn, had his character been other than it was, might have elicited from a prosperous and ambitious Egypt that missing subsidy which was necessary to the existence of the poverty-stricken Hijāz, in exchange for a timely enhancement of Egyptian prestige through the action of the Hijāz Government. Instead, he chose to administer to the Egyptian Government a wanton rebuff.³

The Egyptian contingent to the Pilgrimage, though no longer the most numerous, was distinguished by the fact that it escorted the *Mahmal* ('load') accompanying the *Kiswah* ('drapery') which the Egyptian Government presented annually for the adornment of the *Ka'bah*. The departure and return of the *Mahmal* were national festivals in Egypt, and the Hijāzī authorities had been accustomed to honour it with a ceremonial reception. Latterly, as the Westernization of the Egyptian people had progressed, the material as well as the spiritual welfare of the Egyptian Pilgrims had begun to

¹ Indeed, the establishment of the Ottoman Sultan's protectorate over the Holy Cities had been an incidental consequence of his conquest of Egypt.

² See Part I, Section (ii) (*f*), pp. 82-3 above.

³ For the following events see *Oriente Moderno*, III, 3, pp. 178-82, and 4, pp. 242-4.

receive attention, and the contingent had been accompanied by doctors. Originally, these appear to have served in a private capacity ; but, while the standard of public hygiene in Egypt was steadily rising, in the Hijāz it had been rapidly degenerating since the substitution of the Hāshimī for the Ottoman régime, until, in anticipation of the 1923 Pilgrimage, the Egyptian Government decided to make public provision for the health of its nationals during their sojourn in the Holy Land. Accordingly, in a telegram of the 17th June, 1923, the Egyptian Government officially requested the Hāshimī Government's consent to the dispatch of two Egyptian medical officers with two dispensaries, who were to take up their quarters at Jiddah and Mecca respectively for so long as the Egyptian Pilgrims remained in the country.

It seems that, in a previous year, a similar request from the Government of the Netherlands had been granted by King Husayn ; but that the two Javanese Muslim doctors who had thereupon accompanied the Javanese Pilgrims had so gravely offended the King by reporting unfavourably upon the public health organization of the Hijāz that Husayn had expelled them from his dominions.¹ He had rejected a similar request from the Indian Government, for fear of creating a precedent which might be cited by other (non-Muslim) Powers with Muslim subjects ;² and any proposal for the establishment of foreign medical missions or hospitals in the Hijāz had become tantamount, in his mind, to an insidious attack upon the sovereign independence of the Hāshimī Government. Instead, however, of discussing the Egyptian Government's request from this standpoint, he refused³ to discuss it at all until the Egyptian Ministry of *Awqāf* had resumed the payment of allowances to certain individuals in the Hijāz whom they had struck off their rolls. The Ministry⁴ was accustomed to make monthly payments, from the Egyptian charitable bequests which it administered, to the poor of Mecca and Medina ;⁵ but these payments were a free gift, to which the beneficiaries had no legal claim, and the Egyptian Ministry, in discharge of its trusteeship, kept a careful list of the recipients, from which it excluded those who were no longer indigent or deserving. For the financial year in question the total sum assigned by the Egyptian Ministry of *Awqāf* to 'the Saints' of the *Haramayn*

¹ *Al-Qiblah* of Mecca, 2nd August, 1923.

² *Communiqué* of the 23rd June, 1923, from the Diplomatic Agency of the Hāshimī Government at Cairo.

³ Telegram of the 18th June, 1923.

⁴ See the Egyptian Government's *communiqué* of the 12th September, 1923,

⁵ Compare the Jewish collections abroad for 'the Saints' in Jerusalem.

happened to be greater than in any previous year ; but a considerable number of former recipients had been struck off the rolls in favour of a larger number of new beneficiaries, and it was to this that King Husayn objected.

In answer to his note the Egyptian Government declined to discuss the question of the *Awqāf* as being irrelevant to its original request, from which it declared that it could not recede. King Husayn remained obdurate and the Egyptian Government likewise, with the result that the *Mahmal*, accompanied by the medical mission, eventually arrived at Jiddah without any agreement between the two Governments having been reached. Thereupon King Husayn refused to allow the Egyptian medical mission to land. The Egyptian Government then obtained a *fatwā* (legal opinion) ¹ from the Rector of Al-Azhar and the Grand Mufti of Egypt to the effect that King Husayn's action in preventing the Egyptian medical officers from making the Pilgrimage absolved the whole Egyptian contingent from their duty to do so ; the *Mahmal* was recalled to Egypt, and the Egyptian Government abstained from the Pilgrimage under protest, though a majority of the Egyptian Pilgrims appear to have proceeded on their own account to the Holy Cities.

In the interval before the Pilgrimage of 1924 the two Governments succeeded in reaching an agreement, as a result of which King Fu'ād authorized the dispatch of the *Mahmal* in a decree of the 17th June ; and this time the *Mahmal* was received at Jiddah with honours and duly proceeded to Mecca.² Here, however, events occurred³ which alienated Egyptian public opinion from King Husayn still further. Meanwhile the extortions to which the Pilgrims were subjected in the Hijāz, both by the public authorities and by private profiteers, reached their climax this year. There was a shortage of water⁴ which caused many deaths, especially among the Javanese, and the liquid was sold by the Badu at fantastic prices.

The effect of these experiences upon Egyptian opinion may be gauged by the following passages from a representative Egyptian journal : ⁵

The Holy Places of Arabia belong to the entire Islamic World. It is a world interest that order should reign there and that the rules of

¹ Text in the Egyptian Government's *communiqué* of the 14th July, 1923.

² *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, p. 521.

³ *Op. cit.*, IV, 10, pp. 639-40 ; *The Times*, 8th August, 1924.

⁴ The cisterns of Mount 'Arafāt were not filled this year in anticipation of the Pilgrims' arrival. It was insinuated that this omission was deliberately designed for the profit of the water-sellers.

⁵ *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo, 15th August, 1924.

hygiene should be observed there. Whoever governs there and derives profit from the influx of Pilgrims is responsible, in the sight of all Muslims, for the good government of that region. . . . Now that the Hijāz is under the government of the Sharīfs, it has fallen into decadence instead of prospering, as had been hoped. . . . The Islamic World has to face the dilemma of either intervening in order to reorganize and civilize the Hijāz, in the interest of the thousands of Pilgrims who visit it, or else disinteresting itself and abandoning the Pilgrims to hardships and epidemics, without any hope that Husayn will concern himself with their welfare.

It is not surprising that the Egyptian public remained indifferent, and the Egyptian Government ostentatiously neutral, when the Wahhābīs invaded the Hijāz a few weeks later.¹

Less blameworthy than Husayn's alienation of Egypt, though far more serious in its consequences to himself and his House, was his failure, during the nine years which intervened between his first negotiations with Sir Henry M'Mahon in 1915 and the Wahhābī invasion of the Hijāz in 1924, to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain. This failure was less blameworthy because, in his relations with Great Britain, King Husayn found himself in a genuine dilemma which was not of his making (except for his improvidence in not insisting upon a treaty before ever he broke with the Turks). In the meantime Great Britain had entered into precise commitments towards France, the Zionists, and the League of Nations, and she would not enter into any agreement with King Husayn which was incompatible with these. If Husayn compacted with Great Britain on these terms he would be sinning against his own conscience and against the public opinion of the Islamic World. On the other hand, so long as he failed to sign a treaty with Great Britain he left himself without cover against Ibn Sa'ūd. If, therefore, Husayn perpetually protracted these negotiations while perpetually objecting to the British drafts,² it would be unjust in this case to blame him overmuch—and such blame would come with particular ill-grace from Great Britain, to whose policy King Husayn's dilemma was ultimately due.

Towards the end of the year 1921 the British Government took the initiative by dispatching Colonel T. E. Lawrence to Jiddah with the mission of obtaining from King Husayn the ratification of the Versailles Treaty, and submitting to him drafts of bilateral agreements between the British and Hāshimī Governments. Colonel

¹ *The Times*, 18th September and 8th October, 1924.

² For a general résumé of these negotiations see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, pp. 650–1, quoting *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, 24th June, 1924.

Lawrence negotiated first with Husayn himself at Jiddah and then with his son and former foreign minister, 'Abdu'llāh, at 'Ammān ; but Art. 22 of the Versailles Treaty (i. e. Art. 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which laid down the principle of 'A' Mandates for certain ex-Ottoman territories) proved an insuperable stumbling-block, and these negotiations came to nothing.¹

Early in the year 1923, when the military triumph of the Turkish Nationalists and the convening of the Lausanne Conference seemed to portend a general settlement of Middle Eastern affairs, King Husayn sent Dr. Nājīyu'l-Asil to confer with Lord Curzon,² first at Lausanne and then in London, and by April 1923 a text³ for submission to the King had been drafted.

By the terms of this draft Great Britain was to recognize and uphold Arab independence in 'Irāq, Transjordan, and the Arab States of the Peninsula, excluding Aden. In regard to Palestine it was put on record that the British Government had already promised that nothing should be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the Arab community there. Great Britain promised her good offices if all or any of the above-mentioned states expressed the desire to take steps towards eventual federation. King Husayn was to recognize the special position of Great Britain in 'Irāq, Transjordan, and Palestine, and to do his best to collaborate with Great Britain in the fulfilment of her obligations in regard to those countries. As regards King Husayn's relations with the rulers of the 'Asīr and the Najd, he was to undertake to maintain friendly relations with them and to do his best to settle the existing boundary disputes by friendly negotiations, while Great Britain was to give her good offices in promoting such a settlement, and was to undertake—if and when the frontiers were definitively determined—to oppose any aggression against King Husayn's territory by every pacific means in her power. Great Britain was not to interfere in King Husayn's measures for the care of the Pilgrims, who were to pay fixed dues per head, the amount to be published (in advance of the Pilgrimage) every year. As far as British nationals were concerned the Ottoman Capitulations were to be abolished in name and reintroduced in substance in King Husayn's dominions.

This draft was taken by Dr. Nājīyu'l-Asil to Mecca,⁴ but the

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, I, p. 629, quoting the *Morning Post*, 9th February, and *Al-Muqattam*, 12th February, 1922. ² *The Times*, 12th February, 1923.

³ Official résumé in *The Palestine Weekly*, 15th June, 1923 ; alleged full text, in French, in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 15th March, 1924.

⁴ He arrived at Jiddah on the 30th April, 1923 (*Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 727).

publication of its provisions raised a storm. The Palestinian Arabs upbraided King Husayn with having betrayed their cause, and the clauses providing for British support to the Hijāz in case of aggression by a third party and for the substantial reintroduction of the Capitulations were severely criticized throughout the Islamic World.¹ The cry was raised that 'a Christian protectorate was being established over the Holy Places of Islam'. Husayn followed his own inclinations by bowing before the storm and declining to sign, and Dr. Nājīyū'l-Asīl returned to London to begin his negotiations over again. Towards the close of the year he was able to submit a new draft to his master; but Palestine once more proved a stumbling-block, and on the 18th January, 1924, King Husayn went to 'Ammān² in order to get into closer touch with the Arab community in Palestine and to discuss the Palestinian problem with the British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the Secretary-General of the Palestine Government, Sir Gilbert Clayton; but these negotiations led to no result, and on the 20th March Husayn left 'Ammān for Jiddah via Ma'ān and 'Aqabah.³ Thereafter he proposed to the British Government to negotiate *de novo* through fresh representatives on both sides; but the British Government insisted on continuing, if at all, through the same channels,⁴ and Dr. Nājī's labours were accordingly renewed. In June 1924 he left London a third time for Mecca with a third draft in his pocket;⁵ but the new formula regarding Palestine proved no more acceptable to King Husayn than its predecessors,⁶ and the indefatigable doctor travelled for the fourth time to London in order to start his fourth series of negotiations. He had hardly made his fourth landing on English soil before he was released from his Sisyphean task by the military intervention of Ibn Sa'ūd.

When King Husayn had to face Ibn Sa'ūd's attack in force, he found himself not only without a treaty with Great Britain but also without the privileges of membership in the League of Nations. The original membership to which he had become entitled through the signature by his representatives of the Versailles Treaty (containing the Covenant of the League) had never been confirmed by

¹ For a review of comments in the Palestinian, Egyptian, and Turkish Press see *Oriente Moderno*, III, 2, pp. 112-15.

² For King Husayn's visit to 'Ammān see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, pp. 158-68. For his assumption of the Caliphate during this visit see p. 64 above.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, p. 239.

⁴ Statement by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in the House of Commons on the 30th April, 1924, in answer to a parliamentary question.

⁵ *The Times*, 18th June, 1924.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 12th August, 1924.

ratification ; and it appears that when his representative presented himself at Geneva in the autumn of 1923 with a view to taking his seat in the Fourth Session of the League Assembly, he was refused admission by the competent committee because he was unable to declare that his Government accepted the Statute of the League without a reservation in regard to mandates. Ibn Sa'ūd, a better diplomatist than his rival, had waited to strike until Husayn, by his own acts, had reduced himself to complete diplomatic isolation.

(c) THE NAJDĪ-HIJĀZĪ WAR (1924-5).

Ibn Sa'ūd's decision to strike in the autumn of 1924 was possibly determined by two events : King Husayn's assumption of the Caliphate at 'Ammān on the 7th March, 1924,¹ which revived the pretensions of the House of Hāshim in a new and peculiarly provocative form ; and the cessation of the British subsidy on the 31st March, 1924, after which Ibn Sa'ūd had little to lose by giving the British Government displeasure.

Early in April 1924 the Sultan of Najd is reported ² to have reorganized his military dispositions throughout his dominions.³ On the 2nd June the Sultan's son and heir, Faysal b. 'Abdi'l-'Azīzi's-Sa'ūd, issued a proclamation 'to the Islamic World and the Arab nation',⁴ in which he not only rejected Husayn's pretension to the Caliphate but made a bid to supplant him in the leadership of the Arab nationalist movement.⁵

On the 4th June, two days after the issue of this proclamation, a congress of the military and tribal leaders,⁶ the 'Ulamā and the

¹ See p. 64 above.

² *Le Temps*, 30th September, 1924.

³ Since the military and the civil organization of the Najd were practically identical, it is possible that this was the occasion when the organization of the Sultanate into four general governorships was carried out (see *Oriente Moderno*, V, 6, pp. 311-12, quoting *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, 6th March, 1926, for an account of the new arrangements).

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, pp. 478-9, quoting from *Al-Akhhbār* of Cairo, 24th June, 1924. From the Indian Khilāfat Committee's letter (see below, p. 297) it appears that the Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Aziz sent King Husayn some kind of ultimatum ten days before the Congress of Riyād, that is, about the 25th May, 1924.

⁵ It is to be noted that while the Amīrs of the provinces of Najd were chosen exclusively from the notables of Riyād, and while the religious authorities were similarly chosen exclusively from among the Wāhhābī Doctors of the Law, the treasury and customs officials were drawn from any Arab country where ability was forthcoming (*Oriente Moderno*, V, 6, p. 312.)

⁶ Including such notables as Faysalu'd-Dawish, the Amīr of Artāwīyah and chief of the tribe of Mutayr, as well as the chief of the Harb and the chief of the Rawāqah section of the 'Utaybah.

Ikhwān of Najd, was opened at Riyād with great formality¹ by the Sultan's father, the old Imām 'Abdu'r-Rahmānī's-Sa'ūd, to discuss petitions which had been received from the *Ikhwān* 'for a campaign (*ghazw*)² and the Pilgrimage'. During the Pilgrimage of a previous year the rising tension between the Houses of Hāshim and Sa'ūd had found vent in a bloody affray between the contingent of Pilgrims from Najd and the Hijāzīs—an international scandal in the streets of the Holy City during the truce of God—and thereafter the Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd (at the instance, apparently, of Great Britain) had interdicted his subjects from taking part in the Pilgrimage, for fear that another outbreak of the kind might bring the two Arabian protégés of Great Britain into open war with one another. At the congress of the 4th June, 1924, the *Ikhwān* declared that they could no longer bear to refrain from performing their religious duty and that, if Husayn offered to prevent them, they would enter Mecca by force. The Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz replied by denouncing Husayn's hostility towards the Wahhābīs and his pretensions to be leader of the Arab Movement and *Amīru'l-Mū'minīn*. At the same time he maintained his interdiction of the Pilgrimage for the current year, on the ground that, however easy it might be for the Najdīs to take Mecca and Medina by force from King Husayn, it would be both unwarrantable and impolitic for them to attempt this (especially in the Pilgrimage season) except as mandatories of the Islamic World, since the Holy Cities were a common possession of all Muslims.

When the Indian Khilāfat Committee read the report of this congress, they lost no time in sending Ibn Sa'ūd that message from the Islamic World for which he was waiting.³ After praising the Sultan's attitude at the congress, they declared :

If Husayn rejects all our proposals, we shall judge it necessary to attack him and occupy his country, in order to render possible the establishment of concord among the Arabs in the Peninsula, and in order that the Arab alliance may be solid and the power of the Islamic community strong.

It seems doubtful whether this letter can have reached Ibn Sa'ūd before he opened his campaign on the 29th August, but undoubtedly

¹ See *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, pp. 643–5, for an account of the proceedings, dispatched on the 11th July, 1924, from Bahrayn and published in *Al-Akhbār* of Cairo, 7th August, 1924.

² The English word *raid* is derived from the Arabic *ghazw* through the Italian *razzia*.

³ Text of their letter in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, pp. 645–6.

it encouraged him in his refusal to make peace until King Husayn and his family had ceased to rule a foot of territory in the Peninsula.

Ibn Sa'ūd's plan of campaign was carefully worked out on an ambitious scale.¹ While the main body of the Wahhābī levy was concentrated at Khurmah and Turabah for a blow at the heart of King Husayn's dominions, three expeditionary forces were dispatched to cut the Hijāz Railway north of Medina and to raid Transjordan and 'Irāq, and supporting columns were sent to Qurā-yātu'l-Milh in the Wādī Sirhān and to Jawf. These northern expeditions, the fortunes of which are related elsewhere,² were not, apparently, intended to be pushed home, but were designed as diversions to prevent the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh and King Faysal from sending help to their father.

On the main front³ the Wahhābīs crossed the border on the 29th August and immediately threatened Tā'if—the best oasis in the Hijāz, where the notables of Mecca were accustomed to spend their summers. A force of Hijāzī regulars arrived on the spot under the command of the Amīr 'Alī b. Husayn; but, receiving no support from the Hijāzī tribes,⁴ 'Alī threw a small garrison into Tā'if, distributed arms to some of the townspeople and the tribesmen, and withdrew his main force to Hadā, about twenty miles to the north-west. Thereupon the people of Tā'if intimidated the Hāshimī garrison, raised the white flag, and opened the gates of the city on the 5th September. The Wahhābī advance-guard rushed in; but unfortunately it was under the command of Khālīd b. Lu'ayy, the chief of Khurmah and Turabah, who had old scores to pay off; a massacre began;⁵ and a number of Meccan notables perished in their summer quarters, before the senior Wahhābī commander, Sultān b. Bijād b. Humayd⁶ arrived and put an end to the slaughter on the afternoon of the following day. A group of twenty-seven distinguished Pilgrims who happened to be still in Mecca addressed a protest to the foreign consuls at Jiddah and to the press of the Islamic World; but the consuls declared emphatically that their Governments would not intervene. It became evident that 'Alī's army was as incompetent to defend Mecca as it had been to defend

¹ *La Syrie* of Bayrūt, 22nd August, 1924; *Le Temps*, 30th September, 1924.

² In Section (vi), p. 341 below.

³ For the details of the Wahhābī invasion of the Hijāz see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, pp. 647–55.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, IV, 12, p. 755, quoting an eyewitness's account.

⁵ For details see *op. cit.*, IV, 12, pp. 756–7.

⁶ Captain of the Baraqah section of the 'Utaybah tribe and Amīr of the settlement (*hijrat* or *mahjar*) of Ghatfat (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, p. 643).

Tā'if; and when it was reported that Wahhābī reinforcements had arrived, there was a panic in the Holy City, and a general exodus of the population began.¹ On the 25th September, the Wahhābīs advanced from Tā'if in force, and on the 27th 'Alī's troops were driven into Mecca from Hadā with the enemy at their heels. At the eleventh hour, King Husayn appealed to the British Government to come to his aid—for example, by sending a small force of aeroplanes to Jiddah²—but, after four years' negotiations, the Anglo-Hijāzī Treaty was still unsigned, and though Husayn appealed to the memory of his intervention on the British side in the General War, his subsequent conduct might perhaps be held to have absolved the British Government from its moral obligations towards him. In any case the British Government refused Husayn's request and officially declared its neutrality;³ and on the 3rd October the unfortunate 'King of the Arabs' abdicated from the throne which he had occupied for eight years.⁴

It was announced at Jiddah⁵ that 'the people of the Hijāz' had 'decided to demand the resignation of the Hāshimī Government directed by King Husayn and the constitution of a Provisional Government for the protection of the country'. This Provisional Government was to be nominated by the people themselves, and it was added that they were 'ready to conform to the orders of the entire Islamic World' and that they had no desire to be at war with anybody. On the 4th October the Amīr 'Alī b. Husayn accepted the position of 'Constitutional Sovereign of the Hijāz', and appointed

¹ *The Times*, 29th and 30th September, 1924.

² *Ibid.*, 1st October, 1924.

³ *Ibid.*, 4th and 6th October, 1924. The British Government grounded its decision to remain neutral, not on the fact that it was under no treaty obligations to King Husayn, but on the opinion that the issue between its two Arabian protégés was one of religion.

⁴ The ex-King Husayn retired from Mecca to Jiddah on the 9th October, 1924 (*The Times*, 10th October, 1924), and sailed on the 14th on his private steam-yacht for 'Aqabah. He lay off 'Aqabah, without establishing himself on shore, until June 1925, when the British Government insisted upon his taking up his residence elsewhere, for fear that his presence at 'Aqabah might expose that port (which Great Britain was then claiming for Transjordan) to a Wahhābī attack (*The Times*, 13th and 19th June, 1925). After rejecting several alternative proposals, Husayn settled, before the end of June 1925, in Cyprus, where he was still living at the time of writing (statement in the House of Commons by the Colonial Secretary on the 24th June, 1925, in answer to a parliamentary question). For the circumstances of Husayn's transfer from 'Aqabah to Cyprus see further Husayn's letter, dated Nicosia, 22nd August, 1925, to Mr. Stanley Baldwin (text in *The Near East* of London, 10th September, 1925) and Mr. Baldwin's reply of the 27th October, 1925 (text in the *Morning Post* of London, 20th November, 1925).

⁵ Text of *communiqué* in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, p. 655.

a new ministry ;¹ and on the 5th this new Hijāzī Government dispatched an official letter to Ibn Sa'ūd, as well as an open telegram via Bahrayn, in which they informed the Sultan of Najd of the change of régime in the Hijāz, and requested him to suspend the advance of his troops and to send delegates to treat for peace.² The immediate purpose of these *démarches* was to save Mecca, but that hope was not fulfilled. King 'Alī evacuated Mecca on the 13th October, and on the same day Khālīd b. Lu'ayy entered the city at the head of the Wahnābī forces.³ This time the *amān* (security or 'quarter') was immediately proclaimed, and there was no massacre or looting such as had disgraced the Wahnābīs' entry into Tā'if. Certain religious monuments, however, were destroyed, and certain rituals prohibited which savoured of idolatry to the puritanical mind of the conquerors.⁴ King 'Alī, with the remnants of the Hijāzī army, threw himself into Jiddah ; with the exception of Yanbu', the other ports of the Hijāz—Rābigh, Lith, and Qunfudah—opened their gates to the conqueror ;⁵ and thus the last ruler of the House of Hāshim, who had already abandoned his father's pretension to be absolute monarch of 'the Arab countries' for the more modest style and title of 'Constitutional Sovereign of the Hijāz', found his dominions confined to the walls of three beleaguered towns : Jiddah, Yanbu', and Medina. Even in Jiddah he was not to be left in peace, for King Husayn's enemies were implacably determined to visit the sins of the father upon the children. On the 7th October the open telegram of the new Hijāzī Government drew from the Indian Khilāfat Committee a telegram to Ibn Sa'ūd, in which they declared that Husayn's sons, as well as Husayn himself, must leave the Hijāz, that the Holy Land must be placed under a democratic government, and that its constitution must be drawn up by the whole Islamic community.⁶ The Government of the Najd declared itself in agreement with these views, and on the 16th October—after the occupation of Mecca—it replied to the Hijāzī Government's telegram of the 5th by declaring that, while the Najd had no intention of annexing or dominating the Hijāz, but would leave the new régime in the Holy Land to be determined by the Islamic World, there could be no peace until both Husayn and his sons had left the country. In

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 656.

² See *op. cit.*, IV, 12, p. 758 for texts of the Hijāzī Government's telegram of the 5th October, 1924, and the Najdī Government's reply of the 16th.

³ *Op. cit.*, IV, 10, p. 657.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, IV, 12, p. 759.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 761.

⁶ Text of this telegram, and of Ibn Sa'ūd's replies to the Khilāfat Committee and to the new Government of the Hijāz, in *op. cit.*, pp. 758-9.

November a peace delegation which went from Jiddah to Mecca received the same answer from the Wāhhābī Governor of the conquered city.¹ Neither King 'Alī nor his supporters were ready for peace on these terms, and for the next fourteen months 'the Constitutional Sovereign of the Hijāz', who deserved a better fate than his father 'the King of the Arabs', remained invested in Jiddah by the rival to whom the dominion of Arabia had fallen.

Meanwhile, the very completeness of his military victory confronted Ibn Sa'ūd with an extremely difficult political problem. In his speech of the 4th June at Riyād, he had rightly predicted that a war between the Najd and the Hijāz on the sacred soil of the Holy Land would excite a dangerous current of feeling against the Najd in the Islamic World. Among the vast conservative majority of Muslims, Wahhabism was tolerated, if at all, on sufferance; and there was an inclination, which lay very near the surface, to denounce its Puritanism as heresy whenever it declared itself in violent or sensational acts, such as an invasion of the Holy Land by force of arms or an iconoclastic purification of the Holy Places. A century earlier the first Wāhhābī Empire had expiated its impious seizure of Mecca and Medina by its overthrow at the hands of Mehmed 'Alī, who had liberated the Holy Cities and carried the war to a conclusion in the heart of the Najd, as the mandatory of the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, with the approval of the Islamic World. After the lapse of more than a century this deeply-rooted Islamic feeling still retained a force which was little affected by political calculations or personal animosities; and in 1924 it was only the politically-minded Western-educated minority that was moved by a resentment against Husayn for having revolted against Turkey in 1916, and by the calculation that Ibn Sa'ūd, as the stronger Power, would be the more effective champion in Arabia of the common Islamic cause, to take satisfaction in the violent overthrow of the House of Hāshim by the Wāhhābīs. This division of Islamic opinion declared itself even in India;² and in Egypt, notwithstanding the recent quarrel with King Husayn over the Pilgrimage,³ the Wāhhābī invasion of the Hijāz reawakened memories of the victorious campaigns of Mehmed 'Alī against the first Wāhhābī invaders of the Holy Land in 1811-18, in which Egyptian nationalism took pride. In 1924 Egypt had neither the power nor the inclination to intervene militarily a second time on the Hāshimis' behalf; but the latent

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 761, quoting *Al-Akhhār* of Cairo, 18th November, 1924.

² *The Times*, 20th November, 1924.

³ See above, pp. 289-93.

hostility towards the Wahhābīs, which these historical memories rekindled, was quickened by the massacre at Tā'if. In Palestine, Syria, and 'Irāq, where the House of Hāshim stood for Arab national aspirations and had championed those aspirations loyally, if with only partial success, the feeling against the Wahhābīs was naturally stronger. The Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine telegraphed to Ibn Sa'ūd a request to suspend operations, and circularized a number of Muslim Governments, societies, and dignitaries for support;¹ and a searching criticism of the Indian Khilāfat Committee's policy toward King Husayn, Mustafā Kemāl Pasha, and the Caliphate appeared in *La Tribune d'Orient* of Geneva,² a journal which represented the views of certain Egyptian and Syrian publicists resident in Europe. The indignation of the Shī'īs, both in India and Persia, was considerably more intense than that of their Sunnī co-religionists of the old school. It remained to be seen whether the 'Modernist' minority in Islam, who not only approved but had to some extent instigated the Wahhābī invasion of the Hijāz, would be strong enough to carry the day. Certain 'Modernist' theologians of Egyptian and Syrian origin supported Wahhabism on religious grounds, as a revolt against superstition and a return to the simplicity and rationality of primitive Islam;³ but the most influential of Ibn Sa'ūd's supporters—for example, the leaders of the Indian Khilāfat Committee—were publicists and politicians whose inspiration was the democratic ideal of the West, and their alliance with a prince who stood not only for a return to the primitive faith of Islam but for a resurrection of the primitive method of empire-building in Arabia, rested on precarious foundations.⁴

Thus the conciliation of Islamic opinion was an urgent but by no means an easy task for the Wahhābī conqueror of Mecca, and he was already embarrassed by certain commitments. It will be remembered that he had undertaken 'to keep open within his territories the roads leading to the Holy Places, and to protect Pilgrims on their passage to and from the Holy Places', in his treaty of the 26th December, 1915, with Great Britain (Art. 5); and no less would be expected of him by the Muslim World. Moreover, in a proclamation published after the capture of Tā'if, he appears to have justified his aggression on the ground that King Husayn had neglected the rights of the Holy Places and had de-

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 12, p. 752.

² *La Tribune d'Orient* of the 20th October, 1924: article by 'Alī Al-Ghayāṭī, translated from the Arabic in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 12, pp. 753-4.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, p. 655.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, V, 12, p. 667.

barred the people of the Najd from making the Pilgrimage, and to have sworn that he had no designs on the Hijāz or the Caliphate, that he would protect all property and persons and would make the Pilgrim routes safe, and that he proposed to leave the question of the Holy Places to be settled by the Muslim World.¹ On the 25th September a second Congress of the Najd appears² to have been held at Riyād and to have come to the following decisions : that the military occupation should be extended to the whole of the Hijāz with the exception of Mecca ; that there should be no peace with the Hijāzī Government so long as the Caliphate Question remained unsettled ; that King Husayn should be deposed ; and that Husayn's pretensions to be Caliph and King of the Arabs should be annulled. The abdication of King Husayn on the 3rd October and the election of his son 'Alī as Constitutional Sovereign of the Hijāz may possibly have been a deliberate response to these demands of the 25th September on the Wahhābī side ; but almost immediately thereafter—whether at the instance of the Indian Khilāfat Committee or under the exhilaration of his own success—Ibn Sa'ūd extended his war aims. On the 13th October, as has been recorded above, he occupied Mecca, and on the 16th he informed the new Government of the Hijāz that the war would continue until all members of the ex-King Husayn's family had been expelled. This ban was not only invidious in itself³—since King 'Alī, who in character and conduct presented a strong contrast to his father, was a deservedly popular figure—but it was a serious reservation upon Ibn Sa'ūd's simultaneous profession that he intended to leave the destiny of the Hijāz to be determined by the Islamic World.

In order to clear up this situation a third Congress of the Najd met at Riyād, under Ibn Sa'ūd's personal presidency, on the 29th October ;⁴ and in the presence of more than three hundred notables—including not only twenty military commanders and numerous local representatives from the various administrative districts of the principality, but five 'Irāqīs, three Syrians, and two Egyptians—the Sultan made an important declaration of policy. After reiterating that the sole purpose of the invasion of the Hijāz was to guarantee the liberty of Pilgrimage and to settle the destiny

¹ *The Times*, 20th October, 1924.

² *Le Temps*, 6th November, 1924.

³ Compare the ban upon the restoration of the Hapsburg Dynasty in Hungary (*Survey*, 1920-3, pp. 289-98).

⁴ A report of the proceedings was telegraphed from Bahrayn on the 30th October and reproduced in *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo, 11th November, 1924. (See *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 12, pp. 759-60 ; and *Le Temps*, 6th and 28th November, 1924.)

of the Holy Land in a manner satisfactory to the Islamic World, he asserted that the situation in Mecca had improved and that the notables who had been exiled by Husayn had accepted his Ibn Sa'ūd's invitation to return home and to receive back their property. He then informed the congress that he had made a compact with the majority of the commanders who had served in the war that the Muslims should be invited to a congress at Mecca to decide the destiny of the Holy City ; and that invitations were to be sent to 'Irāq, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, India, Turkey, and the North African countries. He added that he had already provided for the provisional government of the Hijāz by sending to Mecca a governing commission, on which the Sharīfs and notables of Mecca were well represented, under the presidency of one of his own sons. He defended his refusal to treat with King 'Alī, his insistence that 'Alī should evacuate the Hijāz, and his ban upon the entire family of Husayn, on the ground that this policy was approved by the Indian Muslims and that Mr. Shawkat 'Alī had declared that the Holy City ought not to be the seat of an autocrat ruling by force. In conclusion, the Sultan bid once again for the support of the settled Arab peoples bordering on the Peninsula : the 'Irāqīs, the Syrians, the Lebanese, the Palestinians, and the Egyptians.

After this declaration had been approved by the congress at Riyād, Ibn Sa'ūd published a proclamation to the Islamic World in which he announced officially that he had occupied Mecca, declared that he was on the point of proceeding in person to the Holy City, and requested his co-religionists in all parts of the world to send delegates to meet him there in order to decide what the future régime in the Holy Land should be. In November Ibn Sa'ūd travelled from Riyād to Mecca in state, but his gesture was a failure. The Egyptians looked askance at his proposal for an Islamic Congress at Mecca¹ as an attempt to steal the thunder of the Caliphate Congress² which had been invited to meet at Cairo in the spring of 1925 ; Angora officially declined the invitation ; 'Irāq, Syria, Palestine, and the 'Gulf Chiefs' prayed him to have them excused ; and only the Indian Khilāfat Committee acceded to a proposal which they were suspected of having themselves inspired.³

The Indian delegation, which arrived at Jiddah in December 1924,

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, p. 629, quoting *Al-Muqattam*, 24th November, 1924 ; pp. 668-9, quoting *Al-Ahrām*, 17th November, 1924.

² See pp. 81-90 above.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 12, pp. 761-2.

entered into a public controversy with the Hijāzī Government and eventually left the Hijāz for Egypt without having brought peace any nearer.¹ On the 8th February, 1925, they sailed from Suez for Bombay, while the Hijāzī Government published the correspondence in a Red Book.² Public opinion in Egypt, if accurately reflected in the Press, took the view that the Indian delegation had interfered unwarrantably in the affairs of an independent Government and that their claim to be neutral in the conflict between the Hijāz and the Najd had not been borne out by their acts.³ On the other side, Mr. Shawkat 'Alī, in a letter addressed to the Rector of Al-Azhar University at Cairo apropos of the forthcoming Islamic Conference in that city, denounced 'the traitor 'Alī b. Husayn, who only aims at the satisfaction of his personal ambitions'.⁴

The approach of the Pilgrimage season of 1925 created a problem both for Ibn Sa'ūd and for all Governments with Muslim subjects. The Governments hesitated to allow their nationals to expose themselves to the probable risks and certain hardships of visiting the Hijāz in time of war, when Mecca was held by one belligerent and Jiddah, its natural port, by the other; whereas Ibn Sa'ūd was anxious not to incur the odium of having made the Pilgrimage impossible. The original pretext for his invasion had been the extortion and maladministration to which the Pilgrims had been exposed under the Hāshimī régime; yet King Husayn had never rendered it physically impossible for Muslims to fulfil their religious duty, and if that were to be the result of Ibn Sa'ūd's intervention, he might find himself discredited in the eyes of the Islamic World. Accordingly, on the 25th February, 1925, the Sultan of Najd published a proclamation⁵ to all Muslims far and near informing them that 'Alī b. Husayn was closely blockaded in Jiddah and that he (Ibn Sa'ūd) would not only welcome Pilgrims but would guarantee their security on the road to Mecca from either Rābigh or Līth or Qunfudah. Meanwhile, the Netherlands Government had actually prohibited its nationals from participating in the Pilgrimage until further notice, under the impression of the sufferings undergone by

¹ For the history of this controversy see *op. cit.*, V, 2, pp. 87-90, reproducing an interview with the Indian delegation which had been published in a Jiddah newspaper, and quoting *Al-Muqattam*, 7th and 8th February, 1925; *The Manchester Guardian*, 4th February, 1925; and *The Times*, 10th February, 1925.

² *Muhimmatu'l-Wafdi'l-Hindī fi'l-Hijāz*, published officially at Jiddah on the 10th February, 1925.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 2, p. 93.

⁴ *The Times*, 10th February, 1925.

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 4, pp. 179-80.

Javanese Pilgrims who had been caught in the Hijāz by the Wāhhābī invasion in the previous year.¹ After mature consideration the Egyptian Government did the same.² The Government of India, in two *communiqués* of the 25th April and the 11th May, declined either to prohibit the Pilgrimage or to assume responsibility for any Indian Muslims who might venture upon it.³

Since the previous November the military operations in the Hijāz had been at a standstill. The Wāhhābīs, having driven the remnants of the Hijāzī army behind the walls of Jiddah, Yanbu', and Medina, and having isolated these three places from one another, had not attempted to take them by assault. On the other side, the blockade of the interior—which King 'Alī had proclaimed on the 6th January, 1925,⁴ in retaliation for the action of the Wāhhābīs in advancing up to the walls of Jiddah on the 4th⁵—appears to have caused little embarrassment to the Wāhhābī forces, which were self-supporting, and to have inflicted hardship only upon the civilian population of the Holy Cities. After the conclusion of the Pilgrimage of 1925, Ibn Sa'ūd at length sought a military decision. In August Medina was 'bombarded', and on the 1st September, 2nd October, and 4th and 6th November attacks were delivered upon Yanbu'.⁶

The attack on Medina illustrated the embarrassments to which a Wāhhābī invader of the Holy Land was exposed. On the 20th August the Hijāzī Government announced that the Tomb of the Prophet had been struck by Wāhhābī projectiles; and although Ibn Sa'ūd pointed out that he possessed no artillery, and the damage appeared on investigation to be confined to five bullet-holes,⁷ the report sent a wave of indignation through the Islamic World,⁸ which was far from being neutralized by the indifference of the Turks⁹ and the special pleading of the Indian Khilāfat Committee.¹⁰ On the 30th August King Fu'ād of Egypt sent a personal telegram¹¹ to Ibn Sa'ūd requesting an assurance that the religious monuments in Medina would be safeguarded from injury. Ibn Sa'ūd telegraphed the required assurance on the 4th September; and King Fu'ād,

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, p. 179.

² *Op. cit.*, V, 3, p. 146; 4, p. 179; 5, pp. 237-9.

³ *Op. cit.*, V, 5, p. 237.

⁵ *The Times*, 6th January, 1925.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 22nd January, 1925.

⁶ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, p. 662.

⁷ Statement by the Persian Consul-General in Syria and Palestine, who investigated in person (*Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, p. 663, quoting *Al-Muqattam*, 20th December, 1925).

⁸ Survey in *Oriente Moderno*, *loc. cit.*

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 664.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 666-7.

¹¹ Texts of King Fu'ād's telegram and Ibn Sa'ūd's reply in *op. cit.*, pp. 664-5.

finding himself a hero, proceeded to send to the Hijāz a commission of inquiry.¹ This Egyptian commission reported that the Hijāz was economically prostrate ; that the population of Jiddah and Mecca had dwindled,² and that the people as a whole were indifferent to their political destiny and were yearning for peace at any price. On the other hand, they reported that Ibn Sa'ūd still refused to withdraw from the country until the entire family of Husayn had abandoned their claim to be its rulers and had gone into exile.³

When the Egyptian mission visited Mecca, Ibn Sa'ūd's war-aim was on the point of being attained. Medina, after being reduced to extremities,⁴ capitulated on the 5th December, and Yanbu' followed her example on the 21st.⁵ Meanwhile, King 'Alī had decided, at a council held in Jiddah on the 15th December, to abandon the struggle ; *pourparlers* were opened, through the good offices of the British Consulate, with Ibn Sa'ūd, and were carried through to an agreement. On the 18th December King 'Alī announced his withdrawal⁶ from the Hijāz in a note to the foreign consuls at Jiddah ; the Wahhābīs entered the city peacefully on the 19th ; and on the 22nd King 'Alī sailed for 'Irāq via Aden.⁷ On the 25th December, Ibn Sa'ūd announced officially to the foreign consuls at Jiddah that the war was over.⁸

It was significant that even this triumphal *communiqué* struck an apologetic note. The victor laid stress upon his peaceable disposition ; upon his efforts to spare the Hijāz the rigours of war even at the cost of protracting the campaign ;⁹ upon his proposal for an Islamic Congress at Mecca to decide what the definitive régime in the Holy Land should be ; and upon his exertions to maintain a just and efficient provisional government. Fourteen months' experience had taught Ibn Sa'ūd that the *de facto* possession of the

¹ The commission left Cairo on the 10th September, reached Jiddah on the 24th, visited Mecca, and returned to Cairo on the 4th October, 1925.

² The actual figures given by the Egyptian commission for the populations of the two cities at the time of their visit cannot be taken as authoritative, since their estimate of the pre-war population, which can be checked from other sources, was greatly exaggerated in both cases.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, pp. 665-6, quoting *La Bourse Égyptienne* of the 13th October, 1925.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, V, 12, p. 666, quoting *Al-Muqattam*, 1st November, 1925.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 672.

⁶ It is to be noted that King 'Alī used the word 'withdrawal' (*insihāb*), not 'abdication' (*tanāẓul*).

⁷ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, p. 673.

⁸ Text of announcement in *op. cit.*, VI, 1, p. 44.

⁹ Students of modern European history will be struck by the parallel between the siege of Jiddah, 14th October, 1924-19th December, 1925, and the siege of Gaeta, November 1860-13th February, 1861.

Holy Land was not an unmixed blessing ; and, leisurely though the campaign had been, he had now completed his conquest before he had solved the problem of its disposal.

(d) THE PROCLAMATION OF SULTAN 'ABDU'L-'AZĪZ B. SA'ŪD AS KING OF THE HIJĀZ AND THE ISLAMIC CONGRESS AT MECCA (1926).

After the fiasco of his first attempt to convene an Islamic Congress at Mecca in the autumn of 1924, the victorious Sultan of Najd appears to have thought of installing some new ruler who would be agreeable to himself as well as to his co-religionists ; and both the Sharif 'Alī Haydar (Husayn's cousin and rival) and the Sayyid Ahmadu's-Sanūsī seem to have occurred to him as possible candidates. The Sanūsī actually made his way from Turkey to Mecca, via Syria, Palestine, Jawf, and Hā'il, towards the end of 1924. From the political point of view his friendship with the Turkish Nationalists, his general prestige in the Islamic World, and the presence of a number of Sanūsīyah *Zāwīyahs* in the ranges of the Harb Badu between Mecca and Medina were points in favour of his candidature ; but he quarrelled with his Puritan hosts over the question of whether it was legitimate to make the Pilgrimage to the tomb of one of the Prophet's wives ; and, after being stigmatized as an apostate, a heretic, and a polytheist, the outraged saint was sent off under escort to South-Western Arabia on the thankless mission of composing the feud between the Idrīsī and the Imām.¹

Having been baffled in this direction Ibn Sa'ūd sought a new opening in an interview which he gave on the 2nd July to a second Indian delegation which had come to Mecca for the Pilgrimage. On this occasion he insisted on two points : the strict, though primitive, orthodoxy of his faith and his absolute political independence, notwithstanding his treaty with Great Britain.² On the 20th July he followed this up with a manifesto³ to the Islamic World, in which, after publicly expressing his appreciation of the Indian Khilāfat Committee's support, he reopened the suggestion for an Islamic Congress at Mecca, while announcing that he would wait to renew his invitation until the means of communication had improved. Finally, on the 26th October, 1925, he addressed a circular note⁴ to the Egyptian, Turkish, 'Irāqī, Afghan, and Persian

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 3, pp. 146-7 ; V, 6, p. 310 ; and V, 12, p. 674.

² *Op. cit.*, V, 9, pp. 659-60, quoting *Al-Ahrām*, 6th August, 1925.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 9, pp. 451-2, quoting the Wahhābī journal *Ummu'l-qurā* of Mecca, 24th July, 1925.

⁴ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, pp. 667-8.

Governments, in which he called God to witness the following declaration :

I did not desire to make myself master of the Hijāz or to take dominion over it. The Hijāz is a trust placed in my hands until the moment when the Hijāzīs shall elect a ruler from among themselves—a ruler who shall regard himself as the servant of the Islamic World and shall work under the control of the Muslim peoples.

Ibn Sa'ūd then recapitulated as follows the points on which he stood pledged to the Islamic World. The Hijāz was to belong to the Hijāzīs in matters of government but to the Islamic World in matters concerning the religious rights of all Muslims. The future sovereign of the Hijāz was to be elected by a referendum taken under the control of the Islamic World, and Ibn Sa'ūd would then resign his trust into the hands of the new sovereign—but only under certain conditions : the *Sharī'ah* was to be the law of the land ; the Government of the Hijāz, while independent in its internal affairs, was not to have the right to make war, or to conclude economic treaties with any non-Muslim state, or to conclude political treaties with any state whatsoever ; and the constitution and frontiers of the Hijāz were to be determined by an Islamic Congress, in which the Khilāfat Committee and two other private Indian associations were to be represented, as well as all independent Muslim Governments. The note concluded with an invitation to the Governments addressed to co-operate with Ibn Sa'ūd in bringing the proposed congress together.

This invitation, again, provoked unfavourable comments in Egypt—where it was pointed out that the first proposal for a general Islamic Congress had emanated from Egypt and that the Najd had been one of the first Muslim states to accept the invitation to Cairo—and the Hijāzī Government protested against it with its last breath ; ¹ but ' nothing succeeds like success ', and on the 8th January, 1926, less than three weeks after the surrender of Jiddah and the withdrawal of King 'Alī, the Egyptian Government announced ² its intention to resume its official participation in the Pilgrimage.

Meanwhile, the notables of Mecca cut the Gordian knot by exercising the right of self-determination, which had been promised them by Ibn Sa'ūd, in the only manner open to them in the circumstances. They met in council and passed a resolution to the effect that the Hijāz should belong to the Hijāzīs, that the people of the Hijāz

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, pp. 667–9, quoting *Al-Ahrām*, 17th November, and *Al-Muqattam*, 9th December, 1925.

² *The Times*, 9th January, 1926.

should administer their own affairs, that Mecca should be the capital of the whole Hijāz, and that the office of King of the Hijāz should be conferred upon his Highness the Sultan of the Najd and its dependencies, on condition that he governed in accordance with the Book of God, the *Sunnah* of His Prophet, and the conduct of the primitive Muslims. This resolution was presented to Ibn Sa'ūd and was supported by declarations to the same effect from the notables of the other cities of the Hijāz; the terms of the resolution were then embodied in an act of allegiance (*bay'ah*), which Ibn Sa'ūd signed; and the public ceremony of the declaration and acceptance of allegiance took place at Mecca on the 8th January. On the same day the new King of the Hijāz appointed a constituent body of fifty-one members, including three Najdīs; and on the 13th January he appointed his own son Faysal President of the Provisional Government—pending the preparation of a constitution—with a consultative council of two Hijāzīs and one Najdī to advise him.¹ Presumably Ibn Sa'ūd calculated that Islamic opinion would accept at the hands of a victor a *fait accompli* which it would have censured so long as his rival remained in the field. At any rate, on the 14th January, 1926, the following *communiqué*² was published in Cairo by 'The Agency of the Kingdom of the Hijāz and of the Sultanate of the Najd and its dependencies':³

Telegrams received from His Highness the Sultan state that the People of the Hijāz have proclaimed him King of the Hijāz. His Majesty would have preferred in all sincerity that this step should be deferred; but the People of the Hijāz, in the exercise of their inherent right to elect themselves a ruler, have insisted with him upon his acceptance, and he has not been able to excuse himself from giving them satisfaction. His Majesty does not cease to regard himself as bound by the pledge which he has given to the Islamic World regarding the rights which Muslims possess in the Holy Places. He is ready to accept the views of the Islamic World in all that concerns the comfort of Pilgrims and visitors and the means of giving them security, and he is equally ready to assist every well-wisher of the Holy Land and its inhabitants.

Thus the political complication in the Hijāz was cut instead of being unravelled; but it may be doubted whether such an experienced and far-sighted statesman as 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd was altogether satisfied with this solution.

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 2, pp. 101-3, quoting *Al-Ahrām* of the 25th and 27th January, 1926.

² Text in *op. cit.*, VI, 1, pp. 43-4.

³ *Wikālatu Mamlakati'l-Hijāzi wa-Sultānati Najdīn wa-Mulhaqātihā bi-Misr.*

It is true that, within the next ten weeks, he was officially recognized as King of the Hijāz by the Governments of Great Britain, France, the U. S. S. R., and the Netherlands¹—that is, by the principal non-Islamic Powers which at that time bore rule over Islamic populations ; but he had still to legitimize his position in the eyes of the Islamic World, which had started with a prejudice against Wahhabism and had been scandalized by the violence with which the Puritans had suppressed the cult of saints in the conquered Holy Land ;² and he had also to win the loyalty of the Hijāzīs, who smarted under a conquest that had opened with the atrocities at Tā'if and had brought acute economic distress upon the whole country before its long-delayed completion.

As a conciliatory gesture towards the Hijāzīs, he announced, in the spring of 1926, his decision to set up five local consultative councils—the members to be elected and the presidents to be nominated by the Government—at Mecca, Medina, Jiddah, Yanbu' and Tā'if, and a general consultative council to be composed of delegates from the local councils and representatives of the Badawī tribes ;³ but the intended effect of this concession was counteracted in advance by a series of penal ordinances, published on the 23rd April, against non-attendance at the Friday prayer, the consumption, sale, and manufacture of alcoholic beverages, the smoking of tobacco, and the freedom of meeting and speech ;⁴ and the first elections, held in May, were overshadowed by the simultaneous imprisonment or deportation of sixteen Hijāzī notables who were accused of seditious action in favour of the House of Hāshim.⁵ As conciliatory gestures towards the Islamic World Ibn Sa'ūd obtained a *fatwā* from fifteen Medinese 'ulamā supporting, though without enthusiasm, his Puritanical campaign against idolatry ;⁶ and on the 25th February he published a proclamation⁷ guaranteeing the security of Pilgrims throughout their sojourn in the Holy Land ; but he still felt so uncertain of his position that, on the 28th April, 1926, at the risk of a second rebuff, he issued fresh invitations to an Islamic Congress at Mecca, for the beginning of June.⁸

In the circular telegram of invitation,⁹ the King-Sultan announced

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, II, 4, p. 222.

² See *op. cit.*, VI, 5, pp. 287–8 for the suppression of these cults and the destruction of the tombs and shrines round which they centred.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 289–90. ⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 289. ⁵ *Op. cit.*, VI, 7, pp. 401–2.

⁶ See *op. cit.*, VI, 5, pp. 288–9, for texts of the question and answer.

⁷ See *op. cit.*, VI, 4, p. 220, for the text.

⁸ That is, for 20th Dhū'l-qa'dah, A. H. 1344.

⁹ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, p. 285.

that the objects of the Congress were to promote the well-being of the Hijāz and its inhabitants and the security of Pilgrims, and to fulfil his previous undertakings to refer the destiny of the Holy Land to the decision of the Islamic World. He thus implicitly excluded from the agenda the question of the Caliphate,¹ which was due to be discussed at the forthcoming congress at Cairo.² Invitations were sent to the Governments of four Islamic countries—Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and the Yaman—which were independent both *de jure* and *de facto*;³ to those of two countries—Egypt and ‘Irāq—which were independent *de jure* but not altogether *de facto*; to one Islamic ruler—the Amīr ‘Abdu’l-Karīm in the Moroccan Rif—who was independent *de facto* but not *de jure*; to one Islamic ruler—the Bey of Tunis—who was both *de jure* and *de facto* under the protectorate of a Western Power; to two Muslim official bodies—the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine⁴ and the Central Religious Directorate for the Muslims of the R.S.F.S.R.;⁵ to five private associations—three in British India and two in the Dutch East Indies; and to three individual religious dignitaries—two in Damascus and one in Algiers.⁶

The opening of the Congress, which actually took place on the 7th June, 1926,⁷ was attended by nearly sixty delegates;⁸ but, apart from the delegation representing the Muslims of the U.S.S.R.,⁹ all these delegates were entirely unofficial, except for those who represented Ibn Sa‘ūd’s own dominions of the Najd, the Hijāz, and the ‘Asīr. The Turkish Government, which this time had accepted Ibn Sa‘ūd’s invitation,¹⁰ had delayed in sending its delegation, and the other Governments had not yet replied. When, however, the Congress, after suspending its sittings from the 17th to the 26th June

¹ On this point see the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 19th April, 1926.

² See Part I, Section (ii) (*f*) above.

³ An invitation addressed to ‘The President of the Government of Western Tripoli’ was received and acknowledged by the Italian Governor of Libya (*Oriente Moderno*, VI, 8, p. 418).

⁴ See p. 364 below.

⁵ For this organization, which had its seat at Ūfā, see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, pp. 319–20.

⁶ One of the two Damascenes invited was Shaykh Badru’d-Dīn, the father of the Qādi Shaykh Tājū’d-Dīn.

⁷ That is, on the 26th Dhū’l-Qa’dah, A.H. 1344.

⁸ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, pp. 312–13; *The Times*, 9th June, 1926.

⁹ For the composition of this delegation see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 286–7. It was noteworthy that the delegation dissociated itself from the Soviet Government and insisted on being called, not ‘The Russian Delegation’, but ‘the Delegation of the Russian Muslims’. For further light on the attitude of the Russian Muslims towards the Soviet Government see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, pp. 155–8.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, VI, 5, p. 286; *Le Temps*, 13th May, 1926.

on account of the Pilgrimage, reopened on the 27th, not only a Turkish but an Afghan and a Yamanī official delegation made their appearance.¹ A few days earlier, the Egyptian Government had also decided to send a delegation.² On the other hand, on the 23rd June the Persian Government announced its refusal to participate, in a note³ which was a violent indictment of Wahhābī behaviour in the Holy Land. The Egyptian official delegation duly arrived on the 30th June,⁴ and an official delegate from the Idrīsī on the 4th July.⁵

In his inaugural address⁶ (read out for him by Shaykh Hāfiz Wahbah)⁷ Ibn Sa'ūd showed statesmanship by imposing only one limitation upon the freedom of discussion, which was that the Congress should confine its attention to the affairs of the Hijāz and not concern itself with international questions or with issues between Muslim peoples (outside the Hijāz) and their respective Governments. At the last meeting of the session, however, on the 5th July, Ibn Sa'ūd transgressed his own ruling by causing a resolution to be moved regarding the status of 'Aqabah and Ma'ān—two places on the borderline between the Hijāz and Transjordan which, a year earlier, had been expressly claimed for Transjordan by the British Government in its capacity as mandatory Power.⁸ The resolution of the 5th July, 1926,⁹ which was proposed by the Syro-Egyptian Sayyid Muhammad Rashīd Ridā and seconded by the head of the Indian Khilāfat Committee delegation, asserted that historically 'Aqabah and Ma'ān were integral parts of the Hijāz, and that their annexation to Transjordan—a country under the mandate of a non-Muslim Power—was a direct violation of the Prophet Muhammad's dying injunctions ; and it committed the Congress to protesting against the annexation and instructing 'the *de facto* ruler' (*Wāliyu' l-amr*) in the

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, p. 353.

² *The Times*, 24th June, 1926.

³ Translation of the text in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, p. 310. Compare *The Times*, 25th June, 1926.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, p. 354. Upon the arrival of the Egyptian official delegation, the private Egyptian members of the Congress withdrew. The Egyptian delegation raised objections to the separate representation of the Sudan (*op. cit.*, VI, 6, p. 316).

⁵ *Op. cit.*, VI, 7, p. 358.

⁶ For the proceedings of the Congress see *Revue du Monde Mussulman*, vol. lxiv, 1926 (2^{me} trimestre) and *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, pp. 309-17 and 7, pp. 353-62. See also three articles (published in *The Times*, on the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd July, 1926) by Sirdār Iqbāl 'Alī Shāh, a Western educated Afghan who attended the Congress from the opening as a private member. See further the interview with the Turkish delegate, Edib Servet Bey, copied from the *Hākimiyyet-i-Milliyeh* in *Le Temps*, 12th August, 1926.

⁷ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, pp. 310-12.

⁸ For this claim see p. 342 below.

⁹ Translation of text in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, p. 360.

Hijāz to do everything in his power to obtain the retrocession of the two places. This resolution was carried ; but it was noteworthy that the Egyptian official delegation not only refused to join in discussing it, on the ground that it was outside the scope of the agenda, but withdrew while the discussion took place ; and that the Turkish and Afghan delegations, while they did not withdraw, abstained from participation. On the 16th June the non-official members of the Congress, a majority of whom appear to have voted for the motion of the 5th July, had shown greater discretion when, pending the arrival of the Turkish, Afghan, and Yamanī delegations, they had postponed discussion of a more sweeping resolution, regarding the independence of the whole *Jazīratu 'l-'Arab*, which had been brought forward by the Indian delegate Mr. Shawkat 'Alī.

While on this international issue the Indian delegates and the Wahhābīs saw eye to eye, they differed acutely on one of the most important questions which came within the proper scope of the Congress, namely, the cults of saints at shrines and tombs, which the Wahhābīs proscribed as idolatrous. On the 8th June the '*ulamā*' present at the Congress attempted to postpone the raising of this dangerous issue by announcing, in a joint declaration, their intention to form a commission of eight '*ulamā*—two each from the Najd, British India, Egypt, and Java—who were to draw up regulations on the subject at leisure. At the last meeting, however, on the 5th July, Mr. Shawkat 'Alī insisted on bringing forward a resolution¹ to the effect that the religious monuments destroyed by the Wahhābīs should be repaired forthwith ; that those not yet destroyed should be looked after and safeguarded ; and that the work of repair should be entrusted to a mixed commission of Sunnī and Shī'ī '*ulamā*', whose decisions should be definitive. At the suggestion of an 'Asīrī delegate, the Congress disposed of this resolution by referring it to the commission of eight which had been contemplated in the declaration of the 8th June.

On this matter, in which the Puritanism of the Wahhābīs was most readily excited to a fanatical pitch, the general sense of the Congress was evidently averse from pressing Ibn Sa'ūd too hard—the more so since the cults of the saints were merely customary and could hardly be justified on a strict interpretation of the *Sharī'ah*. The Wahhābīs, however, had not only suppressed what they regarded as idolatrous practices in the Hijāz but had interfered with the liberty of Pilgrims to practise three out of the four *madhāhib* or rites which were recog-

¹ Text in *op. cit.*, p. 361.

nized as equally orthodox in the Sunnī community. Since the Hanbalite *madhhab*, which alone was tolerated by the Wahhābīs, had hardly any adherents except the Wahhābīs themselves, this interference with religious liberty had aroused widespread resentment ; and, on the 30th June, a resolution ¹ in favour of equal liberty for the practice in the Hijāz of all four *madhāhib* was proposed jointly by one Russian, one Afghan, one Yamanī, and three Indian delegates, and was supported, in the name of Islamic solidarity, by the official representatives of Turkey and Egypt. In deference to the strenuous opposition of the Najdīs, this resolution was defeated by twenty-seven votes to twelve ; but its defeat aroused so violent a storm that another resolution to much the same effect,² which was moved by the Egyptian delegate next day, was carried.

On the other hand, Ibn Sa'ūd defeated all attempts—such, for instance, as were made by the Indian delegate Mr. Shawkat 'Alī on the 14th June and by the Turkish, Afghan, Russian, and Yamanī delegations in a joint resolution of the 3rd July ³—to introduce a fixed tariff for charges payable by Pilgrims or to establish the principle that the Government of the Hijāz was accountable to the Islamic World for the expenditure of the revenue which it derived from the Pilgrim Traffic. Indeed, the Wahhābī King of the Hijāz emulated his Hāshimī predecessor in the jealousy with which he regarded the interference of foreign Muslims—a jealousy which he carried so far as to veto the formation of an international Islamic company for the construction of additional railways in the Hijāz, though these railways were to serve the Pilgrims and were to be paid for by voluntary contributions from Muslims abroad.⁴

Political and religious controversy, however, was not the outstanding feature of the Mecca Congress. The time, attention, and energy of the delegates were principally occupied in promoting the material well-being of the Pilgrims by discussing non-contentious and matter-of-fact details of public administration, such as might have appeared on the agenda of the various technical organizations of the League of Nations at Geneva. While it was recognized that the public security established in the Hijāz by Ibn Sa'ūd was effective, there was much dissatisfaction in regard to hygienic conditions.⁵ A Palestinian delegate drew an unfavourable comparison

¹ Text in *op. cit.*, p. 355.

² Text in *op. cit.*, p. 356.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 359. The difficulty was surmounted by a proposal that the funds for constructing such railways should be constituted into *awqāf*.

⁵ See the statement by the Turkish delegate (*Le Temps*, 12th August, 1926).

between the indifference regarding the health and convenience of Muslim Pilgrims in the Hijāz and the care taken of Christian Pilgrims at Jerusalem. An 'Asīrī delegate moved that, 'for hygienic and economic reasons', steps should be taken to utilize the carcasses of the victims sacrificed on the 10th Dhū'l-Hijjah at Minā. He estimated that carcasses of an average aggregate annual value of £E20,000, which might have been given to the poor, were left to rot on the ground.¹ On the 3rd July, the Congress adopted a series of resolutions,² moved by one of the official Egyptian delegates, Colonel Al-Masīrī Bey, which aimed at making comprehensive provision for the Pilgrims' welfare. The Governments and the Muslim communities of the countries from which Pilgrims came were to be urged to found permanent hospitals in the Hijāz and to send annual medical missions for the period of the Pilgrimage; and detailed proposals were made for the organization, during the Pilgrimage Season, of first-aid patrols of motor-cyclists, for the opening of dispensaries, for the building of sanitary slaughter-houses and latrines, and for the improvement of the water-supply.

Proposals were also made by Al-Masīrī Bey and by Mr. Shawkat 'Alī for the construction of motor-roads and railways from the Red Sea ports to Mecca and Medina, and these projects were accepted by Ibn Sa'ūd, though, as has been mentioned above, he vetoed both the formation of an international railway company and the earmarking of the public revenue derived from the Pilgrim Traffic. As an alternative method of raising the funds for these various public works—the necessity of which the Sa'udian Government did not deny—the Najdī delegation secured the adoption of a resolution³ demanding that the income from the *awqāf* (Pious Foundations), which had been founded in the Hijāz and in other parts of the Islamic World for the benefit of the Holy Cities, should be strictly applied in future to the purpose originally intended by the founders. The most important of the *awqāf* in question was the Hijāz Railway, which had been constructed, before the General War of 1914–18, by the Ottoman Government out of funds raised throughout the Islamic World by voluntary subscription, in order to place Medina (and eventually Mecca) in direct communication by rail with Damascus and the Mediterranean coast. Since the War the Hijāz Railway had almost ceased to work—partly as a result of damage incurred in the course

¹ Compare the observations of the Apostle Judas Iscariot in the Gospel according to St. John, xii. 5.

² Text in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, p. 357.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, VI, 6, p. 315.

of the military operations, but still more on account of the territorial arrangements of the Peace Settlement, which had drawn three international frontiers across the track of the line. Instead of running from end to end through Ottoman territory, the Hijāz Railway now started in Palestine at Haifa, traversed a corner of Syria,¹ ran out of Syria into Transjordan, and eventually passed, through the disputed district of Ma'ān, into Hijāzī territory. The line was thus partitioned between the independent Kingdom of the Hijāz and three other states which were under British and French mandates. On the 15th June the Congress unanimously adopted a resolution,² moved by one of the Palestinian delegates, in which the Executive Committee of the Congress and the Government of the Hijāz were requested to demand from the two mandatory Powers the rendition of those sections of the Hijāz Railway which ran through the territories under their respective mandates, and to appeal to the League of Nations in case the mandatories refused.³

The Congress showed that the humanitarianism as well as the materialism of the West had gained an influence over its members by adopting an anti-slavery resolution⁴ which was moved on the 3rd July by the leading representative of the Association of Indian 'Ulamā. A commission was to be appointed to inquire into slavery and the slave-trade in the Hijāz and to present proposals to Ibn Sa'ūd's Government for the suppression of both, in so far as they were in conflict with the *Shari'ah*.⁵

The Congress took a keen interest in its own organization and procedure. At its second sitting on the 8th June it provisionally adopted Arabic as its official language, and decided that each delegation should employ as its spokesman the best Arabist among its members ; but this decision was ignored by Mr. Shawkat and Mr. Muhammad 'Alī, the representatives of the Indian Khilāfat Committee, who declined to

¹ The branch line from Dar'ā to Damascus lay wholly in Syrian territory.

² Text in *Oriente Moderno*, loc. cit.

³ The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League was already alive to the fact that the Hijāz Railway was a public trust and not the property of the Governments through whose territory it ran ; and it had cross-examined the accredited representative of France regarding the administration of that section of the line which ran through Syria. (See *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission* [C. 174. M. 65. 1926, vi], pp. 39-40 and 104.)

⁴ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, p. 358.

⁵ Since, in Primitive Islam, Muslims had been exempt from slavery, and since it was unlawful for non-Muslims to reside in the Hijāz, it was deduced that the existence of slavery and the slave-trade in the Hijāz was contrary to the *Shari'ah*.

have their tongues tied and repeatedly scandalized their colleagues by addressing them in Urdu and English.¹ Four sittings (from the 9th to the 13th June inclusive) were devoted to the drafting of a statute (*qānūn asāsī*). The Congress constituted itself into a permanent organization, styled 'The Congress of the Islamic World' (*Mu'tamaru'l-'Alami'l-Islāmī*), which was to assemble annually at Mecca and to extend its scope from the Holy Places and the Pilgrimage to Islamic affairs in general.² The Islamic World was mapped out into areas which were to be entitled to separate representation. A drafting committee was appointed, and the official delegations from Turkey, Afghanistan, the Yaman, and Egypt were invited, after their arrival, to meet this committee and present their observations. On the 3rd July these four delegations proposed that the coming into force of the statute should be postponed for a year in order to allow them time to refer the text to their respective Governments; but the Congress declared the statute binding upon all delegations which had approved it, and pointed out that if the four official delegations had not arrived so late they would have been represented on the drafting committee.³ Before breaking up the Congress appointed, on the 5th July, a provisional standing committee, and arranged for the subsequent election of a permanent standing committee of six 'whole-time' members—one of whom was to be a Turkish railway engineer, another an Egyptian architect, another an Indian financier, and another a Syro-Palestinian educationalist, while the fourth and fifth were to be experts in hygiene and law who were to be the common representatives of the Hijāz and the Najd. The Turkish, Afghan, and Egyptian official delegations, however, gave notice that the appointment of this committee was beyond the scope of their instructions. The Egyptian and Yamanī official delegations also declared formally that they did not regard themselves as bound by the terms of Ibn Sa'ūd's message to the Congress, in which he had set forth his line of conduct in religious and political matters.

The Pilgrimage of the year fell in the latter part of June while the

¹ See *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, pp. 313 and 315; 7, p. 354; see also the article by Sirdār Iqbāl 'Alī Shāh in *The Times* of the 23rd July, 1926.

² On the 28th June one of the Indian delegates to the Cairo Caliphate Congress, Ināyatu'llāh Khān, addressed an identical letter to the President of the Cairo Congress and to Ibn Sa'ūd proposing that the two Congresses should be amalgamated (Text in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, p. 321).

³ It was noteworthy that the non-official members of the Congress were not at all in awe of the official delegations. At the first sitting Mr. Muhammad 'Alī raised a storm by proposing that the Presidency of the Congress should be conferred on the Turkish delegate, who had not yet made his appearance (Article by Sirdār Iqbāl 'Alī Shāh in *The Times*, 23rd July, 1926).

Congress was in session.¹ Ibn Sa'ūd not only provided public security but fixed maximum prices for the transport of Pilgrims from Jiddah to the Holy Cities,² and the number of Pilgrims who arrived this year from overseas was estimated at 60,000.³ Trouble, however, once more arose over the Egyptian *Mahmal*.⁴ After having announced, on the 8th January, its intention to resume participation in the Pilgrimage, the Egyptian Government ascertained in April that Ibn Sa'ūd intended to impose certain humiliating restrictions on the customary ceremonial of the *Mahmal*, on the ground that it savoured of idolatry. After a diplomatic correspondence which appears to have been as arduous as that which had been provoked by King Husayn in 1923, the Egyptian Government at length induced Ibn Sa'ūd to sanction the traditional procedure, except that the military escort of the *Mahmal* were not to smoke or to play their music. Accordingly the *Mahmal* started out on its customary itinerary ; but on the 19th June, during a halt at Minā, the Najdī Pilgrims encamped on the spot were infuriated by the bugle-calls of the Egyptian escort and began to stone the Egyptian caravan. Ibn Sa'ūd, informed of what was happening, at once sent his son Faysal to intervene, with a party of Najdī troops ; but, before these had succeeded in dispersing their fanatical countrymen, the Egyptians opened fire, with the result that twenty-five Najdī Pilgrims (men, women, and children) and forty camels were killed, and Ibn Sa'ūd had to intervene in person to stop the fighting. Officially the incident was closed by an exchange of letters between the King and the Egyptian Amīrū'l-Hajj. On the 27th, however, fresh difficulties arose because the Wahhābī authorities believed that the *Mahmal* was being made an object of idolatrous adoration ; and on the 30th the Egyptian Government found it advisable to promulgate a decree recalling the *Mahmal* to Egypt forthwith, though it had not yet visited Medina.

Thus, though the Mecca Congress had proved unexpectedly successful, the Wahhābī domination over the Islamic Holy Land continued to produce discord in the Islamic World and to embarrass the efforts of those Muslims who were working for Islamic solidarity.

¹ It has been mentioned that on this account the Congress suspended its sittings between the 16th and the 27th June.

² *The Times*, 11th March, 1926. See Sirdār Iqbāl 'Alī Shāh's account of his journey from Jiddah to Mecca in a motor lorry, in *The Times*, 21st July, 1926.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, p. 353.

⁴ See *op. cit.*, pp. 362-4 ; *The Times*, 23rd and 26th April, 24th and 25th June, and 2nd, 9th and 19th July, 1926.

(e) SOUTHERN ARABIA (1919-25).

After the withdrawal of 'Alī b. Husayn from Jiddah in A.D. 1925, as after the overthrow of Maslamah at 'Aqrabā in A.D. 633, two possible enterprises presented themselves to the Arabian conqueror : he might round off his dominions in the Peninsula, or he might attempt to burst its northern bounds by hurling against them the united forces of the Najd and the Hijāz which he had already gathered into his hands. In 633 the Caliph Abū Bakr allowed his hand to be forced by his generals and found himself committed to both enterprises simultaneously. In 1926 Ibn Sa'ūd was more effectively master of the situation and more circumspect in using the initiative which he had obtained. His policy towards the north is dealt with elsewhere.¹ In regard to Southern Arabia, where part of the fruit was ready to fall into his hands whenever he chose to pluck it, while the rest could not be plucked at all without a breach with Great Britain, he gave no indication of aggressive intentions. It may be convenient at this point to record briefly the history of Southern Arabia during the preceding seven years.

In the Yaman the impression made by the local situation during the General War—when the Imām Yahyā of San'ā had remained faithful to the Ottoman Empire, and Turkish forces, encamped on the soil of the British Aden Protectorate, had invested Aden itself by land—was not effaced by the terms of the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, which was the result of a Turkish defeat in a distant scene of operations. In pursuance of the Armistice, and in obedience to orders from the Ministry of War at Constantinople, the majority of the Turkish troops in the Yaman surrendered to the British, and the latter occupied the ports of Luhayyah and Hudaydah. Luhayyah they handed over to their protégé the Idrisi; Hudaydah they kept provisionally in their own hands; but they did not attempt to take over the inland districts which had been under Turkish administration and they did not inherit the Ottoman suzerainty over the Imām. The Imām did not regard himself as committed by the Turkish Armistice, and he was not overawed by the victory of the Allies. On the contrary, he persuaded some of the Turkish troops and civil officials in the Yaman, including the ex-Vālī, Mahmūd Nedīm Bey, to take service with himself; ² and he aspired with their aid to make himself master of the whole country; but this ambition was opposed by the people of certain

¹ In Section (vi) below.² *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 729.

Sunnī districts, who had no desire to exchange Turkish for Zaydī rule. In the autumn of 1919 a British mission which attempted to travel from Hudaydah to San'ā, with an escort sent by the Imām, was detained on its road at Bājil;¹ and meanwhile the Imām himself invaded the British Aden Protectorate and occupied Dāla'.² A year later, when the British evacuated Hudaydah, on the 31st January, 1921,³ this port, which was the natural maritime outlet for San'ā, was allowed to pass into the possession of the Imām's rival, the Idrīsī. For the moment the breach between the Imām and Great Britain was complete; but the opposition which the Imām continued to encounter in his attempt to acquire the Ottoman heritage in the Yaman inclined him to seek an understanding with his British neighbours at Aden. In a theologico-political manifesto of the 18th June, 1923,⁴ which was designed to conciliate the Yamanī Sunnīs, he referred incidentally to Great Britain in markedly friendly terms, and intimated his expectation of receiving British support. In fact, an emissary of the Imām's seems to have been continuously resident at Aden during the years 1922 and 1923, and in 1925 Sir Gilbert Clayton was sent by the British Government to the Court of San'ā on a special mission;⁵ but at the time of writing no treaty had yet been concluded between the two parties. During 1924 the Imām continued his efforts to assert his authority throughout the Yaman, but these efforts met with varying fortunes,⁶ and his prospects were not improved by the repatriation of the Turkish officials in his service,⁷ which he effected during the same year by agreement with the Government of Angora.⁸

The Idrīsīyah Principality of Sabyā reached its zenith in the occupation of Hudaydah in 1921, by which it cut off the rival princi-

¹ Lieut.-Col. M. F. Jacob: *Kings of Arabia* (London, 1923, Mills & Boon) Ch. XI.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 251.

³ *L'Asie Française*, May 1925.

⁴ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, III, 3, pp. 184-8, from *Al-Liwā' u'l-Misrī* of Cairo. Cf. *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, p. 404.

⁵ Statement in the House of Lords at Westminster on the 23rd June, 1926, by the Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, in answer to a parliamentary question. Cf. *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 4, p. 225.

⁶ For his dealings with Baydā, on the border between the Yaman and the Hadhramawt, see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, p. 514. For an account of conditions in the Yaman by a San'ā'ī visitor to Cairo, see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 7, pp. 403-4, quoting *Al-Muqattam* of the 8th and *Al-Ahrām* of the 9th June, 1926. At this time about two-thirds of the Imām's subjects appear to have been non-Zaydīs.

⁷ For an interview with Mahmūd Nedīm Bey on the state of the Yaman when he left it, see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 6, pp. 313-14, quoting *Alif-Bā* of Damascus.

⁸ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, p. 514, and 10, p. 658.

pality of San'ā from the sea ; but on the 20th March, 1923, the Sayyid Muhammad b. 'Alī was gathered to his fathers ; his son 'Alī b. Muhammad, an incompetent and unpopular minor, reigned in his stead ;¹ and the principality became a prey to internal feuds and foreign aggressions. The Hijāzīs promptly occupied several districts in the interior of the 'Asīr ;² in the spring of 1924 the Sayyid Mustafā, a cousin of the new Amīr 'Alī, made himself independent in Hudaydah ;³ and 'Alī was temporarily deposed. By October 1924 not only Sabyā but Hudaydah was again in 'Alī's hands ;⁴ but early in 1926 'Alī was deposed again, this time by his uncle Hasan, and in March he went into exile at Aden.⁵ This repeated division of the Idrīsīyah House against itself gave the Imām Yahyā his opportunity. As soon as the Sayyid Muhammad died, Yahyā had resumed hostilities, and, in spite of some initial reverses, he gradually closed in upon Hudaydah during the next two years. At the end of 1924 he occupied Bājil, and a few weeks later Luhayyah ;⁶ on the 27th March, 1925, the Idrīs's garrison in Hudaydah, which was now isolated, marched away, and the Imām's forces took possession in April.⁷ Towards the end of 1925, when the war in the Hijāz between King 'Alī b. Husayn and Ibn Sa'ūd was in its last phase, the Imām was reported to have set a force on the march northwards from Luhayyah, along the Tihāmah coast, and to have sent a mission to Ibn Sa'ūd, proposing a compromise between him and King 'Alī and demanding the cession of Qunfudah to the Imām.⁸ If the Imām was contemplating armed intervention in the Najdī-Hijāzī War, the capitulation of Jiddah must have caused him to change his mind. On the other hand, in March 1926, shortly after the Sayyid 'Alī had been evicted from Sabyā by his uncle Hasan, the Imām marched upon Sabyā and Jayzān ; and, in the autumn of 1926, these two focal points of the Idrīsīyah principality were being closely besieged by the Zaydī forces.⁹

By that time their respective conquests had almost brought the two surviving Powers of the Peninsula into territorial contact. In the direction of the Yaman the principality of the Najd stretched

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 725-6.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 727.

³ *The Times*, 25th April, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 4th November, 1924 ; *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 12, pp. 763-4.

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 4, p. 224 (quoting the Meccan *Ummu'l-Qurā* of the 19th February, 1926), and VI, 7, pp. 402-3.

⁶ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 4, p. 202, and 6, p. 313.

⁷ *The Times*, 14th and 19th April, 1925.

⁸ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, pp. 674-6.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, VI, 5, pp. 290-I, and 7, pp. 404-5.

out a long arm southwards through the chain of oases between the north-western margin of the Rub'ū'l-Khālī and the line of the Jabal Tuwayq ; and, as early as the Pilgrimage of July 1923, a deputation from the Ismā'īlī heretics of Yām, in the Wādī Najrān, had announced to King Husayn that they were being hard pressed by the Wāhhābīs.¹ After the conquest of Tā'if and Mecca, Ibn Sa'ūd inherited King Husayn's recent conquests in the interior of the 'Asīr ; and he appears to have extended his occupation to within twenty-five miles of Sabyā and to have released the tribal hostages whom the Idrīsī had been holding in custody in the castle of Haq-wah.² In general, however, his attitude towards the Idrīsī, as an enemy of the House of Hāshim and a buffer against the Imām of San'ā, was benevolent ; and in February 1926 the new Idrīsī Sayyid Hasan—who partly owed his throne to the military support of the Wāhhābī Governor of Ibhā in the interior of the 'Asīr—apparently offered to recognize Ibn Sa'ūd as his suzerain if he would come to his rescue against the then imminent attack from the Imām. Ibn Sa'ūd appears to have rejected this proposal and to have signified his intention of remaining neutral, on the ground that he had no designs upon the Idrīsī's country, and that he was in friendly relations with the Imām.³ When the Zaydī forces advanced upon Sabyā and Jayzān in March, the Wāhhābī garrisons which had been sent there earlier in the year, in support of the Sayyid Hasan, were withdrawn ;⁴ and—whether or not as the result of a definite understanding between Riyād and San'ā—the Zaydī Government was included among the parties whom Ibn Sa'ūd invited, on the 28th April, to his Islamic Congress at Mecca.⁵ This conciliatory behaviour on Ibn Sa'ūd's part towards the Imām decreased the danger that the Idrīsīyah principality might become a bone of contention between the two remaining Arabian Powers.⁶

In regard to the ' Gulf Chiefs ' Ibn Sa'ūd appears to have kept his pledge to the British Government (treaty of the 26th December,

¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 4, pp. 244–5, quoting *Al-Haqqīqah* of Bayrūt, 29th August, 1923.

² *The Times*, 27th January, 1925.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 4, pp. 224–5, quoting *Ummu'l-Qurā*, 19th February, 1926. A treaty between the Najd and the 'Asīr was signed on the 21st October, 1926. For a translation of the text see Appendix VII, pp. 584–6 below.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, VI, 5, p. 290.

⁵ See p. 311 above ; and *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 4, p. 225.

⁶ Edib Servet Bey, the delegate of the Turkish Government at the Mecca Conference (June–July 1926), reported that, while there was no indication that Ibn Sa'ūd intended to relinquish possession of the Hijāz, there was equally little evidence of serious disagreement between Ibn Sa'ūd and the Imām Yahyā. (*Le Temps*, 12th August, 1926.)

1915, Art. 6) to refrain from 'all aggression on or interference with' them. The British Government's own relations, during the period under review, with the Shaykhs of Kuwayt and Muhammarah are dealt with elsewhere.¹ In Bahrayn the British Consul appears, in May 1923, to have pressed the reigning Shaykh 'Īsā to abdicate, and, when he declined, to have arranged that the government should be carried on *de facto* by 'Īsā's son Hamad in 'Īsā's name.²

(vi) **The Delimitation of Frontiers between the Dominions of Ibn Sa'ūd and the States of Kuwayt, 'Irāq, and Transjordan (1921-5).**

The problem which confronted the Wahhābī prince 'Abdu'l-'Azīz b. Sa'ūd, at the beginning of the year 1926, after the withdrawal of King 'Alī b. Husayn from Jiddah and his own proclamation at Mecca as King of the Hijāz, was not unlike that which had confronted the first successor of the Prophet Muhammad, when the overthrow of the Prophet Maslamah at 'Aqrabā in A. D. 633 had brought the Najd and the Hijāz under one Government. Indeed, if 'Riyād' were substituted for 'Medina', the following description of the Arabian situation in 633³ would be singularly apposite to the situation at the time of writing :

It would have been a titanic problem for the Government at Medina, in barren Arabia, to compel all these restless elements, with their inveterate habit of raiding, to live side by side in concord under the Islamic Peace of God ; and yet, within the frontiers of the [Islamic] principality, fratricidal feuds were ruled out for the future. . . . The necessity of keeping his own victorious troops busy and of reconciling the conquered tribesmen to the new conditions drove [Abū Bakr] irresistibly into a further extension of the Islamic dominion—this time beyond the bounds of Arabia.

It is not unreasonable to infer that, in 1926, a similar situation in Arabia was giving rise to a similar train of thought in the mind of Ibn Sa'ūd. The pledge to keep open the Pilgrim routes and to protect the Pilgrims, which he had given to Great Britain in 1915 in respect of his then dominions, he had now given to the Islamic World in respect of the Holy Places themselves. His acceptance of the crown of the Hijāz had placed on his shoulders the responsibility for reconciling the interests of the Pilgrims with the interests of the Hijāzīs, who were accustomed to live by the perquisites

¹ See p. 272 above, and Section (xiii) below.

² *Oriente Moderno*, III, 5, p. 316, and III, 7, p. 453.

³ C. H. Becker : *Islamstudien*, vol. i, 'Die Ausbreitung der Araber' (Leipzig, 1924, Quelle und Meyer), p. 76.

of the Pilgrim Traffic ; and he would have to achieve this out of his own resources, for the streams of gold which, since the seventh Christian century, had flowed into Arabia successively from Constantinople, Ctesiphon, Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, Constantinople, and London, had at last run dry. Ibn Sa'ūd's own subsidy from the British Government had come to an end on the 31st March, 1924,¹ and thus, by 1926, policy and piety had both ceased to elicit from more prosperous parts of the world the tribute which Arabia had originally extorted by military force. Nothing except a fresh application of force beyond the borders of the Peninsula was likely to set the golden stream flowing again. Meanwhile, Ibn Sa'ūd had announced to foreign Governments that the war in Arabia was at an end, and he had informed the congress of his own subjects which had assembled at Riyād on the 29th October, 1924, that he was determined to found in Najd ' a Power in harmony with all the demands of civilization and progress '. Whither should he turn his eyes except towards the wealthier and more civilized Arab countries which adjoined the Peninsula along its landward border ? There were several Syrians, Egyptians, and 'Irāqīs in the audience which Ibn Sa'ūd was addressing on that occasion, and in the same speech ' he declared that his dominions were an open field for the fruits of Syrian, Lebanese, and Egyptian genius, and affirmed that he was the friend of the Syrians, Lebanese, and 'Irāqīs '.²

Thus, in 1924, his attention was already focussed upon his northern horizon ;³ and by that time he had made his influence felt in the

¹ See p. 273 above.

² *Le Temps*, 28th November, 1924 ; *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 12, pp. 759-61.

³ At the time of writing it was impossible to tell whether those energies would discharge themselves in peaceful or warlike activities. The Wahhābīs had already had their Battle of Mu'tah, when, in August 1924, British armoured cars and aeroplanes had done execution upon their raiders in Trans-jordan. Was their Mu'tah to be obliterated by an Ajnādayn and a Yarmuk and a Qādisiyyah ? To a large extent, no doubt, this depended on technical military factors, but it also depended in part upon the development of the political situation. In the seventh century the sudden and amazing change in the military fortunes of the primitive Muslims, after their first disastrous encounters with Roman and Persian troops at Mu'tah and the Battle of the Bridge, can apparently be traced to a favourable turn in the tribal politics of the frontier. In Palestine and Syria the Muslims obtained their opportunity through a false economy of the Roman Treasury, which suppressed the customary annual subsidies to the Badawī tribes on the southern border of Palestine in its effort to pay off the public debt contracted during the Great War of 609-28. The Melkhite (Catholic) Church, which was the Roman Government's creditor, seems to have taken much the same view of its financial claims against its ally, the Imperial Roman Government, as the United States Government took of ' Inter-Allied Debts ' after the War of 1914-18. The Badu, driven to take from the Roman Government by force

Hamād and Shāmīyah steppes,¹ where, since the close of the War, there had been important changes in the political and in the economic situation.

Politically, the tribesmen of the Shāmīyah had escaped from control—they had ceased to pay taxes and had increased their stock of up-to-date Western small-arms—and the difficulty of restoring control was increased, in the Peace Settlement, by the partition of the surrounding settled territories between several independent Governments. For nearly three centuries before the outbreak of the War of 1914 the settled countries flanking both sides of the Shāmīyah triangle had been continuously in the hands of a single Power, the Ottoman Empire; and however inefficient the Ottoman administration might be, its ubiquity gave it a considerable advantage in attempting to keep the tribesmen in order. Nomads cannot live without an exchange of commodities with agricultural communities; and, under the Ottoman régime, a re-

what they were no longer to receive by favour, thereupon threw open to the Muslims the gateway into the Roman provinces, of which they held the keys. In 'Irāq, again, the Muslims were drawn, half against their will, into a second venture by the importunity of Muthannā b. Hārithah, the chief of the Shaybān section of the Bakr b. Wā'il—a tribe which in the seventh century ranged where the Dhafir ranged in the twentieth. At the time of writing it was impossible for any one—even, perhaps, for Ibn Sa'ūd himself—to foretell whether similar opportunities, if they arose, would tempt the new master of Arabia to seek a similar solution for his internal problem.

¹ The Hamād-Shāmīyah steppe was an immense triangle of territory with its base line running almost due east and west from the head of the Gulf of Kuwayt to the head of the Gulf of 'Aqabah, its apex in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, and its sides flanked by the limits of cultivation in 'Irāq on the east and in Transjordan and Syria on the west. Beyond the eastern flank of this triangle the steppe extended further, without a break, across the Middle Euphrates, between Hīt and Jarāblus, as far as the Baghdad Railway on the north and the Tigris on the east, over almost the whole of the so-called Jazīrah (the 'island' or 'Mesopotamia' between the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates, above 'Irāq). The Shāmīyah and the Jazīrah formed an intermediate zone between the Arabian Peninsula and the nearest settled Arab countries. This steppe was partially isolated from the Peninsula by the sandy desert of the Nafūd, which skirted the base-line of the triangle. On the other hand, the climatic and other physical conditions of the Shāmīyah condemned its inhabitants to pastoral nomadism by precluding agriculture; and, socially and politically, the region had always shared the fortunes of Arabia proper. An Arabian explosion of the seventeenth century had re-peopled the Shāmīyah almost entirely with tribes of the 'Anazah group and the Jazīrah with a fraction of the Shammar, whom the impact of the 'Anazah, as they burst the bounds of the Peninsula, had split away from the main body in the neighbourhood of Hā'il and driven far northward across the Euphrates. Thus, by the time when the explosion died down, the 'Anazah had been deposited in the Shāmīyah as a wedge between a southern and a northern fraction of the Shammar, and this geographical distribution of tribes (as distinct from their political and economic situation) remained substantially unaltered during and after the General War of 1914-18.

calcitrant tribe on the Shāmīyah might find itself excluded, by the single paramount Power, from every market, east or west, to which it resorted. The Peace Settlement of 1919–20 favoured the liberty of the Shāmīyah tribes by breaking up the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire into the British mandated territory of 'Irāq (which was erected into an Arab Kingdom under a Hāshimī ruler, Faysal b. Husayn), the French mandated territory of Syria (which was divided and redivided by the mandatory Power into half-a-dozen states and territories), and the British mandated territory of Palestine (the marches of which, towards the Shāmīyah, were eventually organized into the autonomous Arab principality of Transjordan, under King Faysal's brother, the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh). Henceforth, the tribes of the Shāmīyah and the Jazīrah could postpone the restoration of control by expeditiously crossing the new international frontiers,¹ and occasionally by playing off one mandatory administration against another.² At the same time, the new situation was not, on the whole, to the tribesmen's advantage, for it promoted their political liberty at the cost of their economic well-being. The new international frontiers which had been roughed out at Paris and London and San Remo were for the most part arbitrary lines; and they ignored such facts of economic geography as the distribution and seasonal migrations of the nomadic tribes or the trade units constituted by the nexus between the commercial centres in the settled districts and their hinterlands in the nomadic regions.³

¹ *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1923–December 1924* (London, 1925, H.M. Stationery Office), pp. 39–40.

² See *op. cit.*, pp. 40–1, for the successful co-operation of the French authorities in Syria and the British authorities in 'Irāq, in the years 1923 and 1924, in dealing with the tribal problem along the frontier between the two mandated territories. See further Section (ix), pp. 464–6 below.

³ Damascus, for example, had formerly been mistress of an economic hinterland which had extended into the heart of Arabia. So great were its natural advantages that, even after the British occupation of Jerusalem and Baghdad in the course of the Great War, the Turks were still able from Damascus to send military supplies to Ibn Rashīd at Hā'il in the distant Jabal Shammar. In this vast area the merchants of Damascus had been accustomed to purchase live stock and hides from the Badu and to sell them food-stuffs and manufactures in exchange. Yet the Anglo-French boundary agreement, which came into force on the 10th March, 1923, struck a deadly blow at the prosperity of Damascus by drawing an international frontier, south and east of the city, at an average radius of about 100 miles. Again, the Hijāz Railway, which had been built from Haifa to Medina, through continuous Ottoman territory, by the united efforts of the Islamic World, now started in Palestine, trespassed on a corner of Syria, slipped out again into Transjordan, and passed thence into the Hijāz—thus traversing no less than four successive jurisdictions between its termini. As for the effect of the new frontiers upon the economic life of the Badu, it may be

While, however, the new frontiers were introducing into the Shāmīyah these additional elements of political and economic instability, the region was acquiring an unprecedented international importance as a zone of transit which might aspire to rival, for some purposes, the Isthmus of Suez. The project of an overland route from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was as old as that of the Suez Canal; and although Chesney's abortive survey of the Euphrates Valley route¹ had been eclipsed by the dazzling achievement of de Lesseps, the British negotiators revived the project, in a new form, in 1916. In the secret agreement above mentioned, France 'accorded' to Great Britain the Palestinian ports of Haifa and 'Akkā and consented that Great Britain should build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway from Haifa to Baghdad; and, south of a French Syria and of an international Palestine, a tenuous but unbroken zone of British influence was drawn on the map, across the centre of the Shāmīyah, from the south-eastern corner of the Mediterranean to the north-western corner of the Persian Gulf. This British land-bridge from sea to sea did not disappear from the map when the secret agreement was translated into terms of mandates. South of that new frontier between the French and British mandated territories which came into force on the 10th March, 1923, the Trans-jordan dependency of Palestine abutted, at least theoretically, upon the Kingdom of 'Irāq at some point in the intervening steppe.

In the meantime, irrespective of these diplomatic *tracés* on the map, the Shāmīyah was rapidly being converted into an international highway. The Sykes-Picot, like the Chesney, railway project had been still-born; to construct an unremunerative strategic line 550 miles long as the crow flies would have required a longer purse than the British Government had at its command by the end of the Great War; but the airman and the chauffeur rushed in where the

illustrated by the case of the Ruwalā—the leading tribe among the 'Anazah, who played an important part in the political history of the Shāmīyah from 1918 to 1925. The annual range of pastures which belonged to the Ruwalā by unwritten but prescriptive right was now divided, at least in theory, between three jurisdictions. Its northern fringe lay in the French mandated territory of Syria, its middle zone in the British mandated territory of Trans-jordan, and its southern fringes in the area which, under the secret Anglo-French Agreement of the 16th May, 1916, had been abandoned to an independent Arabia. By this arrangement almost the whole of the Ruwalā country was cut off from its market and source of supply; for 'the Ruwalā, who raise no crops, are entirely dependent on Damascus for provisions' (Admiralty Handbook, *Arabia*, p. 49).

¹ See Lieut.-Col. F. R. Chesney, *Reports on the Navigation of the Euphrates* (London, 1833); and *Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris*, 1835-7 (London, 1850, Longmans, Green & Co., 4 vols, and case of maps).

railway-engineer feared to tread. Partly under the stimulus of the War, the aeroplane and the motor-car had recently been developed to a point of efficiency at which the barriers of steppe and desert fell before them ; and under post-war conditions there were special incentives for overcoming the local barrier of the Shāmīyah. Since the British occupation in the course of the War, 'Irāq had entered upon an economic revival which was gathering momentum as it proceeded ; and, beyond 'Irāq, Persia was showing symptoms of a similar tendency to revive under the military rule of Rizā Pahlawī and the financial guidance of Dr. Millspaugh and his American colleagues.¹ This economic revival naturally expressed itself in an increased traffic of goods and passengers with Europe. Before the War of 1914-18 Europe had communicated with 'Irāq and Southern Persia via the Suez Canal and the Gulf Ports, and with Northern Persia via the Black Sea Straits and the Transcaspian and Transcaucasian Railways ; but since 1914 this northern route had been continuously closed by war and revolution in Turkey and Russia, while the southern route was circuitous, slow, and costly. In these circumstances, the new traffic called into existence, in October 1923,² a new overland motor route from the Syrian and Palestinian ports which extended the economic hinterland of the Mediterranean eastwards, across the Shāmīyah, to Baghdad and Tihrān. Thus the northward thrust of Ibn Sa'ūd's Arabian principality, beyond the confines of the Peninsula, threatened not merely to disturb the borderland between the desert and the sown but to cut across an important new line of international communications.

From Central Arabia there were two main routes of egress towards the north : the Wādī Rummah (in its lower reaches called the Bātin), which started in Qasīm and pointed north-eastwards at Basrah in 'Irāq, and the Wādī Sirhān, which started at Jawf, on the northern edge of the Nafūd, over against the Jabal Shammar, and pointed north-westwards at 'Ammān in Transjordan. So long as Ibn Rashīd

¹ See Section (xiii), pp. 543-5 below.

² *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1923-December 1924*, p. 42. For details see 'The Discovery and Development of the New Land Route to the East', by Major D. McCallum, in *The Journal of the Central Asian Society*, vol. xii, Part I (1925). In February 1924 the Representative Council of the Lebanon voted £S.5,000 (100,000 French francs) as a prize for the first business concern to guarantee a regular postal service between the Lebanon and 'Irāq (*Oriente Moderno*, IV, 5, p. 309). The route was extended to Tihrān in the spring of 1924 (*op. cit.*, p. 324). In 1925 a transit convention was concluded between 'Irāq and the French mandated territory ('*Irāq Report for 1925*, pp. 10 and 174). See further, *op. cit.*, p. 23, and Hansard (House of Commons), 18th February, 1926, p. 2213.

maintained his position at Hā'il, Ibn Sa'ūd marched only with the Arabian principalities of the Hijāz, the Jabal Shammar and Kuwayt, and had no direct contact with either 'Irāq or Transjordan.

In the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913,¹ the then 'autonomous Sanjāq of Kuwayt' had been plotted out on the map—a radius of some forty miles, measured from Kuwayt itself, being recognized as under the direct administration of the Shaykh, while a wider zone, extending to the Bātin on the east and a long distance southward down the Gulf Coast, was recognized as the tribal sphere of influence of the principality. In the treaty of the 26th December, 1915, between Ibn Sa'ūd and the Government of India, Ibn Sa'ūd pledged himself to refrain from aggression upon or interference with the territories of the Shaykh of Kuwayt and the other Gulf Chiefs, but the limits of these territories were expressly left for future determination. There was thus no direct boundary agreement between Kuwayt and Riyād, and in 1919 a dispute between these two parties over tribal allegiances in the outer zone, which had been assigned in 1913 to Kuwayt by the British and Ottoman Governments, led to a raid on Kuwayt territory by the leader of the Wahhābī *Ikhwān*, Faysalū'd-Dawish. At the end of December in the same year some of the Dhafir, a tribe west of the Bātin which paid allegiance to 'Irāq, were involved in a second raid of the same Wahhābī captain against certain Shammar, with whom these Dhafir happened to be camping. The situation in these quarters was eased, however, by a meeting between Ibn Sa'ūd and Sir Percy Cox at 'Ujayr ('Uqayr) on the Hasā coast in September 1920, and by the accession of a new ruler² at Kuwayt on the 24th March, 1921.³

The expansion of Ibn Sa'ūd's power did not become a serious problem for either 'Irāq or Transjordan until his conquest of the Jabal Shammar principality in 1921.

The immediate results in the 'Irāq of this campaign were twofold. It produced a state of continuous lawlessness on the southern frontiers; the Dhafir and some of the local tribes, profiting by the general unrest, engaged in raids and forays, sometimes on the *Ikhwān*, sometimes on each other, [sometimes] on the tribes of Kuwayt, while the *Ikhwān* retaliated on their side. Secondly, it started a migration to the 'Irāq of Shammar tribes fleeing from the forces of Ibn Sa'ūd. They passed up through the 'Amārāt 'Anazah, the tribesmen of Fahad Beg ibn

¹ See p. 282 above.

² Shaykh Ahmadū'l-Jābir, nephew of Shaykh Salīm, who had died on the 27th February, 1921.

³ For these and the following events see *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, October 1920–March 1922*.

Hadhdhal, and a portion of them crossed the Euphrates at Ramadi into the Jazīrah, after paying kodah, a tax on domestic animals, to the 'Irāq administration. The rest remained in the pasturages of the 'Amārāt.¹

The arrival of these Shammar refugees created a problem not only for the 'Amārāt 'Anazah but for the mandatory Power in 'Irāq, since the 'Amārāt were dependent upon 'Irāq economically and were anxious not to transfer to another Power the political allegiance which they paid to Baghdad. Fahad had obtained from Ibn Sa'ūd an assurance that his people should be immune from attack on the part of the *Ikhwān*; but the traditions of Arab hospitality forbade him to turn the Shammar refugees away, and at the same time he was unable to prevent them from using his camping grounds as a taking-off place for counter-raids against the victorious Wahhābīs. Consequently he received in April 1921 a sharp letter of remonstrance from Ibn Sa'ūd, in which the Amīr of Najd put forward a claim to the allegiance of all branches of the 'Anazah, on the ground that his own house was of 'Anazah descent. At this stage the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq, Sir Percy Cox, intervened by ordering all the Shammar refugees to cross to the left bank of the Euphrates and by proposing to Ibn Sa'ūd an early meeting with King Faysal, under Sir Percy Cox's own auspices, in order to establish a clear understanding as to the frontiers between 'Irāq and the Najd and the treatment of tribal affairs. Ibn Sa'ūd suggested that the meeting should be preceded by a preliminary agreement on the principles of the proposed treaty, whereupon Sir Percy Cox put forward, as the *prima facie* basis for negotiations, that the tribes of the Muntafiq, 'Amārāt 'Anazah, and Dhafir must be accepted as appertaining to 'Irāq, and that the line of the frontier would be determined in accordance with predominant and prescriptive rights to watering-places.

At this juncture the situation was complicated by an estrangement between the 'Irāq Government and Humud b. Suwayt, the Shaykh of the Dhafir, whose tribal ranges covered the approach to 'Irāq from the Najd, to the west of the Bātin. Ibn Suwayt was offended with Baghdad on two grounds: his subsidy had just been stopped (as the Roman subsidy to the tribes covering the approach to Palestine from the Hijāz had been stopped in A. D. 633),² and his enemy, Yūsuf Beg as-Sa'dūn, had just been appointed by King

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 118-19.

² The stoppage of Ibn Suwayt's subsidy was not a false economy but a deliberate penalty for his failures to prevent his tribesmen from raiding.

Faysal commander of a new camel corps which was intended to guard the Arabian frontiers of 'Irāq. Ibn Suwayt promptly paid a visit to Ibn Sa'ūd at Riyād (as Muthannā b. Hārithah—whose tribesmen, the Bakr b. Wā'il, had occupied in the seventh century the ranges occupied by the Dhafir in the twentieth—had visited Khālīd in the winter of A. D. 633-4 and the Caliph 'Umar in the winter of 636-7).¹ Sir Percy Cox wrote to Ibn Sa'ūd requesting him not to receive the malcontent; but, before the letter reached Riyād, Ibn Suwayt had returned thence with presents from the Sultan of Najd and with a representative of the Wahnābī Government, who was commissioned to collect tribute from the Dhafir themselves and from any 'Irāqī shepherds on the Dhafir range. The defection of Ibn Suwayt exposed 'Irāq to invasion. In February 1922 a strong Wahnābī force was concentrated at Hafar (the south-western limit of the Kuwayt sphere of influence in the Bātin); Yūsuf Beg as-Sa'dūn and his camel corps retorted by making a reconnoitring expedition towards the Dhafir range; Faysalū'd-Dawīsh followed them up as they retired; and on the 11th March, 1922, he looted Abu'l-Ghar, made contact with the 'Irāqī camel corps in camp at Shaqrah (some thirty miles south of the Basrah-Nāsiriyyah railway and almost due south of Nāsiriyyah), and delivered an unprovoked attack, in which he inflicted heavy losses both on the camel corps and on certain Muntafiq tribesmen who were encamped near by.

This grave incident was prevented from leading to a rupture by the conciliatory action of the principals on either side.² Sir Percy Cox refrained from punitive measures³ against the offending Wahnābī force, while Ibn Sa'ūd, on his part, declared publicly that the raiders had acted without his authority, that he deeply regretted what had occurred, and that he was determined to punish those who should be proved guilty. Faysalū'd-Dawīsh withdrew to the interior of the Najd; and, left to his own resources, Humud b. Suwayt, the recalcitrant Shaykh of the Dhafir, was quickly brought to reason. After he had defied the 'Irāqī Government's order to surrender himself at Nāsiriyyah and had exchanged shots with the camel corps on the 23rd April, he was subjected to aerial bombard-

¹ Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-8 and 88.

² From this point onwards see *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1922-March 1923*.

³ On the 14th March the Wahnābīs fired on British aeroplanes which were keeping them under observation, and orders were then given for immediate measures of retaliation; but Faysalū'd-Dawīsh appears to have withdrawn before action upon these orders was taken.

ment and made his submission at Baghdad in May. The tension on the tribal border was further relieved by the disbanding of the camel corps in June and by the decision not to post garrisons of 'Irāqī troops on this frontier.

Incidentally, the Wāhhābī raid of March 1922 created serious internal difficulties in 'Irāq itself for the mandatory Power. It produced a wave of genuine national feeling, which was expressed in the local press with a violence that threatened to prejudice the forthcoming negotiations between the 'Irāqī and the Najdī Governments ; and it gave a political opening to the Shī'ī *mujtahids*¹ of the *Kāzimayn* (the Shī'ī Holy Cities of Karbalā and Najaf, on the right bank of the Euphrates) who were hostile to the mandatory Power as well as to the Wāhhābīs.² On the 1st April the *mujtahid* Shaykh Mahdiyyū'l-Khālīsī summoned a tribal conference to meet at Karbalā on the 13th for the consideration of measures for the defence of 'Irāq against the Wāhhābīs, and it was feared that an anti-British demonstration might result ; but the meeting passed off without disturbance, though it left a legacy of ill-feeling between local factions.

Meanwhile, on the 3rd April, Sir Percy Cox had dispatched a message to Ibn Sa'ūd in which he laid down a provisional boundary³ between the Najd and the 'Irāq and required the Sultan immediately to recall such of his followers as were on the wrong side of the line. This requirement appears to have been fulfilled ; on the 1st May, 1922, the representatives of the two Arab states met at Muḥammārāh in the presence of a British official ; and on the 5th a treaty was signed.⁴

This Treaty of Muḥammārāh was interesting as an intelligent attempt to solve the problem of establishing a practical frontier between two states in a region inhabited, not by a sedentary population, but by seasonally migrating pastoral tribes.⁵ The negotiators

¹ Doctors of the law 'speaking with authority and not as the scribes'.

² The Shī'īs as a whole seem to have been more deeply hostile to the Wāhhābīs than were the orthodox Sunnis—partly owing to the memory of the Wāhhābī sack of Karbalā in A. D. 1801, and partly because Wāhhābism represented the opposite extreme of Islam to their own.

³ Text of the topographical description in *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, October 1920–March 1922*, p. 121 ; *tracée* of the definitive frontier of the 2nd December, 1922, on map II at the end of the present volume.

⁴ English text in *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1922–March 1923*, pp. 183–6.

⁵ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 463–71, for the treatment of the same problem in the Anglo-Italian treaty of the 15th July, 1924, regarding the rectification of frontier in Jubaland ; and Part II, Section (xii), pp. 184–8 above, for the treatment of it in the Italo-Egyptian treaty of the 6th December, 1925, regarding the rectification of frontier in the Libyan Desert.

started by recognizing this or that tribe as belonging to one or other of the two states, and then went on to agree that the wells and ranges customarily used by the several tribes should be recognized as falling respectively within the territory of the state to which the particular tribe had been assigned. It was this procedure which made agreement possible, for the Wahhābīs recognized the claim of 'Irāq to the allegiance of the Muntafiq, Dhafir, and 'Amārāt, but refused to accept the provisional topographical boundary, laid down by Sir Percy Cox on the 3rd April, as a definitive frontier.

In the text of the treaty it was first recorded that the Muntafiq, Dhafir, and 'Amārāt belonged to 'Irāq and the Shammar of the Najd to the Najd,¹ and it was provided that a committee of two persons with local knowledge from each Government, presided over by a British official, should determine the location of the wells and ranges used by the several tribes and should fix a boundary line between the Najd and 'Irāq on this basis. The two Governments mutually agreed to restrain their tribes from aggression on the other party's tribes, to punish such aggression when it occurred, and to discuss the question of taking combined action as occasion arose (Art. 1). They further agreed (Art. 2) to insure the safety of the Pilgrim routes and to protect Pilgrims so long as they were within their respective boundaries, as had been guaranteed to His Britannic Majesty's Government by the Sultan of Najd in Article 5 of the treaty between them (to which explicit reference was made). Commercial intercourse between 'Irāq and the Najd was placed on a most-favoured-nation-treatment basis (Art. 3); and mutual freedom of travel was granted for traders or Pilgrims duly provided with passports (Art. 4). Any tribe belonging to one of the countries which settled in the other country was to pay grazing fees (Art. 5). A final clause (Art. 6) provided that, in the event of a breach in the relations of either of the contracting parties with the British Government, the treaty was to become null and void. This clause was inserted at Ibn Sa'ūd's instance in order to safeguard him against the possibility of incompatible commitments, in view of his previous treaty with Great Britain.² The Najdī delegate undertook in a post-

¹ i.e. the Southern Shammar of Ibn Rashīd's extinct principality as opposed to the Northern Shammar of the Jazīrah.

² Statement in *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1922–March 1923*, p. 9. At this date the Anglo-'Irāqī Treaty (see *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 188–92) was still unsigned, and it was uncertain whether the Bill for its ratification would secure a majority in the 'Irāqī Parliament.

script that, pending the territorial delimitations, the tribes of the Najd should not attack the tribes of 'Irāq.

The delimitation committee did not find agreement easy, but a protocol¹ embodying the compromise at which they arrived was duly signed on the 2nd December, 1922, at 'Ujayr ('Uqayr), on the Hasā coast, on the occasion of a personal meeting between Sir Percy Cox and Ibn Sa'ūd. The new frontier² started from the western edge of the Bātin, at a point about 125 miles SSW. of Basrah as the crow flies, and ran in a north-westerly and westerly direction to the Jabal 'Anazan, the centre point of the Shāmīyah, which was defined as the neighbourhood of the intersection of latitude 32° north with longitude 39° east. In order to meet Ibn Sa'ūd's objections to Sir Percy Cox's original line of the 3rd April, a rhomboid of territory at the south-eastern extremity of the border, which properly fell within the range of the Dhafir, was declared to be neutral and common ground (Art. 1); and Najd tribes living near the border were given licence to water at the neighbouring 'Irāq wells, provided these were nearer to them than those within the Najd boundaries (Art. 2). The two Governments mutually agreed not to fortify watering places adjoining the border and not to concentrate troops in their neighbourhood (Art. 3).

On the same date there was also signed, under British auspices, an agreement between the Najd and Kuwayt, in which the frontier between these two states was delimited likewise. This line started from the eastern edge of the Bātin, at a point immediately opposite the starting-point of the Najd-'Irāq frontier, described above, and ran in a direction slightly south of east until it struck the 29th parallel of latitude at a point about forty-five miles west of the coast of the Persian Gulf and rather more than forty miles south-west of the town of Kuwayt. Thence the frontier described part of the circumference of a circle (convex towards the south) with its centre in the town of Kuwayt and a radius of rather more than forty miles, until it struck the coast of the Persian Gulf just south of Rāsu'l-Qalī'ah. It was agreed that this line from the Bātin to the sea should constitute the indisputable southern frontier of Kuwayt State; but to the south of it a second area was delimited which started at the point where the southern frontier of Kuwayt struck parallel 29, and ran first approximately south-south-east and

¹ Texts of the two protocols of the 2nd December, 1922, in *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1922-March 1923*, pp. 184-6.

² See the *tracé* on map II at the end of the present volume.

then due east until it struck the coast, in its turn, at a point rather more than forty miles south of Rāsu'l-Qatī'ah and rather more than eighty miles south of Kuwayt town. This territory was to have a status similar to that of the rhomboid at the south-eastern extremity of the frontier between the Najd and 'Irāq. The Governments of Najd and Kuwayt were to share equal rights in it until a further agreement concerning it should be made between them through the good offices of the Government of Great Britain.

Thereafter the Shaykh of Kuwayt notified to the competent British authorities the northern frontier which he claimed as towards 'Irāq, and his claims were accepted in April 1923. The Kuwayt-'Irāq frontier, which was settled in this manner, followed the Bātin north-eastwards down to a point just south of the latitude of Safwān, and then broke away eastwards in an irregular course which left Safwān and Umm Qasr within 'Irāqī territory and struck the western shore of the creek known as the Khūr Zubayr at a point just south of the second of the two places mentioned. Thence the frontier ran down the waterways of the Khūr Zubayr and the Khūr 'Abdu'llāh and so out into the Persian Gulf. Eight islands—including Warbah, Būbiyān, and Faylakah—were specified as appertaining to Kuwayt.

The general effect of these arrangements was to do away with the large sphere of tribal influence which had previously been recognized as belonging to Kuwayt, but which had in practice for the most part passed *de facto* under the influence of Ibn Sa'ūd, while maintaining the area under the direct administration of the Shaykh intact at all points and considerably extending it towards the north-west. The loss of the sphere of influence was further compensated by the creation of the neutral area to the south of the new southern frontier of Kuwayt State.

In a second protocol, signed at 'Ujayr on the 2nd December as between the Najd and 'Irāq, these two Governments agreed that merchandise passing between their territories should be subject only to their own recognized duties and customs regulations, and that the levying of toll by the tribes should be put down. In the same instrument they agreed that 'should any tribe or section of a tribe which is outside the boundaries of and not subject to either Government desire to offer its allegiance to one of them, they will not prevent it from doing so'.

This last-cited clause gave Ibn Sa'ūd a free hand, as far as 'Irāq

was concerned, to the west of longitude 39° and the south of latitude 32°—that is, in the Wādī Sirhān, which pointed north-westwards towards the capital of Transjordan. At this very time the Wahhābī Power was making strides in that quarter which, while not a direct menace to 'Irāq, were not a matter of indifference to Great Britain, who held a mandate on the western as well as on the eastern flank of the Shāmīyah. In this direction the key-point was the twin oasis of Jawf and Sakākah, which was not only the chief centre of habitation in the Wādī Sirhān but was the gateway into the Shāmīyah from Central Arabia.

Before 1909 Jawf had been held by Ibn Rashīd ; but in that year—when the Āl Rashīd were already weakened by the resurrection of the Āl Sa'ūd on their southern flank—this north-western outpost of their family had been seized by Nūrī Sha'lān, the chief of the Ruwalā 'Anazah in the Western Shāmīyah.¹ The difficulties of the position in which the Ruwalā 'Anazah were placed by the redrawing of the map after the War of 1914–18 have been described above. In 1920, Nūrī Sha'lān, who since 1918 had given his allegiance to the Amīr Faysal, was cut off from his natural market by the expulsion of Faysal from Damascus and the occupation of that city by the French. In the same year Ibn Rashīd recovered Jawf. His re-occupation of it was ephemeral, for in 1921 the principality of the Jabal Shammar was extinguished by Ibn Sa'ūd, and, after a passing visit from the Wahhābīs, Jawf passed into Nūrī's hands again.

Meanwhile Nūrī, whose tribesmen could not exist if Jawf and Damascus were simultaneously closed to them, had visited General Gouraud at Damascus in the summer of 1921 and was reported ² to have accepted a subsidy from France, who at that time was in effective military occupation of the whole of Syria. In December 1921, however, he fought a disastrous battle with the chief of the 'Amārāt 'Anazah, Fahad b. Hadhdhal;³ and not long after this he appears to have forfeited the support of France through the hostile action of his tribesmen, who destroyed a French air-station at Qaryatayn, in the Hamād, between Damascus and Palmyra.⁴ Thus, notwithstanding his recovery of Jawf, his position had become critical by the beginning of the year 1922. He had broken with his kindred on the east, while, north and south, he now had for his

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 110.

² *The Times*, 6th April, 1923.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, I, p. 630.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, quoting *Al-Muqattam* of Cairo, 26th February, 1922 ; *The Times*, 4th May, 1922.

neighbours, not the weak principalities of Jabal Shammar and Arab Syria, but the powerful French and Wāhhābīs. He naturally turned westward towards Transjordan, where—in a fragment of the defunct Arab State of Syria which had been assigned to the British Zone in the secret Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, and which had therefore been exempt from French conquest in 1920—the Amīr Fayṣal's brother, 'Abdu'llāh b. Husayn, had founded a new Arab principality in February 1921 under the aegis of Great Britain as mandatory Power in Palestine.¹ In the spring of 1922, Ghālīb Pasha Sha'lān and Mr. Philby, the British Resident in Transjordan, visited Nūrī at Sakākah on a mission from the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh and obtained his consent to the 'annexation' of the Ruwalā 'Anazah country, including Jawf and Sakākah, to Transjordan.² Ibn Sa'ūd, however, already had his eye on this strategic position. As the Transjordan mission travelled south-eastwards towards Jawf down the Wādī Sirhān, they almost fell into the hands of a Wāhhābī raiding-party travelling in the opposite direction. A few weeks later Ibn Sa'ūd seems to have demanded Nūrī's allegiance in the same menacing terms which he had used, a year earlier, in his letter of April 1921, to Nūrī's kinsman and rival Fahad b. Hadhdhal, the chief of the 'Amārāt.³ Nūrī could no longer turn for help to France, as Fahad had turned (and not in vain) to Great Britain; and he appears to have regarded the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh of Transjordan, to whom he had just tendered his allegiance, as a broken reed. In this situation he is reported to have yielded to Ibn Sa'ūd's threats and to have made his formal submission to the Sultan of Najd, accepting from him a subsidy in lieu of that which he had drawn, since the preceding summer, from the French High Commissioner in Syria.⁴ Ibn Sa'ūd seems to have taken a material guarantee of Nūrī's good faith by occupying Jawf with his own forces in June 1922,⁵ and the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh seems to have retorted to this by occupying the oasis of Qurāyātu'l-Milh (Kāf), towards the north-western end of the Wādī Sirhān.⁶ In spite of this precaution, a Wāhhābī expeditionary force—consisting of 'Utaybah tribesmen who had recently transferred their allegiance to the Najd from the Hijāz—succeeded in marching, in thirty-seven days, from Riyād, through Jawf, to Qasru'l-Azraq, at

¹ See Section (vii) (a).

² See *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 109–11, for an account of this mission by Ghālīb Pasha himself, copied from *Alif-Bā* of Damascus by *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo (10th July, 1922).

³ See above, p. 331.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 21st January, 1926.

⁴ *The Times*, 4th May, 1922.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 6th April, 1923.

the north-western extremity of the Wādī Sirhān ; and from this base, on the 15th August, 1922, they successfully raided two villages of the Banu Sakhr tribe, in Transjordanian territory, two miles west of the Hijāz Railway and twelve miles south of 'Ammān.¹

During the remainder of the years 1922 and 1923, the relations between Nūrī Sha'lān, the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh, and Ibn Sa'ūd were ambiguous. In the spring of 1923 Nūrī appears to have visited Damascus and 'Ammān, and to have induced 'Abdu'llāh to restore to him Qurāyātu'l-Milh ; and there, for the time being, Nūrī maintained himself, with Transjordanian support, in spite of a reconnaissance in force against the oasis which was made, on the 17th June, 1923, by a Wahnābī captain at the head of various tribesmen of the south-western Shāmīyah who had by this time submitted to Ibn Sa'ūd.² Meanwhile, on the eastern flank of the Shāmīyah, relations between the Najd and 'Irāq remained precarious, notwithstanding the treaty and the two protocols of 1922.³ The Wahnābīs were perpetually collecting revenue from, and otherwise exerting authority over, Badu, who were temporarily or even permanently encamped on the 'Irāqī side of the new frontier, while the Shammar, who had taken refuge in 'Irāq in 1921, were perpetually abusing their asylum by raiding Ibn Sa'ūd's domain in the Shāmīyah. A specially violent outburst of such raids in June 1923 evoked from Ibn Sa'ūd a demand that the Shammar should be expelled from 'Irāq ; but this was refused by the British High Commissioner, though pressure was put by him on the 'Irāq Government—which was unable to prevent the raids—to procure a restitution of the looted property and to punish the offenders. This constant strain in the relations between the two states had led Sir Percy Cox to propose a personal meeting, under his own auspices, between King Faysal and Sultan 'Abdu'l-'Azīz as early as the spring of 1923 ; but the project fell through ; and, instead, Faysal visited his brother 'Abdu'llāh at 'Ammān by aeroplane on the 28th July, and conferred with him until the 2nd August (when he returned by the same route to Baghdad) on the common menace from the Wahnābīs.⁴ In the autumn, when the project of a conference was revived by the British Government, it

¹ *Ibid.*, 18th and 21st August ; *Al-Muqattam*, 25th August, 1922. This was a shrewd stroke, since the Banu Sakhr were not only the most important Badu dependent on the Transjordan Government, but were enemies both of the French and the Ruwalā.

² *Oriente Moderno*, III, 2, pp. 93-4, and 7, p. 429.

³ See *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1923-December 1924*, pp. 42-51.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, III, 4, pp. 226-7, quoting *Filastīn*, 3rd August, 1923.

was proposed to include Transjordan and the Hijāz as well as 'Irāq and the Najd, 'but from the first the auspices were unfavourable'. Ibn Sa'ūd declined to attend in person (a refusal which diminished in advance the possible efficacy of the conference for the establishment of better relations between the Āl Hāshim and the Āl Sa'ūd); and King Husayn was unwilling to appoint a representative unless an undertaking were given that the Āl Rashīd should be reinstated in their former principality of Hā'il—a condition which Ibn Sa'ūd could not be expected to accept nor Great Britain to propose to him. Representatives of Ibn Sa'ūd,¹ King Faysal, and the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh eventually met on the 17th December, 1923, at Kuwayt,² under the Presidency of Lieut.-Col. S. G. Knox, who had recently been acting as British Resident in the Persian Gulf. The 'Irāqī delegation was accompanied by the paramount Shaykh of the refugee Shammar, but the negotiations broke down over the questions of mutual compensation for tribal raids in the past and the settlement of disputes in the future. A suggestion for the setting up of a joint tribunal to settle disputes and to control the movement of tribes was accepted by the 'Irāqī delegates but rejected by the Najdīs, while on the other hand the 'Irāqīs at first took up the position that they could come to no agreement with the Najdīs unless there were a simultaneous settlement between the Najd and the Hijāz. The conference twice adjourned and twice reassembled. At the third session it was hoped that King Husayn would be represented by his son the Amīr Zayd and Ibn Sa'ūd by one of his own sons; but, instead, three of the former Najdī delegates returned, bringing letters of protest from Ibn Sa'ūd against raids which had been made on his dominions by the recalcitrant tribe of Mutayr, who had taken up their quarters in the neutral zone between 'Irāq and the Najd, and also a letter from Faysalu'd-Dawīsh, in which he threatened reprisals against 'Irāq. In spite of warnings from Colonel Knox, Faysalu'd-Dawīsh executed his counter-raid on the 14th March, before the 'Irāqī delegates had returned to Kuwayt. In these circumstances the 'Irāqī Government, with the approval of the British High Commissioner, refrained from reattending the conference, and since no delegation from the Hijāz arrived, while the Najdī and Transjordanian delegations failed to agree over the disposal

¹ Of Ibn Sa'ūd's five delegates one was an Egyptian journalist, and another a Kuwaytī, while the leader was an exile from Medina.

² For the Kuwayt Conference see *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1923–December 1924*, pp. 45–50; and the reports in the Arabic Press reproduced in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, pp. 204–8.

of the Wādī Sirhān,¹ Colonel Knox dissolved the conference on the 12th April, 1924. More serious than the failure to reach a positive agreement was the evidence of growing intransigence and aggressiveness on the Wahhābī side. Faysalū'd-Dawīsh made another raid on a considerable scale on the 31st May (though this time the 'Irāqī Badu defended themselves successfully and the raid was a failure). Thus, when Ibn Sa'ūd launched his attack on the Hijāz in the summer of 1924, his boundary disputes with his two northern neighbours were still unsettled.

It has been mentioned above² that while the main body of the Wahhābī levy was concentrated, in August 1924, against the southern Hijāz, several expeditionary forces were dispatched northwards simultaneously to make diversions against the other two Hāshimī principalities. On this occasion the Wahhābī invaders of Transjordan were roughly handled. The Transjordanian tribesmen gave warning of their approach; they were located by reconnaissances of the British Air Force in Palestine; and when they attacked a group of Banu Sakhr villages, a short distance to the south of 'Ammān, they were promptly counter-attacked by British aeroplanes and armoured cars, which put them to flight and pursued them eastwards, in successive relays, for forty miles, inflicting heavy casualties, before they succeeded in taking cover in the desert.³ On the other flank of the Shāmīyah a simultaneous Wahhābī raid against the Dhafir and the Muntafiq at Abu'l-Ghar was reported,⁴ and more serious raids followed in December 1924⁵ and January 1925.⁶ In January, however, these raiders of 'Irāq were twice overtaken by British aeroplanes and were almost as roughly handled as the raiders of Transjordan five months earlier.

Meanwhile, the collapse of the Hāshimī Power in the Hijāz and the occupation of the greater part of the country by the Wahhābīs raised the question of the frontiers between the Hijāz and Transjordan, which had been dormant so long as both principalities had

¹ See *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 8, pp. 512-14, for a *communiqué* to the Arabic Press, dated the 14th June, 1924, in which one of the Najdī delegates at the Kuwayt Conference, the Mawlā Hāfiz Wahbah the Egyptian, gave the Najdī version of the conversations between the Najdī and the Transjordanian delegation in regard to boundaries.

² p. 298.

³ Official *communiqué* of the 22nd August from the Palestine Government in *The Times*, 25th August, 1924; official *communiqués* from the Transjordanian Government in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 10, p. 619.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, IV, 10, p. 624.

⁵ *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq, April 1923-December 1924*, p. 51.

⁶ *The Times*, 10th January, 1925.

been ruled by members of the same family. In 1922 King Husayn was reported ¹ to have transferred Ma'ān to his son 'Abdu'llāh ; and in March 1924, during his visit to 'Ammān, he was again reported to have transferred not only Ma'ān but 'Aqabah and Tabūk. On the 27th March this report was officially denied by the Transjordanian Government,² and on the 19th April the then Chief British Representative in Transjordan, Mr. Philby, handed over the 'Ammān-Ma'ān section of the Hijāz Railway to the Amīr 'Alī. This action, however, had not been authorized by the British Government ; ³ and on the 24th June, 1925, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Amery, in reply to a parliamentary question evoked by the British Government's recent action ⁴ in requiring the ex-King Husayn to leave 'Aqabah, declared that Great Britain had never recognized 'Aqabah as falling within the limits of the Hijāz or formally assented to a Hijāzī occupation of the place, and that the Transjordanian Government was taking steps to assert its authority there. On the 6th July, in a written reply to another parliamentary question, Mr. Amery further stated that, while the actual frontiers between Transjordan, the Hijāz, and the Najd had never been precisely defined, the British Government had more than once made it clear that they regarded the correct frontier as crossing the Hijāz Railway at some point between Ma'ān and Tabūk, and as giving Transjordan access to the sea in the neighbourhood of 'Aqabah ; and that, while they had acquiesced in the status of the Ma'ān and 'Aqabah districts remaining indeterminate pending a final delimitation of the frontier, they had felt bound, in pursuance of their declaration of neutrality in the Najdī-Hijāzī War, to take steps to establish the control of the Transjordan administration in this area—for which they regarded themselves as responsible under the Palestine mandate—when it appeared that the area was being used by the Hijāzī authorities for military purposes. He added that Ibn Sa'ūd had once more been invited to co-operate with the British Government in defining that portion of the frontier which lay between the Najd and Transjordan.⁵

As the year 1925 wore on and the inevitable extinction of 'Alī b. Husayn's Constitutional Kingdom of the Hijāz drew nearer, it

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 231.

² *Op. cit.*, IV, 4, pp. 262-3.

³ *Report on the Administration under Mandate of Palestine and Transjordan*, 1924, p. 68.

⁴ See p. 299 above.

⁵ The ex-King Husayn of the Hijāz protested against the annexation of 'Aqabah and Ma'ān to Transjordan in a letter, dated Nicosia, 7th August, 1925, which was published in *The Times* of the 10th August.

became an urgent matter for Great Britain to reach an agreement with Ibn Sa'ūd in regard not only to the Najd-Transjordan frontier but to the tribal régime along the border between Ibn Sa'ūd's dominions and both the areas under British mandate. If Jiddah and Medina were to fall before these issues between Ibn Sa'ūd and Great Britain were settled, the Wahhābī ruler might be tempted, in the hour of victory over the eldest of the three Hāshimī brothers, to throw the forces of a united Arabia against the territories of the other two and attempt to settle the problems of his northern frontier by the sword—a development which would place Great Britain in an exceedingly difficult position. To forestall this possibility the British Government dispatched Sir Gilbert Clayton in September 1925 on a special mission to Jiddah, not to mediate between the Najd and the Hijāz, but to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ūd regarding the Najd-Transjordan and the Najd-‘Irāq frontiers. These negotiations resulted in the signature of two instruments at Ibn Sa'ūd's camp at Bahrah : the so-called ‘Haddah Agreement’ of the 2nd November, 1925, relating to the Najd and Transjordan, and the so-called ‘Bahrah Agreement’ of the 1st November, relating to the Najd and ‘Irāq.¹

In the negotiations leading up to the Haddah Agreement, Ibn Sa'ūd appears at first to have demanded that his dominions in the Shāmīyah should be conterminous with the French mandated territory of Syria.² This claim could not be entertained by the British representative, since, if granted, it would break the existing territorial contact between Transjordan and ‘Irāq, and would incidentally preclude the establishment of air-routes and motor-routes from the Mediterranean to Baghdad through an unbroken zone of territories under British mandate. In the final instrument the frontier was so drawn (Art. 1) as to leave a corridor about sixty miles wide connecting Transjordan with ‘Irāq and separating the Najd from Syria,³ but the British Government undertook (Art. 13)

¹ English texts of these two agreements, and of correspondence between Ibn Sa'ūd and Sir G. Clayton, elucidating certain points in each of them, in British White Paper *Cmd.* 2566 of 1925. In the Haddah Agreement the English and Arabic texts were equally valid. In the Bahrah Agreement only the Arabic text was official.

² *The Times*, 12th November, 1925.

³ For the actual line see the *tracé* on map II at the end of the volume. Since ‘Alī b. Husayn's Constitutional Kingdom of the Hijāz was still in being at the date when the Haddah Agreement was signed, the delimitation of the frontier between Transjordan and the Hijāz was not included in the scope of the negotiations between Sir G. Clayton and Ibn Sa'ūd, though, within a month of the signature of the Haddah Agreement, the Hijāz became part of Ibn Sa'ūd's dominions.

to secure freedom of transit at all times to merchants who were subjects of the Najd for the prosecution of their trade between the Najd and Syria¹ in both directions, and to secure exemption from all customs duties (though not from customs formalities and other conditions) for all merchandise in transit. In a more general clause (Art. 12) free passage across their respective territories was granted by either Government, under certain conditions, to pilgrims and travellers from the other country. Though the new frontier fell short of Ibn Sa'ūd's claims, it still assigned to the Najd the whole of the Wādī Sirhān except its north-western extremity, and in particular the disputed oasis of Kāf (Qurāyātu'l-Milh). Nūrī Sha'lān and his Ruwalā tribesmen, for whose allegiance 'Abdu'llāh b. Husayn and Ibn Sa'ūd had contended for the past three years, were thus tacitly but unmistakably recognized as falling under the jurisdiction of the Sultan of Najd. In return, the Government of Najd undertook (Art. 2) not to establish any fortified post at Kāf or to utilize the neighbourhood as a military centre, and further undertook to prevent incursions by Wahhābī forces into Transjordanian territory. In order to avoid friction constant communication was to be maintained between the chief British representative in Transjordan and the Najdī Governor of the Wādī Sirhān (Art. 3). The established rights, in the territory of either party, of tribes which were under the jurisdiction of the other party, were to be maintained (Art. 4).

There followed several articles, common to the Haddah and the Bahrah Agreement,² which constituted a kind of statute for the tribal régime on either side of both sections of frontier. Raiding was stigmatized as an aggression requiring the severe punishment of the offending tribe by the Government to which they owed allegiance. The chief of the offending tribe was to be held responsible. A Najdī-Transjordanian and a Najdī-'Irāqī mixed special tribunal were to be set up, to inquire into the facts of tribal aggression on either side, assess the damages, and fix the responsibility. The

¹ A customs agreement between the Najd and Syria was negotiated in January 1926 (*The Times*, 30th January, 1926; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 2, p. 94, and 3, p. 156). This agreement appears to have dealt not only with customs but with the Pilgrim Traffic and with the status of either party's subjects in the territory of the other party. Najdīs resident in the French mandated territory were to be under the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts. The Ruwalā 'Anazah were to be subject to Najdī law during their seasonal residence at Jawf. Either party appointed a permanent representative in the other party's territory.

² Articles 5-11 of the Haddah Agreement=Articles 1-7 of the Bahrah Agreement.

decisions of these tribunals were to be final and executory—the execution devolving upon the Government to whom those found guilty were subject. Tribes were not to cross the international frontiers without the sanction of the Governments on both sides of the line ; but, ‘in accordance with the principle of the freedom of grazing’, neither Government was to have the right to withhold its sanction if the migration were due to grazing necessities. The Governments undertook to stand in the way, by all the means at their disposal other than expulsion and the use of force, of the emigration of any tribe from the one country into the other except with the knowledge and consent of the Government to which that tribe owed allegiance. The Governments were not to correspond on official or political matters with chiefs of tribes subject to the other contracting party.

This common group of articles formed the substance of the Bahrah Agreement, since the frontier between the Najd and the ‘Irāq had already been laid down in the treaty and protocols of 1922. Between these two states the outstanding issue was the raiding of Najdī territory by the refugee Shammar and the counter-raiding of ‘Irāqī territory by the Wahhābīs. In the negotiations leading up to the Bahrah Agreement¹ Ibn Sa‘ūd pressed a demand, which he had already put forward during the Kuwayt Conference, for the extradition of criminals. This principle was not accepted by the ‘Irāqī Government or by the British Government as mandatory Power ; but in the text of the agreement (Art. 9) power was given to a Government into whose territory a tribe under the other contracting party’s jurisdiction had immigrated to exact guarantees from that tribe if it subsequently committed raids into the territory in which it had formerly resided ; and if the aggression were repeated, those guarantees were to be liable to confiscation, without prejudice to the sanctions provided for in the preceding articles common to the two agreements. In a further clause the Governments of ‘Irāq and Najd undertook to open negotiations for a special extradition agreement within a period not exceeding one year from the date of the ratification of the Bahrah Agreement by the Government of ‘Irāq.

The signature of the Haddah and Bahrah Agreements marked a great advance towards the establishment of regular and friendly relations between the Najd and the two adjoining Arab principalities of ‘Irāq and Transjordan. The northern frontier of the Najd was now delimited from the Bātin on the east to the intersection of

¹ See the correspondence in *Cmd.* 2566 of 1925, pp. 12–13

meridian 38° E with parallel 29° 35' N. ;¹ permanent provision for the settlement of tribal disturbances had been made by the creation of the two mixed special tribunals : and while Ibn Sa'ūd and Sir Gilbert Clayton were in negotiation, Najdī and 'Irāqī delegates agreed on a formula for a settlement of claims and counter-claims arising out of raids in the past.² It remained to be seen whether, in the long run, Ibn Sa'ūd could or would restrain the united forces of Arabia from attempting to burst the northern bounds of the Peninsula ; but the aggressive spirit of the Wahhābī fighting-men had possibly been damped by their recent encounters with British armoured-cars and aeroplanes, and, if so, the new régime along the border would be inaugurated under conditions more favourable to peace than had obtained during the three previous years, since the moment when the overthrow of the Āl Rashīd had placed Ibn Sa'ūd in possession of the northern gates of Arabia. At any rate, Great Britain, as the patroness of Ibn Sa'ūd and the mandatory Power in 'Irāq and Transjordan, might congratulate herself upon having kept the peace between these three of her Arab protégés during the critical period of the Najdī-Hijāzī War.

(vii) The Administration of the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon³ and of the British Mandate for Palestine.⁴

(a) THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MANDATED TERRITORIES (1920-4).⁵

The events leading up to the assignment of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon to France and of the mandate for Palestine to Great

¹ The frontier was still indeterminate as between Ibn Sa'ūd's new kingdom of the Hijāz (of which he accepted the crown on the 8th January, 1926) and Transjordan. It may be noted that if, from the south-western terminus of the Transjordan-Najd frontier, a line were drawn due eastwards to the Red Sea, that line would assign 'Aqabah and Ma'an to Transjordan and Tabūk to the Hijāz.

² *Cmd.* 2566 of 1925, pp. 14-15.

³ On the 27th February, 1926, the Permanent Mandates Commission debated whether the terms of the French mandate 'for the territories of Syria and the Lebanon' entitled the Mandatory Power to establish more than two independent states in this area. The Commission decided in the affirmative, and put this opinion on record in their report to the Council of the League on their Extraordinary Session of the 16th February-6th March, 1926.

⁴ Properly, the entire internal administration of mandated territories falls within the scope of this Survey, since it came under the cognizance of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, which was an international body. Lack of space, however, has made it necessary to pass over all internal affairs, even of mandated territories, which were of a technical or non-controversial character, and to confine attention to matters which involved relations between the mandated territory and other countries, or critical relations between the mandatory Power, the inhabitants of the mandated territory, and the League of Nations.

⁵ For the historical background see the British Admiralty's Handbook,

Britain by the Principal Allied Powers on the 24th April, 1920, at the San Remo Conference, have been recorded in the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*.¹ The frontier between the territories placed under these respective mandates was settled by the two Franco-British Agreements of the 23rd December, 1920, and the 3rd February, 1922.² The latter agreement came into force on the 10th March, 1923, and the territorial adjustments for which it provided were duly made as from the 1st April, 1924.³ The draft mandates presented by the mandatory Powers designate were approved (with certain modifications) by the Council of the League simultaneously on the 24th July, 1922, and were declared by the Council to have become effective simultaneously on the 29th September, 1923.⁴ The rights of Turkey, the former sovereign over both mandated territories, were extinguished by the Treaty of Lausanne, which was signed on the 24th July, 1923, and came into force on the 6th August, 1924.

Before the institution of these two mandates, the area which they covered between them had been popularly known as 'Syria'. This name reflected the fact that, from the physical point of view, the combined area of the two mandated territories was sharply marked off from the surrounding regions—from Egypt by the Sinai Desert, from Najd by the Nafūd,⁵ from 'Irāq by the Hamād, Shāmīyah, and

Syria (including Palestine) (London, 1920, H.M. Stationery Office), and Foreign Office Peace Handbook No. 60, *Syria and Palestine* (London, 1920, H.M. Stationery Office). For the period under review see Leonard Stein, *Zionism* (London, 1924, Benn), and *Syria* (London, 1926, Benn). For the social background see G. Grolla, 'La Siria e la Competizione Anglo-Francese', in *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 517-23 and 577-80.

¹ Vol. vi, Ch. I, Part III B. The secret agreements regarding these and other portions of the Ottoman Empire which were negotiated during the War of 1914-18 between the Principal Allied Powers were contained, as between the French and British Governments, in an exchange of letters between Sir E. Grey (afterwards Lord Grey of Fallodon) and M. Cambon, consisting of a letter from M. Cambon, dated the 9th May, and a letter from Sir E. Grey dated the 16th May, 1916. The material portions of this correspondence were published in *Le Temps* during May 1919. They were reprinted in the journal *Palestine* (issue of the 31st May, 1919), in R. de Gontaud Biron, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie (1918-19)* (Paris, 1923, Plon), and in J. de V. Loder, *The Truth about Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria* (London, 1923, Allen and Unwin).

² Texts in British White Papers, *Cmd.* 1195 of 1921, and *Cmd.* 1910 of 1923.

³ *Report on the Administration under Mandate of Palestine and Transjordan* for 1924, p. 5.

⁴ A Franco-American convention regarding the French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon was signed at Paris on the 4th April, 1924 (text in the French Government's *Report on Syria and the Lebanon* for the period July 1923 to July 1924, pp. 52-3). An Anglo-American Convention regarding the British mandate for Palestine was signed on the 3rd December, 1924. (Text in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 2559 of 1925.)

⁵ See p. 326 above.

Jazīrah steppes,¹ from Anatolia by the Amanus Mountains, and from Europe by the Mediterranean. Even physically, however, 'Syria' (in the popular sense) was broken up by internal barriers at least as sharp as those which separated her from her neighbours; and although the political frontier drawn between the two mandated territories was an arbitrary line which did not coincide with any of the physical articulations of the country, the lack of correspondence between political and physical boundaries was not a new phenomenon in Syrian history. Since the dawn of that history in the fourth millennium B. C., there was no record of a political frontier which had embraced the whole of Syria, and nothing but Syria, in a single sovereign state. At times, when Syria had exercised the greatest cultural and economic influence upon other parts of the world (for example, during the age of the Phoenicians and Israelites, and the age of the Crusades), the country had been subdivided politically into almost as many minute independent states as classical Greece. In the long perspective of Syrian history, however, such periods appeared as interludes between the more frequent ages in which Syria had been merged politically in territorial units larger than herself,² sometimes by being incorporated integrally in a single empire, and at other times by being partitioned between two rival Powers. The whole of Syria had been incorporated in the Second Ancient Egyptian Empire during its first phase (*circa* 1540–1350 B. C.), in the Achaemenid Empire (*circa* 539–333 B. C.), in the Seleucid Empire during its second phase (*circa* 199–141 B. C.), in the Roman Empire (63 B. C.–A. D. 640), in the Arab Caliphate (A. D. 640–878), in the successive Egyptian Empires of the Tūlūnids (A. D. 878–905), the Ikhshīdids (A. D. 942–69), the Fātimids (A. D. 1038–71), the Mamlūks (A. D. 1292–1516), and Mehmed 'Alī (A. D. 1832–40), and finally in the Ottoman Empire from A. D. 1517 to A. D. 1918, except for the brief interval of Mehmed 'Alī's dominion. On the other hand, Syria had been partitioned between the Second Ancient Egyptian Empire in its last phase and the Hittites (*circa* 1272–1175 B. C.), between the Seleucid Empire in its first phase and the Ptolemies (*circa* 301–199 B. C.), and between the earlier Fātimids and the Byzantines (A. D. 969–1038).

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² In almost all such cases the political centre of gravity of the larger unit in which Syria was merged had not lain in Syria. The exceptions had been the Seleucid Empire, with its capital at Antioch, and the Arab Caliphate, in its first phase under the Umayyad Dynasty, with its capital at Damascus. In both these cases, however, the rulers of the Empire had been non-Syrians who had transferred their capital to Syria for administrative convenience.

The régime introduced in the Peace Settlement after the War of 1914-18 was a transitional compromise between the system of subdivision into minute independent states and the system of partition between two Great Powers. The Syrian territories mandated respectively to France and Great Britain were each organized as a single customs and currency unit, and were each attached, under the mandate, to an Empire extending far beyond the limits of Syria itself. On the other hand, these two mandated territories were subdivided, by the action of the mandatory Powers, into a number of states which were provisionally recognized as independent, subject to temporary assistance and control on the mandatory's part, in pursuance of the terms of the mandates themselves and of the Covenant of the League. During the period between the conditional recognition of the independence of Transjordan by the British Government on the 25th April, 1923, and the merger of the two states of Damascus and Aleppo by General Weygand's decree of the 5th December, 1924, which came into force on the 1st January, 1925, there were no less than seven such states in existence simultaneously : the states of Great Lebanon (Libnānu'l-Kabīr), Damascus, Aleppo (with a special régime in the predominantly Turkish sanjāq of Antioch and Alexandretta),¹ the 'Alawīyīn ('Alouites'),² and the Jabalu'd-Durūz ('Djebel Druse') in the French mandated territory ; and the states of Palestine and Transjordan in the British mandated territory.

This division of political authority in Syria, between paramount Powers external to the country and a number of local Governments technically independent yet all in different degrees subject to the paramount Powers' control, was not unlike the political situation at the beginning of the Christian era. There were also, during the period under review, the same abrupt contrasts of culture between the various Syrian communities, which ranged from nomadic tribes living the changeless life of the steppe to urban communities participating in the highest and most complex civilization of the day. Just as, in the time of Christ, the rhetors and merchants of Greek city-states like Antioch and Gadara were living side by side with the Pharisees of Judaea, the wild Ituraean highlanders, and the nomads of the desert border, so, during the period under review, the Westernized advocates and business men of the Lebanon were

¹ See Section (viii) below.

² The French name for the Ansariyah or Nusayriyah, who constituted the majority of the population of this state.

living side by side with the adherents of strange religions like the Ansariyah and the Ismā'īlīs, with wild highlanders like the Druses, and with pure nomads like the Ruwalā.

The cause of this recurrent phenomenon was to be found in the permanent physical structure of the country. Syria was perpetually brought into touch with the great world by two international highways—one connecting Egypt with Anatolia, via the lowlands of the Shephelah, Jezreel, the Hawrān, Damascus and Aleppo,¹ and the other linking the interior of Asia with the Mediterranean via the Syrian ports.² Through these channels Syria was easily penetrated by cosmopolitan influences in successive waves. The two routes, however, were flanked at close quarters by mountain *massifs* and highland districts, in which the deposits of past cultural tides and the remnants of broken communities were shielded from destruction—for example, the Lebanon and the Jabal Ansariyah along the coast, the hill countries of Judah and Galilee and Mount Hermon and the Anti-Lebanon in the interior, and the highlands of Gilead and the Jabalu'd-Durūz east of Jordan. Thus, in Syria, new movements like Bahaism (which had established its head-quarters at Haifa after being banished from Persia, where it had originated), or like Zionism (for which the Balfour Declaration had opened the door), were to be found side by side with such fossils of ancient faiths as the community of Ashkenazī Jews in Jerusalem, the Samaritans of Mount Gerizim, the Druses of the Jabalu'd-Durūz, Mount Hermon, and the

¹ At the time of writing this route was not yet traversed by an unbroken line of standard gauge railway. Damascus was linked up with Egypt via Dar'a, Haifa, Ludd, and Ghazzah, and with Europe via Rayāq in the Biqā' (Coele Syria), Homs, Hamāh, Aleppo and the Baghdad and Anatolian Railways, with one break at the Bosphorus between the Asiatic and European termini of Haydār Pāshā and Sirkeji. There was a change of gauge, however, both at Haifa and at Homs, the lines connecting these two points being narrow-gauge, while those connecting Haifa with Egypt and Homs with Europe were standard gauge. The narrow-gauge line connecting Damascus with Bayrūt via Rayāq crossed the successive ranges of the Anti-Lebanon and the Lebanon by a rack-and-pinion mechanism. M. de Jouvenel, during his tenure of office as French High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon (November 1925–July 1926), took up a project for supplying the missing link of standard gauge permanent way. He proposed to carry the new line along the coast, from Haifa to Tarabulus (Tripoli), where it was to connect with the existing broad-gauge line from Tarabulus to Homs.

² See above, p. 329, for the opening of this latter route to motor transport during the period under review. During the rising of 1925–6 in the French mandated territory, when an attempt was made to maintain communications between Baghdad and the Mediterranean, via 'Ammān, without passing outside the limits of the territories under British mandate, it was found by experience that there was no commercially profitable alignment for this route which did not traverse the French mandated territory. (See *The Journal of the Central Asian Society*, vol. xii, Part I, 1925, pp. 51–2.)

Lebanon, or the Maronites, the 'Alawīyīn and the Ismā'īlī Shī'īs of the coastal range.

Arabic was the vernacular language of all the inhabitants of Syria, except for a small Turkish population in the Antioch-Alexandretta sanjāq, a fringe of Kurds along the northern frontier on both sides of the Euphrates, and some scattered settlements of Circassians, Armenians, and European Jews (whose social importance, however, was out of proportion to their numbers); but the common use of Arabic did not carry with it a corresponding sense of national solidarity. No doubt the beginnings of a Syrian national consciousness had become apparent before the War of 1914-18, especially among the Syrian colonies abroad; and the struggle against the French mandate, which occupied the period under review, while it embittered certain local feuds, probably tended, on the balance, to break down the particularism of the various Syrian communities. Nevertheless, communal particularism remained, during this period, the dominant feature in the political life of the country; and the Permanent Mandates Commission, in the report on their session of the 16th February-6th March, 1926, in which they had been investigating the antecedents of the rising against the French, recorded 'the fact that, in a population of only two and a half millions [in the territory mandated to France], there were no fewer than eighteen different religious creeds more or less mutually antagonistic'. The Christian sects alone, which accounted in the aggregate for not more than 25 per cent. of the total population of the two mandated territories, maintained two 'Patriarchs of Antioch'¹ and three 'Patriarchs of Antioch and all the East'.²

The most important Syrian community³—at least in point of numbers and ubiquity—were the Sunnī Muslims, who, in both mandated territories, were the predominant element in the rural population of the lowlands and in the urban population on the coast as well as in the interior.⁴ There was a solidarity of feeling⁵ between the Sunnīs on both sides of the new Syro-Palestinian frontier, which was

¹ One Greek Orthodox and the other Syrian (i. e. ex-Jacobite-Monophysite) Uniate.

² One Maronite, another Jacobite-Monophysite, and the third Greek (i. e. ex-Orthodox) Uniate or Melkite.

³ For a systematic description of the inhabitants of Syria see Admiralty Handbook, pp. 175-235, and Foreign Office Peace Handbook, pp. 49-64.

⁴ The Sunnīs seem to have been in the majority in the population of every Palestinian and Syrian port, with the exception of Bayrūt, where they numbered 32,882 out of a total population of 77,292 (French Government's *Report on Syria and the Lebanon*, July 1922-July 1923, p. 45).

⁵ See *The Times*, 30th April, 1925.

manifested in the riot at Damascus on the occasion of Lord Balfour's visit, on the 9th April, 1925, and in the two general strikes successively proclaimed in Palestine on the 2nd November, 1925, as a protest against the conduct of the mandatory Power in the territory under the French mandate,¹ and on the 30th March, 1926, when the French High Commissioner for Syria, M. de Jouvenel, paid an official visit to Jerusalem.² The Sunnī community was the nucleus round which a Syrian national movement would naturally form through the accretion of other elements.

The second in importance of the Syrian communities were the Maronites (ex-Monothelete Christians), who were concentrated in the former Ottoman sanjāq of the Lebanon (within the boundaries of 1861–1920). The strength of the Maronites lay not in their numbers and distribution in Syria itself but in the support on which they could count from overseas—partly from the Maronite colonies in Egypt, West Africa, and North and South America,³ partly from the Roman Catholic Church (with which they had been in full communion since A. D. 1445, though they retained their own Syriac liturgy and their own ecclesiastical discipline), and partly from the French Government, which had a traditional claim to protect all Roman Catholics and Uniates in the Ottoman Empire, and had asserted this claim in 1860 by military intervention on behalf of the Maronites, who were the largest single Ottoman community paying ecclesiastical allegiance to the Vatican. The Maronite community was the nucleus round which a Lebanese national movement would naturally form, if it formed at all; but there was little sign of solidarity between the Maronites and the other Christian communities. The Latins (i. e. the Roman Catholics in the full sense) were insignificant in numbers; the four Uniate Churches (i. e. the Melkhites or ex-Orthodox, the Armenians or ex-Gregorian-Monophysites, the Syrians or ex-Jacobite Monophysites, and the Chaldaeans or ex-Nestorians) were inclined, in spite of their common allegiance to Rome, to be jealous of the more powerful Maronite body; while the Churches not affiliated to Rome went their own way.

Other communities which played an important part during the

¹ *The Times*, 3rd November, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 31st March, 1926.

³ For statistics of emigration from Great Lebanon to various countries in the years 1923 and 1924 see the French Government's *Report on Syria and the Lebanon* for the calendar year 1924, p. 53. During the Peace Conference of Paris a member of the United States delegation told the writer that there was some ground for believing that more than half the land in the Lebanon (within the boundaries of 1861–1920) was then owned by persons resident in the United States.

period under review were the Zionist Jews, the Orthodox Christians, and the Druses. The Zionists, though still weak in numbers, were strong in the concentration of their efforts upon a small section of the country, in the official recognition of their movement in the text of the Palestine mandate, and in the support which they received from the mandatory Power in Palestine, and, in increasing measure, from Jews of every school all over the world.¹ The Orthodox Christians, likewise, were strong in the support of their co-religionists abroad.² The Druses were strong in their warlike spirit and in the intractability of their principal stronghold, the Jabalu'd-Durūz, as a *terrain* for military operations on modern Western lines.³

The Ansariyah of the coastal range north of the Lebanon (an apparently pre-Islamic sect whose doctrines had evolved, under Islamic influence, into a deification of the Caliph 'Alī abū Tālib), the Turks of Antioch and Alexandretta, the descendants of the Circassian refugees whom the Ottoman Government had planted in Syria during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and the Armenian refugees whom the French had admitted since 1921, all acquired a certain importance which they might not otherwise have possessed, owing to attempts which were made by the French authorities to win their support for the mandatory Power and even to play them off against the recalcitrant Sunnis and Druses. The Matāwilah (Shi'is of the same persuasion as those of 'Irāq and Persia, whose chief centres were the Biqā' or Coele Syria and the Jabal 'Amūd or 'Āmil in the immediate hinterland of Sūr and Saydā)⁴ became momentarily important during the Druses' invasion of Great Lebanon in November 1925, when both belligerents bid for their support. Finally, there were communities like the Bābīs, the Samaritans, and the Ismā'ilīs⁵ (Shi'is of the 'Assassin' school, whose religious head was His High-

¹ See sub-section (b) below for the progress made, during the period under review, in the development of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

² On the other hand, the Orthodox Christians were weakened by the dissensions between their higher clergy (who were of Greek origin and language) and the mass of the clergy and laity, who were Arabophone. The Arab opposition to Greek ascendancy in this church had been supported by the Imperial Russian Government until its fall in 1917, with the ulterior object of increasing the influence of Russia in Palestine. See Sir A. Bertram and J. W. A. Young, *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem* (London, 1926, Humphrey Milford).

³ A fuller account of the Druses is given in sub-section (d) below.

⁴ Matāwilah in Arabic means 'Friends' [of the Caliph 'Alī]. When Shāh Ismā'il Safawī imposed this form of Shi'ism upon the population of Persia at the beginning of the sixteenth Christian century, he imported divines from the Jabal 'Āmil to instruct his subjects in their new faith. (See E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, vol. iv, pp. 360 and 427-8.)

⁵ See *Survey for 1924*, pp. 197-8.

ness the Agha Khan, a subject of the Emperor of India), which were interesting either as historical survivals or as possible seeds of future religious growths, but which played no appreciable part in the political life of Syria during the period under review.

This necessarily brief sketch will perhaps have made it apparent that there was a certain correlation between the distribution of the various religious communities in Syria and the physical structure of the country. These two factors, again, combined to determine, in a large measure, the administrative organization which was introduced by the two mandatory Powers.

Under the Ottoman régime the whole area covered by the two mandates, except the sanjāq of Lebanon (Libnān) within the boundaries of 1861, had been subject juridically to the ordinary Ottoman provincial administration, though in practice that administration had been only intermittently effective over the Ansariyah of the coastal range, the Druses of the Jabalu'd-Durūz and the Badu of the steppe. The Lebanon sanjāq had been subject to special organic regulations which had been introduced in 1861, and revised in 1864, not by unilateral acts of the Ottoman Government, but by international protocols, to which not only the Ottoman Government but the five European Great Powers of the day had been parties.¹ Under the regulations of 1864 the Lebanon had been administered by a Christian Governor appointed by and directly responsible to the Ottoman Government, with the assistance of a Central Administrative Council (Majlis) of twelve members appointed by indirect election.² While all individuals were equal before the law and all feudal privileges were abolished, the most striking feature in the regulations was the provision for the representation of the various religious communities on the most important corporate bodies in fixed proportions.³ Under this régime the Lebanon had enjoyed almost unbroken internal peace and prosperity until 1915, when the Ottoman Government took advantage of the General War to set the regulations aside with a high hand.

¹ For the texts of these two protocols see *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1860-1 (vol. 51), and 1870-1 (vol. 61).

² The members were elected by the village Shaykhs, who were elected by the villagers.

³ For example, on the Central Administrative Majlis four seats were assigned permanently to the Maronites, three to the Druses, two to the Orthodox Christians, and one each to the Melkhites, Matāwilah, and Sunnis. The Supreme Judicial Council consisted of six members, one each from the six communities above mentioned. The Governor's administrative agent in each of the seven administrative districts had to be an adherent of the religion which was predominant, in numbers or wealth, in that district.

The military occupation of 'Syria' (in the popular sense) by British, French, and Hijāzī forces, under a British High Command, after the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, the establishment of an Arab National State in the interior with its capital at Damascus, the withdrawal of the British forces into Palestine towards the end of the year 1919, and the overthrow of the Arab Government in July 1920, when General Gouraud, the French High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Syria, invaded the interior and occupied Damascus by military force, have all been recorded in the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*.¹ Technically, the Occupying Powers were bound to apply the previous administrative régime in the occupied territories until the juridical status of these territories had been changed by the coming into force of a peace treaty with Turkey, and by the assignment and approval of the two mandates under which the territories were to be placed. Actually, the French and British Governments did not (and, indeed, could not) wait for these events before introducing administrative innovations.

The first of these innovations, and the most serious in its consequences, was the territorial aggrandisement of the Lebanon by an *arrêté* of the French High Commissioner, General Gouraud, on the 31st August, 1920. There were good grounds for incorporating in the Lebanon the city of Bayrūt, which had previously been an enclave surrounded by Lebanese territory and which contained rather more Christian than Sunnī inhabitants; ² but the *arrêté* of the 31st August, 1920, went much further than this by incorporating in the Lebanon not only Bayrūt but Tarabulus (a city which had 26,094 Sunnī inhabitants as against only 6,066 Christians, and which was also the terminal port of the Homs-Hamāh-Aleppo standard-gauge railway); the Biqā' or Coele Syria (with 19,506 Sunnīs, 30,900 Matāwilah, and 5,102 Druses, as against 37,974 Christians), and the whole territory between the former southern boundary of the Lebanon, Mount Hermon, and the new Syro-Palestinian frontier (with 13,397 Sunnīs,³ 62,796 Matāwilah, and 3,519 Druses ⁴ as against 31,071 Christians).⁵ These annexations were presumably intended

¹ Vol. vi, Ch. I, Part III B.

² Out of a total population of 77,292 there were 32,882 Sunnīs and 34,755 Christians. The balance was made up by the Matāwilah and the Druses (French Government's *Report*, July 1922-July 1923, p. 45).

³ Mainly resident in Sūr (Tyre) and Saydā (Sidon).

⁴ The importance of these Druses was out of proportion to their numbers, owing to the special vitality of the Druse element in the towns of Hāsbayyā and Rāshayyā, and to the presence of the central shrine of the Druse religion at Khalwatu'l-Biyād.

⁵ See *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 697-9, for a somewhat different analysis of

to confirm (or restore) the traditional devotion of the Lebanese Christians to France; yet, though they fulfilled certain Lebanese Nationalist aspirations, they were of doubtful advantage to the Lebanon itself (since, by swelling the non-Maronite and non-Christian elements in the population, they greatly aggravated the already complicated problem of self-government on a basis of fixed communal representation), and they created a new and formidable impediment to that entente between the two strongest Syrian communities, the Maronites and the Sunnis, without which there was no prospect of fulfilling the intentions of the Covenant and the mandate by establishing self-government in Syria as a whole. It is true that, during the period under review, the French Government consistently administered the whole territory under its mandate as a single customs and currency unit, and that the French High Commissioner and his staff provided a political as well as an economic liaison between the several separate states which the mandatory Power set up. The Sunnis and the Druses, however, did not believe in the mandatory Power's impartiality. The establishment of the seat of the French High Commission at Bayrūt, and the *arrêté* of the 31st August, 1920, seemed to indicate that the French had come to Syria with the intention of favouring one Syrian community at another's expense; and though the mandatory Power might have no intention of erecting a customs barrier between the Great Lebanon and the interior and thus cutting off the interior from the sea, there was no guarantee that the dominant elements in the Lebanon would not take this step if the opportunity offered, since they showed themselves uniformly jealous of any measures which tended to tighten the bonds between the Lebanon and other parts of the country.¹ This temper was a natural reaction to the temporary loss, from 1915 to 1918, of the privileged position which the Lebanon had enjoyed during the previous fifty-four years; but the existence of such a temper among the Lebanese made the creation of the Great Lebanon on the 31st August, 1920, a distinctly more unstatesmanlike act than it might have been in less unfavourable circumstances.

The creation of the Great Lebanon (Libnānu'l-Kabīr) on the 31st

the census of the 31st December, 1921. (The figures in the text are from the French Government's *Report*, cited above.)

¹ It would, of course, have been economically disadvantageous for Bayrūt and the other Lebanese ports to be separated by a customs barrier from their hinterland. On the European Continent, however, the new national states which had emerged as a result of the Great War had not been restrained by enlightened economic self-interest from asserting their independence in the fiscal form of tariff walls.

August, 1920, was followed on the 1st September by the formal proclamation of its independence and the promulgation of a provisional statute. The mandatory Power found it necessary, however, not only to maintain the previous system of fixed communal representation but to reserve the post of Governor for a Frenchman, since communal rivalry and suspicion threatened to render any native Lebanese candidate unacceptable to a majority of his fellow citizens.¹ The statute of the 1st September, 1920, established provisionally a nominated administrative commission ;² but a decree promulgated by the High Commissioner on the 8th March, 1922,³ while reserving to the High Commissioner the nomination of the Governor, provided for an elective Representative Council, and electoral and municipal ordinances were promulgated on the 10th and 12th March respectively.⁴ The elections were held, and the new Council met on the 25th May, 1922 ;⁵ but it was alleged that the electors had been subjected to pressure and even violence.⁶ An *arrêté* instituting a Council of State was signed by the Governor of the Lebanon on the 6th September, 1924, and approved by the High Commissioner on the 11th.⁷

The creation of the Great Lebanon by the *arrêtés* of the 31st August and the 1st September, 1920, was part of a general administrative reorganization of the French mandated territory, the whole of which had been brought for the first time under the effective control of the mandatory Power by the conquest of the Arab National State of Damascus in the preceding July. The littoral north of the Lebanon was erected into a 'territory of the 'Alawīyīn', under a French administrator stationed at Lādhīqīyah, on the 2nd September, 1920 ; and, as from the 1st July, 1922, this territory was erected into a state.⁸ The territory of the defunct Arab National State was divided into the two states of Aleppo⁹ and Damascus, under native Governors appointed by the French High Commissioner and controlled by French advisers. The independence of the Jabalū'd-Durūz was recognized (subject to the mandate) by the mandatory Power in an agreement with the local Druse chiefs, which was signed on the

¹ French Government's *Report*, July 1922-July 1923, pp. 9, 10, and 12.

² *Oriente Moderno*, I, p. 654.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 710-16.

⁴ Texts in *op. cit.*, pp. 723-7.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 88-9.

⁶ See the memorial presented by the Delegation of the Syro-Palestinian Congress to the Third Assembly of the League of Nations (*op. cit.*, p. 301).

⁷ Text in *op. cit.*, IV, 10, pp. 609-10.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, II, p. 224.

⁹ For the special treatment of the Antioch-Alexandretta sanjāq of the Aleppo state see Section (viii) below.

4th March, 1921, by M. Robert de Caix, acting on behalf of General Gouraud.¹ The frontier between the states of Jabalu'd-Durūz and Damascus appears ² to have been delimited early in 1922, and the independence of the Jabal was officially proclaimed on the 5th April of that year.

Thus the French mandated territory was divided into five separate states ; but this had no sooner been done than the mandatory Power began to reverse its administrative policy. On the 20th June, 1921, General Gouraud announced that the three states of Damascus, Aleppo, and Lādhiqiyah (i. e. the 'Alawīyīn) were to be federated ;³ the statute of federation ⁴ was signed by the High Commissioner on the 28th June, 1922 ;⁵ and Subhī Bey Bereket, an Antiochene Turk, was elected president of the Federal Council.⁶ In the summer of 1923 the High Commissioner decreed that in each of the three federated states there should be a Representative Council, to be appointed by indirect election.⁷ The elections were held in October, and the three councils met in November.⁸ The Federal Council, now consisting of delegations from the three elected State Councils, opened its second session on the 12th December, 1923.⁹ The debates in these councils showed that all communities in the three federated states, except the 'Alawīyīn,¹⁰ wished to carry the process of unification further ;¹¹ and, in deference to this feeling, the High Commissioner decreed the federalization of gendarmerie and higher education on the 28th February, 1923, and of posts and telegraphs in January 1924.¹² On the 16th January, 1924, the Federal Council passed a resolution demanding a unitary state (the 'Alawī deputies alone voting to the contrary) ;¹³ and in the summer of 1924 General

¹ Translation of Arabic text in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 9, pp. 472-4. The terms of this agreement are described below.

² *Op. cit.*, I, pp. 536-7.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 156-7.

⁴ Text in *op. cit.*, II, pp. 283-7. The second article laid down that 'the states placed under the French mandate, whether federated or not, form a single territory from the currency and customs points of view'. (This applied to the Jabalu'd-Durūz and the Great Lebanon.)

⁵ French Government's *Report*, July 1922-July 1923, p. 5 ; *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 162-3.

⁶ French Government's *Report*, 1922-3, p. 41 ; *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 302.

⁷ See *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 1, pp. 2-14, for the text of General Gouraud's *arrêté* of the 30th April, 1923, constituting the Representative Council in the State of Damascus.

⁸ French Government's *Report*, July 1923-July 1924, pp. 7-8 ; *Oriente Moderno*, III, 7, pp. 422-3 ; IV, 1, pp. 35-6.

⁹ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 1, p. 36, and 2, pp. 98-100 ; French Government's *Report*, 1922-3, pp. 5-6.

¹⁰ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 5, pp. 313-14.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, IV, 2, p. 99 ; II, pp. 529-30.

¹² *Op. cit.*, IV, 2, p. 102.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 99.

Gouraud's successor, General Weygand, announced that the federal organization was to be abandoned, and that the states of Aleppo and Damascus (but not the 'Alawīyīn) were to be amalgamated into a single state of Syria.¹

The 'Alawīyīn were, perhaps, the one community in the mandated territories, apart from the Zionists, to whom the mandatory system had brought unmixed gain. As infidels and wild highlanders they had been alternately repressed and neglected under the Ottoman régime, and at first they offered as violent a resistance to the French as they had offered to their former rulers.² When, however, the French followed up the pacification of this territory by creating the 'Alawī State, with frontiers which gave 153,000 'Alawīyīn the predominance over 108,000 members of other communities,³ the 'Alawīyīn became devoted adherents of France (the more so since, unlike the Maronites, they had had no previous expectations against which to measure French performance), and they began to view any measures tending towards Syrian unity with the same suspicion and hostility as the Lebanese Christians. On the 7th July, 1923, a meeting of 'Alawī notables protested against the inclusion of their state in the Syrian Federation, and demanded either direct French administration or union with Great Lebanon.⁴ On the 2nd April, 1924, the Representative Council of the 'Alawī State telegraphed to General Weygand a 'categorical refusal' to be incorporated in the unitary Syrian State for which the majority of the Federal Council had voted on the preceding 16th January.⁵

The tendency towards unification was opposed with equal vigour by the Lebanese Christians (or, at any rate, by the Maronite majority of them), who, in the High Commissioner's *arrêtés* of the 31st August and the 1st September, 1920, had secured the recognition of their independence within the widest frontiers to which they could aspire. In January 1921, the nominated Administrative Commission of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, IV, 8, p. 485-6; *The Times*, 26th July, 1924.

² L. Stein, *Syria*, pp. 48-9.

³ Figures in French Government's *Report*, 1922-3, pp. 8-9. The total number of 'Alawīyīn in the whole territory under French mandate was estimated at 190,000. The first Representative Council in the 'Alawī State (inaugurated on the 8th November, 1923) consisted of eight 'Alawīyīn, three Sunnis, three Christians, and one Ismā'īlī (*Oriente Moderno*, III, 7, p. 423). A census taken in 1923 was reported (*op. cit.*, II, p. 718) to have revealed that there were only 101,000 'Alawīyīn in the 'Alawī State, out of a total population of 234,000.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, III, 2, p. 84. There was, however, a pro-union party even among the 'Alawī citizens of the State, while the Sunnī citizens were naturally all in favour of reunion with their co-religionists.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, IV, 5, pp. 313-14.

Lebanon protested against a proposal, on the High Commissioner's part, to organize a unitary financial department for revenues common to the whole territory under the French mandate, and insisted that the distribution of the proceeds from the customs and other common funds between the several states should be regulated by treaty, and this only for a limited period.¹ In January 1923 the Maronite Patriarch declared against union with Syria in a public speech on an official occasion.² Accordingly, on the 30th of that month, a convention was signed by the Governor of Great Lebanon and the President of the Syrian Federation providing that matters of common concern should be dealt with by Syrian and Lebanese delegations under a French chairman, and that the initiative in bringing business before these delegations should lie with the Governor, with the President, or (failing action on the part of either) with the French High Commissioner.³ The distribution of the customs receipts was referred to a Commission; and in September 1923, when this Commission had failed, through lack of data, to present proposals, the French High Commissioner allocated 47 per cent. to the Lebanon and 53 per cent. to the Federation as a provisional measure.⁴

The unitary state of Syria (from which not only the Great Lebanon but the 'Alawī State and the Jabalu'd-Durūz were excluded, in deference to desires expressed by the dominant elements in their populations) was brought into being by an *arrêté* of the French High Commissioner, General Weygand, which was signed on the 5th December, 1924, and took effect as from the 1st January, 1925.⁵ A decree of the same date⁶ restored the independence of the 'Alawīyīn. By a third decree,⁷ which likewise took effect as from the 1st January, 1925, the eastern frontiers of the Great Lebanon and the 'Alawī state were rectified, in both cases to the disadvantage of the new state of Syria. Thus, when General Weygand's successor, General Sarraill, arrived at Bayrūt on the 2nd January, 1925, he found the territory under French mandate divided into four states: Syria (Sūriyah), the Great Lebanon (Libnānu'l-Kabīr), the Jabalu'd-Durūz, and the 'Alawīyīn.⁸

¹ *Op. cit.*, I, pp. 25-6; French Government's *Report*, 1922-3, p. 42.

² *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 527.

³ French Government's *Report*, 1922-3, pp. 10-11.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, III, 5, p. 277.

⁵ Text in *op. cit.*, V, 1, pp. 3-4.

⁶ Text in *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Op. cit.*, V, 2, p. 109.

⁸ M. de Caix stated to the Permanent Mandates Commission on the 26th February, 1926, that the mandatory Power had contemplated replacing the dissolved Syrian Federation by a Syrian Union, in which all the states except the Great Lebanon would be included.

Meanwhile, the territory under the British mandate had been divided by the mandatory Power into the two states of Palestine and Transjordan. In respect of Transjordan the mandate itself (Art. 25) had empowered the British Government, with the consent of the Council of the League, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of the mandate as they might consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territory as they might consider suitable to those conditions.¹ In virtue of this article, the British Government proposed to the League that Transjordan should be exempted from all those clauses in the mandate which provided for a special régime in the Holy Places and for the development in Palestine of a Jewish National Home; and on the 16th September, 1922, the Council approved the memorandum in which these proposals were presented.² The British Government prevailed on the Council of the League to make this special provision for Transjordan because, in the British Government's view, Transjordan did (while Palestine did not) fall within the area in which Great Britain had promised King Husayn to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs.³ The British Government had first honoured this pledge by assenting to the inclusion of Transjordan in that Arab National State which was set up, immediately after General Allenby's decisive victory of the 1st October, 1918, with Damascus as its capital and the Amîr Faysal b. Husayn as its constitutional head.⁴ When the Damascus Government was overthrown by General Gouraud's invasion in July 1920, Transjordan was left derelict, since the Arab Government had been destroyed, while the French were precluded from occupying this fragment of the Arab Government's former territories because Transjordan had been assigned to the British sphere in the secret agreements⁵ made during the War of 1914-18. Since the secret agreements held good, as between the British and French Governments, until they were superseded by the mandates, and since, further, the frontier between the French and British mandated territories (as settled by the Anglo-French agreements of the 23rd December, 1920,

¹ Three articles of the mandate were protected by a saving clause.

² See *Cmd.* 1785 of 1922 for the texts of the mandate (approved on the 24th July, 1922) and of the memorandum (approved on the 16th September, 1922).

³ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 123-4.

⁴ The Amîr Faysal was proclaimed King at Damascus in the spring of 1920, but his assumption of the title in respect of the Arab National State in Syria was never recognized by the Principal Allied Powers.

⁵ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Part I A.

and the 3rd February, 1922) did not depart very widely from the line of the secret agreements, the British obligation to recognize and support Arab independence in Transjordan remained unaffected, and the extinction of the Arab Government of Damascus made it necessary for the British Government to honour its pledge in some alternative way. In August 1920,¹ a few weeks after the French High Commissioner in Syria and the Lebanon, General Gouraud, entered Damascus as a conqueror, the British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, visited Transjordan and assisted its settled population (consisting principally of Sunnī and Orthodox Christian Arabs and Sunnī Circassians) to organize the rudiments of self-government. In February 1921 the Amīr Faysal's brother, the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh b. Husayn, entered Transjordan from the Hijāz with the declared intention of attacking the French in Syria; but the British authorities at Jerusalem negotiated an agreement with him 'under which the mandatory Power recognized him, for a period, as administrator of Transjordan, with the condition that any action hostile to Syria must be abandoned'. In 1922 this arrangement was confirmed, and the approval of the Palestine Mandate and the Transjordan Memorandum by the Council of the League in the course of the same year opened the way for giving Transjordan a more definite status.

In April 1923 the British Government authorized Sir Herbert Samuel to make the following announcement at the capital of Transjordan, 'Ammān :

Subject to the approval of the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government will recognize the existence of an independent Government in Transjordan under the rule of His Highness the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh, provided that such Government is constitutional and places His Britannic Majesty's Government in a position to fulfil its international obligations in respect of the territory by means of an agreement to be concluded between the two Governments.²

The announcement was duly made, and the independence of Transjordan simultaneously proclaimed on the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh's part, on the 25th May, 1923.³ The intention was to place the relations between Great Britain and Transjordan on the same footing as

¹ For the history of Transjordan from this date down to the beginning of 1925 see the *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-5* (*Colonial No. 15, 1925*), pp. 53-5; and *Report on Palestine and Transjordan for 1924* (*Colonial No. 12, 1925*), pp. 65-70.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 53-4.

³ For texts of speeches delivered on this occasion see *Oriente Moderno*, III, 1, pp. 61-3.

those already established between Great Britain and 'Irāq.¹ The financial grants in aid which had been made to the Amīr 'Abdu'llāh from 1920 onwards were continued, and the Transjordan administration was assisted by British officials, whose number was raised to five in 1924. Down to the time of writing, however, the Transjordan administration had not attained, either on the financial or on the constitutional side, the standards requisite for the conclusion of that Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement which had been conditionally promised in the British Government's declaration.²

The state of Palestine, between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, where the terms of the British mandate applied in full, remained under direct British administration. The régime of military occupation, dating from the War of 1914-18, was superseded by a civil administration as from the 1st July, 1920;³ and in October the first High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, set up a nominated Advisory Council, consisting of ten British officials and ten Palestinians, of whom seven were Arabs (four Muslims and three Christians) and three were Jews. 'When the promulgation of the mandate was at hand it was thought advisable to confer upon Palestine a constitution of a more representative character. An Order in Council⁴ was therefore issued in August 1922 which provided, among other matters, for the creation of a Legislative Council, consisting of the High Commissioner, ten official and twelve elected members. The elected members were to be eight Muslims, two Jews, and two Christians, chosen by secondary electors, who were themselves to be elected by the primary electors, as under the Turkish system.⁵ The primary elections were held in February and March; but owing partly to a movement of non-co-operation promoted by Arab political leaders, and partly to the indifference of the electorate, an insufficient number of secondary electors, except among the Jews, was nominated.⁶ Conse-

¹ See Section (x) below.

² See a statement made in the House of Commons on the 4th March, 1925, by the Under-Secretary to the War Office, on the status of Transjordan at that date.

³ For the history of this civil administration see the *Reports* for July 1920-December 1921, for 1922, for 1923 (*Colonial No. 5, 1924*), and for 1924 (*Colonial No. 12, 1925*), with Appendices (*Colonial No. 14, 1925*), and the *Report of the High Commissioner for 1920-5* (*Colonial No. 15, 1925*).

⁴ For a translation of the text see *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 450-61. Transjordan was excluded from the application of this Order in Council by an Order of the High Commissioner, dated 1st September, 1922. (Translation of text in *op. cit.*, p. 517.)

⁵ For text (in translation) of the Palestine Legislative Council Election Order, 1922, see *op. cit.*, pp. 514-17.

⁶ For a more detailed account, drawn mainly from the Palestinian native

quently, the Palestine (Amendment) Order in Council, enacted on the 4th May,¹ declared the elections null and void. Two further opportunities were given to representative Arab leaders to co-operate with the Administration in the government of the country, first by the reconstitution of a nominated Advisory Council, but with a membership conforming to that which had been proposed for the Legislative Council;² and secondly by the formation of an Arab agency, to be equivalent to the Jewish agency established under the provisions of the mandate.³ Neither opportunity was accepted, and an Advisory Council consisting only of official members was constituted in December.⁴

Thus, in Palestine, down to the time of writing, the mandatory authorities had failed to obtain the co-operation of the Arab majority of the population in the government of the country. They succeeded, however, in persuading the Sunnī majority of the Palestinian Arabs to organize a Supreme Muslim *Sharī'ah* Council in order to fulfil, for the Muslim community in Palestine, those functions which had been performed previously by the Ottoman Ministry of *Evqāf* and the *Sheykh* 'l-*Islām* at Constantinople.⁵ A constitution drawn up by a Muslim Committee was accepted by the High Commissioner and put into operation (in pursuance of Article 16 of the mandate) in an

press, see *op. cit.*, pp. 676-8. See further the Report of the High Commissioner in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 1889 of 1923.

¹ Text in *Cmd.* 1889 of 1923; and in *Statutory Rules and Orders*, No. 619, 1923.

² 'Invitations were sent accordingly to ten leading members of the Arab population, eight Muslims, and two Christians, men who were recognized by all parties to be among the most representative and most capable in the country. All these gentlemen accepted the invitation, and confirmed their acceptances in writing. There was then set on foot a further agitation on the part of the extremists, directed to securing their withdrawal. Urgent appeals were made to the selected Councillors not to destroy the effect of the abstention from the elections; they were assured that if they also upheld the policy of non-co-operation, in a short time the British Government would certainly change its course; the strongest pressure was brought to bear to induce them to withdraw their acceptances. Under this pressure, with much reluctance and against their better judgement, seven of the ten asked leave to retire. As I did not wish to form a Council of men of less standing, the proposal consequently lapsed.' (*Colonial No. 15*, 1925, p. 46.)

³ This proposal was made by the High Commissioner on the 11th October, 1923, to a meeting of Arab notables, by whom it was summarily rejected. (See correspondence in *Cmd.* 1918 of 1923.) On the 9th November, 1923, Mūsā Kāzimu'l-Husaynī, the President of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress, addressed a letter on the subject of the meeting of the 11th October, 1923, to Sir Herbert Samuel. (Text in the *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 173-4.)

⁴ Quoted from *Colonial No. 15* of 1925, p. 44, and *Colonial No. 5* of 1924, p. 3.

⁵ *Colonial No. 15*, 1925, p. 52.

order of the 20th December, 1921.¹ In accordance with the terms of this Order (Arts. 5 and 6) the first elections to the Council were made by the Muslim Committee, above mentioned, on the 9th January, 1922.² Thereafter (as provided in Art. 6) the members were to be elected by the secondary electors under the former electoral law for the Ottoman Parliament. In the autumn of 1925, when the first term of the Council was running out, there was considerable criticism, within the Muslim community, of the manner in which the members first elected had performed their duties. The new elections (by the secondary electors registered under the Ottoman Law) were held in January 1926 on the responsibility of the Muslim community, without any intervention on the part of the British authorities ; but the irregularities were so great that a number of the results were annulled by the Courts.³

Under the terms of the mandate (Arts. 13 and 14) all responsibility in connexion with the Holy Places in Palestine (some of which were sacred alike to Muslims, Christians, and Jews) was assumed by the mandatory Power, which, in turn, was to be responsible solely to the League of Nations in this matter. A Special Commission 'to study, define, and determine the rights and claims in connexion with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine' was to be appointed by the mandatory—the method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission to be approved by the Council of the League before the Commission might be appointed or might enter upon its functions. After an exchange of views with the Vatican,⁴ the British Government submitted a draft constitution for the Commission to the Council of the League on the 6th September, 1922 ; but the draft, which proved unacceptable not only to the Vatican but to members of the Council, was withdrawn by the British Government on the 4th October, and none of the members availed themselves of the British Government's invitation to present an alternative plan.⁵ Thus the mandatory Power had to fulfil its obligation, under Article 13 of the mandate, to preserve 'existing rights' in the Holy Places, without having 'the advantage of being able to refer to an external authority any difficulties and disputes that might

¹ For a translation of the text of this Order see *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 594–6.

³ *Op. cit.*, V, 12, pp. 641–2, and VI, 2, pp. 95–6.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 538.

⁴ See British White Paper, *Omd.* 1708 of 1922 : *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 31–3 and 208. For an anti-Zionist speech delivered in Rome on the 11th May, 1922, by the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, see *op. cit.*, pp. 29–30.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 282–3, 303, and 347 ; *Colonial No.* 15, 1925, pp. 48–50.

arise';¹ but happily no serious difficulties had arisen down to the time of writing. 'As an interim measure an Order in Council was issued in 1924, withdrawing from the law courts of Palestine jurisdiction over matters relating to the Holy Places or claims relating to the religious communities.'²

(b) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEWISH NATIONAL HOME IN PALESTINE (30th October, 1918, to 30th September, 1926).

By LEONARD STEIN.

The History of the Peace Conference of Paris records the events leading up to the British Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917—usually known as the Balfour Declaration—in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home.³ The Balfour Declaration, having been endorsed by the Principal Allied Powers,⁴ was reaffirmed by the Supreme Council of the Allies at San Remo on the 24th April, 1920,⁵ and figured prominently in the mandate for Palestine, as approved by the Council of the League of Nations on the 24th July, 1922.⁶

The approval of the mandate was immediately preceded by the publication of an important statement of British policy in Palestine. In May 1922 Sir Herbert Samuel returned from Jerusalem to London, where a Palestine Arab Delegation had for some months been engaged in presenting to the Colonial Office the Arab case against the establishment of the Jewish National Home and what they believed to be its implications. The object of the High Commissioner's visit was to represent to the Government that the Arabs, the Zionists, and the Jews throughout the world were alike entitled to know exactly where they stood, and that what was urgently required was an authoritative statement of British intentions.⁷ The outcome was the Churchill memorandum, which, after stating categorically that 'the Declaration of 1917 is not susceptible of change', proceeded to interpret it as follows :

When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the im-

¹ *Colonial No. 15, 1925, loc. cit.*

² For the text of the Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council made on the 25th July, 1924, see *Colonial No. 17, 1925*, p. 17; and *Statutory Rules and Orders*, No. 815, 1924.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

⁴ Vol. vi, pp. 170 *et seq.*

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 175.

⁶ Text in British White Paper, *Cmd. 1785* of 1922.

⁷ See the *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-5* (British White Paper, *Colonial No. 15* of 1925), pp. 27-8.

position of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development, and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connexion.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews.

For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden on the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.

Before the memorandum was published, the President of the Zionist Organization was asked by the Colonial Office for 'a formal assurance that your Organization accepts the policy as set forth in the Statement, and is prepared to conduct its own activities in conformity therewith'. On the 18th June, 1922, Dr. Weizmann gave this assurance, adding that 'the Organization, on its side, will continue to spare no efforts to foster the spirit of goodwill to which His Majesty's Government have pointed as the only sure foundation for the future prosperity of Palestine'. An advance copy of the memorandum was also shown to the Palestine Arab Delegation, who gave reasons for declining to concur in it. The memorandum, together with the correspondence just summarized, formed part of a White Paper presented to Parliament at the end of June 1922.¹ The policy then laid down by the Secretary of State was endorsed by his successor in October 1923,² and was reaffirmed in the name of the Government of the day in June 1924,³ and again in April 1925.⁴

¹ *Omd.* 1700 of 1922.

² The Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for Palestine, 4th October, 1923. (See British White Paper, *Omd.* 1989 of 1923, p. 4.)

³ Statement by the Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, accredited British representative to the Permanent Mandates Commission, on the 30th June, 1924 (*Minutes of the Fourth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 87).

⁴ Statement by Mr. L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to an

The mandate, in its final form, recited the Balfour Declaration, took note of its endorsement by the Principal Allied Powers, and went on to make provision for carrying it into effect. The mandatory's obligations in this regard may be summarized as follows :

[a] The mandatory was to be responsible for placing Palestine under such conditions as would secure the establishment of the Jewish national home and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safe-guarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion. [Article 2.]

[b] An appropriate Jewish agency was to be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in matters affecting the establishment of the Jewish national home. This agency was to be the Zionist Organization, so long as the constitution of that body was regarded by the mandatory as appropriate. The Organization was to take steps, in consultation with the mandatory, to secure the co-operation of all Jews who were willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home. [Article 4.]

[c] While ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population were not prejudiced, the Administration of Palestine was to facilitate Jewish immigration, and to co-operate with the Jewish agency in encouraging the settlement of Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes. [Article 6.]

[d] The Nationality Law of Palestine was to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who took up their permanent residence in Palestine. [Article 7.]

[e] The Administration of Palestine might arrange with the Jewish agency to construct or operate any public works or services, or to develop any of the natural resources of Palestine, with the proviso that any profits in excess of a reasonable return on the capital invested were to be utilized for the benefit of Palestine in such manner as the Administration might approve. [Article 11.]

[f] Hebrew, together with English and Arabic, was to be one of the official languages of Palestine. [Article 22.]

The mandate for Palestine, though approved on the 24th July, 1922, did not become formally effective until the 29th September, 1923.¹ It now came, for the first time, within the cognizance of the Permanent Mandates Commission. After a preliminary survey at its fourth session in the summer of 1924,² the Commission exhaustively examined the situation in Palestine at its fifth session in the following autumn.³ In its report to the League Council, the Commission

Arab deputation in Jerusalem, on the 21st April, 1925 (full text in official *communiqué* printed in the *Palestine Weekly* of Jerusalem, issue of the 1st May, 1925, pp. 452 *et seq.*)

¹ See above, p. 347.

² *Minutes of the Fourth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 87-90 and 155.

³ *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 47, 54-98, and 119-25.

expressed some anxiety as to 'the divergencies which bring Zionism and the Arab majority into conflict', though it added that 'the consequences of this conflict are mitigated by the wisdom and impartiality displayed by the High Commissioner'. The Commission was impressed by the 'ardour and Zionist zeal of the Jewish immigrants', but was of opinion that 'immigration has not, perhaps, always been in proportion to the capacity of the economic absorption of the country'.¹ When the report came before the Council in December 1924 it was criticized by the British representative, Sir Austen Chamberlain, as hardly doing full justice either to the efforts of the Palestine Government to fulfil its onerous duties or to the results actually achieved by the Jewish immigrants during the past few years. The Chairman of the Commission made a conciliatory reply, and the report was adopted.² The Commission again dealt with Palestine at its seventh session in October 1925.³ Its report,⁴ which was adopted by the Council in December 1925, recorded a marked improvement in the situation. The population, both Jewish and Arab, was increasing; immigration was being carefully regulated; there was no unemployment of any account; and political agitation had diminished. The situation in Palestine was reviewed by the Commission for the third time at its ninth session in June 1926.⁵ In its report,⁶ which was adopted by the Council in September 1926, it noted with satisfaction that order had been preserved in all parts of Palestine, that political unrest was subsiding, and that measures were being taken to encourage local self-government. A number of petitions relating to Palestine were received by the Commission from various Jewish and Arab sources, while, apart from petitions in the strict sense of the term, memoranda on the development of the Jewish National Home were annually submitted by the Zionist Organization. Some of the more important questions raised by the Jewish petitioners are discussed under the appropriate headings below.⁷

¹ Report printed in Annex No. 10 to the *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 188-9.

² See Sir Austen Chamberlain's report on the thirty-second session of the Council (*Cmd.* 2336 of 1925, p. 11).

³ *Minutes of the Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 98-121, 136-9, and 140.

⁴ Printed in Annex No. 14 to the *Minutes of the Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 212-14.

⁵ *Minutes of the Ninth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 54, 152-81, 182-6, and 187.

⁶ Printed in Annex No. 9 to the *Minutes of the Ninth Session*, p. 217.

⁷ See below, pp. 376-7, 380-1, 383. The full text of the memorandum sub-

The mandate having become effective in September 1923, the international status of Palestine was finally regularized by the coming into force of the Treaty of Lausanne on the 6th August, 1924. The way was thus cleared for the enactment of the nationality law referred to in Article 7 of the mandate. The Palestinian Citizenship Order in Council¹ came into force on the 1st August, 1925. Jews, as such, received no privileges, but the Order enabled an immigrant to be naturalized after two years' residence, on satisfying the competent authority that he was of good character, had an adequate knowledge of one of the three official languages, and intended to make Palestine his home.

Immigration did not begin to flow freely until nearly two years after the date of the Armistice. The duty of the Military Administration was to maintain the *status quo*, and the only immigrants whom it saw its way to admit were returning residents, together with a limited number of experts and other persons with special claims to consideration. The replacement of the military régime by a Civil Administration in July 1920² was followed in September by the enactment of an Immigration Ordinance³ and by the establishment of a Department of Immigration and Travel,⁴ which was subsequently reduced to a branch of the Central Secretariat.⁵ In the exercise of his powers under the Immigration Ordinance the High Commissioner authorized the admission as immigrants of persons who had relatives in Palestine or resources of their own, and also of persons whose maintenance for one year was guaranteed by the Zionist Organization.⁶ The Zionist quota for the first twelve months was fixed by the Government at 16,500,⁷ but this figure was not actually reached. As a result of the Jaffa riots immigration was temporarily suspended on the 4th May, 1921. It was reopened on the 3rd June, but under new regulations, which abolished the category of immigrants guaranteed by the Zionist Organization and substituted a new category of 'persons who have a definite prospect of

mitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission by the Zionist Organization in 1925 is printed as part of Annex No. 9 to the *Minutes of the Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 185-92, together with the text of the covering letter (pp. 183-5). The text of the covering letter to the 1926 memorandum is printed as Annex No. 6 to the *Minutes of the Ninth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission* (pp. 198-201).

¹ *Statutory Rules and Orders*, No. 777 of 1925. ² See above, p. 363.

³ Text in *Palestine Official Gazette*, 16th September, 1920.

⁴ *Report on Palestine Administration*, July 1920-December 1921, p. 126.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1924 (*Colonial No. 12*), p. 54.

⁶ *Ibid.*, July 1920-December 1921, p. 127.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

employment with specified employers or enterprises'.¹ It was not long, however, before the new regulations began to operate in practice in much the same way as the old. The admission of immigrants seeking employment came to be regulated by the Government in accordance with a periodical estimate of the actual and prospective demand for labour. This estimate was known as the Labour Schedule. Provision having been made for the admission of duly qualified individuals, Jews and non-Jews, the balance of the quota fixed by the Schedule was placed in bulk at the disposal of the Zionist Organization,² which established in the various emigration-centres elaborate machinery for the selection of its nominees.³

The Immigration Ordinance of 1920 was repealed in September 1925 and replaced by fresh legislation based on five years' practical experience.⁴ The Labour Schedule was preserved, and the admission of immigrant labour continued to be regulated on the system already described. The second main category of immigrants consisted of 'persons of independent means', who were defined by the regulations as including persons with an assured minimum income of £E60, skilled artisans with a minimum capital of £E250, and persons who, having a minimum capital of £E500, were qualified in a profession or intended to engage in commerce or agriculture. No immigrant was admissible as a person of independent means unless his entry had been expressly approved in advance by the Government of Palestine.⁵ Given the prescribed qualifications, such approval was usually forthcoming, but visas for Palestine were no longer granted automatically, as they had been before 1925, to any person who, not being known to be undesirable, could prove possession of £E500. So far, therefore, as middle-class immigration was concerned, the legislation of 1925 gave the Government of Palestine a larger measure of control than it had previously exercised. Immigrants of all classes were usually allowed to bring with them their wives and certain members of their families, while residents in Palestine could obtain permission to introduce dependent relatives for whom they were in a position to provide.

¹ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.* ² *Report on Palestine Administration*, 1922, p. 52.

³ This machinery is described in the *Memorandum submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the information of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, October 1924, p. 18.

⁴ Text in *Palestine Official Gazette*, 15th June, 1925 (draft), and 1st September, 1925 (promulgation of Ordinance and Regulations as drafted, with slight amendments).

⁵ Authority to sanction the admission of certain classes of 'persons of independent means' was delegated by the Government of Palestine to the Palestine Immigration Officer at Warsaw.

It was on these lines that the Government of Palestine attempted to facilitate Jewish immigration, as required by Article 6 of the mandate, while complying with the principle laid down in the Churchill Memorandum that the volume of immigration must not exceed 'whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals'.

The course of Jewish immigration from the Armistice to the 30th June, 1926, is shown in the following table, which is based on the official returns :

<i>Period.</i>	<i>Jewish immigrants (including dependents) other than returning residents.</i>
Armistice to 31st August, 1920	2,000 (estimate) ¹
1st September, 1920 (first Immigration Ordinance) to 30th April, 1921 (immigration suspended on 4th May, 1921)	9,625 ¹
1st May–31st December, 1921 (immigration reopened 3rd June, 1921)	4,968 ¹
1922	7,844
1923	7,421
1924	12,856
1925	33,801
January–June 1926	9,900 ²
Total	88,415

It thus appears that since the Armistice there had been (in round figures) 89,000 Jewish immigrants. An estimate of about 5,000 for returning residents brings the total up to 94,000. The emigration returns are not equally complete, but of the post-war immigrants about 10,000, or a little over 11 per cent.,³ appear to have emigrated,

¹ These figures are based on published official returns, supplemented by unpublished information in the writer's possession. The published official figures are as follows :

Year 1920—estimate of 10,000 Jewish immigrants, including 3,000 returning exiles (*Report on Economic and Commercial Situation to 31st March, 1921*, p. 8).

1st September, 1920, to 30th April, 1921—10,061 immigrants, of whom 8,030 entered under Zionist auspices and 2,031 independently. How many of the latter were Jews is not stated (*Report on Palestine Administration, July 1920–December 1921*, p. 127).

3rd June to 31st December, 1921—4,784 Jewish immigrants (*op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*).

² Including non-Jews. Jews are separately enumerated only in the annual returns : 97 per cent. of the total number of immigrants were Jews in 1925, and 94 per cent. in 1924.

³ In April 1925 Sir Herbert Samuel put the figure at 'probably not more than one in ten of the immigration' (*Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920–5*, p. 30). In 1926 the proportion was considerably higher, and in some months of that year there were more departures than arrivals.

together with about 5,000 pre-war residents—a total of about 15,000, leaving a net increase by immigration of about 79,000 during the period under review.

As has been seen, serious efforts were made to regulate the arrivals in accordance with the economic situation, and employment was found for the bulk of the immigrants, though there was naturally a certain ebb and flow in the state of trade and the demand for labour. The following figures are taken from the official returns :

<i>Date.</i>	<i>Unemployment amongst Jews.</i>
1923—July–December, monthly average	2,000 ¹
1924—January	1,700
June	500
December	350 ²
1925—January	400
June	450
December	3,000 ³

The sudden slowing down of middle-class immigration in the autumn of 1925 was followed by a check to the exceptional prosperity which marked the earlier part of the year. The trade depression reflected in the unemployment returns continued to affect the labour-market in 1926. In June 1926 the number of Jewish unemployed rose to about 6,000. At the close of the period under review it was still oscillating round about this figure, though a gradual reduction was anticipated as a result of recent substantial investments of Jewish capital and the improvement in the general state of trade which was expected to follow the impending flotation by the Palestine Government of a loan of £4,500,000, of which a large proportion was to be devoted to railway construction and harbour works.⁴ The immigrants were in no case allowed to become a charge on public funds. Where necessary, the Zionist Organization provided temporary grants or loans and co-operated with other Jewish bodies in pressing forward the execution of necessary capital works in advance of immediate requirements.

In making provision for the unemployed, the Zionist authorities received valuable advice and support from the leaders of the Jewish Labour Organization, which was an active and powerful body, with a membership, on the 1st September, 1926, of 22,460, or 70 per cent. of the Jewish workers of all grades.⁵ The subsidiary institutions

¹ *Report on Palestine Administration*, 1923, p. 47.

² *Ibid.*, 1924, p. 62.

³ *Ibid.*, 1925, p. 56.

⁴ The objects of the loan are described in *Cmd.* 2696 of 1926.

⁵ *Palestine Bulletin*, Jerusalem, 27th October, 1926.

founded or controlled by the Labour Organization included a Workers' Bank, which made advances in 1925 totalling £107,000; a Co-operative Society with a turnover in 1925 of £179,000; and a Co-operative Labour Guild employing a monthly average of 2,000 workers.¹

The Jewish immigrants were of the most varied types and nationalities, but they were largely drawn, as was to be expected, from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, where half the Jewish population of the world was living in dense masses under conditions which stimulated Jewish group-consciousness and created an incessant outward pressure.

Apart from dependent relatives of residents in Palestine, the immigrants fell, as has been seen, into two main categories. The first consisted of persons brought in, for the most part under Zionist auspices, to fill vacancies in the labour-market. Immigrants of this type, with their dependents, made up 40 per cent. of the Jewish arrivals in 1922, 59 per cent. in 1923, 42 per cent. in 1924, and 46 per cent. in 1925. When the doors were first opened in September 1920 the proportion was still higher. The great majority of the early settlers were youthful idealists of both sexes, many of whom had abandoned their Universities or professions in Eastern or Central Europe to devote themselves to manual labour in Palestine. These were the *Chaluzim* ('Pioneers'), who gave the first wave of immigration a distinctive character. The *Chaluz* Movement was subsequently organized on a permanent footing, and assisted by the Zionist Organization to provide its members with facilities for agricultural and industrial training in various parts of Europe. As time went on the *Chaluzim* no longer played as predominant a part as they had done at the outset, but they still formed the backbone of the Jewish immigrant population, and especially of the new agricultural settlements.

The second main category of immigrants consisted of those who entered Palestine on their own responsibility as persons of independent means. Immigration of this type increased in relative importance from 19 per cent. of the whole in 1922 and 13 per cent. in 1923 to 41 per cent. in 1924, and 35 per cent. in 1925. In the summer of 1925 the tide which had flowed so strongly for eighteen months began to ebb, and there was afterwards a considerable

¹ See *Memoranda submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the information of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, October 1924, p. 31, and June 1926, p. 19.

decline both in the number and in the proportion of middle-class settlers.

The Jewish population of Palestine at the date of the Armistice was about 55,000.¹ It was found to be 84,000 at the Census of October 1922,² and was believed by the High Commissioner to have increased to about 108,000 in March 1925.³ At the end of 1925 it was estimated by the Zionist Organization at 138,000.⁴ On the 1st September, 1926, the total population, exclusive of about 110,000 nomadic Badu, was officially estimated at 777,000, including 158,000 Jews,⁵ who thus constituted about 20 per cent. of the settled inhabitants, as compared with just under 13 per cent. at the Census of 1922.

Both in its ecclesiastical and in its secular aspect the Jewish community had a well-defined corporate life. With a view to clearing up certain disputes which had arisen with regard to the Chief Rabbinate of Palestine, a Rabbinical Assembly was convened, at the instance of the Government, in February 1921. The Assembly appointed a Rabbinical Council of eleven members, headed by two Chief Rabbis, one of whom represented the Sephardic and the other the Ashkenazic section of the community. The Government officially recognized these authorities by Public Notice dated the 18th March, 1921.⁶ The Jewish Community maintained Rabbinical Courts, which, like the religious courts of the other communities, exercised a limited statutory jurisdiction in matters of personal status. This jurisdiction was conferred upon them by the Palestine Order in Council, 1922,⁷ supplemented on certain points by subsequent local legislation.

The organization of the community on its secular side dated back to the autumn of 1920, when a Jewish National Assembly was elected on a wide franchise, and appointed a Jewish National Council, who were, in practice, recognized by the Government as the spokesmen of the Jewish population in matters of local concern. Fresh elections having been held, the National Assembly met for the second time in January 1926, and appointed a new National Council.

¹ *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-5*, p. 29.

² *Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922* (Palestine Government, 1923).

³ *Report of the High Commissioner, 1920-5*, p. 30.

⁴ *Report on Palestine Administration, 1925*, p. 71.

⁵ *Jewish Telegraph Agency Bulletin*, 22nd January, 1927.

⁶ *Palestine Official Gazette*, 1st April, 1921.

⁷ *Statutory Rules and Orders*, No. 1282 of 1922.

The Religious Communities Organization Ordinance, which came into force on the 16th April, 1926,¹ empowered the High Commissioner to make regulations providing for the organization of any religious community in Palestine as a corporate body with an officially recognized status and with a right to levy contributions on its members for communal purposes. Such regulations could, however, only be made at the request of the community concerned. The Ordinance was of general application, but it was anticipated that it would first take effect in the case of the Jews, and would be followed by the constitution on a statutory basis of a recognized Jewish community enjoying a certain measure of self-government in purely communal affairs.

The situation was complicated by the fact that there were a certain number of Jews who did not recognize the authority of the Jewish National Council. These Jews belonged almost entirely to the pre-war population of Jerusalem. They were distinguished by their rigid adherence to the Pentateuchal Law, and they saw in Zionism, as a national movement inspired by modern ideas, a challenge to the theocratic conception of Jewish life which was, in their view, of the essence of orthodox Judaism. They were separately organized under the name of the Ashkenazic Jewish Community of Jerusalem, which claimed to speak for 1,600 heads of families.² They had behind them an international organization known as the *Agudath Israel*, which had a considerable membership in Poland, as well as in Frankfurt, Vienna, and certain other centres of conservative Jewish thought. These two bodies made parallel representations both to the mandatory Power and to the Permanent Mandates Commission.³ Their main contention was that the adherents of the *Agudath* should not only be free to remain outside the jurisdiction of the Jewish National Council, but should also have official recognition as a separate and independent community. The Mandates Commission dealt with this matter at its ninth session in June 1926. It noted, in its report on the petition of the *Agudath Israel*, that 'according to the mandatory Power, . . . it is not intended that any regulations

¹ Text in *Palestine Official Gazette*, 15th February, 1926 (draft), and 16th April, 1926 (promulgation of Ordinance as drafted).

² Petition from Council of Ashkenazic Jewish Community of Jerusalem, printed as Annex No. 8 to the *Minutes of the Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 181-3.

³ Petition from the Ashkenazic Community, 22nd November, 1924, printed in *loc. cit.*; petition in support from *Agudath Israel*, 11th October, 1925, printed as Annex No. 5 to the *Minutes of the Ninth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 195-6.

which may hereafter be framed for the organization of the Jewish community should make it compulsory for any individual or congregation to come under the control of the *Waad Leumi* (Jewish National Council).¹ On the other hand, the Government made it clear that it was not disposed to establish on a statutory basis a second Jewish community side by side with that which represented the overwhelming majority of the Jewish population.² The Jewish Community Regulations were still under discussion at the close of 1926, but from the proceedings at the ninth session of the Mandates Commission it appeared that, while recognizing only one Jewish community, they would give dissentients liberal facilities for contracting out and would leave them free to establish independent congregations, which would not, however, enjoy statutory recognition. This, it may be added, would be in full accordance with the views of the Zionist Organization, as laid before the Permanent Mandates Commission in June 1926. While contending that 'statutory recognition as a second Jewish community cannot reasonably be claimed by a group consisting of a few hundred families', the Zionist memorandum went on to observe that 'what such a group has a right to expect is unrestricted liberty of conscience. If it prefers to dissociate itself from the bulk of the Jewish population it should be free to do so, and to organize itself on a voluntary basis.'³

How the Jewish population was distributed between the towns and the country can be seen from the following table :

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION OF PALESTINE

	<i>Census figure, October 1922.</i>	<i>Official estimate, March 1925.⁴</i>	<i>Zionist Organization estimate, December 1925.⁵</i>
Urban areas	68,622	85,000	114,000
Rural areas	15,172	23,000	24,000
Total	83,794	108,000	138,000

¹ Report of Madame Bugge-Wicksell (printed as part of Annex No. 9 to the *Minutes of the Ninth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 224-6). This report was adopted by the Commission (*Minutes*, p. 181).

² See statement by accredited British representative (*Minutes*, pp. 153 et seq.), and observations of the British Government on memorandum of *Agudath Israel* (Annex No. 5a to *Minutes*, pp. 196-8).

³ Memorandum submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the information of the Permanent Mandates Commission, June 1926, p. 30.

⁴ Appendices to the *Report on Palestine Administration* for 1924 (*Colonial No. 17*), p. 7. The figures nominally relate to the year 1924, but the total of 108,000 is that given by Sir Herbert Samuel (*Report of the High Commissioner*, 1920-5, p. 30) for March 1925.

⁵ *Report on Palestine Administration*, 1925, p. 71.

These figures show that the majority of the immigrants had settled in the towns—some from choice, but others because they had not yet been able to fulfil their original intention of going on the land. A considerable quantity of immigrant labour found employment in a variety of industrial undertakings, large and small, which had recently been established with Jewish capital in or near Jaffa and Haifa. According to a census taken by the Zionist Organization in July 1926, the number of Jewish factories and workshops in Palestine was at that time 592, representing an aggregate investment of £E1,849,000 and employing a personnel of 5,711.¹ The accuracy of these figures cannot be guaranteed, but there is no doubt as to the importance of the part played by Jewish capital and labour in the industrial development of Palestine during the period under review.²

The growth of industry, coupled with the rapid increase of the urban population, created a large demand for labour in the building and constructional trades. At the end of 1925 the number of Jews thus employed was estimated by the Zionist Organization at about 6,000. According to the same authority, the Jewish urban population at that date also included (in round figures) about 1,500 railwaymen and other transport workers, and 6,000 independent craftsmen and artisans, together with 2,500 clerks, 2,000 shopkeepers and shop-assistants, and 2,500 members of the medical, teaching, and other professions. These figures did not purport to be statistically exact, but they presented a picture which, in general outline, was probably not far from the truth.³

While there was a considerable increase in the Jewish population of Jerusalem and, in a more marked degree, of Haifa, the main centre of urban settlement since the Armistice was the township of Tel-Aviv, which, though loosely attached to Jaffa, was recognized in 1921 as a separate unit with a municipal organization of its own.⁴ At the end of 1925 the population of Tel-Aviv, which was

¹ *The Third Census of Jewish Industries of Erez Israel* (Trade and Industry Department, Palestine Zionist Executive, Jerusalem, October 1926).

² 'This increase in commercial activity, in building enterprise and new industrial developments, is due almost entirely to Jewish capital and the entry during the year of an immigrant class with money to invest' (*Report on Palestine Administration*, 1925, p. 7).

³ These figures are taken from an unpublished memorandum, dated the 29th January, 1926.

⁴ *Palestine Official Gazette*, 1st June, 1921. An Order published in the *Official Gazette* of the 16th December, 1926, provided that 'the inhabitants of the Township of Tel-Aviv shall not be entitled to participate in the elections for the municipality of Jaffa'.

exclusively Jewish, was estimated at 40,000, as compared with 13,000 at the end of 1922¹ and about 2,000 in 1914.²

As has been seen above,³ the Jewish population of the rural areas at the end of 1925 was estimated by the Zionist Organization at 24,000, as compared with an official estimate of 23,000 in the spring of 1925 and an ascertained figure of 15,172 at the Census of October 1922. The 24,000 Jews were distributed among one hundred agricultural settlements, including forty-four established under the direct auspices of the Zionist Organization, of which nine were founded in 1925.⁴ The Zionist settlements were of two main types. The *Moshevei Ovdim* ('Workers' Settlements') were colonies of small-holders, while the *Kvutzoth* ('Groups') were based on the principle of common ownership and corporate responsibility. Both types dispensed with hired labour, and the allotment of land per head was designed to correspond to the area which could be worked by a single family. Some of the older colonies specialized in oranges and wines, but the post-war settlements depended mainly upon mixed farming, including dairy-farming, poultry-farming, and tobacco-planting.⁵ In most cases the bulk, if not the whole, of the initial capital was provided from Zionist funds. This was regarded in principle as a debt to be paid off in course of time by the colonist, or the group of colonists, as the case might be. There was, however, little prospect of such repayments being made on any appreciable scale for some time to come. Most of the post-war settlements were still in their infancy, and though they were gradually advancing towards independence, few of them were as yet in a position to pay their way.

The standard cost of establishing a family in a 'workers' settlement' was £E700.⁶ This was exclusive of the cost of land. The acquisition of land was a serious problem. In 1914 the Jewish Colonization Association had been promised by the Turkish Government a concession for the reclamation of the Kabbarah swamps, which covered, with the adjacent sand-dunes, an area of about 11,000 acres on the plain between Jaffa and Haifa. In 1921 this pre-war concession was confirmed by the Government of Palestine in an

¹ *Memorandum submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations*, June 1926, p. 25.

² *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-5*, p. 37. ³ p. 377.

⁴ *Memorandum submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations*, June 1926, p. 11.

⁵ For further details see *Report of the Zionist Organization to the Fourteenth Zionist Congress*, 1925, pp. 173 *et seq.*

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 210.

amended form.¹ This, however, was the only important step which was taken during the period under review towards giving effect to those provisions of Article 6 of the mandate which required the Government of Palestine to encourage the settlement of Jews on state and waste lands. It was at one time expected that extensive areas of state land would be available for Jewish colonization in the Jordan Valley around Beisan. It was, however, found on inquiry that these lands, or a large proportion of them, were occupied by Arab cultivators having moral, if not legal, claims to be left in possession.² These claims were recognized by the Government, which in 1921 formally undertook to give the occupiers facilities for acquiring full ownership on easy terms.³ The Zionist Organization did not question this policy in principle, in so far as it was based on the moral claims of the cultivators. It did, however, point out that, while the allotment was intended to correspond to their bona fide requirements, some of the allottees were already offering their rights for sale. It asked that, in sanctioning such transfers, the Government should give it preferential treatment as against private purchasers, whose object—it was alleged—was in many cases speculation in land-values. It was further contended that there must in any case be a surplus which could be immediately placed at its disposal. Finally, it pressed for an early allotment of state lands suitable for settlement in other parts of Palestine.⁴ The Government's reply was, in brief, that, with regard to the Beisan lands, nothing could be done until the allotment undertaken in 1921 had been completed; with regard to state lands in other parts of the country, the results of the land survey then in progress must be awaited before the Government could proceed in the light of exact information as to the extent and character of the state domain. This question was closely examined by the Permanent Mandates Commission, which, while fully recognizing the Government's difficulties in giving effect to Article 6 of the mandate, expressed the hope that 'every effort will be made to hasten the survey, the completion

¹ *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-5*, p. 32.

² See Sir Herbert Samuel's statement to the Permanent Mandates Commission (*Minutes of the Fifth Session*, p. 57).

³ The text of the 'Beisan Agreement' is printed in the *Palestine Official Gazette*, 1st January, 1922.

⁴ Covering letter to the *Memorandum submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations*, June 1926 (printed as Annex No. 6 to the *Minutes of the Ninth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 198-201).

of which will be of the utmost importance for the general development of Palestine and in particular for the establishment of the Jewish National Home'.¹

Meanwhile, the land required for Jewish colonization had to be bought from private owners at inflated prices, usually amounting to twice or three times its pre-war value.² These purchases were in every case effected under arrangements safeguarding, to the satisfaction of the Government, the interests of any sitting tenants.³ The total area of land in Jewish ownership at the end of 1925 was 1,100,000 dönüms, as compared with 900,000 dönüms at the end of 1924,⁴ and about 400,000 at the date of the Armistice.⁵ The area held as Jewish public property by the Jewish National Fund was 185,000 dönüms, of which 140,000 were in or near the Plain of Esdraelon.⁶ A large part of the remainder was owned by the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association, which administered the settlements founded by Baron Edmond de Rothschild before the War. Between the 1st April, 1921, and the 31st December, 1925, £650,000 was provided from Zionist funds for agricultural colonization.⁷ This was exclusive of Zionist expenditure on the purchase and amelioration of land. Expenditure under these heads amounted during the same period to approximately £700,000,⁸ making a total of (in round figures) £1,350,000.

An important Jewish contribution to the development of Palestine was the hydro-electric scheme associated with the name of Mr. Pinhas Rutenberg. The main object of the Rutenberg scheme was to utilize the latent sources of energy in the Jordan and its affluents for the purpose of providing Palestine with an ample supply of cheap electrical power. The scheme would have the inci-

¹ Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the work of its Ninth Session (June 1926), printed as Annex No. 9 to the *Minutes of the Ninth Session*, pp. 215 *et seq.*

² *Report of the High Commissioner on the Administration of Palestine, 1920-5*, p. 32.

³ *Appendices to Report on Palestine Administration, 1924*, p. 7. See also *Report on Palestine Administration, July 1920-December 1921*, p. 112.

⁴ *Memorandum submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, June 1926*, p. 10. One dönüm = about a quarter of an acre.

⁵ *Id.*, October 1924, p. 19.

⁶ *Id.*, June 1926, p. 10.

⁷ The exact figure given in the publications of the Palestine Foundation Fund is £647,389.

⁸ *Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization to the Fourteenth Zionist Congress, 1925*, p. 164. The figure actually given in this report is £573,329 for the period October 1921-March 1925. The figure of £700,000 includes an estimate on a similar scale for the eighteen months, January-September 1921 and April-December 1925.

dental effect of facilitating the systematic irrigation of a large area in and around the Jordan Valley. By an agreement dated the 21st September, 1921, the Government of Palestine undertook to grant a concession in the nature of a monopoly to a company to be formed by Mr. Rutenberg within two years. This undertaking was subject to certain conditions, one of which was that the constitution of the company should be subject to the approval of the High Commissioner for Palestine in agreement with the Jewish agency referred to in the mandate, i. e. the Zionist Organization. The validity of this agreement was challenged on the ground that it conflicted with a concession granted before the War to M. G. Mavrommatis, who claimed, as a Greek subject, to be entitled under the Treaty of Lausanne to have his concession confirmed and adapted to post-war conditions. The Greek Government supported M. Mavrommatis, and eventually took the case to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which gave judgement on the 25th March, 1925.¹ So far as the Jerusalem district was concerned M. Mavrommatis was held to have established his claim. So far as it related to other parts of Palestine the Rutenberg agreement was unaffected by the judgement. Meanwhile, fresh negotiations had begun between the Government and the Rutenberg group, and it was not until the 5th March, 1926, that the concession was finally granted, in an amended form, to the Palestine Electric Corporation, to which Mr. Rutenberg's rights had been transferred. The Corporation had at its disposal a capital of nearly £1,000,000, the bulk of which had been provided by various Jewish bodies and individuals interested in the development of Palestine. In accordance with the spirit of Article 11 of the mandate the concession provided for the limitation of dividends and for the payment of surplus profits to the Government of Palestine. At the close of the period under review the Corporation had already erected Diesel engine power-stations at Haifa and Tiberias. It also controlled the Jaffa Electric Company, which held a separate but parallel concession in the Jaffa district, and was now supplying electric light and power to Jaffa and Tel-Aviv. The Rutenberg concessions were discussed by the Permanent Mandates Commission at its fifth session in October 1924, when the question was raised whether the concessions ought not to have been put up to tender. Sir Herbert Samuel's reply was that the company was mainly financed by Jewish organizations interested in the development of Palestine, and 'it was not

¹ *Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice*, Series A., No. 5 (Leyden, 1925).

anticipated that any tenders could be forthcoming for an enterprise the financial attractions of which were not very great'.¹ A similar reply was made on behalf of the Government when the same question was raised at the ninth session of the Commission in June 1926.²

A prominent part in the Zionist programme was played by the Hebrew school-system, for which £393,000 was provided from Zionist funds between the 1st April, 1921, and the 31st December, 1925.³ At the end of 1925 the Education Department of the Zionist Organization was administering 168 schools, with 622 teachers and 16,132 pupils.⁴ Other Jewish schools outside the Zionist system had a total attendance of nearly 10,000.⁵ At the end of 1924, 85 per cent. of the Jewish children between the ages of five and fourteen were at school. In the case of the Christian and Muslim communities the corresponding percentages were respectively 76 and 14.⁶ Similar figures were not published for 1925, but there is no reason to think that they would have been materially different. The cost of maintaining the Jewish schools fell entirely on Zionist and other Jewish funds, except for a trifling grant-in-aid, amounting in 1925 to £E3,679.⁷ The Zionist Organization repeatedly represented to the Government that this contribution was inadequate, and it also brought the matter to the notice of the Permanent Mandates Commission, which, in its report on the work of its seventh session in October 1925, expressed the hope 'that more substantial assistance may be given to Jewish schools in view of the constantly increasing number of school children'.⁸ In 1926 the Commission was informed that a substantial increase in the grant-in-aid was in contemplation.⁹

In addition to kindergartens, elementary, secondary, and technical

¹ *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 86.

² *Minutes of the Ninth Session*, p. 180.

³ A statement of the main items of Zionist expenditure will be found in the publications of the Palestine Foundation Fund. By the 31st December, 1926, the total Zionist expenditure on education had risen to £489,000.

⁴ *Memorandum submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations*, June 1926, p. 23. The figures given in the *Report on Palestine Administration*, 1925, p. 68, refer to the previous school year.

⁵ *Loc. cit.* The Annual Report for 1925 of the Government Department of Education (Table V) gives the total number of Jewish school children as 25,555, of whom only 25 were at Government schools.

⁶ *Report on Palestine Administration*, 1924, p. 32.

⁷ Annual Report of Government Department of Education, 1925, p. 9.

⁸ Annex No. 14 to the *Minutes of the Seventh Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 213.

⁹ Observations of the British Government, dated the 10th June, 1926, on a letter from the Zionist Organization (printed as Annex No. 6a to the *Minutes of the Ninth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 201 *et seq.*). In the financial year 1926-7 the grant was raised to £E10,000.

schools, and teachers' training colleges, the Zionist educational system included a Technical Institute at Haifa and an Agricultural School for Women at Nahalal in the Vale of Esdraelon. At Tel-Aviv there was a Zionist Agricultural Institute, which maintained experimental stations in the various climatic zones. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem was formally opened on the 1st April, 1925, when the inaugural ceremony was performed by the Earl of Balfour. In its initial stages the University was not so much a teaching body as a group of Research Institutes, including Institutes of Chemistry, Mathematics, and Microbiology, and—on the Arts side—an Institute of Jewish Studies, to which a School of Oriental Studies was afterwards added. Throughout the Zionist educational system Hebrew was the language of instruction; indeed, one of the most powerful factors in the consolidation of the Jewish National Home was the revival of Hebrew, which had become firmly established as the Jewish vernacular and had its recognized place under the mandate as one of the three official languages.

Next to agricultural colonization and education the main items of Zionist expenditure were immigration and public health. In the period 1st April, 1921–31st December, 1926, £303,000 was spent on immigration, including the maintenance of Zionist agencies in the principal emigration-centres and of immigrants' hostels at the ports of arrival. In the same period £208,000 was spent on medical and sanitary work, primarily for the benefit of the Jewish population, but also to the advantage of Palestine as a whole. The anti-malarial work of the Zionist Organization and other Jewish agencies was singled out for approval in the report of the Malaria Commission of the League of Nations Health Organization on its visit to Palestine in 1925.¹

The entire expenditure of the Zionist Organization was defrayed by voluntary contributions from all parts of the world. Between the 1st October, 1917, and the 31st March, 1926, these contributions were stated to have amounted in the aggregate to £4,286,000,² the bulk of which was actually expended in Palestine. According to a Zionist estimate based on the best available data, about £1,500,000

¹ League of Nations Document, C. H. Malaria. 52, pp. 19 and 28.

² The following figures are given in the *Memorandum submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations*, June 1926, p. 39:

Restoration Fund, £878,000,

Jewish National Fund, £1,242,000,

Palestine Foundation Fund, £2,166,000,

making a total of £4,286,000. The last figure does not, however, include about £500,000 collected by the Palestine Foundation Fund but not actually expended in Palestine.

was spent in Palestine during the same period by the Jewish Colonization Association and the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association, while about £4,000,000 of Jewish money was brought in by other public bodies, companies, and private individuals.¹ If these figures were substantially correct, the Jewish capital invested in Palestine since the British occupation amounted in the aggregate to about £10,000,000.

Article 4 of the mandate for Palestine required the Zionist Organization, which was recognized as the Jewish agency, to take steps, in consultation with the mandatory Power, to secure the co-operation of all Jews who were willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home. The contributors to the Palestine Foundation Fund included, by the time of writing, a considerable and growing number of Jews and Jewish bodies not formally associated with the Zionist Movement. It was, however, felt by the Zionist Organization that something more was required, and that the object to be aimed at was the reconstitution on a broader basis of the Jewish agency for Palestine referred to in the mandate. The Organization therefore expressed its willingness to share its rights and obligations as the agency with duly accredited representatives of Jewish communities in all parts of the world. Of these, the most powerful, as well as much the largest outside Poland, was the Jewish community of the United States. Resolutions in favour of American participation in the Jewish agency were adopted at a conference held in New York in February 1924, and attended by representative American Jews of all shades of opinion. These resolutions were confirmed and amplified at a second conference of a similar character in March 1925.² Parallel steps were taken in Great Britain, and the Anglo-Jewish community declared for participation in the agency through its two most representative bodies—the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Anglo-Jewish Association. Preliminary discussions on similar lines also took place in Germany, Holland, and Italy.³

The Zionist Congress, at its meeting in Vienna in September 1925, formally endorsed this policy, and adopted a series of resolutions embodying an elaborate scheme for the reorganization of the Jewish agency for Palestine.⁴ The distinctive feature of the scheme was

¹ *Loc. cit.*

² Text in the *New Palestine* of New York, 22nd February, 1924, and 6th March, 1925.

³ The question of the Jewish agency is further discussed by the present writer in *Zionism* (London, 1925), chap. vi.

⁴ Text in *Report on Palestine Administration*, 1925, pp. 68–70.

that it proposed to allot half the seats on the governing bodies of the agency to accredited representatives of Jewish communities in various parts of the world, the other half being reserved for the Zionist Organization. The Vienna Congress was followed by a prolonged period of inaction. The European communities awaited a lead from the United States. The American Jews, on the other hand, were distracted by an acrimonious controversy as to the respective claims of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and of a scheme which was favoured by an influential group of philanthropists for the settlement of Jews on the land in Southern Russia. The leaders of this group were also the leading figures in the Conferences which in 1924, and again in 1925, had declared for the representation of the American Jewish community in the Jewish agency for Palestine. As a result, the negotiations for the enlargement of the agency came to a temporary standstill. They made no further progress until the end of 1926, when Dr. Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organization, succeeded in composing the differences which threatened to wreck them. On the 17th January, 1927, a statement on the subject of the agency was issued in New York under the joint signatures of Dr. Weizmann, on behalf of the Zionist Organization, and Mr. Louis Marshall, on behalf of the representative Jews who had taken part in the Conferences of 1924 and 1925. This statement was to the effect that agreement had been reached as to the desirability of reorganizing the Jewish agency for Palestine on the lines of the Vienna resolutions. It had also been agreed, as a preliminary measure, to appoint an authoritative Commission for the purpose of framing, for the guidance of the agency, a comprehensive programme of practical work in Palestine. As soon as the Commission had reported, immediate steps were to be taken towards the reconstruction of the agency on a broader basis.

(c) THE OPPOSITION TO THE MANDATES (1920-4).

When the administration of the French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon and of the British mandate for Palestine came under the observation of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, the Commission was impressed by the strength of the opposition which the two mandatory Powers had been, and were still, encountering among the population of the mandated territories. In the report on its fifth session (23rd October-6th November, 1924) the Commission recorded (in its studiously discreet

phraseology) that 'the existence of discontent'¹ in Palestine 'could not be denied', while in the report on its eighth session (16th February–6th March, 1926) it was more outspoken in regard to the territory mandated to France.

From the time when the mandate was first introduced, there existed in Syria, alongside of the party favourable to France, other parties which were hostile to French influence and, it may be added, to the mandatory system itself. This opposition has never relaxed for a moment.²

As the Permanent Mandates Commission itself pointed out,³ the opposition arose out of the circumstances in which these two mandates had been introduced. Notwithstanding certain declarations, general and particular, which had been published by the Allied Powers during the War of 1914–18, and notwithstanding the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the paramount consideration in the introduction of these mandates had not been to fulfil the aspirations, or even to serve the best interests, of the majority of the population in the territories concerned. The parties whose aspirations and interests had taken precedence were the French and British Governments. The majority of the population (apart from the Maronites and the Zionists actually domiciled in the country, who constituted, even in the aggregate, a small minority) would have preferred, apparently, that no mandatory régime at all should be imposed upon them, or, as a second choice, that a single mandate for the whole of 'Syria' (in the popular sense) should be conferred upon some Power other than France. This was what had been reported by the King–Crane Commission of Inquiry, which had been sent to the spot by the United States Government in 1919;⁴ and their report tallied with certain antecedent facts which were not open to dispute. During the hundred and twenty years ending in 1918 Syria had been exposed to more intensive Western influence than any other Arab country, not excluding Egypt; and since the Turkish Revolution of 1908 a Syrian National Movement inspired by the political ideas of the West had been gathering head. After the intervention of the Ottoman Government

¹ In the same sentence the Commission stated expressly that this was 'in no way attributable to the Representative of the mandatory Power, who faithfully discharges the twofold duty imposed by the mandate'.

² For M. de Caix's account of the opposition in the French mandated territory see *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission* (C. 174. M. 65. 1926. VI.), pp. 63–5.

³ See *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission* (C. 617. M. 216. 1924. VI.), p. 188, and *Minutes of the Eighth Session*, pp. 202–3.

⁴ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 148–9.

in the General War of 1914–18, an Arab National Committee in Damascus had made overtures to the British Government—employing as their intermediary the Amīr Husayn of the Hijāz—in the hope of throwing off Turkish rule by force and winning national independence for all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire with the assistance of the Allies.¹ Before the outbreak of the insurrection in the Hijāz in 1916 the movement in Syria was detected by the Turkish authorities and was rigorously repressed—a number of the Syrian Nationalist leaders being executed. Thus the Syrians had produced martyrs for their National cause; and after the overthrow of the Turkish domination by Lord Allenby's victory in 1918, they were not prepared to forgo independence (especially when independence was being granted to a much more backward Arab province like the Hijāz) or to reconcile themselves to a mere change of masters—even though the new masters were more enlightened and progressive than the Turks and were installed not as sovereign but as mandatory Powers.

In all but a fraction of the two mandated territories the mandatory system had to be imposed upon the inhabitants by compulsion. The cis-Jordanian part of the territory mandated to Great Britain had been conquered by the British army, during the War of 1914–18, direct from the Turks without any intermediate régime; but the more extensive territory mandated to France was not occupied by the French army until the Turks had been driven out and the Arab national flag had been hoisted, not only over Damascus and Aleppo, but over Bayrūt, Tarabulus, and Lādhiqiyah. It required diplomatic pressure from Lord Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief of the British, French, and Arab forces in this area, to instal the French along the Syrian littoral at the close of 1918; and it required regular military operations on the part of General Gouraud to instal them in the interior in July 1920.² The fact that the interior of the French mandated territory was actually conquered from an Arab National Government (and treated as a conquered country) by the mandatory Power gave the French mandate an unfortunate start,³ and it was not surprising that Damascus (where

¹ See *op. cit.*, Part III A.

² For the events here alluded to see *op. cit.*, pp. 158–9.

³ The more so as General Gouraud's operations against the Arab National State of Damascus in 1920 were on a much larger scale than the French participation in the Allied operations against the Turks on the Syrian front during the War of 1914–18. In the campaigns which had resulted in Lord Allenby's crowning victory, the brunt had been borne by the British army, and the small French contingent attached to Lord Allenby's command had

the defunct Arab Government had established its capital) continued to be the focus of an anti-French movement. The opposition, however, was hardly less energetic, though on the whole less militant, in other parts of the two mandated territories and among the Syrian communities abroad. It took shape in numerous political organizations, of which the most important were the Palestine Arab (Muslim-Christian) Congress, organized on the 12th December, 1920,¹ and the Syro-Palestinian Congress, organized in August 1921 at Geneva.² This latter was a comprehensive association, to which not only the Palestine Arab Congress but other organizations, including representatives of Lebanese colonies abroad and Lebanese exiles, were affiliated.

The grievances of the Syro-Palestinian people³ were partly political and partly administrative; and the political grievances, in their turn, related partly to the division of the country into two mandated territories and half-a-dozen states, and partly to the frontiers and to the political régimes with which several of these states were endowed by the mandatory Powers.

The Syro-Palestinians pointed out that the whole of 'Syria' (in the popular sense) had been under one sovereignty from the expul-

sion of a less conspicuous part than the Arab national forces led by the Amīr Faysal b. Husayn. Of course, the Syrian front was a minor theatre of operations, and Lord Allenby's victory, even if it could have been won, would have been futile from the political point of view if the Allies had not also been victorious on the Western front. The French High Command showed themselves good strategists and faithful servants of the common cause of the Allies in concentrating their efforts upon the main theatre of war. For the people of Syria, however, it was difficult to realize that the issue of the whole War had been decided on the battle-fields of Western Europe; and inevitably they estimated the relative military contributions of the Principal Allied Powers to the common victory by their relative participation in the Syrian campaigns. Thus, in Syria, France received considerably less and Great Britain considerably more credit for her 'war effort' than was warranted by the full facts of the case.

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 93-4. The Palestine Arab Delegation (*Wafdu'l-'Arabīyū'l-Filastīnī*) of the Palestine Arab Congress published, in London, in November 1921, a document entitled: 'The Holy Land: The Moslem-Christian case against Zionist aggression' (translation in *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 596-603). The Zionist Organization made a detailed reply in a pamphlet entitled *The Truth about Palestine*.

² *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 291 and 411-13.

³ For the various heads under which the grievances were tabulated by the Syro-Palestinians themselves see the memorial presented by the notables of Damascus to Subhi Bey Bereket, the President of the Syrian Federation, in December 1922 (précis in *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 476); the demands presented by a Damascus delegation to General Sarraïl in January 1925 (précis in *op. cit.*, V, 2, pp. 106-7); and the appeal addressed by the Executive Committee of the Syro-Palestinian Congress to the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations (printed as Annex No. III to the *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, 16th February-6th March, 1926).

sion of the last Crusaders by the Mamlūk Sultans of Egypt at the close of the thirteenth century after Christ down to the expulsion of the Ottoman Turks by the Allied Powers in 1918. Why was Syria now partitioned into two mandated territories? The Syro-Palestinians believed that this arrangement represented a compromise between the imperial ambitions of France, who had long regarded the whole of Syria as her allotted portion in the heritage of the Ottoman Empire, and the imperial interests of Great Britain, who was unwilling to see another Great Power establish itself in the immediate vicinity of the Suez Canal. They further believed that the French, at any rate, had divided up the territory under their mandate into five (afterwards four) states with the deliberate object of accentuating the existing disunity of the various Syrian communities, in order that France might divide and rule, instead of teaching the Syrians to co-operate in the practice of self-government, in pursuance of Article 22 of the Covenant. As examples of this policy they cited the aggrandizement of the Lebanon, the creation of the 'Alawī State, and the separation (afterwards abandoned) of Aleppo from Damascus. The French, on their side, protested that they had subdivided the mandated territory not in order to foment particularism but in order to conform to particularist tendencies which were already in existence and were receiving vigorous expression;¹ they recalled that the mandate itself directed them (Art. 1) to promote local autonomy to the full extent that circumstances might permit; and they pointed out that their policy of subdivision had been confined to the political sphere, and that in matters of currency and customs they had always treated the whole territory mandated to them as a single unit. The Mandates Commission² neither called in question the right of the French to do what they had done nor discussed their motives, but they were 'particularly struck' by 'the lack of continuity which' appeared 'to have marked the policy'.

¹ See French Government's *Report*, 1922-3, p. 39; *Report*, 1923-4, p. 9; and M. de Caix's statement to the Permanent Mandates Commission (*Minutes of the Eighth Session*, pp. 75-8 and 83). No other motive was ever avowed officially on the French side. The Executive Committee of the Syro-Palestinian Congress alleged, however (*op. cit.*, p. 175), that in 1920 M. de Caix himself had privately reported to the French Government that the division of the country into small states was an absolute necessity if France was to govern and control it: and in a dispatch published on the 15th January, 1926, the correspondent of *Le Temps* wrote as follows: 'La tâche de M. de Jouvenel s'en trouve toute tracée: diviser pour régner. La division est faite. Le règne commence.'

² *Minutes of the Eighth Session*, pp. 206-7.

The Commission thinks it beyond doubt that these oscillations in matters so calculated to encourage the controversies inspired by the rivalries of races, clans, and religions, which are so keen in this country, to arouse all kinds of ambitions, and to jeopardize serious moral and material interests, have maintained a condition of instability and unrest in the mandated territories.

The second political grievance related to the frontiers and the political régimes with which the mandatory Powers had endowed the three states of the Great Lebanon, the 'Alawiyyin and Palestine. The Syro-Palestinians believed that the mandatories, realizing that the majority of the population was against them, had sought to bind certain minorities to themselves by giving them a position of privilege and even dominance over their neighbours which they could only hope to retain so long as the mandatory Powers remained in the country.¹ The 121,879² Sunnis annexed to the Lebanon on the 31st August, 1920, and the 94,000 Sunnis³ annexed to the 'Alawī State did not reconcile themselves to this political separation from their co-religionists in the State of Syria;⁴ while the erection of a Palestinian State within the Biblical frontiers 'from Dan even unto Beersheba'⁵ aroused still more vehement opposition among the Arabs of all communities in that area.

The political difficulties with which Great Britain had to contend in Palestine were indeed more formidable, in themselves, than any that confronted France in the territory mandated to her. The non-'Alawī elements in the 'Alawī State and the non-Christian elements in the Great Lebanon were only minorities, whereas the recalcitrant element in Palestine amounted to nearly 90 per cent. of the total population in 1922⁶ and to something over 86 per cent.

¹ For the translation of a manifesto issued on the 19th January, 1923, by the Bayrūt Central Group of the Lebanese National Party, protesting against any attack on the integrity of the Great Lebanon, see *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 527-8.

² French Government's *Report*, 1922-3, p. 45.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 718.

⁴ The people of Tarabulus demanded the disannexation of their city from the Great Lebanon when M. de Caix, then Acting High Commissioner, visited Tarabulus on the 24th January, 1923 (*Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 596). In January 1925 the Sunnis of Lādhiqiyah petitioned General Sarraill that the 'Alawī State should be annexed to the State of Syria or, as a second best alternative, to the Great Lebanon (list of their demands in *op. cit.*, V, 2, pp. 107-8).

⁵ *Colonial No.* 15, 1925, p. 55.

⁶ The official census of 1922 (*Report*, 1922, p. 58) gave the following results:

Arabs (Sunnis, Christians, Druses, Matawilah)	671,098
Jews	83,794
Others (Samaritans, Bahā'is, Hindus, Sikhs)	2,290

Total 757,182

in 1925.¹ Again, the minorities in the Great Lebanon and the 'Alawī State had no reason to expect that the balance of numbers would turn further against them, whereas the majority in Palestine had good reason to expect a steady increase, through immigration, in the absolute numbers (though not necessarily in the percentage) of the Jewish minority.² Finally, the frontiers and the political régimes in the Great Lebanon and the 'Alawī State were matters in

¹ In 1925 it was estimated (*High Commissioner's Report*, 1920-5, p. 48) that the total population of Palestine was 802,000, of whom 690,000 were Muslims and Christians and 104,000 were Jews. For later estimates see p. 375 above.

² The Palestinian Arabs ignored the fact that the mandatory Power was consistently careful to restrict immigration into Palestine to the measure of the country's economic capacity (see Section (b) above). Moreover, the additions to the Jewish population of Palestine through immigration were partly offset by the greater net natural increase among the Arab inhabitants of the country. In 1923, for instance, the net natural increase per 1,000 was stated to be 21.8 per cent. in the case of the Arabs and 21.4 in the case of the Jews. In absolute figures this meant an Arab natural increase of 12,518 and a Jewish natural increase of only 1,890, while the net Jewish immigration in the same year only amounted to about 4,000 (Leonard Stein, *Zionism*, p. 200). The following additional information has been supplied by Mr. Stein in two letters to the writer of this Survey.

(1) Letter of the 25th November, 1926 :

The figures quoted from my book on Zionism are now, of course, somewhat out of date, though they were the latest available when the book was written. There has since been a considerable increase in the volume of Jewish immigration. Recent vital statistics published by the Palestine Government do not distinguish between Jews and non-Jews, but, assuming that the net rate of natural increase is about the same for both, the annual natural increase of the Arab population may be put (in round figures) at about 15,000. In 1924 the net Jewish immigration (immigrants less emigrants) was just under 11,000, so that the net Jewish immigration plus natural increase was still slightly, but only slightly, less than the natural increase of the Arabs. On the other hand, in 1925 the net Jewish immigration was just over 32,000, the Jewish natural increase was about 2,000, and the total increase in the Jewish population was just about 34,000, and was, therefore, considerably in excess of the natural increase of the Arabs during the year. It is at present uncertain how far any inference can be drawn from the figures for 1925, since this was a year of record immigration and the 1926 figures will certainly be much smaller. What all this actually amounts to is that the growth of the Jewish population by immigration and natural increase combined up to the end of 1925 has exceeded, by an uncertain but not very considerable figure, the growth of the Arab population during the same period, but that, on the other hand, this is solely due to the unprecedented immigration in 1925. It is hardly necessary to add that the Arabs start with so large a numerical majority that even if Jewish immigration plus natural increase continues somewhat to exceed the natural increase of the Arabs, there is still little prospect of the Arabs being overtaken in a numerical sense within a measurable period of time.

(2) Letter of the 23rd February, 1927 :

Vital statistics distinguishing between Jews and non-Jews are now available for the years 1924 and 1925. These statistics had not been published when I wrote to you on November 25th, 1926. They show that in 1924 the net natural increase was 14,856 (=25.1 per thousand) in the case of

which the mandatory Power possessed an entirely free hand, so that the French authorities were exclusively responsible for the results of these arrangements and completely at liberty to alter the arrangements themselves if the results proved unsatisfactory. In Palestine, on the other hand, the political régime to which the majority of the population was opposed had been prescribed by the terms of the mandate; and, except in respect of Transjordan, the mandatory Power had no discretion in the matter. The Permanent Mandates Commission, when it first took official cognizance of the administration of the British mandate for Palestine during its session of the 23rd October–6th November, 1924, pointed out that ‘whereas all the other mandates, the application of which it’ had ‘hitherto examined, were only intended to give effect to the general principles laid down in Article 22 of the Covenant, the Palestine Mandate’ was ‘of a more complex nature’, since it required the mandatory, ‘while giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant, to carry out also the plan of establishing in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people,’ in the terms of the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917. ‘A twofold duty’ was ‘thus imposed on the Administration of Palestine by the actual terms of the mandate’; and the attempts of the mandatory (sincere and resourceful though they were) to perform both parts of its duty simultaneously were frustrated by the organized opposition on the Arab side. The reaffirmation of the Balfour Declaration in the British Government’s memorandum of the 3rd June, 1922,¹ had interpreted the meaning of ‘the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine’ in terms which might have been expected to reassure and reconcile the Palestinian Arabs; but while the Zionist Organization formally accepted the policy of the memorandum on the 18th June, 1922, the Arabs retorted by the campaign

the non-Jewish population, and 2,427 (=25·63 per thousand) in the case of the Jews. The corresponding figures for 1925 were: non-Jews, 13,685 (=23·8 per thousand); Jews, 2,183 (=18·1 per thousand). Why the difference between the Jewish and non-Jewish rate of increase should have been so much greater in 1925 than in 1924 I am not at present able to explain. I ought to add that the figures for the non-Jewish population relate to the settled inhabitants only, and do not include about 110,000 Bedu who are not included in the official returns. If their natural increase were taken into account, the total figure for the non-Jewish population would, of course, be a little larger.

The net Jewish immigration (immigrants less emigrants) in 1926 was 6,445.

¹ Text in British White Paper, *Cmd. 1700 of 1922: Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization*, pp. 17–21. For the circumstances see *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, p. 177.

of non-co-operation which has been recorded above.¹ When, on the 21st February, 1922, the Palestine Arab Delegation had demanded that the constitution of Palestine should (among other things) 'provide for the creation of a national independent Government in accordance with the spirit of paragraph 4, Article 22, of the Covenant of the League of Nations', the Colonial Office had replied :

If your Delegation really represents the present attitude of the majority of the Arab population of Palestine, and Mr. Churchill has no grounds for suggesting that this is not the case, it is quite clear that the creation at this stage of a national Government would preclude the fulfilment of the pledge made by the British Government to the Jewish people.²

This foreboding was justified by the subsequent action of the Palestinian Arabs, and at two successive sessions of the Permanent Mandates Commission (the 23rd October–6th November, 1924, and the 19th–30th October, 1925) the representative of the British Government frankly admitted that it was impossible to grant the Arabs representation on an elective Council in proportion to their numbers on the Palestinian roll of electors because in that event 'the Government of Palestine would have been placed in a permanent *impasse*. . . . On the one hand, it would be obliged to carry out certain measures under the terms of the mandate, and, on the other, a hostile majority in the Council would have opposed any attempt to execute those measures'.³

In view of this inherent and apparently intractable political crux, the British mandate might have seemed to have less prospect than the French of being successfully administered. Yet while the conditions in the French mandated territory became progressively worse, those in the adjoining British territory experienced a progressive improvement during the same period. 'The riots in Jerusalem at Easter time in 1920, and in Jaffa and its neighbourhood in May 1921,' in which '104 persons lost their lives, 407 were injured, and extensive damage was done to property',⁴ were not repeated. On the other hand, the demonstrations⁵ in Damascus during April 1922, when the city was visited by Mr. Charles R. Crane (one of the

¹ pp. 363–4.

² *Cmd.* 1700 of 1922, p. 6.

³ Statements by Sir Herbert Samuel in *Minutes of the Fifth Session*, pp. 55 and 65; statement by Mr. Ormsby-Gore in *Minutes of the Seventh Session*, p. 102.

⁴ *Colonial No.* 15, 1925, p. 26. Cf. *Cmd.* 1540 of 1921; *Disturbances in May 1921: Reports of the Commission of Inquiry*.

⁵ See *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 728–9; II, pp. 27–8.

two authors of the King-Crane Report), were unfortunately harbingers of violence to come. Again, Lord Balfour (whose name was anathema to all the Syro-Palestinian Arabs because it was associated with the historic declaration which had promised a national home in Palestine to the Jews) was received by the Palestine Arabs in Jerusalem, when he arrived there on the 25th March, 1925, in order to open the new Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, with nothing worse than a studiously peaceful general strike,¹ of which they considerably gave him notice before he sailed from England.² It was not till he paid a passing visit to Damascus on the 8th-9th April that his presence produced an outburst of fury which threw a great city into uproar, compelled the authorities to call out the troops, caused twenty-four casualties (one fatal) in the tussle between the soldiers and the populace, and placed Lord Balfour's own life in serious jeopardy before he could be spirited away and deposited safely on board a steamer in Bayrūt harbour.³

Another symptom of a relative *détente* in the political situation in Palestine was the foundation, on the 9th November, 1923, of a new National Party (*Hizbu'l-Watanī*)⁴ in rivalry with the Palestine Arab (Muslim-Christian) Congress; for though the official programme of the younger party differed little from that of the older, and the schism was reported to have arisen less over questions of principle than out of family and personal rivalries, this meant that the hostility towards the mandatory Power and its policy, which had hitherto held the Palestine Arabs together in a single solid phalanx, was beginning to abate. A still clearer symptom was the progressive reduction of the British garrison. When the first civil High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, wrote a retrospective report upon his five years' tenure of office, on the 22nd April, 1925, he was able to report⁵ that the British forces in Palestine had been reduced to a single regiment of cavalry—stationed there by the desire of the British War Office and not at the request of the Palestine Administration—one squadron of aeroplanes and one company of armoured cars (some of these aeroplanes and cars being

¹ *The Times*, 26th March, 1925. For the preparations, see *ibid.*, 19th March, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 27th February, 1925.

³ See *Le Temps*, 11th April; *The Times*, 11th, 13th, and 16th April, 1925.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 12th, 13th, and 14th November, and 24th December, 1923. Cf. *Colonial No. 15*, 1925, p. 44.

⁵ *Colonial No. 15*, 1925, p. 5; for details regarding the policing of Palestine at this time see *The Times*, 18th May, 1925, 15th and 25th February, and 1st April, 1926.

stationed in Transjordan to deal with Wahhābī raiders) and 450 British gendarmes. A few months later Palestine, with this insignificant British garrison, was still enjoying almost untroubled peace and internal order, while the French mandated territory immediately adjoining the Palestine frontier was in flames.¹ Subsequently, both the British and the Palestinian sections of the Palestine gendarmerie were disbanded, and were replaced by a new organization entitled the Transjordan Frontier Defence Force, which was composed of Arabs and Circassians, with a small contingent of Jews, under British officers.² In the course of the year 1926 the British garrison was reduced to vanishing point by the withdrawal of the cavalry regiment above mentioned.

This apparent paradox was explained by the fact that the grievances of the Syro-Palestinian people were administrative as well as political. The political odium which the British incurred as the international trustees of the Jewish national home in Palestine might be greater than that which the French had brought upon themselves by dividing Aleppo from Damascus and creating the 'Alawī State and the Great Lebanon; but the hostility of the Syro-Palestinians to the mandatory system was also inflamed by a formidable list of complaints against the mandatory administration, and the complaints of this kind were directed almost exclusively against the French authorities.

These administrative grievances may be subsumed under the heads of currency regulations, official languages (especially as employed in educational institutions and courts of law), the suppression of civil liberties (including not only martial law but espionage, deportations and internments, the censorship of the Press, and restrictions upon freedom of association), administration proper (including the selection of native office-holders and the control exercised over them by the mandatory Power), and the official *personnel* by which the mandatory itself was represented in the mandated territory. In this connexion it will be convenient to consider the opposition to the French mandate among the Druses of the Jabalu'd-Durūz. The grievances by which the opposition here was aroused were almost entirely administrative and not

¹ For the disproportion between the respective strengths of the French and British garrisons in the two mandated territories (after allowing for the difference in the area and population of the two territories) at the time when the insurrection in the French territory broke out see *The Times*, 8th August, 1925.

² Some particulars of this force are given in the Middle Eastern Estimates for 1926-7.

political. Yet this was the spark which, in 1925, fired a train of revolt long laid across southern and central Syria.

The currency¹ which the French found in circulation in the territory mandated to them was the Egyptian pound, which General Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies of Occupation, had substituted on the 2nd November, 1918, for the previous Turkish currency as legal tender. The Egyptian pound remained a stable currency during the period under review, whereas the French franc depreciated at an accelerating rate from the Armistice of 1918 onwards. The French Government, which in 1920 'was maintaining in the Levant a large army of which the effective force amounted to as many as 70,000 men', found it 'extremely inconvenient and expensive to have continually to buy in Egypt Egyptian pounds in order to meet expenditure in Syria'.² Accordingly, in 1920, the French High Commissioner established by *arrêté* a Bank of Syria, and conferred on it the exclusive privilege of issuing notes in a new Syrian currency redeemable in French francs at the fixed rate of 20 centimes per piastre (the Syrian pound being thus equated with 20 French francs, whatever the rate of the French franc on the world market). By the 6th February, 1925, this bank had issued notes up to an aggregate value of 184,000,000 French francs in circulation, as against a reserve of 183,900,000 French francs of which only 3,500,000 were in gold or in foreign state bonds payable in gold, while no less than 108,730,000 were in bonds on the French State or guaranteed by it. Moreover, the majority of the shares were held in France. On the other hand, the gold reserve, such as it was (i.e. less than 3 per cent.), was kept in Syria; and, after investigating the matter, the Permanent Mandates Commission felt that no weight should be given to an allegation, which was categorically denied by the mandatory Power, that the bank was attempting to drain the mandated territory of its gold.

The acceptance of this new Syrian paper currency had been one of the demands in General Gouraud's ultimatum of the 14th July, 1920, to the Arab National State of Damascus, and after the French conquest of the interior in that month the new currency was accordingly introduced there also. On the 23rd January, 1924, the status of the Bank of Syria, which had previously depended on the High

¹ See French Government's *Report*, 1924, pp. 88-90; *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 114-15; and *Minutes of the Eighth Session*, pp. 107-18 and pp. 204-5.

² Statement by M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 111.

Commissioner's *arrêté*, was confirmed, for a term of fifteen years as from the 1st April, 1924, in a convention between the bank of the one part and the Governments of the Syrian Federation and the Great Lebanon of the other (though not without strenuous opposition in the Syrian Federal Council).¹ Thus the mandatory Power deprived the people of the mandated territory of the stable currency which they had previously enjoyed, and caused them to experience the losses and uncertainties of depreciation by making their currency dependent on that of France. This real grievance, combined with the apparently imaginary grievance of the drain of gold, brought odium upon the mandatory. It must be noted, however, that the French authorities in Syria sought to mitigate the local consequences of the depreciation of the French franc by authorizing the use of gold currencies—in 1921 for all contracts of more than forty days', and in 1924 for all contracts of more than five days' duration. The circulation of the Syrian paper currency was stated to be practically confined to Bayrūt and the neighbourhood; and its employment in payments by the Administration was offset by the fact that the taxes were collected in it likewise.² Nevertheless, the Permanent Mandates Commission, after investigation, formed the opinion that the currency policy of the mandatory Power was impeding the preparation of the mandated territories for the full exercise of their independence—'a result which would be inconceivable without autonomy in financial and monetary matters'.³

Official languages were a grievance not only in the French but in the British mandated territory, where the mandate itself prescribed (Art. 22) that Hebrew should rank as official, along with Arabic and English. In the French mandated territory Arabic and French were made the official languages by the action of the mandatory Power; and French, as well as Arabic, was made a compulsory subject in all schools maintained out of public funds.⁴ A greater

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 2, pp. 96-8.

² On the other hand, 'the fines inflicted as the result of insurrection were payable in gold.' (Statement by M. de Caix, in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 116.)

³ In 1924 the British mandatory authorities in Palestine began to examine the question of replacing the Egyptian pound there by a new Palestinian currency; but one of the postulates of the scheme was that the exchange value of the new currency was to be maintained at parity with gold (*Report for 1924*, p. 5). A Palestine Currency Board was eventually set up in London. (See a public notice on this subject in the *Palestine Official Gazette*, 1st September, 1926.)

⁴ French Government's *Report*, 1924, pp. 11-12; *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 110.

grievance was the introduction of French into the law courts—a grievance connected with the provisions, in lieu of the Capitulations, which the mandatory Power made for dealing with cases in which foreigners were concerned.¹ For this latter purpose, General Gouraud signed, on the 16th November, 1921, an *arrêté* instituting mixed tribunals in both the Lebanon and Syria; but this *arrêté* was not published until March 1922, and it aroused such a storm of opposition that it was never put into force. On the 7th July, 1923, it was abrogated by a new *arrêté* of General Weygand's, in which the establishment of special mixed tribunals was abandoned, while it was provided instead that French magistrates should sit with the native magistrates in the ordinary courts—in the Syrian courts only when foreigners were concerned, but in the Lebanese courts even for the decision of native cases.² Though this change was intended as a concession to public opinion, the coming into force of the new *arrêté* on the 1st February, 1924, was signalized by a strike of the native bar (who protested again on the first anniversary). They complained that the introduction of French magistrates on to the native bench was having the effect of driving the Arabic language out of the courts; and the accredited representative of the French Government admitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission that 'he did not know whether any [French] magistrates had been found who could speak Arabic'.³

The most serious grievance against the exercise of the French mandate was the suppression of civil liberties. Whereas the martial law, originally introduced by Lord Allenby when he effected the military occupation of the country, was abrogated in the British mandated territory as early as the 1st July, 1920, it was maintained in the French mandated territory not only after the transference of the High Command in that area to the French military authorities on the 1st November, 1919, but until the beginning of 1925. Moreover General Sarraill's *arrêté*⁴ of the 10th January, 1925, by which it was tardily abrogated, was supplemented by a second *arrêté* of the same date⁵ which contained the following provisions:

Art. 2.—If public order has been disturbed in a State, or if the security of the territory demands it, the powers belonging to each State

¹ See *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 727–8; II, pp. 144–7; III, 5, pp. 262–6; IV, 1, p. 37; 2, pp. 101–2; 3, pp. 182–3; *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 19, 183, and 189–90.

² Statement by M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 19.

³ Statement by M. de Caix, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Text in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 2, pp. 104–5.

⁵ Text in *loc. cit.*

for the maintenance of order and public security may be exercised by the High Commissioner. The latter acts thenceforth in place of the State Government, either directly or through his delegates. In the same circumstances, the local police and gendarmerie forces pass directly under the orders of the French military authorities.

Art. 3.—In case of grave troubles, or if external circumstances render it necessary, the High Commissioner may invest the military authorities in the whole or part of the territory with the whole or part of the powers of jurisdiction and police normally exercised by the civil authorities.

In the same circumstances the High Commissioner received the right to permit the military authorities to exercise certain additional powers, including those of removing suspects and forbidding publications¹ and meetings, which they had been exercising during the previous four years under martial law.

The removal of suspects in the French mandated territory under French martial law was resorted to on a far larger scale than in Egypt or 'Irāq under British martial law before the raising of the state of siege in those two countries.² This penalty was sometimes inflicted by sentence of a court martial and sometimes by an administrative act of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army of Occupation—an office which, in the persons of Generals Gouraud, Weygand, and Sarraill, was united *de facto*, though not juridically, with the High Commissionership.³ The representative of the French Government admitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the persons deported and interned sometimes had no opportunity of defending themselves, and that there was no appeal against the High Commissioner's decision except by a complaint addressed to the Government in Paris. The place of the 'enforced residence' thus inflicted was usually a prison on the island of Arwād, but sometimes a French possession overseas. Under this procedure, in 1920, a number of members of the Lebanon Administrative Council were condemned by court martial and banished for having published a manifesto,

¹ For the Press Censorship see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, p. 184, and *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 99–100. In the British mandated territory, between the 1st July, 1920, and the 22nd April, 1925, there was no censorship of the press, nor was any subsidy paid to any newspaper (*Colonial No. 15*, 1925, p. 44).

² In the British mandated territory of Palestine, between the 1st July, 1920, and the 22nd April, 1925, there were 'no political prosecutions, and no deportations, except of alien communists, and one temporary expulsion of an Arab of little note in 1921' (*Colonial No. 15*, 1925, p. 44). To find a parallel to the deportations and internments in the French mandated territory during the same period, it would be necessary to study the Greek military régime in the occupied Anatolian territories between 1919 and 1922.

³ *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 102–3; *Minutes of the Eighth Session*, pp. 20–2, 66–8, 96–100.

demanding the independence of the Lebanon, on the 10th July;¹ and, though these were permitted to return in 1922,² members of the succeeding Council were condemned and interned in Corsica in the same year. After the demonstrations at Damascus on the occasion of Mr. Charles R. Crane's visit in April 1922, seven persons (including Dr. 'Abdu'r-Rahmān Shāhbandar, afterwards leader of the Damascus Nationalists in the revolt of 1925-6) were condemned to terms of hard labour ranging from twenty years to five. In October 1923, however, and again in January 1925, after the High Commissionership had passed to General Sarraill, a number of sentences of expulsion were remitted, and, on the 1st February of that year, 'only nine of those who had been expelled were being kept out of their country.'³

The information on the strength of which these proceedings were taken by the French military authorities was supplied by an intelligence service⁴ consisting of 'about fifty to sixty French officers' and 'a few civilians. . . . The officers did not confine themselves to receiving information which came to them spontaneously', and 'native informers received subsidies but did not officially form part of the service'.⁵ Serious criticisms in the French Chamber, directed against the conduct of this intelligence service, were virtually admitted by the French Prime Minister on the 18th December, 1925; and the representative of the French Government before the Permanent Mandates Commission 'did not deny that in certain instances intelligence officers doing administrative work might have been somewhat heavy-handed'.

In regard to the civil administration there was a significant contrast between the respective policies of the two mandatory Powers. In the British mandated territory, when the natural leaders of the Arab community persisted in their policy of non-co-operation, the High Commissioner preferred to admit that his efforts at introducing an instalment of self-government had been baffled, and to revert frankly to an autocratic administration rather than 'to form a council of men of less standing'.⁶ France, in her mandated territory, was able to report what seemed, on the face of it, more satisfactory progress. In the course of the year July 1922-July 1923 'a certain number of functionaries who had been

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, I, p. 414.

² *Op. cit.*, II, p. 223.

³ *Op. cit.*, III, 7, p. 423; French Government's *Report*, 1924, p. 12.

⁴ See *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 16, 85-7, 176, 207-8.

⁵ Statements by M. de Caix.

⁶ *Colonial No.* 15, 1925, p. 46.

solely responsible to the French Government passed into the local administrative hierarchies and became thenceforth the employees of the native Governments.¹ Most of the technical advisers disappeared from the High Commission and its Delegations, some being done away with, while others entered the service of the native Governments.² In the following year the French administrative advisers responsible to the mandatory authorities were altogether replaced, in the States of the Great Lebanon and Aleppo, by French inspectors of administrative services who were engaged by the native Governments.³ In the same year Councils of Directors (i.e. Ministers of State), on the precedent of the Council already introduced in the Great Lebanon, were instituted in the other States, an elective Council in each State, with a Federal Council for the three federated States, being set up as has been recorded above.⁴ Moreover, the President of the Federation, Bereket Subhī Bey, and the first Governors of three out of the five States in the mandated territory, were natives; and the mandatory Power could defend the provisional retention of Frenchmen as Governors of the 'Alawī State and the Great Lebanon on the grounds that the former was backward and that the latter was torn by religious dissensions.⁵ The natives themselves, however, asseverated, with good reason, that this imposing façade of native self-government masked a *de facto* domination by the mandatory Power which was not less autocratic than the British régime on the Palestinian side of the frontier.⁶ They maintained that the native office-holders were not only nominees of the mandatory Power but instruments of the mandatory's policy rather than representatives of their own fellow-countrymen; that the elections to the Representative Councils were not free; and that the Councils thus elected, 'tame' as they were, were bound hand and foot.⁷ The real Governor of each State was, in fact,

¹ French Government's *Report*, July 1922–July 1923, p. 11.

² On the distinction between the French officials of the High Commission, who were in the service of the mandatory Power, and those French officials who were in the service of the native States, see a statement by M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 15.

³ French Government's *Report*, July 1923–July 1924, pp. 10–11.

⁴ p. 358.

⁵ See French Government's *Report*, 1922–3, p. 12; *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 100.

⁶ For example, the High Commissioner's *arrêté* of the 8th March, 1922, instituting an elective Representative Council in the Great Lebanon (see p. 357 above), produced disillusionment and bitterness among Lebanese of all parties (*Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 721–2). The new administrative regulations were compared unfavourably with those of 1864 (*op. cit.*, II, pp. 163–4).

⁷ In the city of Damascus the abstentions from voting at the first elections reached a high figure (French Government's *Report*, 1923–4, p. 8). The

the Delegate of the French High Commissioner, and the High Commissioner also possessed a monopoly of legislative power, since he promulgated all important legislation by his own *arrêtés*, while the less important bills which came before the Councils could only do so on the High Commissioner's initiative, and could only acquire executory force if and when a vote of the Assembly received the High Commissioner's ratification.¹

This unavowed but all-pervasive administrative and legislative control on the part of the French authorities, behind a façade of native self-government, was evidently likely, in the long run, to prove more exasperating to the Syro-Palestinian people than the more straightforward procedure of the British authorities in the adjoining territories. It was thus in itself a mistaken policy; yet its consequences might not have been so disastrous as they actually were if the officials responsible for its execution had attained those standards of ability, experience, discretion and, above all, impartial justice which were to be expected from the representatives of a Government upon which an international trusteeship had been conferred. Unfortunately, 'the staff which was at the disposal of the mandatory Administration for the most delicate and highest duties, even for those of State Governors, did not constitute, owing to the diversity of its origin, a sufficiently coherent and experienced body of officials'.²

In the administration of both mandates, it was one of the inherent difficulties of the local situation that the representatives of the mandatory Powers would be expected, *a priori*, by the population to which they were to give their services, to be partisans of some particular local policy or some particular local faction. In regard to every British official it would be asked: 'Is he Gentile or Jew, pro-Arab or pro-Zionist?' and in regard to every French official:

Councils were regarded so completely as instruments of the mandatory Power that in November 1923 there was a movement for boycotting their members (*Oriente Moderno*, III, 7, p. 417). Nevertheless, the Damascus Council, at any rate, became a focus of opposition to the mandatory Power (see, for example, an account of the sitting of the 9th April, 1924, in *op. cit.*, IV, 5, pp. 312-13). This fact might be interpreted in two ways. It might mean either that the elections had been honestly conducted, or else that the opposition in the country was too strong to be counteracted by electoral chicanery.

¹ See the Appeal of the Executive Committee of the Syro-Palestinian Congress, printed as Annex No. III to the *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*. The Permanent Mandates Commission reported (Report on the Eighth Session, printed as Annex No. IV to the *Minutes*, p. 207): 'It seems clear that the French advisers have shown a too pronounced tendency to take the place of the native authorities.'

² *Loc. cit.*

'Is he secularist or "Good Catholic", pro-Sunnī or pro-Maronite?' Both mandatory Powers entered on their task under special commitments to particular communities in the mandated territories—the British to the Zionists and the French to the Latins, Maronites and Uniates of the Lebanon; and both tacitly acknowledged these commitments in their first selections of High Commissioners. The British Government sent out a Zionist, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the French three successive 'Good Catholics'—M. Picot, General Gouraud, and General Weygand. Both, again, varied their selection in 1925, when Sir Herbert Samuel was succeeded by a non-Jew, Lord Plumer, and General Weygand by a prominent supporter of the Cartel des Gauches, General Sarraill.¹ All parties in both mandated territories hoped or feared, as the case might be, that these successive High Commissioners, and their British and French subordinates, would perform their tasks in a partisan spirit; but while these expectations were repeatedly falsified on the British side² (a fact which goes far to explain the relative success with which the inherent difficulties of the Palestine mandate were surmounted), on the French side they were more often fulfilled. Indeed, General Weygand, 'Good Catholic' as he was, appears to have been the only one of the successive French High Commissioners contemporary with Sir Herbert Samuel and Lord Plumer who held the scales as evenly as they. His predecessor General Gouraud took responsibility for partisan acts, like the creation of the Great Lebanon, which sowed the storm; while under his successor General Sarraill—whose appointment in place of General Weygand was ostentatiously made by M. Herriot's Government, and emphatically accepted by General Sarraill himself, as a 'symbolic gesture' in the party struggle of French home politics³—'France exported to Syria', already

¹ General Gouraud held the High Commissionership from the 10th November, 1919, to the 21st April, 1923; General Weygand from the 21st April, 1923, to the 29th November, 1924; General Sarraill from the 29th November, 1924, to the 30th October, 1925. Sir Herbert Samuel took up his appointment as from the 1st July, 1920, and handed over his office to Lord Plumer as from the 1st July, 1925.

² Sir Herbert Samuel informed the Permanent Mandates Commission that 'the underlying idea pursued by the [mandatory] Government [in Palestine] was that it should deal with the Arabs in regard to their possession of their land, their religion, their development generally, exactly as if no Balfour Declaration had been made at all'; and he was censured by certain Zionists less fair-minded and far-sighted than himself for 'leaning over backwards' in his anxiety not to show partiality to his co-religionists. It was the Arabs' turn to be disappointed when they found that Sir Herbert Samuel's successor, Lord Plumer, was firmly resolved to do his duty under the mandate by promoting the development of the Jewish National Home.

³ *Le Temps*, 1st November, 1925.

distracted by indigenous feuds, 'the political and religious differences that have so long characterized her own life'.¹ In this spirit, General Sarraïl dealt with General Weygand's French subordinates as the Cartel had dealt with General Weygand himself, and he further thinned the already dwindling ranks of France's traditional friends among the Syrian people by ruthlessly carrying into the *terre d'outre-mer* that anticlerical crusade which his party was accustomed to carry on at home. He acted with the same roughness in the single conspicuous case in which he supported a subordinate, and continued a policy, inherited from his predecessor; and with singular perversity he selected for this exceptional treatment the Jabalu'd-Durüz—the most dangerous spot in the whole of the French mandated territory. It is not surprising that it was General Sarraïl who reaped the whirlwind.

The ground had been prepared for five years by serious shortcomings among the French administrative staff,² whose collective performance was of more consequence for the fortunes of the French mandate than the vagaries of High Commissioners. Some of these French officials were seconded members of the French home civil service who found themselves suddenly promoted to positions of responsibility which they had neither the ability nor the experience to fill. Others were military officers, or even non-commissioned officers, who were alleged by the population placed under their government to be ignorant of administrative procedure. The majority—especially among the judges appointed to the native bench,³ who in other technical respects were perhaps better qualified than many of their colleagues—were apparently ignorant of the Arabic language. On the other hand, the minority who were linguistically equipped for the task (particularly incumbent upon the representatives of a mandatory Power) of entering into close and sympathetic personal relations with the population of the mandated territory, had been psychologically unfitted for this by their previous careers. These were military officers from the French colonies and protectorates in Africa, where they had been accustomed to apply régimes less liberal than the mandate to populations less civilized and sensitive than the Syrians; and for the most part they failed to adjust their methods and manners to their new duties.

¹ *The Times*, 24th November, 1925. Compare the remarks of the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Marquis Theodoli, in *Minutes of the Eighth Session*, p. 92.

² See *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 84-8, 96-7, 176-7, 179.

³ See p. 399 above.

Thus the very Frenchmen who should have forged the strongest links of human sympathy between France and the Syrian territory mandated to her became the chief stumbling-blocks in the way of an understanding between the two countries ;¹ and, as the Permanent Mandates Commission pointed out,² even those appointed to such important positions as State Governorships sometimes proved unsatisfactory. In May 1923 two hundred Lebanese citizens addressed a petition³ to the French Government, in which they declared that, under the administration of the French Governor of the Great Lebanon, Commandant Trabaud, the public funds were squandered, the police was corrupt, the elections were tampered with, and the officials were arbitrarily appointed and dismissed. The petitioners demanded that an impartial commission of inquiry should be sent out from France immediately. This demand was not complied with ; but Commandant Trabaud was sent away on leave by General Weygand,⁴ and in June 1924 he was replaced by General Vandenberg,⁵ who appears to have given great satisfaction until his summary dismissal by General Sarraill on the 2nd January, 1925, the very day on which the new High Commissioner landed at Bayrūt.⁶ General Sarraill would have been better advised if he had reserved this treatment for the French Governor of the Jabalu'd-Durūz, Captain Carbillet. Instead, he not only rebuffed but treacherously arrested and interned the Druse notables who petitioned for Captain Carbillet's replacement ; and this was the blow that touched off the explosion.

(d) FRANCE AND THE JABALU'D-DURŪZ⁷ (1920-4)

The Druses were the adherents of an esoteric non-proselytizing religion founded in the eleventh century after Christ by the Fātimid Caliph Al-Hākim bi'amri'llāh, and they took their name from

¹ A certain number of French officials in the mandated territory were accused by the Syrians of specific acts of arbitrariness, tyranny, and even corruption. (See *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 177.) In the nature of the case such charges were difficult either to prove or to disprove. No charges of corruption (though many of tactlessness and tyranny) seem to have been brought against either General Sarraill or Captain Carbillet—the two Frenchmen immediately responsible for provoking the revolt of 1925.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 49.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, V, 1, p. 11.

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, III, 1, pp. 48-9.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, IV, 7, pp. 439-40, and 8, p. 485.

⁷ For the social and political background in the Jabalu'd-Durūz see the French Government's *Provisional Report* to the League of Nations on the situation in Syria and the Lebanon in 1925, pp. 7-8 ; *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 101-3 and 160-4 ; *Oriente*

Al-Hākim's apostle Ad-Darazī.¹ In matters of religion the Druse community was divided into a hierarchy of initiation-classes. There was the 'spiritual section' (*qismu'r-Rūhānī*), subdivided into the chiefs (*ar-Ru'asā*), the intelligent (*al-'uqalā*), and the excellent (*al-ajāwīd*); and the 'corporeal section', subdivided into the lords (*al-umarā*) and the ignorant (*al-juhhāl*). Initiation was open to women as well as men. Like many other small and peculiar sects which have managed to survive, the Druses tended to withdraw into mountain fastnesses. At the date when the French and British mandates were introduced there were four main Druse strongholds—one in the Lebanon east of Bayrūt, the second in the extreme south-west of the Great Lebanon, the third on the western slopes of Mount Hermon, and the fourth in the Jabalu'd-Durūz—an isolated mass of rugged and ill-watered mountains which rose abruptly between the fertile corn-lands of the Hawrān to the west and the Hamād steppe to the east. The central shrine of the Druse religion, Khalwatu'l-Biyād, lay in the Mount Hermon district, while the chief political focus of the Druse community had formerly lain in the Lebanon; but during the past two centuries—and especially after the migration which followed the French military intervention in 1860 and the organization of the autonomous sanjāq of the Lebanon in 1861–4—the political centre of gravity had shifted to the most remote and militarily strongest of the Druse fastnesses: ²

Moderno, V, 9, pp. 469–72 (bibliography on pp. 469–70), summarizing a series of articles published in *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo under the pseudonym Ar-Rahhalah; *The Times*, 1st September, 1925. See also the relevant sections in the Admiralty Handbook, *Syria (including Palestine)*, and the Foreign Office Peace Handbook No. 60, *Syria and Palestine*.

¹ The European form 'Druses' reproduces the Arabic Durūz, the plural of Darazī.

² The French military intervention in 1860 on behalf of the Maronites was undertaken with the approval and the diplomatic co-operation of the other Great Powers of the day, including Great Britain; but at the same time the British Government was instrumental in saving the Druses from being altogether sacrificed as the scapegoats for those massacres of Christians in the Lebanon and at Damascus by which the French intervention had been brought about. The events of 1860 strengthened a tendency—which had originated in the international crisis over 'the Eastern Question' in 1839 and the British naval intervention along the Syrian coast in 1840—for the Druses to regard themselves as the special protégés of Great Britain and the Maronites of France. Undoubtedly, during the period following the establishment of the autonomous sanjāq of the Lebanon, the influence of the British consular authorities over the Druses was very strong; but the secret agreements concluded between the Principal Allied Powers during the War of 1914–18 assigned all the four main Druse strongholds to the French sphere, and there was no evidence that, at any time thereafter, the British authorities encouraged the Druses to look towards Great Britain for political support. On the other hand, it is not improbable that a traditional hostility on the part of the Druses towards France, as the patroness of their neighbours and rivals the Maronites,

the Jabalu'd-Durüz (as it came to be called *par excellence*). During the period under review the mandatory authorities estimated that there were 48,000 Druses in the Jabal (out of a total population of about 60,000), 40,000 in the Lebanon east of Bayrūt, 2,000 in the south-west, 7,000 in the Mount Hermon district,¹ and 7,028 in the British mandated territory.²

Being thus isolated from their neighbours by the twofold barrier of their mountains and their religion, the Druses—especially those of the Jabal—had retained certain social customs and characteristics which had no necessary connexion with their religion and had once been prevalent among other Syrian communities, but had latterly been disappearing in the more accessible parts of the country under the influence, especially the economic influence, of Western civilization. The cultivated land attached to each village in the Jabal was held in common and reallocated periodically among the inhabitants;³ and the lords had a prescriptive right to the produce of a certain proportion of the land (the particular portions being reselected at each realloṭment), which the peasants had to cultivate for them besides attending to their own. Sometime towards the end of the nineteenth century after Christ⁴ the leaven of Western ideas had worked its way, even into the Jabalu'd-Durüz, sufficiently to produce a peasant revolt against the traditional system of land-tenure and division of crops; and although the Ottoman authorities had sent troops to re-establish the authority of the Druse lords, the lords had been compelled to make a compromise with the peasants under which the proportion of demesne-land was reduced.⁵ On the whole, however, the lords had succeeded in retaining, or recovering, their traditional privileges and prestige. They spent their revenues principally on keeping open house in their mansions for all who

may have predisposed the Druses to fall out with the French when the region in which their strongholds lay was placed under a French mandate.

¹ Statement by M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 160–1. An earlier French estimate (French Government's *Report*, 1922–3, pp. 8–9) put the Druses of the Jabal at 42,682 (out of a total population in the Jabal of 50,000), 4,362 in other parts of the mandated territory, excluding the Great Lebanon, and 43,633 in the Great Lebanon.

² *Palestine Report*, 1922, p. 58.

³ The periods sometimes ran for three years and sometimes for seven (*Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 101–2).

⁴ 'About 40 years ago' (*The Times*, 1st September, 1925); 'about 20 years ago' (M. de Caix, *loc. cit.*).

⁵ To 'between one-sixteenth and one-eighth part of their [former] lands, according to the locality' (*The Times*, *loc. cit.*); 'the chiefs had a right [during the period under review] to a third of the [total cultivated] area' (M. de Caix, *loc. cit.*).

sought their hospitality (a social obligation which was at the same time the basis of the lords' political ascendancy over the peasantry). The relations which this 'feudal system' established between peasant and lord were strengthened by a keen sense of clan solidarity or *'asabiyyah*, like that which still prevailed among the contemporary inhabitants of Kurdistan¹ and among those inveterate enemies of the Druses, the Badawī tribes of the Hamād. This clan solidarity made the Druses formidable in war out of proportion to their armament and numbers;² and before the French fell foul of them they had given trouble for centuries to successive administrations in Syria, including not merely the Ottoman Government but so redoubtable a ruler as Mehmed 'Alī. Fortunately for those Powers who attempted to keep the Druses in control, their sense of solidarity seldom expanded beyond the clan to take in the Druse community as a whole. The ten noble houses were constantly at feud with one another, and often the different branches, and the different individual members, of a single house were the bitterest rivals.

After the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, the Druses had accepted without enthusiasm the sovereignty of the new Arab National State of Damascus as the Ottoman Government's successor, and they were alleged³ to have made overtures to the French, on their own initiative, before the end of 1919.⁴ When General Gouraud invaded the Arab National State and took Damascus in July 1920, the Druses held aloof, and did not join their neighbours of the Hawrān plain in resisting the extension of French authority. On the 20th December, 1920, after the resistance of the Hawrānis had been overcome by the French, a congress of Druse notables met at Suwaydā, the principal town in the Jabal, and drafted a charter setting forth twelve conditions upon which they would be willing to recognize the French mandate. After protracted negotiations, an agreement⁵ was signed on the 4th March, 1921, by the French

¹ See pp. 479–80 below.

² For the military and political potency of *'asabiyyah* see Ibn Khaldūn: *Muqaddamāt*, *passim*.

³ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 8.

⁴ For the relations between the French and the Druses between the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, and the arrival of General Sarraïl at Bayrūt on the 2nd January, 1925, see the French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, pp. 8–18; *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 54–5, 125–8, 131–7; *Oriente Moderno*, II, pp. 224, 303, 531; III, 5, p. 280; IV, 1, pp. 38–9, and 2, p. 103; V, 9, pp. 446–7 and 467–9; 10, pp. 525–6; 11, pp. 600–1; *The Times*, 10th August and 1st September, 1925.

⁵ For a translation of the text from an Arabic version published in *Al-Ahrām* of Cairo, 1st August, 1925, see *Oriente Moderno*, V, 9, pp. 472–4.

Acting High Commissioner, M. de Caix, on behalf of the mandatory Power, and sealed by a number of the Druse spiritual chiefs and temporal lords in the Jabal.

In this instrument the Jabalu'd-Durūz was promised an independent national Government, with wide administrative independence, under the French mandate (Art. 1). The Government was to be national in the sense that its functionaries were to be elected by the native population and its administration was to conform to local customs. At the same time it was to be assisted by resident French advisers (Art. 2). There was to be a native Governor (*hākim*) elected by the legitimate representatives of the people (Art. 3). There was to be an elective Council of Government (*Majlisu'l-Hukūmah*), with a three years' term, which was to meet once a year, deal with the budget and with the previous year's public accounts, and present proposals to the Government; and a Permanent Administrative Commission partly nominated and partly elected by the Council (Art. 4). The mandatory Power was to enjoy the monopoly of furnishing any necessary technical, financial, economic, or military assistance to the Jabalu'd-Durūz State (Art. 6). The population of the Jabal were to be exempt from compulsory military service and were to possess the right of bearing arms within their own frontiers (Art. 7). They were also to be exempt from the tithe (Art. 10). The mandatory Power was to have the exclusive representation of the Druse Government abroad (Art. 8), and the State Budget was to be subject to approval by the French High Commissioner (Art. 11). On the other hand, the mandatory Power pledged itself not to constrain the Government of the Jabal to enter any Syrian union except for economic purposes (Art. 9). There were to be no customs barriers between the Jabal and the State of Damascus, but the Jabal was to have the right to a quota in the proceeds from the common customs service of the whole mandated territory (Art. 12). Both the mandatory Power and the Government of the Jabal were to refrain from any interference in religious affairs (Art. 14) and to respect the rights of local minorities (Art. 15). A provision which proved important in the sequel was that the Majlis might make requests to the mandatory Power in the circumstances indicated in a special law (provided for in Art. 5) on the competence and functions of the Druse Government, and that the mandatory Power should take such requests into consideration after consulting the Druse religious chiefs (Art. 13).

The delimitation of the frontier between the Jabal and Damascus,

early in 1922, and the official proclamation of the independence of the Jabal on the 5th April of that year, have been recorded already.¹ Meanwhile, at the instance of the mandatory Power, an informal assembly of Druse notables met at Suwaydā on the 1st May, 1921, and elected as Governor of the Jabal Salim Pasha Al-Atrash—the head of one of the two leading branches of the Atrash family, which for the past three-quarters of a century had been the leading noble house in the Jabal, at any rate in the southern and western districts of the territory.² Another assembly which met on the 6th May divided the Jabal into administrative and electoral districts and devised a national flag; and the first Majlis (which was not, however, elected in accordance with Article 4 of the agreement, but was appointed by the lords from among their own number by private arrangements) was opened on the 26th. A French administrative adviser arrived at Suwaydā at the end of June 1921, and a small French garrison at the end of August.

Salimu'l-Atrash had been paramount chief of the Jabal since 1914, and during the short life of the Arab State of Damascus he had been recognized as *mutasarrif* of the Jabal by the Amīr Faysal; but his position had been little more than honorary, and he found his governorship a burdensome and thankless task, even with French support. His chief difficulties were with the members of his own house, who were either jealous of his position or resentful that he did not take fuller advantage of it for providing his kinsmen with posts and salaries. The most troublesome of these Atrash lords was Sultānu'l-Atrash of Qurayyah,³ who in September 1918, when the Ottoman régime was on the eve of its downfall, had taken the lead in declaring in favour of the Hāshimis, and had distinguished himself in the final operations in which the Turks were driven from Damascus. In July 1922 Sultān fell foul not only of his kinsman Salim but of the mandatory Power. An individual who had taken part in an attempt to assassinate General Gouraud at Qunaytirah on the 23rd June, 1921, sought asylum in Sultān's mansion in Qurayyah, when Sultān happened to be away from home, and was seized and sent off under arrest to Suwaydā by the local *mudir* (another member of the Atrash family).⁴ On his return Sultān telegraphed first to

¹ See above, p. 358.

² For the previous history of the House of Atrash see *Oriente Moderno*, V, 9, pp. 464–8.

³ Sultān in this case was a proper name, not a title.

⁴ This *mudir*, Sayyāh Bey Al-Atrash, afterwards fought side by side with Sultān in the revolt of 1925.

Salīm and then to the High Commissioner, demanding his suppliant's release, and when his demand was ignored, he called out his friends and followers, attacked and put out of action a French convoy of three armoured cars which was on its way from Damascus to fetch the prisoner (who had eventually to be transported by aeroplane) and took to the mountains. The religious chiefs exerted their influence to avert a general insurrection, and Sultān's house at Qurayyah was bombed and destroyed by French aeroplanes on the 24th July ; but Sultān himself remained in revolt until his security was threatened by concerted action between the French forces and the Transjordanian gendarmerie, whereupon he sought and obtained an amnesty during the celebration at Suwaydā, on the 5th May, 1923, of the first anniversary of the declaration of independence. His revolt had had its effect in stimulating his unhappy kinsman Salīm to press his resignation upon the French with an insistence to which they eventually yielded. After failing to agree upon a Druse successor, the Majlis appointed the French adviser, Major Trenga, as Governor *ad interim* for successive short terms. Major Trenga left on the 24th July, when Salim Pasha was induced to resume the burden of office with a new French adviser, Captain Carbillet, who had served his apprenticeship in the Senegal ;¹ but on the 15th September, 1923, Salīm died, and the Majlis, which found itself no better able than before to choose between rival claimants, once again resorted to the expedient of appointing the French adviser as Governor *ad interim* for a short term. The lords of the Druses discovered too late that they had exchanged King Log for King Stork.

M. de Caix afterwards described Captain Carbillet to the Permanent Mandates Commission as having made on him an impression of great sincerity, and he submitted information which indicated that this officer had been entirely disinterested. ' Thus, M. de Caix had been informed that Captain Carbillet had never drawn his salary as Governor of the Jabal, but had lived on his officer's pay. If, therefore, he had sometimes acted severely, he had been actuated by a passion to do something, to get somewhere, and not in any way to further his own personal interests.'² Captain Carbillet was not only sincere, disinterested, and energetic ; he was extremely effective in putting his immediate aims into action, especially when those aims related to the production of material results. At the same time, he

¹ *The Times*, 10th August, 1925.

² *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 134.

was tyrannical in his methods, and psychologically blind in his dealings with human beings, to a degree which made it inevitable that his well-meant efforts should end in disaster. In fact, he was a perfect example, in French uniform, of the legendary type of Prussian officer.

During the twenty months for which he was Governor of the Jabalū'd-Durūz Captain Carbillet forced upon the outraged but intimidated Druses a host of material benefits which they had neither dreamt of nor desired, and which, after his departure, they instantly discarded by plunging into a war to the knife with the mandatory Power. He filled the treasury (by strictly collecting the statutory taxes which Salīmu'l-Atrash had omitted to collect for fear of still further offending his relatives) and at the same time he managed to reduce the number of officials and gendarmes; he built a motor-road from Azrā' on the Hijāz Railway to Suwaydā, and 200 kilometres of track in the Jabal itself which were practicable for cars in the dry season, with the result that the number of cars in the Jabal rose from one to twenty-five. He hewed out of the rock of the Jabal another 200 kilometres of irrigation channels and four or five reservoirs. He led a water-supply to Suwaydā from a spring 18 kilometres off, macadamized the streets of the town, and organized a municipal government. He reformed the administration of justice by establishing district justices of the peace and a court of appeal at the capital. He imported from the Hawrān Greek-Catholic school-masters, trained by the White Fathers of Jerusalem, opened thirty-two new schools, and raised the number of school children in the Jabal (with its population of 60,000) to 3,500. He founded a museum for Graeco-Roman antiquities. Without introducing legislation, he took the first step towards abolishing the periodical reallotment of the cultivated land—a system which 'discouraged any planting of trees or efforts at improvement', and which was unpopular with the peasantry 'since the chiefs endeavoured to claim for their third the lands which had been best cultivated during the last triennial period'¹—by treating the act of planting a piece of land with vines as conferring a permanent title,² with the result that in 1924 the peasants cleared and enclosed enough land to plant 1,000,000 vine-stocks. Finally, in the autumn of 1924, he gave effect to Article 4 of the agreement of the 4th March, 1921, by conducting

¹ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 13.

² Private property in land, secured by title-deeds drawn under Ottoman law, was not unknown in the Jabal, though hitherto it had been the exception.

elections (on the indirect system) for a new Majlis, and overcame the obstacle of the almost universal illiteracy of the voters by the use of an ingenious system of hieroglyphs to represent the candidates' names on the voting papers. 'The Majlis elected in this manner by the population contained far fewer great chiefs than had been expected.'¹ On the 1st October, 1924, it fulfilled the second, but violated the first, of the conditions laid down in Article 3 of the 1921 agreement by electing the Frenchman, Captain Carbillet, as the regular Governor of the Jabalu'd-Durüz.

The other side of the picture was that Captain Carbillet ruled with an iron rod. His public works—for which it would doubtless have been difficult to pay out of revenue, since the agreement of the 4th March, 1921, precluded (Art. 10) the levying of the staple Ottoman tax, the tithe on agricultural produce—were executed by compulsory and unpaid labour;² and, although the Ottoman law, previously in force, had sanctioned *corvées* of four working days per annum, 'it was . . . doubtless true that the forced levies among the Druses had been heavier under the French occupation than under the Turkish occupation', and also heavier in the Jabal than in the State of 'Damascus under the French régime,'³ although the Druses had been less accustomed than the Damascenes to bear the yoke of service for the state. Indeed, the French authorities reckoned that in the Jabal, under Captain Carbillet's rule, the *corvées* had worked out at an average of twelve days' labour per annum for each adult male. In particular, the leading of the new water-supply to Suwaydā had required from this town of 5,000 to 6,000 inhabitants the labour of 100 men and 40 camels a day for an unspecified period. Recalcitrance was severely punished; for though the gendarmes (who 'certainly abused their position', as the French authorities admitted)⁴ were reduced in numbers, the alien Greek-Catholic schoolmasters planted out by Captain Carbillet in the Druse villages 'were able to extract, from the authority which they derived from their relations with the Governor, profits which were onerous for the people and which excited the jealousy of the notables'.⁵ In the eyes of the population they were simply informers. The police control was made still more effective by a postal censorship and by a

¹ *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 55.

² See French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 13; *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 26–30 and 122–3.

³ Statements by M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 123.

⁴ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 16.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

system of local passes so rigid that a personal permit from Captain Carbillet himself at Suwaydā was necessary before a Druse could travel from one village in the Jabal to another. When Captain Carbillet visited a village the inhabitants had to turn out to meet him in state; and it was alleged that if they failed to do so a collective fine was imposed upon the village,¹ while the notables were thrown into prison or set to breaking stones on the roads.² Imprisonment was frequent, and 'the reasons for [it] were not always found in the prison registers'. The place of incarceration was sometimes Captain Carbillet's coal-cellar, though 'the use of the coal-cellar as a prison appeared to have been very exceptional'.³

While, in the minds of the peasantry, the burden of the *corvées* evidently outweighed the benefits that accrued to them from Captain Carbillet's agrarian policy, the lords had no benefits of any kind to set against their grievances. The constructive work of the French Governor, such as the agrarian reforms and the extension of education, was bound, in the long run, automatically to diminish the revenues and lessen the influence of the lords; but the French authorities frankly admitted that 'most members of the ruling families do not appear to have been uneasy over the remote political and social consequences of the work that was being done in the country. For example, they were usually in favour of the establishment of those schools which were calculated to produce an entirely new type of peasants. Mostly illiterate themselves, they were proud of seeing schools opened in their villages. It was in a more direct way [than through the incidental consequences of constructive reforms] that the authority of the French officers offended them. Until then the population had thronged the audience halls where the Druse lords entertain their guests at the expense of the village. These guest-houses of the nobles became less frequented. The peasants began to question the utility of the contributions demanded from them for the upkeep of this hospitality when they saw petitioners and

¹ In justice to Captain Carbillet it must be mentioned that 'the fine inflicted on the town of Suwaydā for the theft of Lieutenant Morel's cat . . . had been deemed excessive by Captain Carbillet, who was absent at the time, and who, on returning, restored the fine which had been inflicted on the town' (M. de Caix, *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 134). M. de Caix's comment on Lieutenant Morel's action was: 'This theft might have seemed to be a teasing of the authorities, an act calculated with the object of challenging their prestige. It could easily be imagined that officers isolated in a country where conditions were not very certain reacted energetically.'

² M. de Caix maintained that the punishment of stone-breaking had been inflicted on only one *mudīr* (*loc. cit.*).

³ M. de Caix, *loc. cit.*

plaintiffs repairing more and more to the French officers. There is no doubt that this produced a certain resentment among the chiefs'¹—and there is also no doubt that the diminution of the chiefs' prestige in this way was deliberately intended by Captain Carbillet. He realized that while he might have some chance of ultimately gaining the peasantry's support, the lords were bound to become increasingly hostile to him and his reforms, as the consequences worked themselves out; and, characteristically, he took the offensive. To destroy the prestige of the lords, and especially of the Atrash, was his deliberate aim; but his fatal mistake was to embark on this formidable enterprise without first having made sure of the peasantry's goodwill. So far from this, he had contrived to exasperate all classes of the population alike by the 23rd May, 1925, when—fatigued by the strenuous labours which he had been performing with at most three, and seldom more than two, French assistants, and without supervision from his French official superiors,² he went on leave of absence. He had treated the Druses with a rigour which his most truculent predecessors among the Mamlūk Sultans and the Ottoman Pādishāhs had hesitated to use in their dealings with that redoubtable people. The reaction on the Druses' part, the moment that Captain Carbillet's heavy hand was removed, proved that he would have been wiser if he had acted in a less original manner.

(e) THE INSURRECTION IN THE FRENCH MANDATED TERRITORY
(1925)

On the 29th November, 1924, General Weygand, who had inspired a widespread confidence, and indeed affection, among the people of the French mandated territory which had not been felt for any of his predecessors, received a telegram from M. Herriot's Government, recalling him summarily to France. He embarked at Bayrūt on the 5th December, amid warm demonstrations from representatives of all communities and anxious speculations as to what his sudden replacement might portend.³ The new High Commissioner, General Sarraill, landed at Bayrūt on the 2nd January, 1925,⁴ and lost no time in quarrelling successively with the Catholic Church,⁵ the Lebanese, and the Druses.

¹ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 14.

² Statement by M. de Caix, *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 136.

³ *Le Temps*, 20th December, 1924.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 1, p. 11.

⁵ For this incident, its antecedents, and its significance, see *op. cit.*, V, 1, pp. 81-2 and 83-7; 4, p. 188; 5, pp. 249-50.

The traditional protectorate of France over Catholics and Uniates in the Ottoman dominions had never been placed on an unassailable basis, and had constantly been challenged by other Catholic Powers. Nevertheless, it had come to be regarded by French public opinion of almost all persuasions as so important a factor in the international position of France that a continuity of policy in asserting it had become one of the fundamental maxims of French statecraft; and foreign observers had been scandalized, or struck with admiration, when they saw French Administrations, which were waging war against the Catholic Church in France, exert themselves as zealously on behalf of Catholic interests in the Levant as their clerical opponents would have done if they had happened to be in power. This maxim, wittily formulated in the epigram that 'Anti-clericalism was not for export', was deliberately transgressed by General Sarraïl.

Juridically, the French protectorate—as an integral part of the old Ottoman order to which not only the Capitulations but the Millet System and the Caliphate had belonged¹—had already lapsed with the Capitulations themselves, of which it was a corollary.² It had lapsed not only in territories remaining under the sovereignty of the new Turkish Republic, in which the Capitulations were abolished by Article 24 of the Treaty of Lausanne, but in the ex-Ottoman territories placed under mandates, in which the Capitulations were suspended, by the terms of the mandates themselves, for the duration of the mandatory régime.³ The protectorate, however, had been traditionally signalized by certain liturgical honours, with which representatives of the French Government had been received by representatives of the Catholic Church in the Ottoman Empire; and the payment of these honours had been especially conspicuous in Bayrūt, as the centre of the most considerable body of Catholic and Uniate population within the former Ottoman frontiers. When Ottoman sovereignty in Syria was replaced by the French mandate, and the representative of France came to Bayrūt no longer as a Consul-General under the Capitulations but as a High Commissioner under the mandate, the local representatives of the Catholic Church had

¹ For this old Ottoman order and its liquidation after the War of 1914–18 see Part I, Sections (i) and (ii) above.

² See the *Osservatore Romano*, 31st January, 1925.

³ Thus, in the French and British mandated territories in 'Syria', the suspension of the Capitulations presumably came into operation juridically on the 29th September, 1923, when the Council of the League declared the mandates to have come into force; and in Turkey on the 6th August, 1924, upon the coming into force of the Lausanne Treaty.

not ceased to offer the traditional honours ;¹ and, on the French side, General Sarraïl's predecessors—conscious that the local support of the Catholic Church was an important political asset for France in administering a mandate which was not popular among the population of the mandated territory—had taken pains to signify their appreciation of the courtesy by which the old ceremonial was continued in this particular fragment of the former Ottoman dominions. General Sarraïl, too, upon landing at Bayrūt on the 2nd January, 1925, duly received his invitation to the customary reception in the parish church of the Latin community in the city ; and he broke a French tradition of several centuries' standing by returning a refusal.

This rebuff was met by a dignified letter² from the Apostolic Delegate :

In face of your refusal, I have no choice but to submit. I will inform the Holy See, and there will be no more to be said. The historic privilege of France will have expired ; but France must take note that the fault is not ours.

The incident did not, however, end here ; for, on the 23rd January, 1925, an explanation of General Sarraïl's conduct was demanded in the French Chamber of Deputies, during a debate over the question of abolishing the French Embassy to the Vatican. M. Herriot sought to defend General Sarraïl by stating that the honours which he had refused had been offered to him as a private person, and that he had not refused honours offered to him officially ; but this distinction was denied in an authoritative article on the French protectorate which was published on the 31st January in the organ of the Vatican, the *Osservatore Romano* ;³ and the Apostolic Delegate in Syria retaliated by removing from Bayrūt Cathedral the arm-chairs hitherto reserved there for the representatives of France. This brought M. Herriot to his knees. He entered into a personal correspondence with the Apostolic Delegate, and the incident was officially closed when Monsignore Giannini graciously replaced the arm-chairs, and M. Herriot responded in a letter of the 4th March, 1925,⁴ with a solemn declaration that the French Government had ' no intention of renouncing in the East either the duties or the rights

¹ It was alleged in quarters representing the opinion of the Vatican (i. e. in the *Osservatore Romano*, 31st January, 1925) that, in the territory mandated to Great Britain, and especially in Jerusalem, the French Government had renounced the traditional liturgical honours at the San Remo Conference.

² Text in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 2, pp. 81-2.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 84-6.

⁴ Text in *op. cit.*, V, 5, pp. 249-50.

which it ' derived ' from a long tradition sanctioned by international treaties and recognized by the Holy See '. General Sarraïl—who had aggravated his first offence by neglecting to return a call which the Maronite Patriarch, notwithstanding the incident of the 2nd January, had courteously paid him on the 7th ¹—appears to have received private instructions from Paris to attend all ecclesiastical ceremonies which had been attended by his predecessors ; and on the 30th March he belatedly called, in full-dress uniform, at the Maronite Patriarch's winter residence of Bakurki.²

General Sarraïl was equally unfortunate in his political action in the Lebanon, though in this field he evidently intended to be conciliatory. On the 2nd January, 1925—the day on which he landed at Bayrūt and refused the liturgical honours—he found time to meet the Representative Council of the Lebanon and announce to them that he proposed to nominate a Lebanese national as Governor of the State. At the same time he informed them that, with this intent, he had asked for the resignation of the French Governor in office, General Vandenberg ³—though this officer had gained the same reputation for impartiality as General Weygand, by whom he had been appointed. While the motive given for this new departure was liberal it at once evoked opposition from the representatives on the Council of three minorities : the Druses, the Greek Orthodox, and the Melkhites.⁴ Nevertheless, on the 5th January, General Sarraïl promulgated an *arrêté* ⁵ summoning the Lebanon Representative Council to meet, in extraordinary session, on the 12th and, ' before discussing any other business ', to elect three candidates (who might be either Lebanese nationals or French) for the Governorship. The candidates elected were to be scrutinized by the High Commissioner, and, when at least two elected candidates had secured his approval, the Council was to elect the new Governor from among these. The appointee was to take office, for three years, as early as the 20th January. When the Council met, however, the High Commissioner's Delegate forbade not merely the discussion of other business, but any discussion at all, before the candidates were elected ; and, when the Council would not accept his ruling, he broke the session off by leaving the hall. On the 13th a second *arrêté* from General Sarraïl dissolved the Council, while a third *arrêté* appointed another Frenchman, M. Cayla (hitherto the High Commissioner's

¹ *Op. cit.*, V, 2, pp. 103–4.

² *Op. cit.*, V, 4, p. 188.

³ See above, p. 406.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 2, p. 101.

⁵ Text in *op. cit.*, V, 1, pp. 11–12.

Delegate in the 'Alawī State), as Governor of the Lebanon *ad interim* in General Vandenberg's place.¹ Yet a fourth *arrêté*, of the 30th January, empowered the Governor of the Lebanon to make administrative ordinances on his sole authority when the Council had been dissolved.²

On the 27th March, 1925, M. Cayla published (without promulgating) the draft of a new electoral ordinance which was to abolish not only the indirect system of election but that allocation of seats to the several religious communities in fixed proportions which had been a cardinal feature in the administration of the Lebanon since 1861;³ and during the same month General Sarraill exhibited publicly⁴ the draft of a new administrative ordinance, which was to abolish the existing administrative divisions and to repartition the territories, old and new, of the Great Lebanon State into eleven districts (each with an Administrative Council to be elected by *scrutin de liste*) and one autonomous *nāhiyah*. This latter ordinance was promulgated, without modification, on the 9th April.⁵ The draft electoral ordinance was tacitly replaced by two *arrêtés*,⁶ promulgated on the 3rd and 5th June respectively by M. Cayla, which brought the existing electoral ordinance of the 10th March, 1922, into conformity with the new administrative ordinance, but this time without abandoning the principle of fixed communal representation.⁷ Elections in the two degrees were held on the 28th–30th June and the 12th July respectively, and the new Representative Council met on the 16th of the latter month⁸ and confirmed M. Cayla's appointment.⁹

In March, when M. Herriot had barely succeeded in allaying the ecclesiastical storm which had been raised by General Sarraill, M. Cayla had all but raised it again by making two public speeches advocating the introduction into the Lebanon of secular schools.¹⁰

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 2, p. 101; French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 6. On the dismissal of General Vandenberg see M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 91 and 128.

² *Oriente Moderno*, V, 5, p. 235.

³ *Op. cit.*, V, 7, p. 354.

⁴ The declared intention of this unusual procedure was to give the population an opportunity of expressing its opinion on the draft; but the effect of what had been a liberal gesture was more than counteracted when the criticisms offered were ignored and the original draft was promulgated without modification.

⁵ Text in *op. cit.*, V, 6, pp. 274–8.

⁶ See *op. cit.*, V, 7, pp. 353–5.

⁷ The withdrawal of the March 1925 draft was reported to have been due to the direct intervention of the Quai d'Orsay (*op. cit.*, V, 8, p. 406).

⁸ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁹ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 4, p. 187, and 5, p. 248.

The Maronite Archbishop of Bayrūt, the Melkite Archbishop of Saydā,¹ and other Lebanese ecclesiastical dignitaries protested from their pulpits ;¹ and the Maronite Archbishop of Bayrūt went so far as to refuse to invite M. Cayla to the High Mass on Easter Monday. When pressed to reconsider his refusal by the High Commissioner's secretary he was upheld in it by the Maronite Patriarch and by his colleagues in the episcopate. It is true that the Latins, the Melkhites, and the Greek Orthodox succumbed to their jealousy of the Maronites and invited M. Cayla to their Easter celebrations (though not with the official formalities) ; but, even so, France could not afford to quarrel with the Maronite Church. On the 28th April M. Cayla paid a personal visit to the Maronite Patriarch at Bakurkī, in order to inform him that he had not, and never had had, the intention of founding secular schools, and that he proposed to put into execution the educational programme of his predecessor, General Vandenberg, which General Weygand had approved. The Patriarch announced his victory to the Archbishop of Bayrūt in a letter which the Archbishop read out at a public demonstration held in his honour on the 17th May.²

In these circumstances it is not surprising that, on the 22nd April, 1925, General Sarraill found it necessary to approve an *arrêté*³ of M. Cayla's extending the power of the Governor of the Lebanon to take punitive measures against the press ; or that on the 22nd September the Lebanese National League in Egypt should have addressed an appeal⁴ to the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations on behalf of Lebanese liberties. It was more significant that, on the 23rd of the previous month, the same Lebanese organization in Egypt had addressed to the French Government a public protest against French policy towards the Druses.⁵

In fact, General Sarraill had no sooner imperilled his rear by alienating the traditional supporters and allies of France in the Lebanon than he delivered a frontal attack in the Jabalu'd-Durūz against the traditional enemies of the Maronite community and of the French connexion.⁶

¹ *Op. cit.*, V, 4, p. 187 ; 5, pp. 248-9 ; and 6, pp. 293-4.

² *Op. cit.*, V, 5, p. 249, and 6, p. 293.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, V, 5, p. 250.

⁴ Text in *op. cit.*, V, 10, pp. 519-21.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, V, 9, p. 460.

⁶ For the dealings of General Sarraill with the Druses of the Jabalu'd-Durūz down to the arrest of the Druse envoys at Damascus on the 13th July, 1925, see the French Government's *Provisional Report for 1925*, pp. 15-17 ; *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 91, 128-9, 131-7, 144-5, 185, 205-6 ; articles in the *Echo de Paris*, 28th September-6th October, 1925, by M. de Kerillis, summarized in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 11, pp. 586-8 (N.B. these articles should be used with a certain caution, for,

In April 1925 a delegation from the Jabalu'd-Durūz waited upon General Sarraill at Bayrūt in order to complain of Captain Carbillet's administration, which has been described above.¹ General Sarraill replied that Captain Carbillet enjoyed his entire confidence. The Druses then drew General Sarraill's attention to the agreement of the 4th March, 1921, Article 2, which stipulated that the Governor of the Jabalu'd-Durūz should be a native, and asked for the fulfilment of this provision. Thereupon General Sarraill brusquely dismissed the delegation;² and on the 22nd April he dispatched to his French Delegate for Syria and the Jabalu'd-Durūz, at Damascus, a copy of the 1921 agreement with a covering letter³—to be shown to Captain Carbillet—in which the High Commissioner declared that he regarded the agreement as possessing 'a purely historical value', and requested the delegate to consign it to the archives of the Jabalu'd-Durūz Government. The untoward effects of this repudiation of a treaty were delayed by Captain Carbillet's departure, on leave of absence, on the 23rd May.⁴ His *locum tenens* in the Jabal, Captain Raynaud, was at once approached with the same complaints; and this led him to make an informal inquiry into the situation. On the 2nd June he presented his conclusions—which were alarming—in a report to the French Delegate at Damascus, in which he submitted that, if a revolt was to be averted, an official inquiry should be instituted forthwith. A second Druse delegation then repaired to Bayrūt but failed to obtain an audience with General Sarraill, notwithstanding the efforts of Fu'ād Arslān, the Druse member of the Lebanon Representative Council.⁵ Another Druse delegation succeeded, on the 13th June, in obtaining an interview with an emissary of the French Government, M. Brunet,⁶ but

although M. de Kerillis published them after a personal visit to the mandated territory, they were evidently written with animus); *The Times*, 10th August, 1925. See also the reports of the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies on the 18th–20th December, 1925, and in the Senate on the 17th December.

¹ See pp. 412–16.

² 'The High Commissioner . . . replied . . . in a rather rude manner by informing the delegation that he considered [that] the de Caix Agreement was null and void, and that he would treat those who did not agree with him as rebels' (statement by General Bourgeois in the French Senate on the 17th December, 1925, quoted in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 131).

³ Text in de Kerillis, *op. cit.*

⁴ See above, p. 416.

⁵ The mandatory authorities claimed to have received other petitions in a contrary sense: one, on the 10th June, protesting, in the name of thirty-five villages, against the criticisms upon Captain Carbillet; and another, on the 15th July, demanding Captain Carbillet's return to the Jabal (French Government's *Provisional Report for 1925*, p. 15).

⁶ On M. Brunet's mission see below, pp. 441–2.

M. Brunet omitted to report their complaints to Paris. On the 17th June Captain Raynaud sent in a fresh report to Damascus, in the same sense as the first, but in a more urgent tone. On the 3rd July his warnings were justified by an ominous outbreak at Suwaydā during the celebration of Qurbān Bayrām, in which shots were fired at the assistant administrator, Lieutenant Morel. Captain Raynaud fined the town of Suwaydā 200 Napoleons in gold, and expelled and arrested certain individuals. The religious chiefs intervened in the cause of peace and the effervescence subsided. On the 6th General Sarraill reacted to this news by instructing his delegate at Damascus to replace Captain Raynaud—‘ whose state of mind, as is apparent from his report of the 2nd June, does not correspond to the actual state of affairs in the Jabalu’d-Durūz ’—by another officer. The officer selected was Major Tommy Martin, the chief of the French military intelligence service at Damascus. Immediately upon his arrival Major Martin was presented with a petition, supported by about a hundred signatures or seals, in which the replacement of Captain Carbillet was once more demanded. This petition was forwarded to the High Commissioner on the 8th July, but was left unanswered. A third Druse delegation repaired to Bayrūt, and was rebuffed more harshly than ever. Meanwhile, at Suwaydā, an official inquiry was at last opened by Major Martin—who had been instructed to take this step by a High Commissioner who had recalled Captain Raynaud for recommending it—and, ‘ while it seemed that a number of these accusations [against Captain Carbillet] were unjustified, or were at least misrepresentations of the facts, a certain number appeared to be not without foundation. Unfortunately, events did not permit the inquiry to be prosecuted.’¹

On the 11th July General Sarraill addressed to his Delegate at Damascus the following letter : ²

I request you to summon to Damascus the conspirators, more especially Hamād Bey, ‘Abdu’l-Ghaffār, and Sultān Atrash, on the pretext [*sic*] of receiving their demands. You will inform them that

¹ French Government’s *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 17. Though the outbreak of the revolt prevented the prosecution of the inquiry by Major Martin at Suwaydā, the Permanent Mandates Commission elicited (*Minutes of the Eighth Session*, pp. 135 and 145) the fact that no inquiry at head-quarters was subsequently made into the conduct of Captain Carbillet. His official superiors, without either interrogating him personally or requiring him to present a report, continued to employ him on official missions (see *Le Temps*, 20th August, 1925).

² The text here given is the English translation, in the *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 128, of the letter, as quoted by the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission from the report of the meeting of the French Senate on the 17th December, 1925.

I hold them responsible for any disorder which may occur in the Jabal, and that I shall keep them in forced residence at a place which you will choose for me.

Representations 'with the object of avoiding at all costs the arrest of the Jabal chiefs under such conditions',¹ which the Delegate at Damascus made to General Sarraill on the 12th, were disregarded by the High Commissioner as completely as if this French Delegate had been a Druse petitioner. Accordingly, five invitations to visit Damascus were issued, and the three Druse chiefs who were so confiding as to respond to them were relegated to 'enforced residence' at Palmyra. 'These proceedings', which 'received their fitting penalty by the recall—perhaps too long deferred—of General Sarraill',² decided Sultānu'l-Atrash, who had prudently stayed at home, to take up arms; and this was the beginning of the Syrian Insurrection. The campaigns of 1925 and 1926 proved as savage, devastating, and indecisive as the first two campaigns of the Greek War of Independence, which had begun in similar fashion when, in April 1821, a highland chief, the Maniot Petros Bey Mavromikhális, had taken up arms against the 'Osmanlis in the Morea.

On the 15th July a French officer who visited Sultān reported that he was mobilizing his followers; on the 18th French aeroplanes on reconnaissance were fired upon; and, on the 20th, Sultān's forces seized Salkhad, the second most important town in the Jabal after Suwaydā.³ On the 21st a column consisting of 7 French officers and 166 men (two-thirds Syrians and one-third Algerian Spāhis), which had been sent out by the French garrison at Suwaydā to the rescue of some airmen who had made a forced landing, was taken by surprise and enveloped by superior Druse forces. After a hand-to-hand struggle 107 men were left on the field and less than 70 regained Suwaydā, where the French garrison was invested that same evening in the fortified barracks of the Turkish era.⁴

The French military authorities in the mandated territory took these events so little to heart that, on the 30th July, they allowed a first-rate battalion of Algerian *tirailleurs* to embark for Morocco;⁵

¹ Words used by the Marquis Theodoli, the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

² Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission on its Eighth Session (printed as Annex No. IV to the *Minutes of the Eighth Session*, p. 206).

³ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 17.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*; *communiqué* issued by the French Prime Minister on the 13th August and published in *Le Temps* on the 14th August, 1925; *Le Temps*, 26th September, 1925.

⁵ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, pp. 17–18. For the military situation in Morocco at that moment see pp. 142–5 above.

and, in assembling a force for the relief of Suwaydā, they persisted in including a battalion of Malagasies (Madagascans), although the commandant had officially reported his unit to be unfit for service when he had received his orders to hold himself in readiness.¹ The relieving column, about 3,000 strong (including about 63 French officers and 840 French other ranks, the remainder being Malagasies and Syrians), marched out, on the 2nd August, from Azrā', on the Hijāz Railway, under General Michaud's command. Although General Michaud's striking force had to fight its way forward it outdistanced the supply train of munitions and provisions. At nightfall the convoy, thus separated from the main force, was suddenly charged by a swarm of Druse horsemen; the Syrian and Malagasy escort broke in panic; the unfortunate Commandant Aujac committed suicide; and the entire convoy, including several field-guns, fell into the Druses' hands, while the main force, deprived of its supplies, had to fight its way back to Azrā' on the 3rd. In two days the Colonne Michaud had lost 432 missing (mostly believed prisoners), 14 known to be killed, and 385 (including 23 officers) wounded, and on the 12th August the French Government admitted a total casualty list, since the outbreak of the revolt, of no less than 800.² This sensational victory over so considerable a French force did for Sultānu'l-Atrash what had been done for 'Abdu'l-Karīm by his victory over the Spaniards at Anwāl.³ It gave him the necessary prestige for gaining adherents outside the narrow circle of his own clansmen; and it supplied him, at the enemy's expense, with the military equipment for arming the fresh recruits that came to his standard.

On the 24th August, after an unsuccessful attempt at mediation by the Druses of the Lebanon,⁴ Sultānu'l-Atrash attempted a surprise attack on Damascus. This attempt was frustrated, for when the 1,500 mounted Druse raiders were within four miles of the city they were detected by French aeroplanes and attacked by a regiment of Algerian Spāhīs, who routed them with heavy casualties.⁵ The

¹ Text of Commandant Aujac's report, dated Aleppo, the 23rd July, 1925, in *Le Temps*, 3rd November, 1925.

² *The Times*, 13th August, 1925. On the 14th October, 1925, M. Painlevé stated officially that the total number of French killed in Syria from 1920 up to the end of July 1925 was 6,040, including 179 officers (*The Times*, 16th October, 1925). On the 5th November he gave more detailed figures, running from the 1st January, 1920, to the 25th October, 1925 (*Le Temps*, 7th November, 1925).

³ See pp. 115-17 above.

⁴ *The Times*, 17th and 28th August, 1925.

⁵ See the French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 18; *The Times*, 26th and 31st August and 3rd September, 1925; *Oriente Moderno*,

French authorities believed that the raid had been made in collusion with certain elements in Damascus itself—particularly the noble family of the Bakris (which had sent recruits to the Amīr Faysal when the Hijāz had risen in the name of Arab nationalism in 1916) and a nationalist organization of ‘intellectuals’ called the People’s Party (*Hizbu’sh-Sha’b*). They succeeded in arresting six members of the executive committee of the People’s Party; but the President, Dr. ‘Abdu’r-Rahmān Shāhbandar, with several of his associates, made his escape to the Jabalu’d-Durūz, whither the Bakris had already betaken themselves; and a ‘National Syrian Government’ appears to have been proclaimed by these Damascene refugees in the Jabal about the second week in September.¹ Under Dr. Shāhbandar’s inspiration Sultānu’l-Atrash issued a proclamation summoning all Syrians to fight for ‘the complete independence of Arabic Syria, one and indivisible, sea-coast and interior; the institution of a National Government and the free election of a Constituent Assembly for the framing of an Organic Law; the evacuation of the foreign army of occupation and the creation of a national army for the maintenance of security; and the application of the principles of the French Revolution and the Rights of Man’.² This combination, in action and aim, of elements hitherto so foreign to one another as the feudal lords of the highlands and the Westernized ‘intellectuals’ of the cities was an unfamiliar phenomenon in Syrian history. It indicated that, even in Syria, the gale of Nationalism, blowing in from the West, was beginning to pierce those barriers of religious prejudice and communal rivalry by which this ancient house had so long been divided against itself.³

The repulse of the Druse raid towards Damascus on the 24th August was followed by a second French counter-offensive for the relief of Suwaydā. On the 2nd September General Gamelin was appointed by the French Government to command the military forces

V, 9, pp. 461–2 (French official *communiqué* to the Damascus press). The French estimated the Druse casualties in this engagement at 700.

¹ *The Times*, 31st August and 10th September, 1925; *Oriente Moderno*, V, 9, pp. 459 and 462–3; French Government’s *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 19.

² English translation of the text in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 191.

³ It is instructive to compare the co-operation between Sultānu’l-Atrash and Dr. Shāhbandar at the outset of the Syrian Insurrection with the co-operation between highland chiefs like Petros Mavromikhális, or brigands like Kolokotronis, and Westernized ‘intellectuals’ like Prince Mavrogordato at the outset of the Greek War of Independence in 1821. In the Greek case a partnership which seemed too fantastic to endure started the Greek people on a new career as a united nation.

in the mandated territory, under General Sarraill as Commander-in-Chief.¹ On the 14th General Gamelin occupied Musayfirah, about ten miles east of Darā', on a route leading from the Hijāz Railway towards Suwaydā over an easier *terrain* than that on which General Michaud had met with his disaster. On the 17th a violent Druse attack on Musayfirah was repulsed with heavy losses ;² and on the 24th, after another battle, the French garrison in Suwaydā was relieved.³ On the 26th, however, Suwaydā was evacuated, owing to the lack of water⁴ and the difficulty of bringing up supplies, and the garrison was escorted back to Musayfirah by the relieving force. At the beginning of October the Colonne Gamelin made another expedition into the Jabal ; but again General Gamelin found it impossible to hold the ground that he conquered. He fell back to Musayfirah for the second time on the 9th October ;⁵ and Musayfirah itself was evacuated in the first week of November.⁶ The moral effect of these repeated French retreats outweighed the effect of the successes by which they were preceded ; and the revolt, having defied repression in the Jabalu'd-Durūz, now began to spread rapidly into the districts to the north and west of it. During the night of the 4th–5th October the city of Hamāh was entered by a party of Badu acting in collusion with a native captain in the Syrian Legion ; and the insurgents, after holding the place for forty hours, were only driven out by systematic bombing from the air. This affair at Hamāh was afterwards estimated to have caused 200 casualties and material damage to the value of £150,000 sterling ; but the tragedy of Hamāh was quickly thrown into the shade by the greater tragedy of Damascus.⁷

Although the first Druse raid towards Damascus had been repelled on the 24th August the French military authorities gradually

¹ *The Times*, 3rd and 4th September, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 19th September ; *Le Temps*, 20th and 23rd September, 1925.

³ *The Times*, 25th September, 1925.

⁴ The water-supply which Captain Carbillet had led to Suwaydā had been cut off by the besiegers.

⁵ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 19.

⁶ *The Times*, 7th November, 1925.

⁷ For the Hamāh affair see *The Times*, 7th and 16th October, 1925 ; *Oriente Moderno*, V, 10, pp. 523–4. The Badawī tribe concerned were the Mawālī. Nūrī Sha'lān, the chief of the Ruwalā 'Anazah, and Ramadānu'sh-Shallāsh of Dayru'z-Zūr, were also reported to have taken part. For the events in Damascus on the 18th–20th October, 1925, see the French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, pp. 19–22 ; *Oriente Moderno*, V, 11, pp. 591–4 (containing summaries of accounts in the Syrian Arabic press) ; *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 147–56 ; *The Times*, 21st, 23rd, 27th, and 29th October, 2nd and 11th November ; *Le Temps*, 5th November.

lost control of the open country between Damascus and the Jabal ; and on the 11th and 12th October attacks were made upon isolated French soldiers in Damascus itself. Feeling in the city was further inflamed when, on the 14th October, twenty-six corpses of insurgents—belonging to a band operating in the Ghūtah,¹ on which the French forces had inflicted casualties that day—were paraded on camel-back through the main streets and then exposed to public view in the Marjī Square.² In reprisal the corpses of eleven Circassian irregulars in the French service were exposed at the Bābu'sh-Sharqī by a band of Druse insurgents on the 17th ; the same night, there were further attacks on isolated French soldiers ; and on the morning of the 18th several small parties of insurgents succeeded in entering the Maydān and Shāghūr quarters, on the southern outskirts of the city.³ The majority of the population shut themselves up in their houses ; a minority made common cause with the invaders ; some of the native police and gendarmerie did the same, while the rest allowed themselves to be disarmed ; the French garrison and their Circassian auxiliaries only succeeded in retaining command of the citadel and the quarters to the north-west of it, and their tanks failed to reduce the insurgent quarters to order by charging through them and ' shooting them up '. Meanwhile, the insurgents were pressing north-westwards towards the bazaars, with an eye to loot, and were committing atrocities in the Armenian refugee camp to the south of the city and in the Armenian quarter.⁴ In the late afternoon they were attacking the Senegalese garrison of the 'Azm

¹ The Damascus Oasis.

² ' The parade was a revolting spectacle, as the bodies rocked in rhythm with the camels' movements. It was intended as a warning to the turbulent element. It had, however, an entirely opposite effect. . . . ' (*The Times*, 27th October, 1925). ' A certain number of rebels were killed, and, in conformity with the procedure under the former régime, their bodies were exposed to public view. Twenty-six corpses had been brought back on camels and were exposed—not naked, as had been stated, but clothed—in one of the public squares of the town. He did not disguise the fact that he had no taste for this kind of procedure ' (statement by M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 153). General Sarraill was reported to have defended this procedure on the ground that ' such exposures take place in the normal course ', and that ' there was nothing in this particular occasion to distinguish it from previous cases of the same kind ' (*The Times*, 31st October, 1925).

³ The band which entered the Maydān quarter was apparently not more than sixty strong, but it was led by an ex-chief-night-watchman who had the topography at his fingers' ends.

⁴ This special attack on the Armenians was in reprisal for excesses previously committed by the irregulars in the French service, who were chiefly recruited from among the Armenians and the Circassians (see p. 435 below). Twenty-three Armenian civilians were killed (*Le Temps*, 1st December, 1925).

Palace on 'the Street called Straight'—one of the masterpieces of Damascene architecture, which the mandatory authorities had put to double use as a museum of Islamic art and a residence for the French High Commissioner on his visits to the city. General Sarraïl was actually in residence at the time, and, returning in the course of the day from a tour of inspection to Azrā' on which he had gone the day before, he gave orders (without declaring martial law) for the bombardment of the city from the citadel.¹ The firing on the 18th, which began about 6 p.m. and was kept up intermittently during the night, was intended to intimidate, and was so directed as to do no damage. On the morning of the 19th, however, all the French troops were withdrawn, suddenly and without warning, into the citadel and the quarters to the north-west of it, leaving the rest of the city, including the Christian quarter, unprotected; and at 10 a.m. a fresh bombardment—this time with intent to do damage—was opened not only upon the Shāghūr and Maydān quarters, but upon the bazaars in the heart of the city. The French claimed that, even then, they only fired shells of a type which would burst in the air and so clear the flat roofs and terraces of enemy combatants, without exploding inside the houses.² Nevertheless, they themselves admitted that this second bombardment, which lasted from 10 a.m. on the 19th to about noon on the 20th, and which was reinforced by charges of tanks and bombing and machine-gunning operations by aeroplanes, caused 131 deaths.³ Meanwhile, on the morning of the 19th, the insurgents added to the destruction by storming the 'Azm Palace and partially burning it, after looting its treasures. The foreign residents in Damascus were thus caught without warning⁴ between two fires in a great city which the legal representatives of law and order had not only abandoned to anarchy but were actually shelling as though it were a fortified place held by enemy forces in time of war. Several foreigners had narrow escapes from the French shells (one of which burst in a sitting-room of the British Presbyterian

¹ *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 147.

² See French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 21; and statement by M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 153.

³ *Le Temps*, 1st December, 1925; cf. French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 21.

⁴ It was at first reported that the French residents had been previously warned and removed to a place of safety (*The Times*, 27th October, 1925); but this was indignantly denied by General Sarraïl, who expressed astonishment at the protests of the foreign consuls, on the ground that he had 'not given warning to anybody' (*Le Temps*, 1st November, 1925).

Mission) ;¹ but they suffered no harm from the insurgents owing to the chivalrous and effective intervention of a number of Muslim notables, who took emergency measures for the protection of the Christian quarter at the instance of the British representative, Mr. Consul Smart, the *doyen* of the foreign consular body.² On the morning of the 20th deputations of notables from the insurgent quarters waited upon the French authorities to ask for terms ; and the bombardment, which was suspended at midday in return for the cessation of the insurgents' rifle fire, was officially terminated on condition that the city should pay a collective fine of £T100,000 (gold),³ and should deliver up 3,000 rifles. Drastic measures (including not only surcharges, but threats to renew the bombardment)⁴ were taken to collect the money and arms demanded⁵ and to hunt the rebels out of their hiding places, and at least ten captured rebels were executed.⁶ The total loss of life was never accurately ascertained. The French authorities estimated the civilian deaths at not more than 150,⁷ other observers at not less than 1,200.⁸ None of the foreign residents were among the victims.⁹ The French troops lost 14 killed, 32 wounded, and 10 missing. As for the material damage the first French estimate¹⁰ was that an area of 300 metres by 150 had been destroyed by fire in the bazaars, and damage done to the value of 70,000,000 or 80,000,000 francs. Later,¹¹ the burnt area in the bazaars was more precisely estimated at 3½ to 4 hectares, the total number of houses destroyed at 186 (140 by fire and 46 by bombardment), and the total value of the damage at £T418,000 gold (£T182,000 by fire and £T236,000 by pillage). The destruction overtook some

¹ *The Times*, 27th October, 1925.

² See *The Times*, *loc. cit.*, and 2nd November, 1925. A leading part in this work was taken by two grandsons of the Algerian patriot, 'Abdu'l-Qādir, who had settled in Damascus after the French had overcome his long-drawn-out resistance to their conquest of his native country, and who had himself saved the lives of several thousand Christians during the Damascus massacre of 1860. His grandsons, the Amīrs Tāhir and Sa'īd Mustafā, thus carried on a noble family tradition ; but the Amīr Tāhir was arrested for his pains by the French authorities (*Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 153-4).

³ This was the third collective fine which the French had imposed on Damascus since their first occupation of the city in July 1920.

⁴ *The Times*, 27th October, 1925.

⁵ The total amounts demanded were not eventually collected.

⁶ *The Times*, 29th October, 1925.

⁷ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 21.

⁸ *The Times*, 29th October, 1925.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 6th November, 1925.

¹⁰ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 22.

¹¹ Statement by M. de Caix, *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 150.

of the wealthiest and most congested areas, such as the bazaars, and some of the most precious public monuments, such as the 'Azam Palace and the Sināniyah Mosque—both of which sustained serious injury. 'Words fail', a disinterested eyewitness wrote on the 25th October, 'to describe fittingly the spectacle which the ancient and sacred city now presents.'¹ For many days the exodus of inhabitants from this city of destruction filled to overflowing every train leaving for Bayrūt, and covered with refugees every road leading to the coast. As late as the 22nd October Mr. Consul Smart was reported to have warned British subjects that, if they stayed in Damascus, he could not guarantee their safety.² On the 5th November two United States torpedo-boat destroyers arrived at Bayrūt for the protection of American citizens and remained there for more than a month.³

The news from Damascus aroused intense feeling throughout the Islamic World,⁴ and shocked public opinion in the West. In France it sealed the fate of General Sarrail. On the 30th October instructions were sent to him from Paris to hand over the High Commissionership to General Duport and return to France.⁵ On the 8th November he sailed from Bayrūt,⁶ and on the 18th he appeared before the Army Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies in joint session.⁷ The events of the 18th–20th October in Damascus also gave an impetus to the revolt in other parts of the mandated territory; for although the French authorities had succeeded in recovering the command of the city they recalled General Gamelin's force to Damascus from the Jabalu'd-Durūz;⁸ and this measure of precaution on the French side raised

¹ The special correspondent of *The Times* in a telegram published on the 27th October, 1925. Compare his telegram published on the 2nd November. To the writer of this Survey these descriptions vividly recall the spectacle of Smyrna as he saw it in April 1923.

² *The Times*, 11th November, 1925. At the time Mr. Smart was criticized in the French press on the ground that his views on the situation were unwarrantably alarmist, with the implication that he was spreading these views out of malice. Afterwards Sir Austen Chamberlain convinced the new French High Commissioner, M. de Jouvenel, that Mr. Smart had not been actuated by hostility to France, by reading Mr. Smart's official reports aloud to him when he visited London (*The Times*, 23rd November, 1925).

³ *Ibid.*, 22nd October and 7th November; *Le Temps*, 7th December, 1925.

⁴ For a survey of the reactions in different quarters of the Islamic World see *Oriente Moderno*, V, 11, pp. 575–80 (protests from Indian Muslims, from the 'Irāqī Parliament at Baghdad, from the Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress, from the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine, from the Syrian and Lebanese Colony in Egypt, from the Syro-Palestinian Congress, and from the Egyptian Nationalist Party and *Wafd*).

⁵ *The Times*, 31st October, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 9th November, 1925.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 19th November, 1925.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 29th and 30th October, 1925.

the insurgents' *moral* at the moment when French 'methods of barbarism' had strengthened their determination to continue the struggle against the mandatory Power.

Meanwhile, the revolt had begun to spread along the chain of Druse villages in the Wādī 'Ajam, which led, like a train of gunpowder, from the direction of the Jabalu'd-Durūz towards the Druse fastnesses on the western slopes of Mount Hermon. As early as the third week in September the Druse inhabitants of Qal'atu'l-Jandal, on the eastern slopes of Hermon, upon being summoned by the French authorities to surrender their arms, had taken to the mountain, called out their co-religionists round about, and forcibly re-entered their village, from which they proceeded to drive out their Christian neighbours.¹ By the middle of October the Christian inhabitants and the Government gendarmes had been similarly evicted by the Druses of Majdalu'sh-Shams—a village on the southern slopes of Hermon, the chieftain of which had been arrested by the French on the 3rd September.² After the way had thus been prepared Hāsbayyā, on the western slopes of Hermon, was occupied, on the night of the 9th–10th November, by a band of Druses from the Jabal and Hawrānis, under the command of Sultānu'l-Atrash's son Zayd, who had slipped through the French cordon drawn along the line of the Hijāz Railway in the Hawrān plain.³ The gendarmes and the Senegalese garrison at Hāsbayyā retired by arrangement, without fighting, to Marj 'Ayūn.⁴ On the 11th Zaydu'l-Atrash occupied the Christian village of Kawkabā,⁵ on the 15th Marj 'Ayūn itself.⁶ His forces then divided—one detachment, under Muhammad Darwish Hamzah, marching upon Nabatiyah, the chief centre of the Matāwilah of the Jabal 'Āmil, while Zayd himself marched upon Rāshayyā on the 20th and opened a violent attack upon the two squadrons—one of Tunisian Spāhīs and the other of Foreign Legion cavalry—who were holding the fort.⁷ Zayd hoped to gain the active support of the Matāwilah (as one of the non-Christian communities which, in 1920, had been incorporated forcibly in the Great Lebanon), and

¹ *The Times*, 24th September, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 8th September and 15th October, 1925.

³ For the general strategy of the insurgent leaders see *Le Temps*, 6th November, 1925.

⁴ *The Times*, 13th November, 1925. See also the narrative of Miss Cave, an English resident in Hāsbayyā who remained there throughout the Druse occupation, *ibid.*, 30th November, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 14th November, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 17th November, 1925.

⁷ For details of the four days' siege of Rāshayyā, in which the intensity of the Druse attack was matched by the stubbornness of the French defence, see *ibid.*, 26th and 27th November, 1925.

he made a bid for the friendly neutrality of the Christians. He not only published a proclamation declaring that the revolution was a national, not a religious movement, that Syrians of all creeds were brothers, and that he had no intention of trespassing on the old Lebanon sanjāq, within the boundaries of 1861–1920 ; he made good his words by restoring looted Christian property to its owners and punishing his followers when they committed robbery and murder.¹ Unfortunately, during the occupation of Kawkabā on the 11th November, fighting broke out (in spite of precautions taken to prevent it) between the Druses and the Christians inhabitants ; the fighting, in which the Druses gained the upper hand after severe losses on both sides, was followed by looting and arson ;² and this unhappy incident confirmed the impulse of the Christian population in the invaded districts to take to flight. There was a wholesale exodus of Christians—partly towards Bayrūt and partly across the Palestine frontier—and the able-bodied men who found themselves on the French side of the front now responded to the French call to arms.³ On the other hand, the Lebanon Druses, in the immediate hinterland of Bayrūt, would almost certainly have taken up arms on the insurgents' side if Zayd had succeeded in joining hands with them ; and in that event he might have bestridden the Damascus–Bayrūt railway and possibly have forced his way into Bayrūt itself, the seat of the French High Commissioner. 'From the 20th to the 24th November little stood in his way except the heroic defence of the fort at Rāshayyā. The relief of Rāshayyā on the 24th November,⁴ when the garrison was at its last gasp, by a supreme effort on the part of the French High Command,⁵ was the military turning-point in the campaign ; for it gave time for the French reinforcements which had been arriving at Bayrūt from overseas to come into action. With these reinforcements a converging movement upon Mount Hermon was begun ; the French garrison of Nabatiyah (which had held its ground, like the garrison of Rāshayyā) marched eastwards on Marj 'Ayūn and Kawkabā ; a second force marched southwards from Rāshayyā ; and a third north-westwards from Qunaytirah. On

¹ *Ibid.*, 19th November, 1925. Zayd repeated his declarations in a second proclamation a few weeks later (*ibid.*, 1st December, 1925).

² *Ibid.*, 14th November, 1925.

³ For the arming of Christian irregulars by the French authorities see below.

⁴ See *The Times*, 25th and 27th November ; *Le Temps*, 26th November and 19th December, 1925.

⁵ On the 18th November 400 automobiles were mobilized for the concentration of all available French forces on the South Lebanon front (*The Times*, 21st November, 1925).

the 5th December these converging columns met at Hāsbayyā, and the insurgents, after a stout resistance, were forced to abandon the town and take to the mountain.¹ This successful conclusion of the French counter-offensive decided the Matāwilah of the Jabal 'Āmil and the Druses of the Lebanon to keep the peace.² On the 15th December a delegation of Lebanon Druses declared their loyalty towards France to the new French High Commissioner, M. Henry de Jouvenel.³ On the 25th January, 1926, the Lebanese Representative Council sought to confirm the loyalty of the Matāwilah by giving official recognition to their Ja'fari rite⁴ and by allowing them to organize their own communal tribunals for matters of personal statute in substitution for the Sunnī courts to which they had been compelled to resort hitherto.⁵

After the recapture of Hāsbayyā by the French the Syrian insurrection drifted, from the military point of view, into a condition of stalemate. The French had proved their ability to hold the principal towns in the disaffected area, though by methods which were reducing those towns to ruins, and to keep open—or, rather, perpetually to reopen—the principal lines of communication.⁶ On the other hand, the open country had passed out of French control over an area which extended south-and-north from the Jabalu'd-Durūz to Palmyra and east-and-west from the Hamād steppe to the eastern slopes of Hermon and Anti-Lebanon. While Sultānu'l-Atrash held

¹ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 48; *The Times*, 7th December, 1925. Hāsbayyā suffered little damage, and the neighbouring Druse shrine of Khalwatu'l-Biyād remained unscathed.

² The Matāwilah had offered the French authorities 1,500 volunteers when the first call for volunteers was made (see below), but the French decision to restrict the issue of arms to Christians had given such offence that many of them had taken service, instead, with Zaydu'l-Atrash (*The Times*, 19th November, 1925).

³ *Ibid.*, 16th December, 1925.

⁴ *Madhhab*, literally 'way'.

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 2, p. 87. The heads of the Mutawālī and the Sunnī communities in the Great Lebanon made declarations of loyalty to M. de Jouvenel at the beginning of February (*Le Temps*, 4th February, 1926).

⁶ The Damascus-Bayrūt Railway and the section of the Hijāz Railway between Damascus and the Palestine frontier were constantly being cut by the insurgents, who blew up the bridges and culverts and derailed the trains; and the motor traffic on the roads was still more frequently waylaid. In August and September 1925 the overland motor convoys plying between Damascus and Baghdad were attacked so repeatedly that the services had to be temporarily suspended, and were eventually diverted to a route running entirely through British mandated territory via 'Ammān, though the *terrain* on this route was much less favourable. One Nairn convoy of eleven cars, which was carrying Dr. Millsbaugh, the American Financial Adviser to the Persian Government, among its sixty passengers, was ambushed ninety miles east of Damascus and forced to turn back, though it was escorted by four French military cars (see *Le Temps*, 29th August; *The Times*, 31st August, 5th, 10th, and 14th September, and 8th December, 1925).

his own in the Jabalu'd-Durūz the chief stronghold of the Sunnī insurgents was the district of Nabk, east of Anti-Lebanon, in which they had installed themselves about a fortnight before Zaydu'l-Atrash opened his campaign in the Hermon district.¹ The Sunnī insurgents were organized in half a dozen bands, which worked in concert, each in its own district, on a common plan.² The leaders were either representatives of noble houses, like Nāsib Bey Al-Bakrī of Damascus, or ex-Ottoman officers of military experience, like Ramadān Pasha Ash-Shallāsh of Dayru'z-Zūr;³ and, between them, they mustered sufficient prestige to keep their followers in hand and sufficient skill to utilize the *terrain* to the best advantage.

The French, faced with the prospect of an interminable guerrilla war, resorted to the Ottoman expedient of singling out certain minority communities which were attached, by motives of self-interest, to the Paramount Power, and enlisting their able-bodied men as irregular troops.⁴ Even before the outbreak of the revolt in July 1925 they had drawn in this way upon the services of the Syrian Circassians and Armenians;⁵ and the Circassians, at any rate

¹ *The Times*, 2nd November, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 23rd November, 1925. See *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 4, pp. 206-7, for a set of regulations drawn up, for the conduct of their operations, by the insurgent leaders.

³ For a list of these bands and their leaders see *Oriente Moderno*, V, 11, p. 594; *The Times*, 2nd and 17th November, 1925, and 20th January, 1926. For Ramadānu'sh-Shallāsh's career see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 2, pp. 93-4.

⁴ For the general question of the employment of Senegalese, Maghribī, Circassian, and Armenian troops by the mandatory Power see *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 150-6. In 1838 Ibrāhīm Pasha (the son of Mehmed 'Alī Pasha of Egypt and his viceroy in Syria), when baffled by the perennial problem of reducing the Druses of the Jabalu'd-Durūz to obedience, had served out arms to the Maronites of the Lebanon and had unleashed them against their traditional rivals. The Maronites succeeded in pacifying and disarming the Jabalu'd-Durūz, but Ibrāhīm then found it impossible to disarm the Maronites, and the consequent insurrection in the Lebanon was one of the factors which brought Ibrāhīm's rule in Syria to an end (see Foreign Office Peace Handbook, No. 60: *Syria and Palestine*, pp. 30-2).

⁵ For the history of these two communities in Syria see above, p. 351, and *The Times*, 26th October, 1925. See further, for the Circassian irregulars, *Oriente Moderno*, V, 11, pp. 599-600, and *Le Temps*, 7th November, 1925; for the Armenian irregulars, *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, p. 34; 3, pp. 151-2; and 4, pp. 208-9; and *The Times*, 24th and 25th February, 1926. In enrolling these Circassian and Armenian volunteers in Syria in 1925-6 the French followed the precedent of the Greeks in Anatolia in 1919-22, and with the same deplorable consequences. It is remarkable that the Circassians, who were not only Sunnīs, but whose grandparents had been given asylum in the Ottoman Empire by a Sunnī Government after their exodus from the Caucasus in 1859, should have taken service against their co-religionists as the mercenaries of invading Christian Powers. In the case of the Circassians such conduct would appear to throw an unpleasant light on the national character. The case of the Armenians was different, for their past treatment at the hands

(whom the French authorities described officially as 'difficiles à

of their Muslim neighbours had naturally embittered them; and, as refugees dependent on the goodwill of the French authorities in Syria, it would have been difficult for them not to fall in with French policy. (The Armenians domiciled in Syria, who were not dependent on the French authorities to the same extent as the refugees, refrained from enrolling themselves.) Thus the Armenian refugees, unlike the Circassians, in the French mandated territory could hardly be blamed for taking mercenary service with the mandatory Power; yet repeated experience proved that for the Armenians to lend themselves to the designs of European Powers was to court disaster. In Anatolia the Armenians had paid for taking service under the Greek High Command by being expelled wholesale from the country, together with the Greek element in the population, after the Turkish victory in 1922. In Cilicia, again, where the French themselves had previously enrolled Armenian irregulars, during their occupation of that region from December 1919 to December 1921, the consequence had been that the whole Armenian community had been compelled to leave the country when the French had withdrawn. Indeed, the majority of the Armenian refugees who were living in the French mandated territory in 1925-6 had arrived there as a result of these two forced migrations, which they had partly brought upon themselves by consenting to act as catspaws for the French and the Greeks. In a statement before the Permanent Mandates Commission (*Minutes of the Eighth Session*, p. 113) M. de Caix estimated that, in December 1921, 30,000 refugees arrived in the mandated territory from Cilicia, and 30,000 more during the years 1922 and 1923 from the Anatolian territories evacuated by the Greek army. The following statistics of refugees from Turkey, in the French mandated territory, as on the 1st January, 1925, are given in the French *Report* for the calendar year 1924:

		State.	Total number Armenian of refugees. refugees.	
Armenians	89,000	distributed thus	{	
Chaldaeans	4,000			Aleppo 49,400 44,750
Jacobites	1,800			Great Lebanon 35,000 33,700
Orthodox	900			Damascus 10,000 10,000
Syrian Uniates	250			Alawīyīn 1,500 1,450
Nestorians	50			Jabalu'd-Durūz 100 100
96,000		Totals	96,000	89,000 (<i>sic</i>)

The outbreak of the Syrian Insurrection placed the leaders of the Armenian community in the French mandated territory in a difficult position. On the one hand, they dared not give offence to the mandatory Power, on whose goodwill the maintenance of the 90,000 Armenian refugees largely depended. On the other hand, they saw that the enrolment of Armenians as French mercenaries was exasperating the Syrian population, and that promises of protection might prove illusory, as they had so often proved before in Armenian history. The French had not been able to save the Armenians from being plundered and massacred at Damascus on the 18th-20th October, 1925; and when the military situation became a stalemate the situation of the Armenian community became precarious. In February 1926 certain accusations against the conduct of the Armenian volunteers during the fighting in the Maydān quarter of Damascus on the 16th and 17th led to an inquiry by the French military Governor of Damascus, General Andrea, who eventually cashiered thirty-seven suspects and imprisoned twelve men convicted of pillage. In March, after this scandal, the Armenian Patriarch of Antioch courageously requested the new French High Commissioner, M. de Jouvenel, to discharge the Armenian volunteers then serving in the French forces, and not to enlist any Armenians in future. M. de Jouvenel wisely gave his consent; and the Patriarch then addressed an open letter to a Sunni religious

tenir'),¹ played a lurid part in the events of the 18th–20th October at Damascus.² As soon as the revolt broke out the French took the still more unfortunate step of serving out arms to the indigenous Syrian Christians. On the 24th August, during the first Druse raid on Damascus, they were reported to have distributed 650 rifles in the Christian quarter;³ and in the middle of November, during the crisis of Zaydu'l-Atrash's invasion of the Great Lebanon, they enrolled bands of Christian volunteers in much larger numbers.⁴ These Lebanese Christian volunteers—who sometimes looked as if they might well be brigands themselves⁵—might be useful for guarding lines of communication like the Bayrūt-Rayāq Railway; but in at least one engagement in the Marj 'Ayūn their unsteadiness brought a reverse upon the French arms,⁶ while—apart altogether from the question of their military value—their employment was a political disaster. By calling upon one community in the mandated territory to take up arms against another the mandatory Power intensified the traditional blood-feuds between Syrian communities of different religions and thus actually worked against the purpose of the mandatory régime, which had been intended to educate the Syrians in the art of co-operation as an essential step towards self-government.

In a guerrilla warfare waged by irregular forces on both sides it dignitary of Damascus, Shaykh Badru'd-Dīn'l-Husaynī, in which he prayed him to use his influence to mitigate the hostility of the Muslims towards the Armenians. He explained that the Armenian volunteers had enlisted under pressure of economic need, without consulting their religious leaders, and he added that the Armenian community deplored the criminal acts committed by certain of their co-religionists, approved the punishment of the guilty, and hoped that the innocent would not be held responsible for the sins of these outcasts. The statesmanlike and constructive policy of the Armenian Patriarch and of the Druse Commander, Zaydu'l-Atrash, in this matter of religious and communal relations, stands out in striking contrast to the policy of the mandatory Power, which had come to bring not peace but the sword.

¹ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 20; *The Times*, 27th October, 1925.

² 'It was true that Circassians had been used and that they had not yet been sufficiently disciplined, . . . but these men had the advantage of being, among the soldiers of the country, one of the elements on which the administration could rely in order to form a solid military contingent. . . . It was not improbable that the Circassians had been somewhat heavy-handed, but they would very probably be turned into disciplined troops. With very few officers, and owing to the natural violence of these men, some excesses were conceivable' (statement by M. de Caix in *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 151).

³ *The Times*, 3rd September, 1925. The British authorities in Palestine had served out arms to certain remote and isolated Jewish agricultural settlements; but elaborate precautions had been taken that these arms should only be used for self-defence in genuine emergencies, and then only by the joint decision of the responsible heads of the community.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 17th November, 1925.

⁵ *The Times*, 19th November, 1925.

⁶ *The Times*, *loc. cit.*

was inevitable that the chief sufferers should be the peaceful rural population. An insurgent band would install itself in a village, after driving out the Government gendarmerie post, and would proceed to commandeer food-supplies, rifles, and recruits and to turn the village into a base of operations. When the nuisance had become intolerable the French would send a punitive column in superior force, whereupon the insurgents would withdraw and leave the villagers to bear the consequences of their activities. The French would then impose a fine on the village, arrest the notables as hostages, and withdraw in their turn, whereupon the insurgents would re-enter the village on their heels. This cycle would be repeated until, one day, the village would become a battle-field in the process of changing hands. When this happened the houses would be burnt, the cattle looted by the Circassian and Armenian mercenaries, to be sold publicly in the Damascus markets, and the village left derelict, with no alternatives for such able-bodied men as survived except to perish of starvation or else to join the insurgent forces and play their part in inflicting similar calamities on other villages which had survived their own.¹ The district that suffered most was the Ghūtah—the oasis encircling the City of Damascus—which in peace time had been renowned as an earthly paradise in the remote countries of the West as well as in every part of the Islamic World. With its dense groves of fruit-trees which broke the field of vision, and its innumerable water-courses and irrigation channels which impeded the transport of artillery, the Ghūtah lent itself admirably to the tactics of guerrilla warfare; and, under the cover which it afforded, the insurgents hovered at the gates of Damascus, waiting for their next opportunity to push their way in. ‘The “cleaning up” of the Ghūtah’, General Gamelin reported, towards the end of 1925,² ‘was

¹ For the elements in this picture see *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 148–9 and 152 (cross-examination of M. de Caix); *The Times*, 31st August, 8th and 14th September, 13th October, 2nd November, and 3rd December, 1925; *Le Temps*, 3rd December, 1925; *The Times*, 3rd February and 24th May, 1926; *Le Temps*, 1st, 11th, 21st, and 23rd January, 12th February and 1st March, 1926. The following passage may be quoted from the special correspondent of *The Times* at Damascus: ‘The brigands are becoming more numerous almost every day. This is due to the French practice of burning any village where brigands are reported to have been harboured or victualled. The destruction of every such village, which is accompanied by the confiscation of all movable property, naturally adds to the number of people without homes or means of livelihood at large in the country and converts these villagers into brigands, as their only means of subsistence is to take what they want. Lawlessness is thus steadily growing’ (*The Times*, 2nd November, 1925).

² French Government’s *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 49; cf. *The Times*, 19th December, 1925.

effected methodically from the 14th to the 24th December [1925]', but 'these operations did not succeed in completely clearing the environs of Damascus of the little groups of malefactors who are still operating there and who are very difficult to catch. . . . The system for defending the city and exercising surveillance over the oasis has now been perfected methodically. A circular *boulevard* has now been drawn round the city, which makes it possible to guard the exits more effectively ; and avenues have been driven through the oasis in order to make circulation easier. These works are not only of military value but they are entirely approved by the municipality, which believes that they will improve the hygienic conditions and increase the amenities of the capital and its environs.' Eight months' further experience, however, demonstrated that the fruit-trees had not been cut down in sufficient quantities to make the Ghūtah untenable for the insurgents ; and the French military authorities then hit upon the less laborious method of cutting off the waters, so that the groves withered wholesale before ever the axe was laid to their roots.¹ The decay of the Damascus oasis was matched by the decay of the city itself. With the trade which was its life-blood intercepted, with a devastated area in its heart, with barbed-wire entanglements and armed patrols in the streets, with the curfew at night-fall and the noise of firing by night and day, Damascus under the French mandate had drifted into a permanent state of siege.²

(f) THE HIGH COMMISSIONERSHIP OF M. HENRY DE JOUVENEL AND THE INVESTIGATION BY THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Meanwhile, in France itself, the news from the mandated territory—which had become known largely through the British press, owing to the paucity of official information from General Sarraill—had been received with consternation. In the Senate on the 17th December, 1925, and in the Chamber on the 18th and 20th, the conduct of the French authorities in Syria was frankly and vigorously criticized ; and the Government did not attempt to deny that serious errors had been committed or that grave consequences had followed. Indeed, they had forestalled these criticisms by announcing, on the 6th November, 1925, that General Sarraill was to be succeeded in the

¹ See *The Times*, 11th August, 1926.

² For descriptions of Damascus in November and December 1925, and in March 1926, see *ibid.*, 16th November and 21st December, 1925, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th April, 1926.

High Commissionership by M. Henry de Jouvenel—editor of *Le Matin* and Senator for la Corrèze, who had already distinguished himself as a representative of France at Geneva.¹

M. de Jouvenel took a broad view of his task. His first pronouncement of policy² was that he intended to cultivate friendly relations with the neighbours of the French mandated territory—that is, with Great Britain, as mandatory in Palestine,³ and with Turkey—and he visited London on the 19th November,⁴ and Cairo at the end of the month,⁵ before landing at Bayrūt on the 2nd December, 1925,⁶ while he took the earliest opportunities, after his arrival in Syria, to visit the British High Commissioner at Jerusalem and the Turkish Foreign Minister at Angora.⁷ He was thus working to eliminate the possibility of extraneous complications at the same time as he was attempting to deal with the internal situation in the French mandated territory directly. In his internal policy his general aim was to restore the *status quo ante* the Sarraill régime. He recognized that, in order to undo the effect of General Sarraill's blunders, the mandatory Power would have to make more radical, or at least more rapid, concessions than it might otherwise have contemplated; but on vital matters he made it clear from the outset that he did not intend to yield. His aims, he declared, were 'first, order; secondly, impartial justice; and thirdly, as soon as it should be possible, self-government';⁸ he echoed M. Briand⁹ in asserting that 'any abandonment of the mandate was out of the question';¹⁰ and when, after an interview with the Executive Committee of the Syro-Palestinian Congress, whom he met on the 30th November at Cairo, he received a letter from the Committee demanding the abolition of the mandate and the withdrawal of the French Army of Occupation, he at once replied in writing that this solution was 'entirely unaccept-

¹ *Le Temps*, 8th November, 1925.

² Statement of the 7th November, 1925 (*The Times*, 9th November).

³ Throughout the revolt in the French mandated territory, the main theatre of which was immediately adjacent to the Palestine frontier, the British authorities in Palestine were not only 'correct' but loyal in their behaviour towards their French colleagues (see *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 58 and 164, for the testimony of M. de Caix; *Le Temps*, 21st November, 1925, for that of M. de Jouvenel).

⁴ *Le Temps*, 21st and 26th November, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1st and 3rd December, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 4th December, 1925.

⁷ For M. de Jouvenel's visit to Angora see Section (viii) below.

⁸ Statement of the 18th November, 1925 (*The Times*, 19th November).

⁹ *Le Temps*, 8th November, 1925.

¹⁰ Statement by M. de Jouvenel on the 7th November, 1925 (*The Times*, 9th November).

able', and categorically declined the Committee's offer to mediate on these terms.¹

M. de Jouvenel's first concern was to regain for France the sympathies of the Catholic Church² and of the Christian Lebanese by treating the Great Lebanon State with unprecedented liberality. His immediate object in this was to extricate his rear from the perils in which General Sarrail had involved it. His ulterior object was not so much to liberate his forces for taking the offensive against the insurgents at the front as to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms by offering them, as a reward for returning to their allegiance, a treatment not less favourable than that which he was granting to the Lebanon as a reward for never having revolted.

In the Lebanon the anti-French feeling which General Sarrail's policy had aroused had been driven into the background, immediately before M. de Jouvenel's arrival, by the stronger emotion of fear in the face of Zaydu'l-Atrash's invasion; and, on the 2nd December, the Representative Council passed a resolution³ affirming their desire to remain aloof from the affairs of Syria and the Jabalu'd-Durūz, protesting against Zayd's invasion, thanking the mandatory Power for its sacrifices in defence of Lebanese independence, and declaring that the country remained loyal to its friendship with France. This resolution gave M. de Jouvenel a convenient opening. By the terms of the mandate (Art. 1) the mandatory Power was bound, within three years of the mandate coming into force—that is, at a date not later than the 29th September, 1926—to introduce an organic statute for the government of the mandated territory; but this statute was to be prepared, not by constituent assemblies in the several States, but by the mandatory Power itself 'in agreement with the native authorities'; and the French Government had given effect to this obligation by sending Senator Auguste Brunet to the mandated territory

¹ *Le Temps*, 3rd December, 1925; text of M. de Jouvenel's letter, *ibid.*, 13th December; Italian translation of the Syro-Palestinian Congress's letter of the 30th November in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 12, p. 634.

² On the 6th December, 1925, M. de Jouvenel made a point of accepting the traditional liturgical honours by attending mass in the Latin parish church of Bayrūt (*The Times*, 7th December). He got into trouble, however, by promulgating, on the 26th May, 1926, an *arrêté*, to come into force on the 1st June, which withdrew all matters of personal statute except marriage from the jurisdiction of the religious courts (text in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 276-7). This *arrêté* aroused so much opposition among all Lebanese communities, Christian as well as Muslim, that in June its application was postponed. A joint protest appears to have been signed by the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Syrian Uniate Patriarchs (*op. cit.*, VI, 6, pp. 321-2).

³ Translation in *op. cit.*, V, 12, p. 635.

in June 1925 to consult representative notables individually¹ and by setting up a drafting commission, under the chairmanship of M. Paul-Boncour, in the following month.² On the 4th December, 1925, M. de Jouvenel made a speech to the Lebanon Representative Council,³ in which he announced that the time for individual consultations had passed, and that, wherever security existed—though only there—the era of constitutional action [by the people of the mandated territory themselves] was to begin. Since, in the Lebanon, the present Representative Council had been elected as recently as the previous July, M. de Jouvenel in this case rejected the strictly correct but dilatory procedure of holding fresh elections for a constituent assembly, and announced that, instead, the Council itself would be convened in extraordinary session in order to perform constituent functions. The High Commissioner, on his part, would define, in a declaration, the obligations devolving upon France from the undertakings, in regard to the administration of her mandate, which she had given to the League of Nations ;⁴ and, as soon as they had endorsed this preamble, the Lebanon Representative Council were to have a free hand (within such limits as the declaration might lay down) to draft their own constitution. By transferring to the elected representatives of the Lebanese people a function assigned to the mandatory Power under the terms of the mandate,

France will have shown how she conceives the exercise of the mandate in the case of a nation which confides in her and keeps the peace. If the other States [in the mandated territory] wish to participate in the benefit of free institutions, they now know the means. It is quite useless for the rebels to propose conditions to me or to ask me for promises. The act which I am accomplishing here is their answer. I have now deprived the War of all excuse.

On the 10th December the Lebanon Representative Council duly met in extraordinary session and appointed a drafting committee on which the several religious communities were represented in the same proportions as on the Council itself.⁵ On the 15th May, 1926, when

¹ For Senator Brunet's mission see *Oriente Moderno*, V, 6, pp. 273-4 and 292-3. For a semi-official interpretation of the relevant provision of the mandate see *Le Temps*, 7th May, 1925.

² See French Government's *Report* for 1924, p. 9 ; *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 18 ; *Le Temps*, 1st November, 1925.

³ Text in French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, pp. 52-3. For an explanatory statement by M. de Jouvenel himself see *The Times*, 8th December, 1925.

⁴ For the method by which Great Britain ensured the fulfilment of the similar undertakings which she had given in respect of the administration of her mandate in 'Irâq see Section (x) below.

⁵ *The Times*, 11th December, 1925.

this committee was on the eve of reporting, the French Governor of the Lebanon, M. Cayla, resigned, in order to leave his post vacant for a Lebanese national.¹ The Representative Council, sitting as a constituent assembly, debated the draft constitution on the 19th–22nd May, and modified it in several respects—particularly by incorporating in it the terms of the High Commissioner's declaration, which reserved to the mandatory Power the control of Lebanese relations with foreign countries, the position of arbitrator in relations between the Lebanon and the other States under the French mandate, the command of the police and gendarmerie when necessary for the maintenance of order, and the right of veto over fundamental laws, over the dissolution of Parliament, and over the dismissal of the executive head of the State.² On the 24th May, 1926, the Lebanese Republic was officially proclaimed; the High Commissioner nominated twelve Senators; and on the 26th the Senate and Assembly, in joint session, appointed as first President of the new Republic an Orthodox Christian, M. Charles Dabbās.³ Nevertheless, M. de Jouvenel's attempt to regain the sympathy of the Lebanon for France was not altogether a success. As early as February 1926 he found it desirable to check hostile criticism by promulgating an *arrêté* which increased the Government's power over the press, and he sent one Lebanese editor into 'enforced residence' at Arwād.⁴ His reservations of rights for the mandatory Power and his nominations to the Lebanese Senate were ill received; the Maronite Patriarch was reported to have rebuffed his advances; and it was perhaps significant that, immediately after the proclamation of the Republic, there was founded in the Lebanon a 'Party of Syrian Federation' (*Hizbu'l-Ittihādi's-Sūrī*).⁵

On the 21st December, 1925, M. de Jouvenel took the first step towards extending the policy initiated in the Lebanon to other parts of the mandated territory, by ordering⁶ elections⁷ in the 'Alawī

¹ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, p. 277.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 277–9. On the 22nd May the declaration setting forth the High Commissioner's reservations was published as a definition of the rights retained by France, not only in the Lebanon, but in all States in the mandated territory (*op. cit.*, pp. 275–6).

³ *Le Temps*, 25th and 26th May, 1926; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, p. 279.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, VI, 3, p. 154.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, VI, 5, pp. 323–4 and 326.

⁶ Text of the *arrêté* for the Syrian State in French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, pp. 54–5; text of the *arrêté* for the 'Alawī State in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, pp. 28–9.

⁷ The Representative Councils of the Syrian and 'Alawī States, unlike the Lebanon Council, had already reached the end of their terms—the Syrian Council on the 27th November and the 'Alawī Council on the 27th September,

State and in all districts of the Syrian State which had not been placed under martial law. This excluded the Syrian districts of Damascus and the Hawrān; and no elections were ordered in the Jabalu'd-Durūz State, which was not only likewise under the ban of French martial law, but was at this time altogether out of the control of the mandatory authorities. It was provided, however, that in districts temporally excluded elections should be held one month after the state of siege should be raised. In the 'Alawī State the newly elected Representative Council was to formulate its opinion regarding the political links which it desired to see established between this State and the other States under the French mandate. In the Syrian State, before the newly elected Representative Council met, the deputies of each sanjāq or vilāyet were to meet separately and formulate their opinions regarding the political links which they desired to see established between the district which they represented and the other districts of the State. This latter provision may have been sincerely intended to facilitate the process of 'self-determination', but it gave the unfortunate impression that M. de Jouvenel was clinging to the policy of 'divide and rule' which, in the opinion of the Syrians, had hitherto been followed by the mandatory Power—the more so since, in a further provision of his *arrêté* for the Syrian State, he took discretion to organize the deputies into either one Council or more than one, in the light of such views as they might have previously expressed in their preliminary meetings by districts. The 'Council or Councils' so constituted in the territory of the Syrian State were to vote a constitution or constitutions, 'without prejudice to the rights reserved to the mandatory Power'.

On the 21st December, 1925, the date on which M. de Jouvenel ordered the elections in the 'Alawī and Syrian States, the President of the Syrian State, the Antiochene Bereket Subhī Bey,¹ sent in his resignation. The occupation of the Presidency by an individual who was more of a Turk than an Arab, and who would have preferred the capital of the Syrian State to be at Aleppo instead of at Damascus, had been one of the standing grievances of the Damascenes against the French régime;² and M. de Jouvenel now sought to remove this grievance by offering the Presidency to the Qādī of

1925 (French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, pp. 25–6). The new elections had hitherto been adjourned on account of the revolt (*Le Temps*, 9th October, 1925).

¹ See above, p. 358.

² *The Times*, 23rd December, 1925; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, pp. 24–6.

Damascus, Shaykh Tāju'd-Dīn b. Badri'd-Dīnī'l-Husaynī, a Sunnī religious dignitary 'who was *persona grata* to the insurgents but had taken no personal part in the struggle',¹ and by simultaneously (on the 23rd December) releasing those leaders of the Syrian People's Party who had been in 'enforced residence' at Arwād since the end of the preceding August.² Shaykh Tāju'd-Dīn did his best to draw up a programme which, without being unacceptable to the mandatory Power, would secure the support of the Nationalists. The liberated members of the People's Party consented to serve in his Government on condition that the 'Alawī and Jabalū'd-Durūz States should be incorporated in the Syrian State on a basis of decentralization.; that four of the districts which had been annexed to the Lebanon when the Great Lebanon was created on the 1st September, 1920, should be restored to Syria;³ that in the other districts which had been annexed to the Lebanon on the same date elections should be held and the destiny of each district be determined by its elected representatives;⁴ that the relations between Syria and France should be regulated by treaty; that Syria should be admitted to membership in the League of Nations; that Syrian territory should be gradually evacuated by the French forces; that the victims of the revolt should receive compensation; that the currency should be reformed; that the judicial system should be unified; that there should be a general amnesty; and that the Syrian Government should be completely independent in the field of internal administration. When these conditions were rejected by M. de Jouvenel Shaykh Tāju'd-Dīn declined the Presidency on the 6th January, 1926; and by an *arrêté* of the 9th February the High Commissioner appointed as Military Governor of Damascus General Andrea, and as provisional Administrator of the States of Syria and Jabalū'd-Durūz another Frenchman, M. Pierre Alype, who, before Shaykh Tāju'd-Dīn's withdrawal, had already been appointed Delegate of the High Commissioner at Damascus, with authority to put the election orders of the 21st December, 1925, into execution.⁵ On the 28th April M. Alype was replaced by a native Provisional Head of the State in the person

¹ French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, pp. 28-9; see further *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, pp. 26-7; 3, pp. 148-9; 4, pp. 204-5.

² *Op. cit.*, VI, 1, pp. 27 and 31; *Le Temps*, 25th December, 1925.

³ The four districts in question were apparently Hāsbayyā, Rāshayyā, Marj 'Ayūn, and Kawkabā (*Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, p. 31; and 2, p. 88).

⁴ This was an adroit application to the Great Lebanon of the procedure which had been ordered by the High Commissioner himself, in his two *arrêtés* of the 21st December, 1925, for the Syrian and 'Alawī States.

⁵ *Le Temps*, 12th February, 1926.

of Dāmād¹ Ahmed Nāmī Bey, a Circassian notable of the same class and antecedents as his Turkish predecessor Bereket Subhī Bey.² The new Governor so far deferred to Syrian public opinion as to announce, on the day on which he took office, that his policy would be to obtain, by pacific means, an outlet on the sea for Damascus and Aleppo, and to negotiate with the mandatory Power with a view to giving the mandate the form of a treaty, on the model of the treaty between Great Britain and 'Irāq.

In January 1926 attempts were made to hold elections in pursuance of the *arrêtés* of the 21st December, 1925; but for the most part they resulted in failure, notwithstanding two *arrêtés* imposing severe penalties for political agitation and for interference with the liberty of elections, which were promulgated by the High Commissioner on the 12th January.³ Even in the 'Alawī State the polling was noticeably light in divisions where the Sunnī element in the population was strong, and in three divisions the elections had to be cancelled and held over again.⁴ The results were most satisfactory in the predominantly Turkish sanjāq of Antioch and Alexandretta;⁵ but at Aleppo, which hitherto had shown distinctly less hostility towards the French than Damascus, the holding of the elections produced a riot on the 15th, while at Homs and Hamāh the People's Party were largely successful in organizing a boycott of the polls. Eventually, in the thirty-eight electoral divisions of the Syrian State in which the elections were held, thirty-one deputies were returned, three Muslim and one Orthodox Christian seat remaining unfilled at Homs and three Muslim seats at Hamāh. In punishment for the disturbances the districts of Homs and Hamāh were placed under martial law,⁶ and a number of notables from Aleppo and Homs were sent into 'enforced residence' at Arwād—including several of those who had only been released from Arwād a few weeks before.⁷

The new Representative Council in the 'Alawī State declared in favour of maintaining the State's independence; but at the same time they asked that there should be set up an economic commission

¹ i. e. husband of an Ottoman princess. Nāmī Bey's father-in-law was not a Sultan but the ex-Caliph Abdu'l-Mejīd.

² For Ahmed Nāmī Bey's personal history see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 282-3.

³ *Op. cit.*, VI, 2, pp. 91-2.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁵ For the elections in this sanjāq and the desires expressed by the elected deputies see Section (viii) below.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 21st January, 1926.

⁷ For the elections in the Aleppo, Hamāh, and Homs districts see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 2, pp. 90-2; *Le Temps*, 10th, 13th, 14th, and 26th January; *The Times*, 13th and 30th January, 1926.

common to all the States under the French mandate;¹ and on the 1st February, 1926, a proposal for the appointment of a committee to draft a constitution was obstructed by the Muslim deputies on the ground that the 'Alawī territory ought not to be differentiated from other parts of Syria.² Eventually, a drafting committee was appointed and the issue was compromised by a decision to rename the State 'West Syria' and to regard its inhabitants as Syrian nationals.³ In the territory of the Syrian State the deputies who had been elected in the districts of Alexandretta, Aleppo, and Dayru'z-Zūr—the only three districts for which deputies were forthcoming, since at Hamāh and Homs the elections had been boycotted, while in Damascus and the Hawrān they had not been held—were segregated into three separate Representative Councils. The action taken by the Alexandretta Council, which represented a predominantly Turkish population, is recorded below.⁴ The Aleppo Council, which met on the 18th February, telegraphed to the High Commissioner a request for the release of the Aleppines interned at Arwād, and passed a resolution demanding the creation of a United Syrian State, to include the whole of the French mandated territory (not excepting the Lebanon), with the reintroduction of the former Ottoman local government regulations as a guarantee of decentralization.⁵ A similar resolution in favour of a United Syrian State, with the additional demand that the Lebanese and Syrian deputies should be convened in joint session as a constituent assembly, was voted by the Dayru'z-Zūr Council on the 6th March.⁶ Thus the Syrian elections, such as they were, of January 1926, elicited unmistakably, even under adverse conditions, the political aspirations of the Syrian people.⁷

Meanwhile, M. de Jouvenel had made a sincere attempt to come to terms with the insurgents. The initiative was taken by a committee of Muslim and Druse notables in Bayrūt, who asked the High Commissioner for leave to send a peace deputation to Sultānu'l-Atrash in the Jabal and offered their property as bail for their good faith.⁸ M. de Jouvenel issued five safe-conducts expiring on the 25th December, and on the 17th the mission left for the Jabal, taking with them two members of a Damascene deputation which

¹ *Le Temps*, 8th February, 1926.

² *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 3, p. 156.

³ *Op. cit.*, VI, 4, p. 205.

⁴ See Section (viii).

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 3, pp. 150 and 155.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, VI, 4, p. 206.

⁷ See the French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, pp. 26–7.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

had been elected on the 15th in order to wait upon M. de Jouvenel at Bayrūt.¹ The mission to the Jabal failed to arrive at an understanding with Sultān ;² but M. de Jouvenel did not abandon his efforts. On the 22nd he received the Damascene deputation, which was headed by the Amīr Tāhir b. 'Abdī'l-Qādir ;³ on the 24th he proclaimed an amnesty⁴ for any of the rank and file of the insurgents who presented themselves before the French military authorities, in order to lay down their arms, before the 8th January ; on the 26th the Damascene deputation set up a standing committee of negotiation in Bayrūt ;⁵ and on the 1st January French airmen scattered over the Jabal copies of a proclamation⁶ to the Druses from the High Commissioner, in which he assured them that as soon as they laid down their arms he would allow them to draft their own constitution⁷ and choose their own Government, and declared that the responsibility for the continuation of the war would lie with Sultānu'l-Atrash, who had rebuffed the Muslim-Druse peace mission. These efforts, however, were almost entirely unsuccessful. On the 25th February, 1926, a Druse National Assembly, held at Dāmā in the Jabal, dispatched to M. de Jouvenel a series of demands⁸ which were practically identical with those presented in January by the Damascene Shaykh Tāju'd-Dīn. The High Commissioner replied that this communication rendered any conversations, direct or indirect, with the rebels impossible ; and in March he gave orders that negotiations should be discontinued.⁹ At that time the only positive results which had been obtained were the submission of Ramadānu'sh-Shallāsh¹⁰ and the ordering of elections in the Hawrān, in response to a demonstration of loyalty by the local chiefs on the 18th February.¹¹

The negotiations showed that there were three principal stumbling-blocks in the way of peace. The first was the High Commissioner's

¹ *The Times*, 21st and 23rd December, 1925.

² French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 24.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, p. 30 ; *The Times*, 23rd December, 1925.

⁴ Text in French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 50.

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, p. 30.

⁶ Text in French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 51 ; *Le Temps*, 2nd January, 1926.

⁷ The Druses were to be free either to maintain their independence or to merge themselves in Syria (statement by M. de Jouvenel in *Le Temps*, 6th February, 1926).

⁸ For these Druse demands and the summary rejection of them by M. de Jouvenel see *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 4, p. 207, and *The Times*, 9th March, 1926.

⁹ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 4, p. 207.

¹⁰ *The Times*, 28th and 30th January, 1926.

¹¹ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 3, pp. 152-3.

insistence that the insurgents must first lay down their arms in order to become entitled to an amnesty.¹ This obstacle proved insurmountable in the Jabalu'd-Durūz, where the general bearing of arms—a necessity of existence for an agricultural population surrounded by hostile Badu—had become a prescriptive right under the Ottoman régime and had been expressly authorized, within the frontiers of the Jabalu'd-Durūz State, in the Franco-Druse Treaty of the 4th March, 1921. The second stumbling-block was the reservation in the amnesty to the effect that

those who may be recognized as having been leaders of rebel bands shall be the object of individual measures to be determined in accordance with the gravity of the role which they may have played, and with the conditions of their submission—provided that, if these leaders of bands make their submission before the 8th January, 1926, the death-penalty which might be pronounced against them for the crime of sedition would not be executed.

This reservation, upon which M. de Jouvenel also insisted, gave the insurgent leaders the impression that personally they had everything to lose by giving up the struggle.²

The most serious stumbling-block of the three was the demand—presented by the Damascene deputation on the 22nd December, by Shaykh Tāju'd-Dīn in January, and by the Druse Assembly on the 25th February—that the destiny of the territories which had been annexed to the Lebanon by General Gouraud on the 1st September, 1920, should be settled by self-determination. The reopening of this question on the Syrian side on the 22nd December³ immediately

¹ See the High Commissioner's proclamations of the 24th December and the 1st January; *The Times*, 22nd and 24th December, 1925, and 4th January, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th December, 1925; *Le Temps*, 5th February, 1926; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, p. 30.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th December, 1925; *The Times*, 4th January, 1926.

³ The question had already been opened, within the Great Lebanon itself, incidentally to the drafting of the new constitution. In pursuance of a suggestion made by M. de Jouvenel in his speech of the 4th December, 1925, the Lebanon Representative Council, sitting as a constituent assembly, had taken a number of professional organizations into consultation, and this had given the annexed populations an opportunity to record their protests. On the 11th January, 1926, the Tarabulus Bar had declined to participate in drafting the new Lebanon constitution on the ground that Tarabulus ought to be reunited to Syria; and the corporations of Saydā and the Municipal Council of Ba'albak gave similar replies. On the 13th January M. Cayla retorted by dissolving the Ba'albak Council and circulating to all local officials in Lebanese territory an order that they should abstain from any manifestations in favour of the break-up of the Great Lebanon; and, a few days later, the High Commissioner went so far as to prohibit collective petitions in this sense by private individuals.

aroused a bitter public controversy.¹ A meeting of protest, over which the Maronite Patriarch presided, was held at Bakurkī on the 23rd February, 1926; the first article of the Lebanon Constitution voted on the 22nd May stipulated that the State should retain the frontiers which had been assigned to it by the mandatory Power; and the new President of the Lebanese Republic, M. Dabbās, reiterated on the 13th June, in a public speech, that the Lebanon was not prepared to cede an inch of territory—a gesture which drew a public protest, on the 18th, from the Provisional Head of the Syrian State, Ahmed Nāmī Bey. In this controversy M. de Jouvenel took up, from the outset, the position that the territorial dispute between the Lebanon and Syria was pre-eminently one of those inter-State issues in which the mandatory Power had reserved the right to act as arbitrator.² The Damascene deputation pointed out, however, that while in practice M. de Jouvenel was remitting to the decision of locally elected deputies the question of the future relations between the 'Alawī State and Syria, and between the several districts of which the Syrian State was composed, he was not remitting the cognate question of the Lebanese frontiers to the arbitrament of an election. They represented that this was not an impartial exercise of the mandatory's arbitral function, and their disbelief in French impartiality was confirmed by the High Commissioner's own declaration in an open letter which he had addressed, a few days earlier, to M. Pierre Alype at Damascus :

As for the questions of internal frontiers, it is folly to raise them at the present time. Before dreaming of enlarging their country, the Syrians should aspire to organize it.

This refusal to allow General Gouraud's high-handed action of the 31st August, 1920, to be called in question may have been essential if France was to retain the goodwill of the Christian Lebanese; but it was perhaps the principal cause of M. de Jouvenel's failure to overcome the hostility of the Sunnīs and the Druses, who constituted the majority of the population in the mandated territory.³

¹ See *The Times*, 21st December, 1925, and 13th January, 1926; *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th December, 1925; *Le Temps*, 15th and 21st January, 5th and 16th February, 1926; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 1, pp. 30-1; 2, pp. 88-90; 3, p. 150; 4, p. 207; 5, p. 277; 6, pp. 325-6.

² Statements by M. de Jouvenel in *Le Temps*, 21st January and 5th February, 1926.

³ See *The Manchester Guardian*, 29th December, 1925. It is noteworthy that, at the beginning of March 1926, an inter-confessional political conference was held in the Lebanon on the initiative of an Orthodox Christian notable, Najib Bey Sursuq. At this conference the question of the position of the

Accordingly, the Syrian War went on.¹ The reversion from negotiation to violence was signalized on the 16th–17th February, 1926, by fighting in the Maydān quarter of Damascus between insurgent ‘gunmen’ and Circassian and Armenian irregulars in the French service, when the conduct of the irregulars towards the civilian population aroused such vigorous and well-founded protests that the military governor of Damascus, General Andrea, was moved to take strong disciplinary action.² With the return of spring the French military authorities made a fresh effort to stamp the revolt out by comprehensive operations. On the 17th March one French column captured Nabk.³ At the beginning of April the reconquest of the Hermon district, begun in the previous November, was carried a stage further by another converging movement which resulted in the occupation of Bānyās on the 2nd and of Majdalu’-sh-Shams on the 3rd.⁴ On the 23rd April a force commanded by General Andrea marched out from Azrā’ against the Jabalu’d-Durūz and, on the 25th, occupied Suwaydā.⁵ This success was followed up, on the 3rd June, by the occupation of Salkhad, the second town in the Jabal ;⁶ but though the French victories produced a certain number of transient submissions the chief insurgent leaders remained at large—Sultānu’l-Atrash in the Jabal itself and Dr. Shāhbandar in the safer shelter of the Ghūtah⁷—and while French columns continued to patrol the Jabal, they could neither obtain the surrender of arms nor bring to bay the fighting-men in whose hands the arms remained.⁸ So far from being put out of action the insurgents simply transferred the chief centre of their activity from the Jabal to Damascus. On the 7th May a Druse band—reported this time to have been about 200 strong—once again penetrated into the Maydān quarter ; and on the 8th and 9th the Maydān was once again bombarded—this time at half an hour’s notice—by French artillery and aircraft. One-third of the Maydān quarter, which itself contained one-quarter of non-Christian communities in the Lebanon was discussed with moderation on both sides (*Oriente Moderno*, VI, 4, pp. 202–3).

¹ The French forces were still under the command of General Gamelin, who had been appointed *commandant supérieur*, under the *haute direction* of the High Commissioner, in December 1925 (*Le Temps*, 7th December, 1925).

² See foot-note on p. 436 above, and *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 3, pp. 151–2. This did not save the city from being fined £T100,000 and 300 rifles (*op. cit.*, VI, 4, p. 205).

³ *Le Temps*, 18th March ; *The Times*, 26th March, 1926.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 3rd April ; *The Times*, 6th and 7th April, 1926.

⁵ *The Times*, 24th and 26th April ; *Le Temps*, 27th and 28th April, 1926. For details of this operation see *Le Temps*, 19th May, 1926.

⁶ *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 7th June, 1926.

⁷ *Le Temps*, 3rd and 6th May, 1926. ⁸ *The Times*, 25th June, 1926.

the inhabitants of Damascus, was reported to have been laid in ruins. The losses were estimated at 1,000 lives, 1,200 houses, and 400 shops destroyed. The value of the material damage was computed at £700,000 sterling. The street fighting on the French side was conducted, not by French regular troops, but by the Circassian and Armenian mercenaries, who, once again, were accused of having committed wholesale robbery, arson, and murder.¹ This second devastation of Damascus, which appears to have exceeded the first in savagery, failed to intimidate the Syrian people, for in June the revolt spread to a new area in the neighbourhood of Tarabulus,² while in Damascus another batch of notables—including three members of the Syrian Cabinet, which had just been dissolved—were sent into 'enforced residence' on the charge of sympathizing with their compatriots under arms.³

These painful events in the French mandated territory placed the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations in a difficult position. The Syrian revolt was the gravest affair that had yet come under their cognizance. Both in scale and in duration it eclipsed the Bondelzwarts affair in South-West Africa.⁴ Yet, whereas the mandatory concerned in that case had been a small State amenable to international public opinion, in the present case the mandatory was one of the principal Allied Powers, with a permanent seat on the Council of the League—the body to which the Mandates Commission was responsible. If the Commission pressed the French Government too hard it would court the danger of a rebuff which might undermine not only its own authority but that of the League. If, on the other hand, it carried caution too far, it might be letting the case go by default and giving occasion to the enemies of the League to blaspheme. The effect might be particularly unfortunate if the Commission was judged to have treated a Great Power like France with more leniency than a small State like South Africa. In steering its hazardous course between Scylla and Charybdis the Permanent Mandates Commission displayed a high degree of statesmanship—as, indeed, was to be expected in a body of men who could bring so great a fund of personal experience to bear upon the accomplishment of their task.

When the French mandate for Syria came before the Permanent Mandates Commission at its seventh session of the 19th–30th

¹ *Le Temps*, 13th May; *The New York Times*, 20th and 22nd May, 1926; *The Times*, 2nd June, 1926; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, p. 280.

² *The Times*, 25th June, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 16th June, 1926.

⁴ See *Survey for 1920–3*, pp. 397–417.

October, 1925, the Commission only had before it the French Government's Report for the calendar year 1924, which did not deal with the critical period and overlapped with a previous report covering the twelve months from the 1st July, 1923, to the 30th June, 1924. On this account the Commission resolved, on the 19th October,¹ to postpone examination of the report before it, and to recommend the Council to ask the mandatory Power to furnish it, before the 15th January, 1926, with 'a written report, supported by all the necessary documents, in regard to the political events of 1925 as a whole'. 'The Commission would examine this report, at the same time as the report for 1924, together with the petitions relating to Syria which had reached it, during an extraordinary session, to be held at a date sufficiently soon to enable the Commission to submit its recommendations to the Council during its session in March 1926.' The French Government assented to this proposed procedure in a declaration² communicated to the Commission on the 23rd October; the Commission drew the League Council's attention to the proposal in a letter of the 28th;³ the Council approved in due course;⁴ and, before separating, the Commission decided to hold its extraordinary session in February 1926.⁵

The extraordinary session was duly held on the 16th February–6th March, 1926, in Rome.⁶ This time the Commission had before it a Provisional Report for 1925 from the mandatory Power, as well as 108 communications from 83 private bodies or private individuals,⁷ all resident outside the mandated territory. One of the members of the Commission, M. Rappard, drew attention to the fact that the Commission had never received petitions, coming directly from Syria, through the mandatory Power.⁸ The accredited representative of the mandatory Power gave several reasons for this—'among others, that certain of the inhabitants of Syria would fear to submit

¹ Text of their resolution in *Minutes of the Seventh Session* (C. 648, M. 237, 1925, vi), p. 16. See also the section relating to Syria and the Lebanon in the Commission's report, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

² Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 80–1.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 132–3.

⁴ Text of letter dated the 9th December, 1925, from the President, M. Briand, in *op. cit.*, p. 194.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁶ The minutes of this session, including the report of the Commission to the Council (pp. 198–208), are published in League of Nations document, C. 174, M. 65, 1926, vi. This document, which is a mine of information, has already been cited throughout the present chapter, *passim*.

⁷ List in *op. cit.*, pp. 171–3. 'All communications included in this list were submitted to the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission in conformity with the rules of procedure applicable to petitions relating to mandated territories approved by the Council on January 31st, 1923.'

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 166.

complaints owing to the customs of the country and the apprehension inspired by the authorities among populations long subject to the oppression of the old régime.' ¹ The Commission also remarked that although petitions received by the League from sources other than the inhabitants of the mandated territory themselves had been communicated to the French Government by the Chairman of the Commission, in accordance with a resolution of the League Council dated the 31st January, 1923, the petitions thus communicated had 'in no single case been the subject of any judgement or comment by the mandatory Power'. ² The Commission further found it necessary to note that, although Article 17 of the mandate provided that 'copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be attached to the said [annual] report [from the mandatory]', and although the Commission had recalled this obligation in the report on its fifth session, 'the texts in question' had 'not been communicated to it with any of the reports of the mandatory Power on Syria, and that it' had 'in consequence been handicapped in its effort to understand the situation in the mandated territory'. ³ As for the French Government's Provisional Report for 1925, in which the Commission had 'expected to find all the material necessary for its enlightenment', the Commission regretted to record that this document did not fulfil its expectations, and that it contained lacunae 'not only in its statement of the immediate causes of the present rising, but also in regard to the deeper causes of an unrest which had in no way been brought out in the reports for preceding years'. ⁴ 'The inadequacy of the written documentation supplied by the mandatory Power . . . had the effect of prolonging the oral discussions'; ⁵ and while the Commission diplomatically declined to give an official hearing to a distinguished Druse publicist, the Amīr Shakīb Arslān, ⁶ its members searchingly (though courteously) cross-examined the accredited representative of the mandatory Power, M. Robert de Caix, and expressed their 'cordial appreciation of the importance and frankness of his statements', after making due allowance for the fact that he was not 'assisted by an official closely associated with the mandatory administration during the last few months'. ⁷

¹ *Minutes of the Seventh Session*, p. 201.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 199; cf. p. 48.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See *op. cit.*, p. 168, for the text of a letter addressed to the Amīr Shakīb Arslān on the 5th March, 1926, by the Chairman of the Commission.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 202; cf. p. 167.

This cross-examination of M. de Caix brought out into the light of publicity—at a stage when publicity might still influence the course of events—a great body of information regarding the origins and development of the Syrian insurrection, which otherwise would almost certainly have been withheld until it had lost all importance except for the historian. In this manner the Permanent Mandates Commission exercised an indirect but none the less powerful and salutary influence upon the future administration of the French mandate in Syria. Beyond this it elicited from the accredited representative of the mandatory Power a precise declaration¹ concerning the conception which the French Government held of its mission.

The idea which has governed, if not the whole exercise of the mandate, at any rate all the efforts made to organize it, is the following: The mandate is a provisional system designed to enable populations which, politically speaking, are still minors to educate themselves so as to arrive one day at full self-government. This presupposes that the mandatory Power will gradually create native organizations in the mandated territory such as may, when complete, be able to ensure entirely the government of the country, and such as may, if they carry out their duties in a proper manner, render the intervention of the mandatory unnecessary. It appears from this that there should not be any intervention on the part of the organizations of the mandatory Power in the internal affairs of the native Governments.

The Commission drew special attention to this declaration because, 'in the first place, the conception of the mandate, as thus defined, appears to be in strict harmony both with the letter and the spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant, and also of the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon; secondly, the Commission believes that the doctrine thus stated will be found to offer the real solution of the difficult problem which has arisen in these countries.'² The Commission mentioned³ that it had refrained from examining those petitions which claimed the complete independence of Syria, and also those which protested against the assignment of the mandate for Syria to France, for the reason that the mandate had been assigned to France at the San Remo Conference in 1920 'in virtue of a decision of the Supreme Council in which the League of Nations took no part'. The Commission pointed out that its task was 'one of supervision and of co-operation—functions which, though neither incompatible nor in conflict with one another, may yet be accompanied by genuine

¹ Text in *op. cit.*, p. 45; quoted by the Commission in its report, *op. cit.*, p. 202. Cf. M. de Caix's observations on pp. 61-2.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 200.

difficulties when they have to be carried out simultaneously'.¹ As the Commission was 'anxious not to make the task of France in Syria and the Lebanon impossible of performance' it did 'not, in the present instance, recommend the Council to set up a commission of inquiry independent of the mandatory Power. Nevertheless, recognizing its duty of supervision, it' had 'not felt able to abstain from expressing certain criticisms'. The Commission's report, in which these criticisms were presented, was forwarded, on the 17th March, 1926, by the Council of the League to the French Government, with a request that it should take 'the requisite action'.

On the 17th June, 1926, during its ninth session, the Permanent Mandates Commission gave a hearing to M. de Jouvenel.² In regard to the past the French High Commissioner announced that he had instructed an official who did not belong to any of the preceding administrations to make an inquiry into the events which had preceded his own arrival in Syria. In regard to his own administration he made a verbal statement and submitted himself for subsequent cross-examination. In regard to the future he suggested that it might be possible to secure a lasting peace in the mandated territory by the conclusion of treaties—in the first instance between the Lebanon and Syria, and secondly between Syria and France, on the precedent established by the treaty between 'Irāq and Great Britain.³ M. de Jouvenel was reported to have made the statement that the conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty on the Anglo-'Irāqī model was not merely his own personal idea but had become the policy of the French Government. If so an agreed settlement between the mandatory Power and the people of the mandated territory ought to have been within reach of attainment, since this very idea, after having been suggested originally to the accredited representative of the French Government by the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission on the 22nd February, 1926,⁴ had been taken up by Ahmed Nāmī Bey, the Provisional Head of the Syrian State, in his inaugural proclamation of the 28th April,⁵ and had been adopted in the following month by the first ministry that took office under

¹ M. de Caix afterwards testified that the Commission had accomplished this dual task successfully in its eighth session (League of Nations document, C. 173, M. 64, 1926, vi, p. 3).

² Reported in *Le Temps* and *The Times*, 18th June, 1926. See also the *Minutes of the Ninth Session* (C. 405, M. 144, 1926, vi).

³ See Section (x) below.

⁴ *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 62–3.

⁵ See p. 446 above.

him.¹ Unfortunately this ministry was dissolved, for having shown undue sympathy to the insurgents, on the 15th June, two days before M. de Jouvenel presented his suggestion at Geneva, and three of the ex-ministers were sent, with other Damascene notables, into 'enforced residence'.² In July M. de Jouvenel resigned the High Commissionership, and on the 27th August M. Ponsot was appointed as his successor, without any further public reference to the negotiation of a treaty being made on the French side. Meanwhile, the guerrilla warfare in the mandated territory went on.

(viii) **The Status of the sanjāq of Alexandretta and the Situation along the Syro-Turkish Frontier from the Signature at Angora of the so-called 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' on the 20th October, 1921, to the Signature of the 'de Jouvenel Agreement' at the same place on the 30th May, 1926.**³

The Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921,⁴ had tacitly set aside the line originally claimed by France for the new frontier between Turkey and the Syrian territory which was to be placed under a French mandate, and had laid down (Art. 8) a new line, further to the south, which left on the Turkish side the whole permanent way of the Baghdad Railway (including stations and sidings as well as the main track), except the section between Maydān-Akbas and Chōbān-Beg, where the railway made a V-shaped deflexion towards the south in order to pass through Aleppo. The new frontier, thus fixed by agreement between the Government of the Turkish Great National Assembly on the one side and the mandatory Power in Syria on the other, and confirmed in the Lausanne Treaty (Art. 3), approximately corresponded, along the greater part of its course, to the linguistic boundary between the Turkish and Kurdish languages on the north and Arabic on the south. In the coastal sector, however, it left outside Turkey the sanjāq of Alexandretta and Antioch, with a Turkish population which the French authorities

¹ *Le Temps*, 18th May, 1926.

² *The Times*, 16th June, 1926. See p. 446 above.

³ This agreement was negotiated by M. de Jouvenel, and was initialed by him on the 18th February, 1926, but it was only signed by M. Sarraut, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, on the following 30th May. (See the *French Journal Officiel*, 27th August, 1926, pp. 9706 *et seq.*)

⁴ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 33-5 and 53-4. The text of the agreement is printed in *Cmd.* 1556 of 1921, and the text of notes exchanged between the British and French Governments regarding the agreement in *Cmd.* 1570 of 1921.

estimated at 87,000.¹ In compensation for this the agreement provided (Art. 7) that

a special administrative régime shall be instituted for the region of Alexandretta. The Turkish inhabitants of this region shall enjoy all facilities for the development of their culture. The Turkish language shall have an official status there.

This pledge, which was in harmony with the decentralizing policy of the French in their mandated territory, was faithfully observed. A special régime had, indeed, already been conferred upon the Alexandretta sanjāq by an *arrêté* of the High Commissioner dated the 8th August, 1921, and this was followed up by another *arrêté* of the 4th March, 1923. Administratively, 'the laws in force in the [Alexandretta] sanjāq were the same as those applied throughout the State of Aleppo, and the sanjāq was represented on the Representative Council of that State'. (Towards the end of 1923 the High Commissioner went so far as to give the Turkish language parity with Arabic in the State Representative Council of Aleppo).² 'But the *mutasarrif* [of the sanjāq] who was in charge of its administration and who had at his immediate disposal a French deputy delegate . . . exercised . . . practically all the powers of a Governor. Moreover, the sanjāq had an autonomous budget drawn up by the *mutasarrif* and submitted by him to the Administrative Commission of the sanjāq before it was sent to the Governor and submitted by him to the Representative Council of the State.'³ General Weygand's *arrêté* of the 5th December, 1924, which merged the States of Aleppo and Damascus into a single State of Syria,⁴ provided (Art. 9) that the special régime in the Alexandretta sanjāq should remain unaffected, except that the sanjāq should cease to be attached to the Aleppo vilāyet and that the former attributions of the Governor of Aleppo in respect of it should devolve upon the President of Syria. An *arrêté* made by General Sarraill in January 1925⁵ still left the sanjāq within the framework of the Syrian State, but otherwise reconfirmed the existing special régime in matters of finance and administration, particularly the parity of Turkish with Arabic and French as an official language.

The policy inaugurated by General Sarraill's successor, M. de Jouvenel,⁶ raised the hopes of the Alexandrettan and Antiochene

¹ French Government's *Report*, 1922-3, p. 9.

² *Oriente Moderno*, III, 7, p. 424.

³ *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 101. Statement by the French representative.

⁴ See above, p. 360.

⁵ *Oriente Moderno*, V, 2, pp. 108-9.

⁶ See above, p. 440.

Turks, and the deputies returned in the elections of January 1926 by the districts of Alexandretta, Antioch, and Qiriqkhān¹ demanded that the sanjāq should be separated completely from the Syrian State and placed directly under the High Commissioner.² The deputies of the sanjāq were permitted to form themselves into a Representative Council, which held its first meeting on the 22nd February;³ in March this Council, meeting as a constituent assembly, proclaimed the independence of the territory as a separate State, voted a constitution,⁴ and proposed to the High Commissioner that his Delegate at Alexandretta, M. Durieux, should be appointed President.⁵ These resolutions were confirmed on the 22nd April;⁶ but the Government of the State of Syria sent its Ministers of Justice and Finance on a mission to Alexandretta, to induce the Council to reconsider its decision; and on the 12th June, 1926, the negotiations resulted, partly through the good offices of the French delegate, in the Council's rescinding the previous declaration of independence and agreeing that the Alexandretta territory should remain within the framework of Syrian unity under a régime of decentralization.⁷

The consideration thus shown by the French to the Turkish population under their mandate was not reciprocated by an equally scrupulous observance of the 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' on the Turkish Government's part. The first article of this agreement had stipulated that 'the state of war should cease' from the moment of signature; and a positive state of peace was subsequently established by the conclusion of the Mudania Armistice on the 11th October, 1922, the signature of the Lausanne Treaty on the 24th July, 1923, and the coming into force of the treaty on the 6th August, 1924. Nevertheless, the suspension of regular military operations and the juridical restoration of peace was not accompanied, on the Turkish side, by the cessation of guerrilla warfare, and the districts on the Syrian side of the new Turco-Syrian frontier continued to be infested by bands of Turkish *chetehs*, whom the Turkish authorities tolerated and even supported, while disclaiming all responsibility for their handiwork. The incursions of these irregulars into the French

¹ In these districts the polling was very heavy (*Le Temps*, 14th January, 1926).

² *The Times*, 27th January, 1926; *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 2, p. 91. Text of the petition in *Le Temps*, 29th January, 1926.

³ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 3, p. 155.

⁴ Articles 1, 2, and 13 of this constitution are quoted in *op. cit.*, VI, 6, p. 328.

⁵ *The Times*, 22nd March, 1926; 6th April, 1926.

⁶ *Le Temps*, 25th April, 1926.

⁷ *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 6, p. 328.

mandated territory reached their climax during the first half of 1924.¹

In 1925 the Mixed Commission of Delimitation which, by the terms of the 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' (Art. 8), ought to have been constituted within one month, and to have started work within two months of signature, was at last brought into action. The Commission actually met in September, a few weeks after the Kurdish revolt against the Turks had been suppressed and after the revolt against the French in the Jabalu'd-Durūz had begun; but the Turks claimed a number of points to the south of the Franklin-Bouillon Line—for example, the railway-station of Pāyās; a dozen villages in which the land was the private property of certain inhabitants of Killis, on the Turkish side; and the 'pan-handle' of the French mandated territory extending to the Tigris, where the 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' had drawn the frontier along the Nisībīn-Jezīret Ibn 'Umar road.² When M. de Jouvenel arrived in Syria as French High Commissioner he found that these Turkish claims had brought the work of the Delimitation Commission to a standstill.³ Realizing the danger of allowing this Franco-Turkish controversy to drag on while the internal crisis in the French mandated territory continued unabated M. de Jouvenel went in person to Angora in the second week of February 1926;⁴ and on the 18th of that month a comprehensive agreement, embodied in a convention and five protocols, was initialed by him and by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rushdī Bey.

This agreement⁵ followed, in the principal matters with which it dealt, certain established precedents. Thus there was a clause (Art. 14) providing for arbitration in all disputes between Turkey and France (in her capacity of mandatory Power in Syria) in which sovereign rights were not in question. There was a reciprocal pledge to preserve a benevolent neutrality in case of attack upon one of the contracting parties by a third party, as in the Russo-Turkish Treaty of the 17th December, 1925.⁶ Above all there was an arrangement (worked out in detail in one of the protocols, applying

¹ See French Government's *Report*, 1923-4, pp. 13-14; *Le Temps*, 16th and 19th March, 1924; *The Times*, 18th March and 22nd April, 1924.

² *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, pp. 17-18.

³ See *Le Temps*, 30th July, 24th September, 2nd, 9th, 10th, and 16th October, 1925; French Government's *Provisional Report* for 1925, p. 43.

⁴ *The Times*, 13th February, 1926.

⁵ For the official French text see the French *Journal Officiel*, 27th August, 1926, pp. 9706 *et seq.*

⁶ See p. 525 below.

to a zone fifty kilometres deep on either side of the frontier) for co-operation between the two parties in putting down trans-frontier raids, on the lines which had been laid down at Lausanne in regard to the frontiers of Eastern Thrace,¹ and in the Haddah and Bahrah Agreements of the 2nd and 1st November, 1925, in regard to the frontiers respectively dividing Najd from 'Irāq and from Trans-jordan.² Other protocols dealt with the mutual extradition of criminals, the distribution of the waters of the Quwayq and the Euphrates, and the conditions regulating that reciprocal right of military transport over the sections of the Baghdad Railway lying within the respective territories of the two parties, which had been established under the 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' (Art. 10). In other protocols, again, a number of technical questions, long outstanding, were disposed of.³ In consideration of the arrangement for the maintenance of neighbourly relations M. de Jouvenel agreed to those readjustments of frontier in the Pāyās and Killis sectors (though not in the Nisibīn-Jeziret Ibn 'Umar sector) which the Turks had demanded.

The initialing of this Franco-Turkish agreement on the 18th February, 1926, raised two questions. In the first place, the Permanent Mandates Commission, in the report on their session of the 16th February-6th March, 1926,⁴ drew attention to the provision in the French mandate (Art. 4) that 'the mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power'. They expressed the opinion that 'as regards the political agreements which the mandatory Power has so far concluded on behalf of the mandated territories, it does not appear that they have unjustifiably affected the territorial integrity of Syria and the Lebanon'. At the same time they 'noted with satisfaction M. de Caix's statements to the effect that the conventions recently concluded in this field between M. de Jouvenel and the Angora Government will be communicated to the League of Nations for approval so far as they affect the territorial boundaries of the mandated territory, before they are put into force'. In his comments on this report⁵ M. de Caix denied having given any promise

¹ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, p. 108.

² See pp. 344-5 above. For the similar chapter in the Anglo-Turco-'Irāqī Treaty of the 5th June, 1926, see p. 527 below.

³ In the Middle East, as in Eastern Europe, the settlement of such technical questions was the symptom of a *détente* in major political controversies. Compare the *Survey for 1924*, Part II B, Sections (iii), (iv), and (vi).

⁴ *Minutes of the Eighth Session*, pp. 203-4.

⁵ League of Nations Document, C. 173, M. 64, 1926, vi, p. 2.

that the conventions in question would be communicated to the League 'for approval' (a communication which was 'not provided for in Article 3 [*sic*] of the mandate'), and announced that they would only be communicated for registration under Article 18 of the Covenant. In view of this *caveat* the *rapporteur* to the Council of the League on the Permanent Mandates Commission's Report drew attention, once again, on the 17th March, 1926, to the unequivocal terms of the French mandate, Article 4. This elicited from the French representative on the Council, M. Paul-Boncour, an assurance that, while the principle of Article 4 was unchallenged, the conventions under negotiation did not involve either a cession or a lease of territory within the meaning and scope of that article. 'They concerned only the final settlement on the spot of the frontiers between Syria and Turkey fixed by the agreements of 1921, which had been confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne.' He also admitted the obligation, and declared the intention, of the French Government to communicate these conventions, in due course, for registration. 'The communication had not yet been made for the very simple reason that the agreement in question was one still being negotiated and one which the French Government was at present examining.'

The signature of the instruments initialed on the 18th February, 1926, had in fact been delayed because, in a subsequent exchange of letters, the French Government had pointed out to the Turkish Government that, as far as France was concerned, the reciprocal undertaking to preserve neutrality in case of attack upon one of the contracting parties by a third party would be overruled by the obligations of France as a member of the League of Nations. At the moment these prior obligations, to which the French Government thus loyally and frankly drew attention, were of very practical account, since there existed a serious possibility of war between another member of the League, Great Britain, and Turkey over the League Council's award in the matter of the Turco-'Irāqī frontier.¹ If a war between Great Britain and Turkey broke out through Turkey's refusal to accept a League of Nations award, France would be bound by the terms of the Covenant to sever economic relations with Turkey; but she would further be involved in a more intimate way. The main theatre of such a war would be the Mosul vilāyet; in order to conduct military operations there it would be vital for the Turks to have the free use of the Baghdad Railway; and in

¹ See Section (xi) (g) below.

Article 10 of the 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' either contracting party had granted to the other the right to make military transports over that section of the railway which traversed the granting party's territory. The French Government had consistently interpreted this article as applying only to 'military convoys sent for the purpose of the normal relief and provisioning of the Turkish troops stationed in districts served by the line'. It had insisted on this interpretation during the Kurdish Revolt against Turkey in the spring of 1925,¹ for fear that Turkish reinforcements dispatched over the Maydān Akbas-Chōbān Beg section, ostensibly *en route* for the districts in revolt, might be concentrated, after their passage, on the Turco-'Irāqī frontier. On the 23rd February, 1926, five days after the initialing of the new Franco-Turkish Agreement at Angora by M. de Jouvenel, M. de Caix, the accredited representative of the French Government, reaffirmed the French interpretation of the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement to the Permanent Mandates Commission—declaring categorically that at least the Syrian section of the railway 'should not be used by the Turks in any military operations against 'Irāq', and that 'the mandatory Power could not in any circumstances agree to demands put forward with the object of causing the mandated territory to break her neutrality and infringe upon the mutual obligations of States Members of the League of Nations'.² This scrupulously correct attitude on the French Government's part was not well received by the Turkish Government, which pointed out that, in the text of the agreement, the reciprocal pledge to maintain benevolent neutrality had appeared without qualification.³ In consequence the instruments initialed by M. de Jouvenel and Tevfik Rushdī Bey on the 18th February, 1926, were not signed by the same Turkish Minister and M. Sarraut, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, until the 30th May, only six days before the signature of the Anglo-Turco-'Irāqī Treaty,⁴ by which the danger of a war over the Mosul controversy was conclusively averted.

The almost simultaneous signature of these two agreements in 1926⁵ happily removed a cause of friction which had been troubling Anglo-French relations intermittently since the signature of the 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' nearly five years earlier. Not only

¹ See Section (xi) (e) below.

² *Minutes of the Eighth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission*, p. 73.

³ *The Times*, 3rd June, 1926.

⁴ See p. 527 below.

⁵ The Franco-Turkish Agreement was ratified by the Turkish Great National Assembly before the end of June 1926. The exchange of ratifications took place on the 12th August, 1926.

the British Government but the British public had resented the 'Franklin-Bouillon Agreement' as, in their opinion, approximating too closely to a 'separate peace', in contravention of the celebrated Agreement of London, to which the Principal Allied Powers had solemnly subscribed at the outset of the Great War.¹ They had been still further disquieted by the atmosphere of secrecy in which not only M. Franklin-Bouillon in 1921, but M. de Jouvenel in 1926 had conducted his negotiations at Angora. This anxiety and resentment were at least partly justified by the real danger of war which, throughout this period, was impending over the Turco-'Irāqī frontier, and by the strategic importance of the Baghdad Railway, in regard to which the French and the Turks made their own arrangements without taking the British into their counsels. It would be ungenerous, however, in a British Survey of International Affairs, not to draw attention to the fact that, although the establishment of neighbourly relations was at least as urgent a matter for France on the Turco-Syrian frontier as it was for Great Britain on the Turco-'Irāqī frontier, the French Government did not, actually, consult its interests in regard to Turkey at the expense of its obligations towards Great Britain.

(ix) The Regulation of the Frontier between 'Irāq and Syria.²

As far as the Mesopotamian (as contrasted with the Palestinian) sector was concerned the territorial provisions of the so-called 'Sykes-Picot Agreement' between Great Britain and France³ were denounced by the British Government before General Allenby launched his victorious offensive on the Palestinian front in the autumn of 1918; and, during the Peace Conference of Paris, France ceded to Great Britain those portions of the Mosul Vilāyet which the 'Sykes-Picot Agreement' had assigned to her. Meanwhile, the interior of Syria had come under the authority of the Amīr Faysal b. Husayn's Arab National Government at Damascus; and in May 1920 an agreement was made, between the Damascus Government and the British authorities in 'Irāq, under which, on the Euphrates, the administrative boundary between Syria and 'Irāq was drawn across the river at a point some five miles below the town of Abū

¹ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 11-13.

² See *Report on 'Irāq Administration*, March 1922-April 1923 (British White Paper, *Colonial*, No. 4 of 1924), pp. 42-9; *Report for April 1923-December 1924* (*Colonial*, No. 13 of 1925), pp. 39-42.

³ See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part I A, Sections 6 and 7.

Kamāl.¹ In the Jazīrah, between the Middle Euphrates and the Tigris, the whole of the Jabal Sinjār, and the Yazīdī tribal confederation by which it was inhabited, was and remained *de facto* under the control of Baghdad. After the French conquest of the interior of Syria in the summer of 1920 there was signed, on the 23rd December of the same year, an Anglo-French Convention² which defined (Art. 1) the boundary between the French mandated territories of Syria and the Lebanon and the British mandated territories of 'Irāq and Palestine in such a way as to cut through the middle of the Jabal Sinjār and to bisect Abū Kamāl. This line was to be traced on the spot (Art. 2), within three months of signature, by a boundary commission; but the commission was not appointed, and, on the 'Irāqī side, the *de facto* situation established in May 1920 remained unchanged until the French made their authority effective on their side of the frontier zone, which they did in the latter part of 1921. In September 1921 discussions were started between the French High Commissioner in Syria and the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq, on the initiative of the latter, with a view to reopening trade between the two countries and protecting caravans against exactions by the Badu of the Jazīrah steppe. A more serious problem was presented by the trans-frontier raids of the tribes owing allegiance to Syria and 'Irāq respectively, and by the claims for reparation arising out of them;³ and this question was taken up by the two High Commissioners, again on the British High Commissioner's initiative, in March 1922. On the 6th May, 1923, a conference of French and British officials met at Qā'im to deal with the provisional definition of tribal boundaries in the Euphrates sector, the prevention of raiding, and the protection of trade; but this conference was brought to a premature end by a recrudescence of tribal disturbance, and a second conference held at Dayru'z-Zūr on the 20th–25th July, 1923, was almost equally fruitless. Finally, a court of arbitration, composed of the tribal chiefs themselves, was convened at Abū Kamāl on the 2nd–9th September, 1924, under the auspices of the French and British authorities, and on this occasion claims which had arisen since July 1923 were settled, a feud between the chiefs of the Syrian 'Aqaydāt and the 'Irāqī 'Amārāt was composed, and an armistice was signed by the tribal chiefs on either side. The success of this tribal court of arbitration pointed the way towards a permanent

¹ 'Irāq Report, 1922–3, p. 47.

² Text in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 1195 of 1921.

³ For the similar problem on the frontier between the 'Irāq and the Najd see above, pp. 344–5.

regulation of the frontier, and contributed to the solution of the general problem created by the drawing of international frontiers between civilized Governments across tribal territories.¹

The tracing on the spot of the Syro-‘Irāqī frontier had not yet been carried out at the end of 1925, and in the Jabal Sinjār sector the *status quo* remained undisturbed, with the French High Commissioner’s approval.² Another provision of the agreement of the 23rd December, 1920, which remained unfulfilled was the nomination of an Anglo-French commission to study any plans for irrigation in the French mandated territory which might seriously diminish the volume of water in the Tigris and Euphrates at the points where these rivers passed into ‘Irāq.³

- (x) The Ratification of the Anglo-‘Irāqī Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, and the decision taken by the Council of the League of Nations on the 27th September, 1924, regarding the application to ‘Irāq of Article 22 of the Covenant.

In the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*⁴ there has been given an analysis of the draft mandate for ‘Irāq originally submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the British Government in December 1920,⁵ and also an account of the two obstacles to the inauguration of the mandate: the Anglo-American controversy concerning the commercial ‘open door’ in ‘Irāq, particularly with regard to the development of possible oil resources, and the political opposition of the people of ‘Irāq themselves to the principle (or perhaps rather to the name) of the mandatory system. In 1922 the American opposition was overcome by an offer which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, at the suggestion of the British Government, made to the Standard Oil Company and to certain other American interests to surrender to them 50 per cent. of the Anglo-Persian

¹ The raiding tradition could not, of course, be eradicated in a moment, and down to the time of writing trans-frontier raids continued. On the 2nd April, 1926, for example, there was an attack by Syrian tribesmen on the ‘Irāqī Shammar, in which British armoured cars intervened with effect on the Shammar side (*The Times*, 3rd April, 1926).

² For action taken against a recalcitrant Yazidī chief in the Jabal Sinjār by the British Air Force on the 18th April, 1925, see *ibid.*, 21st and 25th April, 1925.

³ See *The Times*, 12th April, and *The Manchester Guardian*, 5th May, 1924, for the project of a barrage and reservoir on the Euphrates at Falūjah.

⁴ Vol. vi, Ch. I, Part III C, Section 9.

⁵ For texts of the original and final drafts of the mandates for both ‘Irāq and Palestine see British White Papers *Cmd.* 1176 and 1500 of 1921 respectively.

Company's share in the Turkish Petroleum Company's rights¹ to the exploitation of oil in 'Irāq.² The first step towards overcoming the nationalist opposition among the 'Irāqīs was the signature at Baghdad, on the 10th October, 1922, of a treaty between the British and 'Irāqī Governments which was intended to be a substitute for the mandate, subject to the consent of the League of Nations. In the *History of the Peace Conference* the negotiation of this treaty has also been recorded and its terms described. It remains to record the ratification of the treaty and the decision taken in regard to it by the Council of the League.

On the 12th October, 1922, in connexion with the publication of the treaty, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies made an announcement³ in which he stated the British Government's conviction that the obligations towards 'Irāq into which they had entered would be completely fulfilled by means of the treaty ; gave a pledge that the British Government would do everything in their power to expedite the delimitation of the frontiers of 'Irāq in order that 'Irāq might be in a position, when the treaty and subsidiary agreements therein provided for had been duly ratified and the Organic Law had been brought into effect, to apply for admission to membership of the League of Nations ; and promised their good offices, provided that effect was being given to the provisions of the treaty, to secure the admission of 'Irāq to membership of the League, as provided for in Article 6 of the treaty—which afforded, in the British Government's opinion, the sole legal means by which the mandatory relation could be terminated.

The treaty, according to its own terms (Art. 18), was to be submitted to the Constituent Assembly of the new kingdom, and was to remain in force for twenty years from ratification, unless before that date Article 6 had come into effect ; but it was laid down in the same clause (Art. 18) that the provisions of the treaty might be reviewed and revised in the meantime ; and as early as the 30th April, 1923, in deference to public opinion both in England and in

¹ The Anglo-Persian Company had other rights (afterwards formally recognized) in the territories transferred from Persia to Turkey before the War of 1914-18 and inherited from Turkey by 'Irāq.

² *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th March, 1925. On the 23rd January, 1923, during the Lausanne Conference, the United States Observer filed a statement reaffirming his Government's point of view regarding the 'open door' in 'Irāq (text in British Blue Book, *Omd.* 1814 of 1923, p. 405).

³ Text in *'Irāq Report*, 1922-3, pp. 186-7. For texts of King Faysal's proclamation of the 13th October, 1922, and of an exchange of telegrams between King Faysal and King George, see *op. cit.*, pp. 24-5.

'Irāq, a protocol to the treaty¹ was signed in which, for the maximum period of twenty years from the ratification of the treaty itself, there was substituted a maximum period of four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey (an event which took place on the 6th August, 1924). The four agreements subsidiary to the treaty, regarding military, judicial, and financial matters, and the employment of British officials, were signed by the 'Irāqī Government on the 25th March, 1924.²

The Constituent Assembly was opened on the 27th March, 1924, and the protracted debates on the treaty which ensued produced a dangerous tension in the political atmosphere. 'There was a genuine feeling, even among some of those who were the heartiest advocates of an alliance with Great Britain,³ that the conditions, especially those contained in the Financial Agreement, were too heavy for the 'Irāq State to carry out.'⁴ On the 20th April an attempt was made to assassinate two tribal deputies who were supporters of the treaty;⁵ the lengthy report⁶ of the Assembly's committee on the drafts, which was presented on the same date, did not facilitate a decision; and on the 29th May there was a demonstration, hostile to the treaty, outside the House of Assembly, which had to be broken up by cavalry of the 'Irāq Army.⁷ Even before that date the *impasse* had become so serious that the British Government had addressed a letter to the League, asking that the question of 'Irāq might be placed on the agenda of the meeting of the Council which was to open on the 10th June, and communicating the text of the treaty and the subsidiary agreements. At the same time they announced that if the Constituent Assembly accepted the instruments by that date, they intended, after obtaining the assent of Parliament, to invite the Council of the League to adopt these instruments as defining the obligations of Great Britain in respect of 'Irāq; but that, failing acceptance by that date, they might have no other option but to obtain the authority of the Council for some alternative

¹ For texts of the treaty of the 10th October, 1922, the protocol of the 30th April, 1923, and the subsidiary agreements which were eventually signed on the 25th March, 1924, see British White Paper, *Cmd.* 2370 of 1925, and League of Nations document, C. 216, M. 77, 1926, vi, C. P. M. 391.

² See '*Irāq Report*, 1923-4, for texts of an exchange of notes of the 26th March and the 10th July, 1924, regarding the execution of any treaties, agreements or undertakings which His Britannic Majesty was under obligation to see carried out in respect of 'Irāq, as mentioned in Article 10 of the treaty of the 10th October, 1922.

³ This feeling seems to have been shared by many British officials [A. J. T.].

⁴ '*Irāq Report*, 1923-4.

⁵ *The Times*, 22nd April and 7th May, 1924.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10th June, 1924

⁷ '*Irāq Report*, 1923-4, p. 22.

arrangement for carrying out in ‘Irāq the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant.¹ The Assembly procrastinated until the eleventh hour, but eventually accepted the treaty shortly before midnight on the 10th June—37 of the 69 (out of 100) members present voting in favour, 24 against, and 8 abstaining.² In their resolution of acceptance³ the Assembly took note of statements received from the British High Commissioner to the effect that the British Government, after ratification, would amend with all speed the Financial Agreement; and, in view of this, they recommended the King to ratify all the instruments, on two conditions: first, that His Majesty should enter immediately into negotiations with the British Government for securing the amendments suggested by the Committee of the Assembly; and, secondly, that all the instruments should become null and void if the British Government failed ‘to safeguard the rights of ‘Irāq in the Mosul Wilāyat in its entirety’.

Thereafter the Assembly unanimously voted the Organic Law on the 10th July and the Electoral Law on the 2nd August, 1924.⁴ The ‘Irāqī Government was notified on the 10th November, 1924, of the ratification of the treaty by King George, and the ratification by King Faysal took place on the 12th December.⁵

Meanwhile, on the 17th June, 1924, the British Government had duly submitted to the Council of the League the draft of an instrument embodying the terms of the documents which had been signed and ratified by Great Britain and ‘Irāq. The Council postponed discussion until their next session; and accordingly, on the 20th September, 1924, Lord Parmoor submitted to them a fresh draft of a decision which it was suggested that they should record.⁶ After a second postponement the Council eventually adopted this draft, as it stood, on the 27th September.

The Council’s decision of the 27th September, 1924, recited a communication from the British Government, in which that Government agreed, so long as the Anglo-‘Irāqī Treaty was in force, to assume,

¹ Foreign Office statement, published in *The Times*, 28th May. 1924.

² ‘*Irāq Report*, 1923–4, p. 22. Seven out of the eight abstainers are stated (*op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*) to have declared at a previous vote against postponing ratification, but to have abstained on this occasion owing to intimidation.

³ Text in *op. cit.*, pp. 22–3.

⁴ ‘*Irāq Report*, 1923–4, p. 23. The Organic Law was promulgated on the 21st March, 1925 (*The Manchester Guardian*, 7th April, 1925), and the first Parliament elected under the Electoral Law was opened on the 16th July, 1925 (*The Times*, 17th July, 1925).

⁵ ‘*Irāq Report*, 1923–4, p. 26.

⁶ Texts of Lord Parmoor’s statement to the Council on the 20th September, 1924, and of the draft decision, which was adopted by the Council on the 27th, in *Cmd.* 2317 of 1925.

towards all Members of the League who accepted the provisions of this arrangement and the benefits of the treaty, responsibility for the fulfilment by 'Irāq of the provisions of the treaty. They further agreed to present to the Council a documented annual report regarding the execution of the treaty ; not to assent to any modifications of the treaty without the Council's consent ; and to submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice any dispute, regarding the treaty, with another Member of the League if it could not be settled by negotiation. They stipulated that, in the event of 'Irāq being admitted to the League of Nations, the obligations hereby assumed by the British Government should terminate. On the other hand, they offered that, on the termination of the period for which the treaty had been concluded, the Council, if 'Irāq had not been admitted to the League by then, should decide what further measures were required to give effect to Article 22 of the Covenant. After reciting this communication the Council accepted the British Government's undertakings and approved the terms of the communication as giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant. They further decided that the former Ottoman Capitulations would not be required for the protection of foreigners in 'Irāq so long as the Anglo-'Irāqī Treaty remained in force.

Thus there was substituted, by a juridically valid procedure, for the draft British mandate over 'Irāq a Treaty of Alliance between the British and 'Irāqī Governments, duly signed, ratified, and approved by the League. At this point the question of the international status of 'Irāq became involved in the Anglo-Turkish controversy over the Vilāyet of Mosul. This controversy came before the Council at the same session at which the decision, just described, was taken, and the connexion was threefold. In the first place, the admission of 'Irāq to membership in the League, which was contemplated in the treaty of the 10th October, 1922, in the protocol of the 30th April, 1923, and in the decision of the 27th September, 1924, could not take place until the frontiers of 'Irāq had been delimited. Secondly, the Constituent Assembly of 'Irāq, in accepting the treaty on the 10th June, 1924, had made this acceptance conditional upon the retention of the entire Vilāyet of Mosul within the frontiers of the 'Irāqī State. Thirdly, the special commission of inquiry into the Mosul controversy, which the Council of the League decided, on the 30th September, 1924, to appoint, recommended, in their report of the 16th July, 1925, that the whole disputed territory should be united with 'Irāq, on condition that the territory should 'remain under the effective

mandate of the League of Nations ' for a period of twenty-five years.¹ This recommendation gave rise to a new treaty between Great Britain and ʿIrāq, which was signed on the 13th January, 1926. In the present Survey this instrument is dealt with in the account of the Mosul controversy,² where it properly belongs.

(xi) The Controversy between Great Britain and Turkey over the frontier between Turkey and ʿIrāq or over the disposal of the former Ottoman vilāyet of Mosul (Mawsil).³

(a) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORY AND OF ITS INHABITANTS.⁴

The former Ottoman vilāyet of Mosul, within the administrative boundaries which it possessed at the moment of the Armistice of

¹ League of Nations Document, C. 400, M. 147, 1925, vii, p. 88.

² See below, pp. 527-8.

³ From the opening of the Anglo-Turkish Conference at Qasim Pasha (Constantinople) on the 19th May, 1924, until the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on the 30th September, 1924, the two parties to the controversy were at issue, not merely as to the lines on which the controversy ought to be settled, but as to what the actual subject of the controversy was. In the text of the Lausanne Treaty (Art. 3, Par. 2) the Vilāyet of Mosul was not mentioned, but only ' the frontier between Turkey and ʿIrāq '. The Turks, however, cited, from the *procès verbal* of the Lausanne Conference, certain remarks made by Lord Curzon from which they argued that ' the problem for settlement ' consisted ' in determining whether the Vilāyet of Mosul ought to remain north or south of the frontier-line between Turkey and ʿIrāq ' (statement by Fethi Bey before the Council of the League of Nations on the 20th September, 1924). They maintained that in any case no territory north of the former northern administrative boundary of the Mosul vilāyet was in question, and they pointed out that in the abortive Treaty of Sévres, which the Lausanne Treaty had superseded, the frontier between Turkey and ʿIrāq, as laid down by the British Government in accordance with its own desiderata at that time, had practically coincided with the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet except in one sector, where it had deviated from it to Turkey's advantage by leaving ʿAmādiyah on the Turkish side (statement by Fethi Bey before the Council of the League on the 27th October, 1924). On the other hand, Sir Percy Cox, the British representative at the Qasim Pasha Conference, demanded, for the frontier between Turkey and ʿIrāq, a line which, for the most part, lay considerably to the north of the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet; and he maintained that the boundary under discussion was the northern boundary of the territory for which Great Britain had accepted a mandate (i.e. the Sévres line) subject to rectifications which might (as in the line which he was now proposing) be in favour not of Turkey but of ʿIrāq (*procès verbal* of the Qasim Pasha Conference, quoted in League of Nations Document, C. 400, M. 147, 1925, vii, p. 80). On the 20th September, 1924, Lord Parmoor invited the Council ' to rule that the problem as submitted to it ' was ' to define the frontier of the state of ʿIrāq as it actually exists, and not the disposal of the Mosul vilāyet, which has been administered as part of ʿIrāq since its occupation nearly six years ago '. These opposing points of

the 30th October, 1918, coincided approximately with the home-territory of the ancient Kingdom of Assyria.¹ It was bounded on the north and north-east by the parallel ranges of the Zagros Mountains,² which separated it on the north from the Ottoman vilāyets of Diyār-bekr and Vān and on the north-east from Persia. On the south-east it was separated from Persia by an arbitrary line cutting across the general direction of the mountains, and from the vilāyet of Baghdad by the River Diyālāh. On the south-west, from the right bank of the Diyālāh to the left bank of the Tigris (at a point a little below the junction of the Lesser Zāb), it was separated from the vilāyet of Baghdad by a line of low hills called the Jabal Hamrīn. West of the Tigris, in the Jazīrah steppe, it was bounded by an arbitrary line drawn across the grazing-lands of the Northern Shammar and other Arab Badawī tribes. During the period under review there was

view had been elaborated in the British memorandum of the 14th August, 1924, and the Turkish memorandum of the 5th September, which were submitted to the Council of the League during this session (texts of both documents in the *League of Nations Official Journal*, October 1924). As a result of subsequent conversations with Lord Parmoor and with Fethi Bey, M. Branting, the *rapporteur* of the Council, was able to inform his colleagues on the 30th September that the British Government fully recognized the right of the Council to draw the frontier between Turkey and 'Irāq on any line which the Council might adopt (i.e. the British Government abandoned its contention that the question at issue was limited to a rectification of the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet), and thereupon Fethi Bey agreed that the question should be laid before the Council in the form which Lord Parmoor had indicated. Accordingly, in the decision, taken at the same meeting, in which the Council determined to set up a commission of investigation, the question at issue was described as 'the question of the delimitation of the frontier between Turkey and 'Irāq referred to [the Council] under Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne'.

⁴ The most authoritative study of this subject is contained in League of Nations Document, C. 400, M. 147, 1925, vii, *Report submitted to the Council by the Commission instituted by the Council Resolution of September 30th, 1924*. In this report the *ex parte* statements of the British and Turkish Governments are analysed and criticized, and independent conclusions are given. These *ex parte* statements were formulated several times over during the course of the controversy. The most important documents in which they are presented are the correspondence between Lord Curzon and 'Ismet Pasha at Lausanne, enclosing both a memorandum and a counter-memorandum on either side (these are printed, with the *procès verbal* of the Lausanne Conference, in *Cmd.* 1814 of 1923, pp. 363-93); and the British memorandum of the 14th August, 1924, and the Turkish memorandum of the 5th September, which were both laid before the Council of the League of Nations on the 20th September, 1924. See also an article by Major H. I. Lloyd on 'The Geography of the Mosul Boundary' in *The Geographical Journal* for August 1926.

¹ The site of the latest capital of Assyria, Niniveh, lay on the left bank of the Tigris, immediately opposite the modern city of Mosul.

² These Zagros ranges ran from north-west to south-east, along an axis which showed a perceptible concavity towards the south-west. The altitudes rose successively from the south-west (where the mountains sank into the plains of the Jazīrah and 'Irāq) towards the north-east (where they buttressed the Armenian and Iranian plateaux).

no controversy either over this western boundary in the Jazīrah (which, with certain modifications, was transformed into the frontier between the mandated territories of ‘Irāq and Syria)¹ or over the north-eastern frontier towards Persia (Persia having remained neutral during the War of 1914–18, so that there was no question of altering her frontiers in the peace settlement). The question over which the controversy between Turkey and Great Britain arose was whether the frontier between Turkey and the new Arab State of ‘Irāq, for which Great Britain had accepted the responsibilities of a mandatory, should be drawn at the southern extremity of the former Mosul vilāyet, along the Diyālah and the Jabal Hamrīn, or at its northern extremity, either along the actual line of the former administrative boundary or along one of the parallel ranges to the north or the south of it,² or should cut across the vilāyet along some intermediate line.³

In the opinion of the League of Nations’ Commission of Inquiry, which visited the disputed territory in 1925,⁴ the Zagros ranges on the north offered a good line of geographical separation from both the economic and the strategic standpoints—though the line claimed by the British Government in 1924 was not superior, from these points of view, to the lines followed by the former administrative boundary of the Mosul vilāyet, or by the so-called ‘Brussels Line’ laid down by the Council of the League on the 21st October, 1924. It would have been feasible, in the Commission’s opinion, to draw a satisfactory frontier still further to the south again.⁵ From the same standpoint the Commission pronounced that the Jazīrah steppe offered a good line of separation, but the Jabal Hamrīn and the River Diyālah a bad line.⁶ The Commission further drew attention to the fact that the Diyālah reservoir, which it was proposed to construct just above the point where the Diyālah made its way through the Jabal Hamrīn, would fall partly within the frontier claimed by

¹ For the Anglo-French negotiations over this frontier see Section (ix), pp. 464–6 above.

² The frontier claimed for ‘Irāq by Great Britain both at the Qasīm Pasha Conference of the 19th May–5th June, 1924, and again in September 1924, at the Thirtieth Session of the Council of the League of Nations, followed a line of heights well to the north of the former administrative boundary of the vilāyet.

³ A possible line of partition along the Lesser Zāb River was suggested by the League of Nations’ Commission of Inquiry (see p. 507 below). The Commission remarked, however (*Report*, p. 57), that ‘although the territory could be divided it constitutes a unit’. (Cf. pp. 72, 86, 87, 88, 89.)

⁴ See below, pp. 504–7.

⁵ League Commission’s *Report*, pp. 21, 74, 86, 87.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 23, 74, 86, 87.

Turkey.¹ Since the solution of the irrigation problem did not directly affect the prosperity of the disputed territory, but was of vital importance to that of the Baghdad region,² the Commission declared it essential that 'Irāq should retain the Diyālah district, whatever decision might be taken regarding the remainder of the disputed territory. In the matter of the commercial connexions between the disputed territory and the surrounding countries, it would appear that those with 'Irāq were the closest and most important, and that those with Syria came second and those with Persia probably third, while those with Turkey (within the frontiers of the Lausanne Treaty) were the least intimate and the least vital.³ The scale was turned in favour of the Baghdad, as against the Syrian, route between Mosul and the outer world by the possibility of using the natural waterway of the Tigris, down which the bulky agricultural produce of the Mosul vilāyet could be floated cheaply and safely.⁴

Nevertheless, though the Mosul vilāyet had closer physical links with 'Irāq⁵ than with any of the other surrounding countries, there was a marked physical contrast between the two regions.⁶ The Baghdad and Basrah vilāyets were a flat alluvial plain, and their agriculture was dependent on irrigation. The Mosul vilāyet, except for its western and south-western border, was a country of rolling lowlands rising into highlands towards the north-east, and its agricultural produce was rain-grown, while the highest mountains were partly clothed in forest. In its internal structure the Mosul vilāyet consisted of a series of parallel zones, along an axis running from north-west to south-east with a certain concavity towards the south-west. From south-west to north-east the zones changed in climate and rose in altitude. The south-westernmost zone was a

¹ League Commission's *Report*, pp. 68, 89, and Map III.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 68. Two million acres between the Jabal Hamrīn and Kūt on the Tigris were to be irrigated from the Diyālah reservoir.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 67 and 69.

⁴ It may be noted that, not far above the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet, there was a section of the Tigris where the river ran through gorges between the Zagros, on the one hand, and the Tūr 'Abdīn Mountains, on the other, and where even down-stream navigation on rafts was exceedingly dangerous. Thus, while the Tigris linked Mosul with Baghdad, it did not similarly link Diyārbekr with Mosul (see League Commission's *Report*, p. 30).

⁵ It seems unnecessary here to enter into the question, which was debated with great learning and at great length by the British and Turkish Governments and by the League of Nations' Commission (*Report*, pp. 24-9), whether, or to what extent, or during what periods, the geographical name ' 'Irāq ' had covered the territory comprised in the Ottoman vilāyet of Mosul, as well as that comprised in the vilāyets of Baghdad and Basrah.

⁶ League Commission's *Report*, pp. 53-4 and 56-7.

semi-arid country resembling the Jazīrah and Shāmīyah steppes, into which it merged ; the next zone consisted of cultivated lowlands, well watered by rain and river, and the next of foothills, providing pasturage for cattle ; while the north-easternmost zone was formed by the high ranges of the Zagros—a belt of Alp and forest adjoining the Persian frontier. The border-line between the first two zones crossed the Tigris a little below its confluence with the Greater Zāb. The foothills touched and crossed the Tigris at the northern boundary of the vilāyet. The Zagros ranges ran wholly on the left or north-eastern side of the river. The vilāyet contained four anticlines of oil-bearing strata, all running from north-west to south-east along the main axis of the territory.¹ The zones were economically interdependent in two ways. There was an important stock-breeding population, which migrated seasonally with its live stock between the mountains, foothills, and plains ;² and there was an ancient high-road,³ running from end to end of the cultivated zone, with a string of towns and villages—Tall ‘Afar, Mosul, ‘Arbīl, Altūn Köprü, Kirkūk, Tāzā Khurmatly, Ta’ūq, Tūz Khurmatly, Kifrī—which were the commercial centres not only for this zone but for the steppe on the one hand and for the foothills and the mountains on the other. A parallel string of secondary towns and villages—Zākhō, ‘Amādīyah, ‘Aqrah, Rowandūz, Rānyah, and Sulaymānīyah—ran along the border-line between the foothills and the Zagros ranges. In the judgement of the League Commission the interdependence between the zones was ‘the predominating factor in the history of the country’,⁴ and this was illustrated by the City of Mosul, which was not only by far the largest of the towns along the high road,⁵ but was the administrative capital of the vilāyet which bore its name.

In the very middle of [the] amphitheatre [formed by successive zones

¹ See League Commission’s *Report*, p. 68 and map 9. There was an anticline on either side of the Jabal Hamrīn ; one, extending from the south-eastern bank of the Greater Zāb to Kirkūk, in the cultivated zone ; and a fourth in the foothills, from a point north of Mosul City to Zākhō.

² For the nomads of the Mosul vilāyet, and for the social and economic distinction between the Kurdish nomads of the mountains and the Arab nomads of the steppe, see League Commission’s *Report*, pp. 40–3 and 55, and map 8.

³ This was a section of the ‘Royal Road’ of the Achaemenid Empire, which is described by Herodotus (Book V, chapters 49 and 53–4). Alexander the Great was advancing along this road, from north-west to south-east, and Darius was attempting to check his advance, when they fought the Battle of Arbela (‘Arbīl).

⁴ *Report*, p. 54.

⁵ According to the League Commission’s *Report*, p. 56, Mosul had 100,000 inhabitants, while Kirkūk, the next largest town in the vilāyet, had less than 20,000.

following a concave axis in ascending tiers] lies Mosul, which is both a central and a frontier town. It is central since all the roads from Zākhō, 'Amādiyah, Dohūk, 'Aqrah, 'Arbīl, Rowandūz and the dependent surrounding districts converge on this point. It is a frontier town on the edge of the desert steppe and the nomad country, with settlements of former mercenaries pushed out towards the west to defend the cultivated land. It is a market town both for local produce and produce in transit, situated at the junction of great land routes, the Tigris waterway and the desert tracks.¹

As for the population of the Mosul vilāyet its characteristics resembled those of the country. It was signally diversified; and yet the diverse racial, linguistic, and religious elements were interdependent in certain ways. The geographical distribution of the constituent elements was related to the divisions between the physical zones. The south-westernmost zone of steppe was mainly occupied by Badawī Arabs. In all the other three zones the predominant element was the Kurds, and their numerical preponderance in the vilāyet as a whole was increased by the fact that the highlands were more densely populated than the plain.² At the same time the predominantly Kurdish area contained important enclaves of non-Kurdish minorities. For example, the League Commission recorded³ a 'very definite personal impression' that the city of Mosul was 'undoubtedly Arab in character'—an important fact, considering that the 100,000 inhabitants (all told) of the city constituted about one-eighth of the total population of the vilāyet, and that the city (as described above) occupied a key-position. Again, in the lesser towns⁴ along the high road there was a strong, and in some places predominant, Turkish element, and 'Turkish is spoken all along the high road in all localities of any importance.'⁵ Another minority who, though Kurdish-

¹ League Commission's *Report*, p. 54; see also p. 57. The League Commission deprecated (*Report*, p. 66) the drawing of a frontier between the City of Mosul and 'its natural hinterland'. Compare the position of Mosul City with that of Peshāwar in the North-West Frontier Province of India—a province which bore much the same economic and strategic relation to the Panjab as the Mosul vilāyet bore to the vilāyets of Baghdad and Basrah.

² League Commission's *Report*, p. 54. The reason given for this fact by the Commission is that 'in the mountain country water is more evenly distributed and more abundant'. For the distribution of population see *Report*, Map 6 (ethnographical map, compiled by the Commission, on the scale of one square millimetre of coloured surface in each Nāhiyeh for every 100 inhabitants); and Map 7 (showing the density of population of the contested area and of the adjoining territories).

³ *Report*, p. 40.

⁴ e.g. Tall 'Afar (League Commission's *Report*, p. 34), 'Arbīl, Altūn Köprü, Qārahtepēh, Kirkūk, Tāzā Khurmatly, Ta'ūq, Tūz Khurmatly (for evidence see *Report*, p. 38).

⁵ The British Government submitted that these Turks were of a different

speaking, were non-Muslim and who formed a very distinct community, were the Satan-worshipping Yazīdīs, whose religious centre was in the hills north of Mosul City, but whose principal stronghold was the Jabal Sinjār—an isolated block of hills in the Jazīrah steppe, on the border-line between the British and French mandated territories.¹ Another minority in the highland zone of the Kurdish area (though their homes lay mostly to the north of the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet) were the Syriac-speaking Nestorian Christians, who 'lead a life very similar to that of the mountain Kurds'.² A smaller, less compact and less warlike Christian community were the Chaldaean lowlanders (former Nestorians, who in A.D. 1778 had accepted the Papal supremacy as Uniates). The Chaldaeans were to be found principally in Mosul City and in a group of villages on the left bank of the Tigris near the north-western corner of the vilāyet.

This cursory catalogue is sufficient to show that the population of the Mosul vilāyet was extremely mixed. As regarded the relative numbers of the different elements the League of Nations' Commission came to the conclusion³ that 'the statistics and maps submitted by the two parties' were 'far from accurate'; and that, while the latest statistics drawn up (in the census of 1923) by the 'Irāq authorities were 'undoubtedly the best,' even these 'must be consulted with

breed from the 'Osmanlis; but this contention was dismissed as irrelevant, after close study, by the League Commission (*Report*, pp. 47-8). The Commission concluded that the name 'Turkmens', by which the British authorities sought to distinguish the Turks of the Mosul vilāyet, belonged equally to all Turks who had crossed the Oxus and embraced Islam since the eleventh Christian century, including the ancestors of the 'Osmanlis, and that all these Turkmens alike were descended from the Oghūz or Ghuzz tribe, which had previously lived in Central Asia. They summed up (p. 57) that 'the Turks in the country are of the same race as those in the Turkish Republic'. This question of race, however, was academic. The important question was that of political feeling and aspiration: did the Turks of the Mosul vilāyet desire, or did they not, to be citizens of the Republic of Turkey? And supposing that desire existed, could it be satisfied without injustice to the local non-Turkish majority? It may be noted that the Commission did not proceed to argue that identity of race was in itself a sufficient ground for political union.

¹ See Section (ix), pp. 464-6 above.

² League Commission's *Report*, p. 52; see further pp. 79-83. These Nestorians were supposed to be descended from the ancient Assyrian inhabitants of the cultivated lowlands, who had been driven into the highlands by successive foreign invaders. For their history during and after the War of 1914-18 see pp. 483-6 below.

³ *Report*, p. 86 (repeating p. 57), and, in detail, pp. 31-5. The Commission were dissatisfied with the ethnographic maps presented to them by both Governments (the Turkish Government's map is criticized severely on p. 37 of the *Report*) and compiled maps of their own (*Report*, pp. 35-7). The British maps are reproduced as maps 4 and 5 appended to the Commission's *Report*.

a certain caution'. The British and Turkish figures¹ were most at variance in respect of the Arabs and the Turks;² but it was evident that neither of these elements, however liberally their numbers might be estimated, was strong enough numerically to enable either Turkey or 'Irāq to claim the vilāyet on ethnographical grounds. The predominant element in the vilāyet was the Kurds, who were sharply distinguished linguistically from both the Turanian-speaking Turks and the Semitic-speaking Arabs by speaking an Indo-European language.³ The Commission observed⁴ that 'the Kurd' not only 'constitutes the strongest racial element in the country' but 'is taking possession of the arable land and is "Kurdizing" certain towns'.⁵ They remarked⁶ that the Kurds and Arabs were the only elements in the vilāyet which lived in compact masses in large areas, and that it was only between them that a line of demarcation could be found or determined; but they pointed out that this line would follow the Tigris down to its confluence with the Lesser Zāb—thus separating Mosul [City] from its fertile and densely populated hinterland—and would continue south of the Lesser Zāb along the main road from Kirkūk to Kifri; and they declined to recommend such a frontier owing to its economic and social disadvantages. They summed up as follows the difficulties of partitioning the vilāyet on ethnographical lines:

(a) The towns inhabited by Turkish majorities or large Turkish minorities are situated in the southern part of the territory—that is to say, in the direction of 'Irāq, whereas Mosul, an Arab town, is situated in the centre of the northern part.

¹ Reproduced on p. 31 of League Commission's *Report*.

² In the Commission's opinion the British Government under-estimated the number of Turks, but the Turkish Government 'exaggerated much more in the opposite sense' (*Report*, p. 37). The Commission were also of opinion (*Report*, p. 57) that the British Government had slightly exaggerated the numbers of the Arabs; and they pointed out that, in the portion of the vilāyet west of the Tigris, apart from Mosul City, the Arab population was so thinly spread that it only numbered 24,000–25,000 all told (*Report*, p. 36).

³ The Kurdish dialects, like those spoken by the Lurs and the Bakhtiāris, who inhabited the south-eastern end of the Zagros Chain, belonged to the Iranian group of the Indo-European family, of which the Persian language was the principal representative. The Turkish Government contended, on the strength of a passage in the article 'Kurdistan' in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, in which the inhabitants of Kurdistan in the Sumerian and Assyrian periods were classified as Turanians, that, notwithstanding their Iranian language, the Kurds were descended from a Turanian stock and were thus long-lost kinsmen of the Turks (Turkish memoranda in *Cmd.* 1814 of 1923, pp. 374 and 390). On this Turkish contention see League Commission's *Report*, pp. 43–4.

⁴ *Report*, p. 55. Cf. the quotation, on p. 45, from the British Foreign Office Peace Handbook, No. 58, *Turkey-in-Asia*.

⁵ Especially the Turkish towns on the high road (*Report*, p. 39).

⁶ *Report*, pp. 86–7.

(b) The only link between this town and other Arab lands with a sedentary population is a territory which is mainly Kurdish, and a road dotted with Turco-Kurdish towns.

(c) The Christians are scattered, but live mainly north of Mosul.

(d) The country which is most definitely Kurdish—that is to say, the eastern part of the territory—is only connected with the north by the Tigris road; the Rowandūz district can only be reached through 'Arbil and the Sulaymānīyah district through Kirkūk.¹

They submitted that

if the ethnic argument alone had to be taken into account, the necessary conclusion would be that an independent Kurdish State should be created, since the Kurds form five-eighths of the population. Moreover, if such a solution were to be considered, the Yazidī, who racially are very like the Kurds, and the Turks, who could easily be assimilated by the Kurds, should be included in estimating the number of the latter. They would then form seven-tenths of the population.²

Another argument in favour of such a solution was the fact, on which the League Commission laid stress, that, of all the Muslim races, the Kurds lived on the most friendly terms with the Christians (both with the Nestorians and with the Chaldaeans);³ but this solution was fraught with difficulties.

Apart from the presence in their midst of the important minorities above described the Kurds of the Mosul vilāyet were profoundly dis-united among themselves. The nomad tribes lived one life, the peasants and townspeople another; and even the sedentary elements were divided and subdivided into clans which, except under compulsion, were not accustomed to acknowledge any higher authority than that of their hereditary local chieftains. Kurdish national feeling might show itself in the negative form of opposition to political control by Turks, Arabs, Englishmen or any other foreigners; but, except among a few persons of Kurdish origin who had settled in Constantinople or the West and had lost touch with their kinsmen at home, there was little sign, as yet, of any positive consciousness of Kurdish national solidarity, even within the boundaries of the Mosul vilāyet, and still less of any desire to express such solidarity in political form.

¹ League Commission's *Report*, p. 58; cf. p. 87. Even the Kurds of the vilāyet were not homogeneous. 'Of the Kurds who inhabit the disputed territory, those who live north of the Greater Zāb are, as regards language, ethnic affinities, and personal and economic relations, more closely connected with the Kurds of the vilāyets of Hakkīyārī and Mardin in Turkey, while those who dwell south of the Lesser Zāb have more in common with the Kurds of Persia. It would be difficult to draw a boundary in the territory between these two rivers' (*Report*, pp. 57-8; cf. p. 46).

² League Commission's *Report*, p. 57; cf. p. 43.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 47 and 53.

The political horizon of most Kurds was still bounded by the feuds between clan and clan, or between rival factions or rival chieftains within the same community ; and Kurdish politics, while lively enough, remained thoroughly personal and oligarchical in spirit.

Nor would Kurdish national solidarity within the boundaries of the Mosul vilāyet, had it existed, have solved the problem ; for the Commission pointed out that

neither the political frontiers of the disputed territory with Persia and Syria, nor the existing boundaries, nor the frontiers claimed by Turkey and by 'Irāq, are racial frontiers.¹

And, in regard to the distribution of the Kurds, they put forward the following figures :

The majority of the Kurdish people—over 1,500,000 out of a total of about 3,000,000—inhabit Turkey ; there are 700,000 in Persia, 500,000 in the disputed territory and some in Syria. In 'Irāq strictly so-called their numbers in relation to the total population are negligible.²

Thus the Kurds in the disputed territory, though the predominant element in the local population, did not constitute either a self-conscious or a self-contained national group, but were only a minority—perhaps not more than one-sixth—of the whole Kurdish people ; and, outside the boundaries of the disputed territory, there was no independent Kurdish national state, either existing or prospective, to which the Kurds of the Mosul vilāyet could attach themselves.³

The natural inference from all these facts was that the disposal of the Mosul vilāyet could not be determined *a priori* on racial, linguistic or religious lines, but that it must be settled by economic and strategic considerations and by the preference of the various elements in the population for one or other of the alternatives open to them, as revealed by some impartial method of inquiry.

Before describing how the controversy between Turkey and Great Britain was settled, it is necessary to give a brief account of the course of events in the Mosul vilāyet itself between the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, and the British Government's appeal to the Council of the League of Nations on the 6th August, 1924.

¹ League Commission's *Report*, p. 87 ; cf. pp. 21, 39, and 57.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 57 ; cf. p. 87.

³ See *H. P. O.*, vol. vi, pp. 90–1, for the provisions in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres regarding the possible establishment of an independent Kurdish State in the territories provisionally left to Turkey east of the Euphrates, and regarding the possible attachment to such a state of the Kurds in the Mosul vilāyet.

- (b) EVENTS IN THE MOSUL VILĀYET FROM THE ARMISTICE OF THE 30TH OCTOBER, 1918, TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON THE 6TH AUGUST, 1924.¹

At midday on the 31st October, 1918, when the Armistice signed at Mudros on the 30th October, between Turkey and the Allies, came into force, the British Expeditionary Force in ‘Irāq, though it was moving rapidly northwards, had not advanced on the Tigris beyond a point between Qal’at Sharqat and the confluence of the Greater Zāb, or on the ‘high road’ beyond the crossing of the Lesser Zāb at Altūn Köprü.² Thus, at the moment when hostilities were to cease, something less than a quarter of the Mosul vilāyet was under British military occupation. The Armistice, however, provided (Art. 16) that the Turkish garrisons in ‘Mesopotamia’ (among other areas) should be surrendered to the nearest Allied commander, and there was a general clause (Art. 7) empowering the Allies to occupy any strategic point in case a situation arose which threatened their security. Accordingly, on the 2nd November, General Sir William Marshall notified the Commander of the Turkish Sixth Army, ‘Alī Ihsān Pasha, that, under the terms of the Armistice, he proposed to occupy a line including Sulaymāniyah, Kōi Sanjāq, ‘Amādiyah and Zākhō, which he described as being the frontiers of ‘Irāq which figured in a German military report of October 1917.³ After opposition on ‘Alī Ihsān Pasha’s part had been overruled by the Turkish Government at Constantinople, the Union Jack was hoisted over Mosul City on the 8th November.⁴

Under the terms of the Armistice this extension of the British occupation was undoubtedly in order.⁵ At the same time a line

¹ See especially the following British official publications: *Cmd.* 1061 of 1920, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* [from the British occupation to the British Government’s Declaration of the 20th June, 1920], by Miss Gertrude Bell (pp. 42–74); *Reports on ‘Irāq Administration*, October 1920–March 1922 (pp. 3, 21, 69, 102–10, and 115–17), April 1922–March 1923 (pp. 3, 31–41, and 50–3), and April 1923–December 1924 (pp. 8–9, 16–17, 25–6, and 29–39). In the present section statements and quotations are taken from one or other of these British official papers, unless otherwise stated.

² See the map in Turkish Red Book: *La Question de Mossoul de la signature du Traité d’armistice de Moudros* (30 Octobre, 1918) au 1^{er} Mars, 1925 (Constantinople, 1925, Ahmed Ihsān).

³ French translation of General Marshall’s letter in Turkish Red Book, pp. 15–16. The line is plotted out on the map attached.

⁴ ‘Alī Ihsān Pasha’s troops were allowed to withdraw northwards instead of surrendering.

⁵ League Commission’s *Report*, p. 84. The Commission dismissed the two contentions, which were stressed and elaborated on the Turkish side (e.g. in

provisionally occupied (whether lawfully or unlawfully) during the Armistice period by the British forces had no juridical bearing on the future frontier between Turkey and 'Irāq, which might eventually be drawn, with equal validity, either to the north or to the south of it. Meanwhile, the juridical sovereignty over the occupied territory remained in the possession of the former sovereign, Turkey,¹ until she renounced her rights, either by a unilateral declaration,² or else by a treaty in which she either transferred her rights directly to another party or parties³ or empowered some third party to take a binding decision as to whether the territory should be transferred or not.⁴

'The occupation of the Mosul vilāyet brought the British Administration into direct relations with the Kurds.'⁵ Even before the Armistice, in the spring of 1918, the prospect of the expulsion of the Turks had led the Kurdish notables of Sulaymāniyah to set up a local provisional Government under the headship of the most influential among them, Shaykh Mahmūd Barzānji,⁶ who at once entered into relations with the British; and after the Armistice, while a British administration was established, before the end of November 1918, in most districts of the Mosul vilāyet within the line designated on the 2nd November by General Marshall, the sanjāq of Sulaymāniyah was

Turkish Red Book, pp. 7-41): (i) that the British troops in 'Irāq had no right to advance beyond the line which they actually occupied on the 31st October, 1918; and (ii) that the actual military front at that moment ought to set the outside limit for the permanent political frontier between the new state of 'Irāq and Turkey.

¹ This juridical point was pronounced by the League Commission to be indisputable (*Report*, p. 85; cf. pp. 84 and 88). 'The superior force of the Turkish argument seems so obvious that there is no need to analyse the cases of the two parties.'

² In the National Pact of the 28th January, 1920, the Turks did, by a unilateral declaration, renounce their rights over ex-Ottoman territories inhabited by Arab majorities; but, as the League Commission pointed out (*Report*, p. 84), this renunciation did not cover the Mosul vilāyet.

³ As she eventually did in the Treaty of Angora (signed on the 5th June, 1926) with Great Britain and 'Irāq.

⁴ As she did in the Lausanne Treaty (signed on the 24th July, 1923), Article 3, par. 2, according to the advisory opinion rendered by the Permanent Court of International Justice on the 21st November, 1925. Reading together Articles 3 and 16 of the Lausanne Treaty the Court opined that, in regard to the frontier between Turkey and 'Irāq, Turkey had, since ratifying the treaty, renounced her claim to the territories beyond the line to be fixed by agreement between the parties or by a decision of the Council. 'This renunciation is suspended until the frontier has been determined, but it will become effective, in the absence of some other solution, in virtue of the binding decision.'

⁵ *Cmd.* 1061 of 1920, p. 57.

⁶ Shaykh Mahmūd Barzānji's political influence, like that of his contemporary the Idrīsī Sayyid of Sabyā (see Section (v) (a), p. 276 above), or of the celebrated Shāh Ismā'il Safawī of Ardabil, was founded upon the religious prestige of an ancestor (see *Cmd.* 1061 of 1920, p. 69).

treated differently. In this district, under an agreement of the 1st December, 1918, British assistance and protection was accorded to Shaykh Mahmūd's Government¹ on condition that they undertook to accept British orders and advice; and the British authorities promised that any Kurdish tribes from the Greater Zāb to the Diyālah (other than those in Persian territory)² who accepted Shaykh Mahmūd's leadership would be allowed to come under his administration. Thereupon Shaykh Mahmūd's régime was extended, under British encouragement, to Kōi sanjāq, Rānyah, and Rowandūz (whereby the assertion of some form of British control over the whole Mosul vilāyet was virtually completed); but this arrangement brought Shaykh Mahmūd into conflict both with his Kurdish countrymen and with his British patrons, and on the 20th May, 1919, he threw off the British connexion by force. On the 18th June Shaykh Mahmūd was taken prisoner and Sulaymānīyah occupied by a British force. The Shaykh was deported to India, and the sanjāq was brought under a direct British administration resembling that which prevailed at the time in ‘Irāq, except that care was taken to appoint Kurds, not Arabs, to official positions under the British staff.

Further north the relations between the British and the Kurds were complicated by the presence in ‘Irāq of some 35,000 Nestorian refugees—including both mountaineers from the Hakkīyārī highlands, on or just beyond the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet, and lowlanders from the Urumīyah district on the Persian side of the Turco-Persian frontier. Since June 1918 these Nestorians had been refugees in camp at Ba‘qubah, where ‘their destiny was a problem for the [British] Administration [in ‘Irāq] and their maintenance for the [British] Exchequer’; and ‘a definite promise of settlement under a benevolent, if not a British, Government had been made to them’. The mountaineer Assyrians (who, unlike the Urumīyah lowlanders, had taken the offensive by rising in arms against the Turks, at the instigation of the Russians, when the latter invaded that part of Turkey in the spring of 1915)³ were, ‘in normal times, just as

¹ Before the Armistice the Turks had reoccupied Sulaymānīyah and temporarily interned Shaykh Mahmūd; but when the *débâcle* came in the autumn the local Turkish Mutesarrif and garrison surrendered to the Shaykh, ‘leaving him in sole authority’.

² The chiefs of a number of Kurdish tribes in Persian territory had attended the Conference at Sulaymānīyah, on the 1st December, 1918, with the British Civil Commissioner for ‘Irāq (*Cmd.* 1061 of 1920, p. 60).

³ League Commission's *Report*, p. 82. The Commission added the following observations: ‘There is no doubt that this people rose in armed revolt

truculent as the other local Kurdish tribes, and no less savage'. During the last four years they had been uprooted from their homes, been subjected to intense sufferings in a succession of forced migrations, and been pauperized by residence in a refugee camp; and these vicissitudes 'had broken up the old organization of the people under their headmen (maliks) and Patriarch'. The task of resettling them was thus as difficult as it was pressing.

The first plan was to plant them in new homes in the district of 'Amādiyah, within the boundary of the Mosul vilāyet, where it would be easier to protect them than in their almost inaccessible native mountains further north; and, with this in view, the 'Amādiyah district was brought under effective British occupation during the first three months of 1919. After 'some rather drastic steps towards clearing the country' had been taken by two Assyrian battalions which had been raised and trained at Ba'qubah the settlement scheme was (for other reasons) postponed and the troops withdrawn—whereupon, on the 15th July, the three Englishmen left in charge at 'Amādiyah were murdered and there was an anti-Christian rising. This outbreak was avenged by a punitive expedition¹ which reoccupied 'Amādiyah on the 8th August, but the district was once more evacuated in December. In the adjoining district of 'Aqrah two British officers were murdered in November; and although 'Aqrah itself was reoccupied in a few days the outlying parts of the district, in the mountains, were abandoned. Meanwhile, in July, the British political officer at Rowandūz had been withdrawn to a point nearer the plains, in consequence of the events at 'Amādiyah.

In the spring of 1920 Agha Petros—an Assyrian who had recently come to the front, in opposition to the Patriarchal House, through his prowess as a fighting-man—proposed to trek across the mountains and establish a Nestorian buffer state on the Turco-Persian frontier, midway between the two former national homes of Hakkīyārī and Urumīyah. The British authorities and about three-quarters of the Nestorian people accepted the project. The remainder of the people hung back under the leadership of the Patriarchal House. Several thousand of this faction were settled forthwith in the foothills of Dohūk and 'Aqrah. Agha Petros's trek was delayed for

against its lawful government at the instigation of foreigners and without any provocation on the part of the Turkish authorities. It is also established that the conditions of life enjoyed by the Assyrian people within the Ottoman Empire were rather better than those of the other Christians, since they were conceded a fairly wide measure of local autonomy under the authority of the Patriarchal House' (*Report*, p. 83).

¹ On this expedition the two Assyrian battalions did good service.

want of transport ; and when the expedition did start eventually on the 27th October it degenerated into a raid in which friendly and unfriendly Kurds were attacked without discrimination. After a few weeks the raiders drifted back to their base-camp with nothing accomplished except the inflaming of national and religious passions. In 1921 a new scheme was worked out for settling the Nestorians¹ under British supervision, and in agreement with the local Kurds, either in their original homes or as near to these as suitable locations could be found for them—starting with those whose homes lay nearest to ‘Amādiyah and sending them out from the base-camp tribe by tribe in succession. This scheme encountered an obstacle in the uncertainty regarding the future frontier. ‘All the Assyrians were unanimous in their determination to remain within the British sphere’; but, as has been mentioned above, the homes of the majority of them lay to the north of the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet, and the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on the 10th August, 1920, had drawn the frontier still further south by leaving the ‘Amādiyah district under Turkish sovereignty. ‘Rightly or wrongly the assumption was made that the frontier would be revised, and that at any rate the actual Mosul vilāyet would eventually pass to ‘Irāq. On this assumption the process of dispersal was carried out, in the hope that in due course it would be supported and the Nestorian Christians not handed over once again to the tender mercies of the Turks.’ In the course of this summer almost all the Assyrians were settled successfully under British auspices—some in the Mosul plain, others in the Dohūk foothills, others in the ‘Amādiyah mountains, and others in their old homes just inside or just beyond the vilāyet boundary.² Some of the settlers drifted back to the plains for the winter of 1921–2, but the bulk of the Hakkīyārī tribesmen stayed in their newly repaired villages for the winter of 1922–3 and were thereafter considered to be settled and self-supporting.³

¹ The Urumīyah Nestorians declined to take part in this scheme and attempted to return to Persia via Baghdad, with unfortunate results for themselves.

² Before the official dispersal scheme was set in movement on the 31st May, 1921, 300 Assyrians of Barwar-i-Bālā returned home by friendly arrangement with the local Kurdish chief. These ‘entered at once into their houses, which had been occupied and kept in good repair by the Kurds, and received their Tapu share (in these parts one-half) of the products from their lands which the Kurds had cultivated’.

³ Rifles were distributed by the British authorities ‘in numbers sufficient for self-defence against other than military attacks, but not so great as to encourage acts of aggression, to those settled in districts where Government protection was difficult, with special partiality to such sections as had weakened their man-power by generous enlistment in the Levies’.

Other Assyrians, again, found employment in the 'Irāq Levies, for which the recruiting of Assyrians was reopened in the winter of 1921-2. By 1923 there were approximately 2,500 Christians enlisted. The Assyrian units of the 'Irāq Levies repeatedly proved themselves first-rate troops for frontier warfare in the mountains; but their formation was followed by trouble with the 'Irāqī populations among whom they were quartered—partly owing to unfounded suspicions that the British were unduly partial to their Assyrian co-religionists and were designing to exploit Assyrian political ambitions in order to keep the 'Irāq State under British domination, and partly owing to petty but provocative acts of self-assertion on the Assyrians' side. In Mosul City, on the 5th August, 1923, there was a riot between Assyrian soldiers and Muslim townspeople; and at Kirkūk, on the 4th May, 1924, there was a much more serious outbreak, in which two companies of Assyrians mutinied and ran *amok* in the town, killing fifty townspeople and injuring many more before discipline was restored. 'All possible measures were taken to bring the guilty to justice, and the case was tried by a special court presided over by a British judge'; but there was not sufficient evidence against individuals for any death sentences to be passed, so that the results of the trial did nothing to allay Muslim indignation.¹

Such outbreaks between the Assyrians and the 'Irāqī Muslims were the more serious because by this time the revival of Turkish *moral* and Turkish power under the leadership of Mustafā Kemāl Pasha had introduced a fresh disturbing factor into the situation in the vilāyet of Mosul. The repatriation of the Assyrians in 1921 beyond the northern boundary of Anglo-'Irāqī administration (which practically coincided with the former boundary of the Mosul vilāyet) had been possible because, since the Turkish *débâcle* of 1918, the writ of the Constantinople Government had virtually ceased to run in the Kurdish highlands, even beyond the line within which the British had established their control, so that, in reoccupying their homes, the Assyrians were taking possession of what was then *de facto*, though not *de jure*, a 'no man's land'. In 1921, however, the new Government of the Great National Assembly at Angora was already strong enough to begin to assert its authority over the Kurdish tribes immediately beyond the boundary of Anglo-'Irāqī administration at its western extremity, adjoining the Tigris; and in June 1921 a small Turkish armed party (subsequently reinforced) arrived at Rowandūz,

¹ For this incident see *The Times*, 10th May and 6th November, 1924, as well as *'Irāq Report*, 1923-4, p. 36.

stiffened the opposition of the local Kurds to the restoration of British control, and organized several successful attacks on ‘Irāqī posts.

Meanwhile, the position of the Kurdish districts and populations which, since the Armistice, had been linked with the Arabs of ‘Irāq under some form of British control, was being affected by that deliberate and progressive change in the relations between Great Britain and ‘Irāq (consequent upon the ‘Irāq revolt of 1920) which had begun with the British Government’s declaration of the 20th June, 1920, and which was to culminate in the ratification of a treaty of alliance between the two countries by an ‘Irāqī Constituent Assembly on the 10th June, 1924.¹ On the 6th May, 1921, the British High Commissioner in ‘Irāq instructed the British Advisers in the Mosul, Kirkūk, and Sulaymānīyah Divisions of the Mosul vilāyet to ascertain the wishes of the Kurdish districts, so far as these were at that time under Anglo-‘Irāqī control,² with regard to inclusion in the new ‘Irāq State ; and in the Mosul and Kirkūk Divisions (but not in the Sulaymānīyah Division) the general referendum on the candidature of the Amīr Faysal to the throne of ‘Irāq was also taken.³ In the referendum the Mosul Division voted for the Amīr Faysal, but ‘the majority of the inhabitants of Kirkūk Division asked that decision should be postponed for a year and meantime declined to take the oath of allegiance to the King’.⁴ The Kirkūklī Kurds asked for a Kurdish Government but declared against attachment to Sulaymānīyah. In June 1921, in response to the special inquiry of the 6th May, ‘Sulaymānīyah Division rejected, almost unanimously, any form of inclusion under the ‘Irāq Government’. In consequence the new régime in ‘Irāq was extended to the Kirkūk and Mosul Divisions (to the former, with certain modifications), whereas the Sulaymānīyah Division ‘remained at its express wish under direct British control, exercised through a British political officer’, and ‘every effort’ was ‘made to develop native [i. e. Kurdish] administration along normal lines.’

On the 17th March, 1922, the Angora Government appointed a Qā’immaqām to Rowandūz, who reached his post in May ; and next month two Kurdish chiefs in the adjoining parts of the Sulay-

¹ See above, p. 469.

² Rowandūz and Rānyah had been out of control since the summer of 1919 (see p. 483 above).

³ The League Commission pronounced that neither this referendum of 1921 nor that of 1919 was a plebiscite (*Report*, p. 17) and that ‘the form in which the [1921] referendum was held was not such as to guarantee the freedom and independence of the voting’ (p. 18).

⁴ *‘Irāq Report*, 1922–3, p. 32. Cf. *Report*, 1920–2, pp. 12 and 15.

mānīyah Division started an armed insurrection against British authority, after murdering two British officers on the 18th June. A punitive column of 'Irāq Levies was sent against the offenders, and by the end of July 1922 it had driven them north-west of the Lesser Zāb and advanced into the Rānyah district with the support of local Kurdish adherents and of Semīqō¹ on the Persian side of the frontier. On the 9th August, however, the column was withdrawn to Sulaymānīyah to rest and refit; the insurgents, this time supported by parties of Turkish soldiers from Rowandūz, reassumed the offensive; an Indian force which reached Rānyah on the 21st August was compelled, by the spread of the revolt among the tribes, to retire on the 1st September; on the 5th September the British officials and other non-Muslim employees in Sulaymānīyah (67 persons) were evacuated to Kirkūk by air; and the limit of British control towards the north-east was thus drawn back to the 'Arbīl-Kirkūk-Kifri lines. A Turkish party occupied Kōi Sanjāq and on the 23rd September 'Amā-dīyah was raided by Kurdish tribesmen, but this attack was beaten off and thereafter the ascendancy was regained by the 'Irāq Levies.

On the 12th September, 1922, Shaykh Mahmūd Barzānjī—whose faction in the Sulaymānīyah Division had been recovering strength since the spring—was recalled from exile to Baghdad; and, after he had expressed his willingness to adhere to the policy of the British Government, he was sent home to Sulaymānīyah with British support and arrived there on the 30th; but he promptly entered into correspondence with the Turks and in November he assumed the title of Hukmdār of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, on the 20th November, the Lausanne Conference opened, with the determination of the frontier between Turkey and 'Irāq among its agenda, and on the 26th November negotiations on this question were started between Lord Curzon and 'Ismet Pasha.² In view of this the British and 'Irāq Governments published a joint declaration in December, in which they recognized 'the rights of the Kurds living within the boundaries of the 'Irāq to set up a Kurdish Government within these boundaries', and invited them to send responsible delegates to Baghdad for a conference, after arriving at an agreement between themselves.³ Shaykh Mahmūd, however, remained obdurate; and in January 1923 Turkish officers visited him at Sulaymānīyah in order to concert an offensive against Kirkūk. Thereupon Shaykh Mahmūd was summoned, under safe-conduct, to Baghdad; and, after he had failed to

¹ See Section (xiii), pp. 538-9 below.

² See p. 494 below.

³ Text of proclamation in *'Irāq Report*, 1922-3, p. 38.

present himself, his Government was declared suspended on the 24th February and he was ordered to leave Sulaymānīyah town by the 1st March, while the inhabitants were informed that, unless he did so, action would be taken. When Shaykh Mahmūd failed once more to comply the Government Buildings at Sulaymānīyah were attacked by air on the 3rd, and on the 4th the Shaykh beat a retreat into the mountains. On the 22nd April an Anglo-‘Irāqī force occupied Rowandūz ¹ (the Turks evacuating the place without fighting), and a refugee Kurdish chief from Neri (north of the Mosul vilāyet boundary, on the Turkish side of the Turco-Persian frontier) was appointed Qā’immaqām. The same force reoccupied Sulaymānīyah on the 16th May ; and this time an attempt was made to incorporate the Division in the ‘Irāq State under a régime of local Kurdish self-government resting on the faction hostile to Shaykh Mahmūd. This faction, however, was only willing to take over the administration on condition that a British garrison was permanently retained at Sulaymānīyah to prevent Shaykh Mahmūd’s return ; on the 15th June, when they learnt that it was the irrevocable intention of the British Government to withdraw the British troops, they resigned ; and the withdrawal of the column on the 19th June ² was followed by the return of Shaykh Mahmūd on the 11th July. Meanwhile, the Shaykh’s opponents took refuge within the British lines ; Rānyah and other border districts were detached from Sulaymānīyah and attached to Kirkūk ; and Shaykh Mahmūd was then informed that action would not be taken against him so long as he left these districts alone and refrained in other ways from hostile activities.

Thus, at the moment when the Lausanne Treaty was signed on the 24th July, 1923, the local situation in the Mosul vilāyet was as follows. The districts adjoining the former northern administrative boundary of the vilāyet, along its whole length from the Tigris to the Persian frontier, were under the effective occupation and *de facto* administration of the British and ‘Irāqī Governments, and so was the rest of the vilāyet, except for a portion of the Sulaymānīyah Division. This portion was in the hands, not of the Turks, but of a local Kurdish notable, Shaykh Mahmūd Barzānji ; and the territory which Shaykh Mahmūd dominated was isolated from the territory effectively occupied and administered by the Turkish Government owing to the Anglo-‘Irāqī occupation of Rowandūz in the previous April.

¹ In this operation the Assyrian Levies again distinguished themselves.

² Air Marshal Sir J. Salmond’s Report of the 23rd June, 1923, published as a Supplement to *The London Gazette* of the 11th June, 1924.

In September 1923 Rowandūz was evacuated for the winter, but it was reoccupied in the early spring of 1924. Attacks by Shaykh Mahmūd upon the districts detached from Sulaymānīyah were punished on the 16th August and the 25th December, 1923, by air attacks on his quarters. Finally, on the 25th May, after warning had been given to the inhabitants of Sulaymānīyah and an ultimatum to Shaykh Mahmūd himself, his quarters were destroyed from the air. Shaykh Mahmūd once again fled to the mountains ; and on the 19th July, 1924, Sulaymānīyah town was reoccupied by an 'Irāqī force.¹ 'A loose administration was set up under the 'Irāq Government, but it was agreed that until peace was restored it should remain under the direct control of the High Commissioner.'² By the 16th November, 1924, the population of the town, which had fallen by the date of re-occupation to 700, had risen from this to 20,000 ; and though Shaykh Mahmūd kept up a guerrilla warfare he was impotent either to reconquer Sulaymānīyah or even to interfere seriously with the restoration of order and prosperity in the Division. An attempt which he made, on the 20th–22nd May, 1925, to overpower a regiment of 'Irāqī Cavalry on the march was beaten off with loss ;³ and, in reprisal, one of the few places in the Division that remained in his hands was occupied by a punitive expedition in June.⁴ At the time of writing Shaykh Mahmūd himself was still in revolt.

(c) THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE MOSUL CONTROVERSY FROM THE TURKISH NATIONAL PACT OF THE 28TH JANUARY, 1920, TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON THE 6TH AUGUST, 1924.

The first article of the National Pact,⁵ to which the Nationalist majority in the Ottoman Parliament, then sitting at Constantinople, subscribed on the 28th January, 1920, laid down the policy of the new Turkish Nationalist Movement in regard both to the Mosul vilāyet and to the Kurds, though neither Mosul nor Kurds were explicitly mentioned. In the first clause of this article the Turks conceded that the destiny of former Ottoman territories which were inhabited by an Arab majority and were in the occupation of enemy forces on the conclusion of the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, should be deter-

¹ *The Times*, 23rd May, 1924.

² 'Irāq Report, 1923–4, p. 32.

³ *The Times*, 23rd and 26th May, 1925.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 11th June, 1925.

⁵ An English translation of the text of this article is quoted in British Blue Book, *Cmd.* 1814 of 1923, p. 370. For a translation of the complete text of the Pact see *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 605–6.

mined by a free vote of the inhabitants ; but in the second clause they declared that all Ottoman territories, whether inside or outside the Armistice Line, which were inhabited by a [non-Arab] Ottoman Muslim majority, formed a whole which did not admit of division either on juridical or on equitable grounds. This formula implied a claim to retain under Turkish sovereignty territories predominantly inhabited not only by Turks but by Kurds ; and though, in January 1920, the Turkish Nationalists were concerned, first and foremost, to resist the establishment of Greek rule over Turkish populations in the vilāyets of Aydyñ and Adrianople, the integral fulfilment of the National Pact also entailed the reassertion of Turkish sovereignty over at least the greater part of the predominantly Kurdish vilāyet of Mosul. When the Lausanne Conference opened the Mosul vilāyet was the only territory covered by the first article of the National Pact for which the Turkish negotiators had still to contend. They had two motives—one sentimental and the other practical—for pressing their contention energetically.

The sentimental motive was that the National Pact had been the sign in which the Turkish Nationalists had conquered. They had held out intransigently for its fulfilment in the face of apparently overwhelming odds ; and, so far, this policy had succeeded beyond expectation. The French had yielded over the Syrian frontier ; the Greeks had been driven out of Anatolia ; and the principal Allied Powers had not only accepted the *fait accompli* there but had conceded that Turkey should recover Eastern Thrace in addition. These sensational successes had given the Turks a feeling that, so long as they insisted upon no more, but no less, than the integral fulfilment of the National Pact they were bound to get their way ; and the Pact itself had become for them something sacrosanct—a table of commandments which must be carried out to the last jot and tittle.

This strong sentiment regarding the National Pact was reinforced by equally strong practical considerations relating to the Kurdish question. Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and his companions had been brought to the point of renouncing Turkish sovereignty over Arab territories by two hard facts : the rise of the Arab National Movement and the military occupation of those territories by the Allied Powers. Yet, while the Turkish Nationalists conceded to the Arabs that right of self-determination which they were claiming for themselves, they were not prepared to make any similar concession to the Kurds. The Kurds were a people in the clan stage of social development, who had scarcely begun to acquire a consciousness of national

solidarity ; and their cultural condition was still so primitive that no Kurdish dialect had yet been reduced to literary form. On these grounds the Turkish Nationalists calculated that the Kurds could be assimilated to and absorbed into the Turkish nation ; and during the period under review, during which the Angora Government turned the whole life of Turkey upside down by a revolutionary ' Westernization ' not only of economic methods and political forms but of social and cultural institutions,¹ they did not hesitate to impose these drastic innovations upon the Kurdish as well as the Turkish populations under their rule.

In the territory of which Turkey was already assured the possession at the opening of the Lausanne Conference the Kurds occupied something between a third and a quarter of the whole area and constituted (after the almost complete elimination of the former Christian minorities) something between a quarter and a fifth of the population. Moreover, the Kurds were not divided geographically from the Turks by any clear-cut line of demarcation, but in many districts were inextricably intermingled with them. It was perhaps hardly to be expected that the Turkish Nationalists should renounce their title to rule and their intention to assimilate the Kurds living to the north of the Mosul vilāyet—the less so, inasmuch as at this time no foreign Power was disputing the sovereignty of the Angora Government over this Kurdish area.² Realizing, however, as they undoubtedly did,

¹ See Part I, Section (ii) (e) above.

² At the Lausanne Conference nothing more was heard of the half-hearted provision in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres for carving an autonomous or independent Kurdistan out of Turkish territory to the north of the Mosul vilāyet. There seems to be no evidence that this provision made any impression on the minds of the Kurdish population concerned, or even that they were aware that it had been inserted in the treaty. On the other hand, from the time of the Armistice onwards the northern Kurds were undoubtedly afraid that the principal Allied Powers would erect an Armenian state in the territory where they lived and would place the Kurdish majority in this territory under the dominion of the Armenian minority. Indeed, on paper a large part of the Ottoman vilāyets of Trebizond, Erzerūm, Bitlis, and Vān was awarded by President Wilson (acting in virtue of Articles 88–9 of the Sèvres Treaty) to the Armenian Republic of Erivan. So long as the danger of Armenian domination was believed to exist this was the chief consideration in the northern Kurds' minds ; for though there is strong evidence that they were already alienated from Turkey by their experience of Turkish rule, it is certain that the prospect of Armenian rule was regarded by them with greater repugnance. It was not till the Armenian danger had been averted, and the influence of the Allied Powers in that quarter extinguished, by the joint military action of the Moscow and Angora Governments in the last three months of 1921, that the northern Kurds and the Turks could begin to settle accounts with one another. This partly explains why a Kurdish national consciousness first manifested itself in the south, round Sulaymāniyah (see below). The southern Kurds were never threatened with inclusion in an

the difficulty of the Kurdish policy on which they had embarked, the Turkish Nationalists took the view that success might depend upon obtaining a territorial settlement which would enable them to apply their policy without exception to all the Kurdish populations formerly subject to Ottoman sovereignty, including the Kurds in the vilāyet of Mosul. There would probably be more effective resistance on the Kurdish side and a greater danger of such resistance developing, under pressure, from a mere traditional refractoriness towards strong government into a new national movement of a positive kind, if a focus of Kurdish nationalism were left in immediate proximity to Turkey but beyond the reach of the Turkish Government's arm. Since 1918 a possible focus had appeared in the Kurdish parts of the vilāyet of Mosul, and especially in the sanjāq of Sulaymānīyah. ‘It was hard to tell how far a national movement for independence existed, and how far it was an artificial product of the personal ambitions of the Kurdish leaders, who doubtless saw in Kurdish autonomy an unequalled opportunity for furthering their own interests ;’¹ and, in dealing with the tribes, the British authorities had adopted the traditional policy of the Ottoman Government (which the Turkish Nationalists had abandoned) of respecting existing custom and allowing the recognized chiefs to carry on the tribal administration of their clansmen. The British, however, had gone further than this, at least in the Sulaymānīyah sanjāq, by installing a Kurdish administrative personnel, organizing Kurdish levies under Kurdish officers, making the Kurdish language the medium of official business, modifying law and taxation to suit local conditions, and endowing the sanjāq with a far-reaching measure of fiscal autonomy. The League of Nations Commission of Inquiry, which visited Sulaymānīyah in 1925, reported as follows :

In this province we found a Kurdish national feeling which, though yet young, was reasonable enough ; for, though the people stated that their supreme desire was for complete independence, they recognized the advantages of an enlightened and intelligent trusteeship. There is no doubt that the ability and good judgement of the British administrators of this province had a large influence on the state of mind of the people.²

It was evidently probable that the mere juxtaposition of the Sulaymānīyah Kurds, with their national aspirations awakened by the liberal régime which they were enjoying under the British aegis, Armenian state, and they therefore had no community of interest with the Turks to counteract their new aspiration to develop their own life on Kurdish national lines.

¹ *Cmd.* 1061 of 1920, p. 63.

² *Report*, p. 76.

would stiffen the opposition of the Kurds living beyond the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet to the Angora Government's policy of compulsory 'Turcification'.¹ On the other hand, it was evident, on strategic and economic grounds, that, if the Mosul vilāyet were restored to Turkey, the Turkish Government would hold 'Irāq at its mercy. The motive of both parties in claiming the Mosul vilāyet was defensive; yet, at the same time either party was convinced that the other party's motive was aggressive. This reciprocal misunderstanding made a diplomatic *impasse* inevitable.

• At Lausanne the discussion of the Mosul Question began with private conversations and exchanges of memoranda between Lord Curzon and 'Ismet Pasha. When these had proved fruitless the question was debated at two meetings of the First Commission on the 23rd January, 1923, which likewise failed to produce any *rapprochement* between the two parties' respective positions. 'Ismet Pasha demanded a plebiscite. Lord Curzon maintained that a plebiscite was not a possible method of settling this particular question, and proposed² 'an impartial examination of all the interests involved', to be conducted by the League of Nations.³ When it became evident that neither party would yield Lord Curzon announced to 'Ismet Pasha that, if he persisted in rejecting the British proposal for a joint reference of the question to the League for inquiry, he him-

¹ This motive for insisting upon the restoration of the Mosul vilāyet to Turkey was frankly avowed to the writer, during a visit to Angora in April 1923 (i.e. during the interval between the two sessions of the Lausanne Conference), by two members of the then Turkish Government. For the Turkish point of view on the Kurdish Question see further *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th February, and *The Times*, 12th February, 1926. The *résumé*, in the latter, of a statement on the subject by 'a certain distinguished Turkish officer' is particularly illuminating.

² *Cmd.* 1814 of 1923, p. 362.

³ In foreshadowing what the effect of his proposal would be Lord Curzon made the following statements: 'If and when this matter goes to the League of Nations, Turkey will at once be invited not merely to become a Member, but to sit on the Council. The Council will have to decide what method of examination to adopt. It may ask the Turks and the British for their respective views; it may decide to send a commission to take the views of the Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and Christians on the spot; it may hold an inquiry in Europe, or it may appoint a single arbitrator to settle the matter. I do not know what it will do, but my point is that the Turkish delegation will be there just like ourselves, and when the two cases have been stated you will get the most impartial examination which it is possible to secure. Further, Article 5 of the Covenant provides that the decision of the Council, upon which the Turkish Government will be represented, will have to be unanimous, so that no decision can be arrived at without their consent' (*Cmd.* 1814 of 1923, p. 401). In urging 'Ismet Pasha to accept Lord Curzon's proposal Baron Hayashi 'invited special attention to Lord Curzon's statement that the decision of the Council of the League of Nations would have to be unanimous' (*op. cit.*, p. 403).

self would refer the question to the League Council under Article 11 of the Covenant as a circumstance which threatened to disturb international peace.¹ ‘Ismet Pasha remained obdurate, and on the 25th January, 1923, the question was duly referred to the League by Lord Curzon.² On the 4th February, however, ‘Ismet Pasha, in a memorandum³ addressed to the Presidents of the British, French, and Italian delegations on the eve of the temporary breakdown of the Conference, proposed ‘to exclude’ the Mosul Question ‘from the programme of the Conference, in order that it may, within the period of one year, be settled by common agreement between Great Britain and Turkey’. In a conversation held on the same day⁴ Lord Curzon agreed ‘to *suspend* the result of his appeal to the League of Nations for a period of one year’, on the two conditions ‘that, if the two Governments failed to reach a direct understanding, the intervention of the League would be resorted to in the manner originally proposed, and that the *status quo* existing in that region should be preserved during the year in which these discussions might continue.’⁵ A modification of this arrangement was embodied in the final text of the Lausanne Treaty, Article 3, which ran as follows :

From the Mediterranean to the frontier of Persia, the frontier of Turkey is laid down as follows :

[1] *With Syria :*

The frontier described in Article 8 of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921 ;

[2] *With ‘Irāq :*

The frontier between Turkey and ‘Irāq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.

In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending a decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.⁶

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 402.

² Text of letter in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 7, p. 416. On the 30th January the question came before the Council, but the Council suspended action pending a pronouncement by the Lausanne Conference.

³ Text in *Cmd.* 1814 of 1923, pp. 837-42.

⁴ Notes of meeting in *op. cit.*, pp. 842-53.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 843-4. Text of draft declaration, embodying the offer and the conditions, on p. 851.

⁶ *Cmd.* 1929 of 1923, p. 15. For the draft proposed by the Turkish delegation on the 8th March, 1923, see Turkish Red Book, p. 135.

In the protocol¹ relative to the evacuation of Turkish territories occupied by British, French and Italian forces, which was signed, simultaneously with the treaty, on the 24th July, 1923, the British and Turkish Governments further undertook (Art. 7) not to modify the *status quo* pending the coming into force of the treaty, and agreed that the negotiations contemplated in the treaty should be started as soon as evacuation had been completed—the nine months to run from the date on which the starting of negotiations took place.

On the 5th October, which was the actual day on which the evacuation of Constantinople by the Allied forces was completed, the negotiations were formally opened by a note from the British *chargé d'affaires* to the Turkish Government.² The period available for negotiations thus became due to expire on the 5th July, 1924,³ but, owing principally to delays on the Turkish side, the negotiations did not actually begin till the 19th May. On that date a British and a Turkish delegation, headed respectively by Sir Percy Cox and Fethi Bey, met at Qasim Pasha, Constantinople; but the conference⁴ almost immediately arrived at an *impasse*, and broke up inconclusively on the 5th June.

Fethi Bey renewed the Turkish demand for the restoration of the vilāyet of Mosul. Sir Percy Cox declined to discuss this demand, and demanded on his part a frontier which, over about two-thirds of its course,⁵ ran considerably to the north of the former northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet.⁶ This new line was demanded by the British Government on the ground that, while 'fulfilling the recognized requirements of a good treaty frontier', it would 'at the same time admit of the establishment of the Assyrians in a compact com-

¹ *Cmd.* 1929 of 1923, p. 215.

² *The Times*, 7th January, 1924.

³ See a letter from Mr. A. L. Kennedy published in *The Times*, 19th June, 1924.

⁴ For a French version of the *procès verbal* see Turkish Red Book, pp. 177–200. Extracts, in both French and English, are given in League Commission's *Report*, pp. 79–81.

⁵ i.e. from the Persian frontier westwards to the neighbourhood of Bayjō.

⁶ For the approximate *tracée* of this line, which the British Government demanded first from Turkey on the 19th May, 1924, and again from the League of Nations on the 20th September, see Map No. III at the end of this volume. No official British map displaying this line appears to have been published. The data given in this volume are taken from the maps appended to the League Commission's *Report*, from a sketch map in *The Times* of the 13th October, 1924, and from a British reply to a questionnaire from the League Commission (quoted in their *Report*, pp. 20–1). The League Commission estimated (*Report*, p. 56) that the area between the line claimed by the British Government and the 'Brussels Line', which did not differ widely from the former northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet (see p. 503 below), was approximately 3,500 square kilometres, as against about 87,890 square kilometres claimed by the Turkish Government to the south of the 'Brussels Line'.

munity within the limits of the territory' mandated to Great Britain by the League of Nations.¹ The line was drawn so as to include, not the whole of the pre-war home of the Assyrians in Hakkīyārī, but such portions of it as they had succeeded in reoccupying, with British approval and assistance, in 1921. Sir Percy Cox maintained that, in this additional territory claimed for 'Irāq to the north of the Mosul vilāyet boundary, scarcely a vestige of Turkish authority was in existence *de facto*.² In reply to Sir Percy Cox Fethī Bey made three points: first that, in demanding this new frontier, Great Britain was raising a question which had never been under consideration during the Lausanne Conference³ and was not covered by the terms of Article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty; second, that the Assyrians, on whose account the new British demand was being made, were a very small minority in the population of the disputed territory and that, in the disposal of this territory, it was inequitable that the interests of the majority should be made subordinate; and third, that the breach between the Assyrians and the Turkish Government and the sufferings undergone by the Assyrians during the past ten years, which were the grounds of the British Government's concern on the Assyrians' behalf, had been brought by the Assyrians on their own heads, when, in 1915, they had taken up arms against their lawful sovereign, the Ottoman Government, without provocation.⁴ Upon Fethī Bey's declaration that he could not accept (even in principle) the new British line Sir Percy Cox broke off the negotiations. He then submitted a draft⁵ for a joint reference of the question to the League of Nations; but Fethī Bey considered this to be beyond his own competence. Accordingly, on the 5th June, 1924, the conference broke up (after having been conducted amicably, on both sides, from first to last); and on the 6th August, just a month after the nine months' term had expired, the question was referred to the League on the single initiative of the British Government.

¹ Before presenting this demand to the Turkish Government on the 19th May, 1924, the British Government had obtained from the 'Irāq Government, on the 30th April, an assurance that it would be prepared to grant to all the Assyrians the same local autonomy as they had enjoyed before the War under Turkish rule (League Commission's *Report*, p. 79).

² Turkish Red Book, pp. 190-1.

³ In support of this point Fethī Bey cited Lord Curzon's presentation of the British case at Lausanne.

⁴ On these three points, as well as on the interpretation of the position taken by Lord Curzon at Lausanne (e.g. in a letter of the 26th December, 1922, to 'Ismet Pasha), the League Commission of Inquiry afterwards endorsed Fethī Bey's contentions, and declared that, in their opinion, 'the solution proposed by the British Government' was not 'consonant with the principles of equity which should govern the desired settlement' (*Report*, p. 83).

⁵ French version in Turkish Red Book, p. 200.

- (d) FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON THE 6TH AUGUST, 1924, TO THE PRESENTATION OF THEIR REPORT BY THE LEAGUE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE 16TH JULY, 1925.

At the instance of the British Government, and with the concurrence of the Turkish Government (which accepted an invitation from the Council of the League to be represented at the discussions on a footing of equality), the issue between the two parties was taken up by the Council at Geneva during its Thirtieth Session (29th August–3rd October, 1924). M. Branting acted as the Council's *rapporteur*, while Turkey was represented (as at the Qasım Pasha Conference) by Fethi Bey and Great Britain by Lord Parmoor.

At Geneva the two parties presented, in new memoranda, the old arguments which they had brought forward at Lausanne and at Qasım Pasha, and proposed the same alternative procedures for settling the controversy—the Turks a plebiscite and the British an inquiry by an impartial commission to be appointed by the Council of the League. The Council abstained from entering into the substance of the dispute and concentrated its efforts upon securing agreement between the two parties on two essential preliminary questions: the definition of the issue which had been brought before the Council, and the powers conferred upon the Council for dealing with it. The settlement of the former question has been described above.¹ With regard to the second question Lord Parmoor took the initiative in declaring that the British Government regarded the Lausanne Treaty (Art. 3) 'as placing the Council in the position of an arbitrator, whose ultimate award must be accepted in advance by both parties', and he declared, 'in the most explicit terms, that the British Government would consider itself bound by the decision of the Council'. Fethi Bey at first confined himself to declaring that the Turkish Government recognized 'the full powers of the Council as conferred upon it by Article 15 of the Covenant'; but he afterwards informed M. Branting that he was prepared, on his Government's behalf, to give the same undertaking as had been given by Lord Parmoor. Accordingly the Council, in a resolution adopted on the 30th September, 1924, put it on record that the parties had undertaken 'to accept in advance the decision of the Council on the question referred to it'.

In the same resolution the Council decided to set up a special commission to lay before the Council information and suggestions,

¹ See note on pp. 471–2.

with due consideration for the views expressed by the parties regarding both the procedure and the substance of the question. The Commission was to fix its own procedure. The members were to be appointed by the President of the Council and the *rapporteur* in agreement. The names were announced on the 31st October. They were Count Paul Teleki, a distinguished geographer and a former Prime Minister of Hungary ; M. de Wirsén, the Swedish Minister at Bucarest ; and Colonel Paulis, a retired officer of the Belgian Army. The choice was ingeniously made. The three members were all nationals of small European countries, who might be expected to be not unsympathetic either towards Turkey, as a small country, or towards Great Britain as a European Power. Again, M. de Wirsén (whom the Commission afterwards elected as its President) was the national of a state which had been neutral in the War of 1914-18, while the other two were nationals of states which had been belligerents on opposite sides. Finally, as individuals, the members—one of whom was a geographer, another a diplomatist, and the third a soldier—were qualified to contribute, between them, the expert knowledge necessary for performing their task. Before the Commission could get to work, however, the Council had to settle another question of transitory but urgent importance—namely, what that *status quo* was which the parties were pledged to preserve until a decision had been reached regarding the definitive frontier.

It has been mentioned that, at the moment when the Lausanne Treaty was signed on the 24th July, 1923, the general position had been that the British were in effective occupation of the Mosul vilāyet and the Turks of the territory to the north of it ; but to this there had been two exceptions. Part of the Sulaymānīyah sanjāq had been in the hands of a Kurdish chieftain, Shaykh Mahmūd, on that date, while part of the Hakkīyārī district, lying immediately north of the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet, had been in the hands of the Assyrians. Thereafter both the British and the Turkish Governments successively took the view that they would not be violating the *status quo*, as between themselves and the other Government, if they extended their occupation to that enclave on their own side which had not been under their occupation on the 24th July, 1923, since such extension would be at the expense, not of the other Government but of local chieftains whom they themselves had never admitted to be more than temporary disturbers of the peace. Either Government, however, in turn protested when the privilege which it claimed for itself was exercised by the other.

During the twelve months between the 24th July, 1923, and the 19th July, 1924, the British authorities in 'Irāq, as has been recorded above,¹ reasserted their control in the Sulaymānīyah sanjāq by a series of steps which culminated, on the date last mentioned, in the reoccupation of Sulaymānīyah itself. At every step the Turkish Government had protested, and each time the British Government had replied that the operation in question was not a violation of the *status quo* but a local administrative measure, necessitated by a menace to public security and in no way directed against Turkish interests.²

Serious consequences threatened to follow similar attempts which the Turkish Government made, after the 24th July, 1923, to reassert its authority in that part of the Hakkīyārī district which the Assyrians had reoccupied in 1921. On the 17th October, 1923, the British Government protested against the reported intention of the Turkish Government to post a subordinate official and troops in this area at Chāl. The Turkish Government neither answered this note nor took the anticipated action.³ During the Qasim Pasha Conference, however, Sir Percy Cox argued, on the 24th May, 1924, that the area in question was a 'no man's land', on the express ground that scarcely a vestige of Turkish authority had survived there. The Turkish Government did not admit the cogency of this argument; ⁴ yet *post hoc*, if not *propter hoc*, the Turkish Vālī of Hakkīyārī attempted to assert his authority in the area by entering it on an official tour.⁵ Thereupon the Assyrians sent an appeal for help to the 'Irāqī Qa'immaqām at 'Amādiyah. This official acted correctly in warning the Assyrians not to take any offensive action against the Vālī; but on the 7th August, 1924, while this message was on its way and while the Vālī was traversing the fastnesses of the Assyrian clan of Tkhuma with a weak escort of gendarmes, the clansmen attacked the party, killed four and wounded five of the escort, took the Vālī prisoner, and sent him to an Assyrian malik on the Mosul side

¹ See p. 490.

² Texts of correspondence in Turkish Red Book, pp. 139-43. See also Fethī Bey's statement to the Council of the League on the 27th October, 1924.

³ Statement by Lord Parmoor to the League Council, 27th October, 1924.

⁴ 'The Turkish state, like any other state, has no need to send troops to occupy every inch of its territory in order to convince its neighbours that all these districts are subject to its authority.' (Statement to the League Council by Fethī Bey on the 27th October, 1924.)

⁵ The seat of the Turkish Vālī of Hakkīyārī was at Jūlamerk, which lay to the north both of the area which had been reoccupied by the Assyrians in 1921 and of the northern frontier claimed for 'Irāq by the British Government on the 19th May and 20th September, 1924.

of the vilāyet boundary. This chief, who had already received the instructions from ‘Amādiyah, had procured the Turkish Vālī’s release before the British Administrative Inspector at Mosul received the news and arrived on the spot ;¹ but the British inspector visited the liberated Turkish Vālī at Chāl in the ‘no man’s land’ and protested against any increase of Turkish administrative *personnel* in that area as being a violation of the *status quo*.²

The Turkish Government, however, having been baffled in its attempt to reassert its authority in the ‘no-man’s-land’ by penetration from the north, assembled a punitive column at Jeziret ibn ‘Umar, on the Tigris, in order to penetrate the area from the west, where the approach was easier. On the 14th September this force, on its eastward march, crossed the River Hazil at Rabanki, about five miles north of Zākhō, and thus entered an area which, while outside the northernmost chain of ‘Irāqī police posts, lay inside the area which had been under effective British administration both on and after the 24th July, 1923, and also inside the former boundary of the Mosul vilāyet.³ After the Turkish authorities at Jeziret ibn ‘Umar had been warned on the 12th September (and those at Constantinople on the 17th) the invading force was bombed and fired upon by British aeroplanes on the 14th, 17th, 18th, 20th, and 21st :⁴ but the Turks, after receiving reinforcements, advanced to Challek on the River Khabūr, compelled the ‘Irāqī police’ post there to withdraw, established a base of their own there, and marched on eastwards until, at Ashuta, they passed out of the territory under Anglo-‘Irāqī administration into the ‘no-man’s-land’. Here they proceeded to burn and plunder the reconstructed Assyrian villages, with the result that eight thousand⁵ Assyrians fled southward into the Anglo-‘Irāqī occupied territory and arrived as refugees at ‘Amādiyah.⁶

¹ See *The Times*, 15th September, 1924 ; and ‘Ismet Pasha’s note of the 16th December to the British Government.

² Note of the 16th September, 1924, from the Turkish Minister in London to the Foreign Office.

³ On this invasion see the British *chargé d’affaires* at Constantinople’s note of the 25th September, 1924, to the Turkish Government ; *The Manchester Guardian*, 30th September, *The Times*, 29th September and 13th October ; statements to the League Council by Lord Parmoor and Fethi Bey on the 27th October.

⁴ Statement by Fethi Bey to the League Council on the 27th October, 1924.

⁵ *The Times*, 28th April, 1926.

⁶ ‘It is worthy of note that during the retirement of the Assyrian non-combatants from the trans-border settlements in September there was not one single case of desertion among the Assyrian units of the force [i.e. the ‘Irāq Levies]. This is the more remarkable as every man knew that his relations were almost defenceless, so great had been the drain on their manpower caused by their enlistment in the levy battalions’ (*‘Irāq Report*, 1923-4,

On the 16th and the 22nd September the Turkish Government—which, since the beginning of the year, had repeatedly protested to the British Government¹ against alleged flights of British aeroplanes on the Turkish side of the *status quo* line—made a fresh protest regarding the bombing of the Turkish column on its way from Rabanki to Ashuta across territory which the Turkish Government asserted to be on its own side of the line.² On the 25th September the British *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople presented a note protesting against the Turkish march from Rabanki to Ashuta as a violation of the *status quo*. On the same date this note was read to the League Council by Lord Parmoor at Geneva, on the strength of Article 11 of the Covenant, while the Turkish note of the 16th had already been laid before the Council on the 20th. The Council took the matter up with Fethi Bey and Lord Parmoor; and in its decision of the 30th September it was able to record declarations by both parties 'to the effect that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present (*sic*) state (*état actuel*) of the territories whose final fate will depend upon that decision'.

The day before, however, the British *chargé d'affaires* at Constantinople had presented a note defining, first, the *tracé* of the true northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet (up to which the British Government claimed that its effective occupation and *de facto* administration had extended on and since the 24th July, 1923), and secondly the *tracé* of the northern limit of the so-called 'no-man's-land' within which the British Government contended that, on and after the same date, Turkish occupation and administration had been virtually non-existent. This British note of the 29th September, 1924, concluded with a demand that all Turkish troops should be withdrawn immediately to the north of both these lines. The Turkish Government failed to comply with this demand; and the British Government, after an unheeded warning on the 5th October, delivered an ultimatum at Constantinople on the 9th, in which it threatened to

p. 38). The high state of discipline which this record implied was praised in the most emphatic terms by the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq.

¹ For French texts of Turco-British diplomatic correspondence respecting incidents on the Hakkīyārī border during 1924 see Turkish Red Book, pp. 147-76.

² The Turkish force had not passed south of the chain of 'Irāqī police posts indicated by the British Government in a note of the 23rd August, 1924. In this British note Challek had not been mentioned. At the same time the British Government had never stated that this chain of police posts constituted the outermost edge of Anglo-'Irāqī administered territory.

take military action unless the demand of the 29th September had been complied with by the 11th October. On the 10th the Turkish Government replied by pointing out that the League Council's decision of the 30th September, 1924, had referred to the *status quo* existing at that moment, and by offering to obtain, and to accept in advance, the Council's own interpretation of this text. On the same date the Turkish Government also appealed directly to the League. Thereupon the British Government suspended the taking of military action, and on the 14th it accepted the procedure which the Turkish Government had proposed. The matter came before the Council of the League at an extraordinary session held at Brussels on the 27th–31st October, 1924.

At Brussels Lord Parmoor demanded the restoration of the *status quo* of the 24th July, 1923, while Fethī Bey argued that the Council's decision of the 30th September, 1924, recorded an undertaking by both parties to accept the *status quo* of the last-mentioned date. He represented that this latter *status quo* had not been violated in the interim by the Turks. At the same time he declared that the Turkish Government was willing to return to the *status quo* of the 24th July, 1923. He maintained, however, that although this alternative might involve a slight Turkish withdrawal on the Mosul-Hakkīyārī border, it would involve a much more extensive British withdrawal in the sanjāq of Sulaymānīyah. A committee of three members of the Council, under the chairmanship of the *rapporteur*, M. Branting, found a compromise between these conflicting positions by suggesting a line of its own, which might be accepted by both parties as representing the *status quo*; and it proposed that they should undertake to withdraw to their own respective sides of this line not later than the 15th November. A draft resolution embodying M. Branting's suggestions was accepted by both parties and adopted by the Council on the 29th October; and the necessary withdrawals were duly carried out by the date stipulated.¹

The so-called 'Brussels Line' did not depart very widely from that *tracé* of the northern boundary of the Mosul vilāyet which had been described by the British Government as defining the northern limit of Anglo-‘Irāqī occupation and administration under the *status quo* of the 24th July, 1923. The effect was to leave under Anglo-‘Irāqī occupation the whole of the Sulaymānīyah sanjāq and to bring under it a fraction of the so-called 'no-man's-land' in Hakkīyārī north of the former vilāyet boundary, while bringing under Turkish

¹ *The Times*, 17th November, 1924.

occupation all the rest of the Hakkīyārī 'no-man's-land', together with some fragments of territory on the Mosul side of the former vilāyet boundary.¹

Both parties were to have authority to exercise full administrative control up to the 'Brussels Line' on their respective sides;² but M. Branting expressly stated that the object of the Council's decision was merely to regulate a provisional situation so that order and peace might be maintained during an interim period; and he added that 'neither the solution of the problem of the final frontier between Turkey and 'Irāq nor the procedure by which the solution is to be reached should be in any way affected thereby'. In the event the 'Brussels Line' became the definitive frontier between 'Irāq and Turkey, with one slight modification.

The decision of the 29th October, 1924, made it possible for the League Commission of Inquiry to start work. The Commission assembled at Geneva on the 13th November, and, after visiting London, Constantinople, Angora, and Baghdad, arrived at Mosul on the 27th January, 1925. After travelling extensively over the disputed territory (south of the 'Brussels Line') by motor-car, by aeroplane, on horseback and on foot,³ and getting into touch (as intimately as time and circumstances allowed) with representative members of the different religions, nationalities, and classes, they left Mosul for Geneva in the last week of March 1925 and presented their report on the 16th July. The conduct of their inquiry was not easy. There were the two inherent difficulties that the territory was being administered by one of the parties which laid claim to it, and that the arrival of the Commission threw the population into a dangerous state of excitement; and these difficulties were aggravated by the Turkish Government's indiscretion in appointing, among the experts assisting the Turkish assessor, two *ressortissants* of the disputed territory who had been obliged to flee the country for having conspired against the existing régime in league with Shaykh Mahmūd.⁴ The Commission

¹ The fragments of the former Mosul vilāyet which were thus brought under Turkish occupation were rather larger than the fraction of the Hakkīyārī vilāyet which was brought under Anglo-'Irāqī occupation. The largest fragment was at the north-western corner of the Mosul vilāyet. The route Rabanki-Challek-Ashuta, however, which the Turks had occupied on and after the 14th September, 1924, was still left on the Anglo-'Irāqī side of the line.

² This interpretation of the Council's resolution, which was elicited by Sir Cecil Hurst, eliminated the so-called 'no-man's-land'.

³ For the Commission's itinerary see *Report*, Map 1; for a record of their activities and experiences see *Report*, pp. 5-13. See also the British Government's *Report on the Administration of 'Irāq* for 1925, pp. 8-10.

⁴ For the antecedents of these two gentlemen see, besides the League Com-

had to procure agreement between the British High Commissioner in ‘Irāq and the Turkish Government regarding the conditions under which the Turkish assessor and his experts should perform their functions; and they also had to insist upon the checking of a tendency, on the part of the ‘Irāqī police, to intimidate the pro-Turkish elements in the population.¹ The Commission appeared to have shown tact and firmness in surmounting these formidable obstacles to their work.

In the matter of procedure ‘the Commission became convinced of the full force of the British assertion as to the insuperable practical difficulties of holding a plebiscite and the considerable doubt which might still remain as to its trustworthiness’.² They formed the opinion that the procedure proposed by the British Government was the one most appropriate for furnishing the Council with the information which it required for the settlement of the dispute; and this was the procedure which the Commission themselves followed. At the same time they ‘endeavoured to neglect no means and no opportunity of ascertaining the desires of the population’.³

In this endeavour the Commission had to overcome a fear of reprisals, which ‘was very great and very widespread’.⁴ Among the reasons given by witnesses who declared against Turkey and in favour of ‘Irāq were the increase in law and order and the improvement in education (changes for which they frequently gave the credit to the British authorities), the abolition of compulsory military service, and the importance of trade relations with Baghdad. ‘Certain tribal chiefs in the remote districts preferred the Turkish Government because under Turkish rule they had enjoyed a larger measure of independence.’⁵ The general impressions of the Commission in this matter were as follows :

The first result of the inquiry is to show that there is no national ‘Irāqī feeling in the disputed territory, except among a section of the

mission’s *Report*, the British Government’s *Report on the Administration of ‘Irāq* for 1925, p. 8.

¹ For an analysis of the pro-Turkish elements see *The Manchester Guardian*, 3rd January, 1925.

² *Report*, p. 18; cf. p. 75.

³ *Report*, p. 19.

⁴ *Report*, p. 75. The passage continues: ‘Fear of reprisals on the part of the existing authorities in the country was particularly marked. More than once a witness, after speaking in private and in a whisper in favour of Turkey, loudly declared himself in favour of the ‘Irāq Government in order that he might be overheard by those who were waiting outside. Doubtless also, in some cases, this hesitation to give an opinion was due to fear of reprisals on the part of the Turks if they should return to the country, but we found that this fear did not prevent any Christian witness from expressing his views. This attitude gradually became less pronounced.’ The worst intimidation seems to have been exerted by the Arab Nationalist Extremists in Mosul City (cf. pp. 8, 11, 76, 78).

⁵ *Report*, p. 76.

Arabs who have some degree of education ; and in their case it is rather an Arab feeling, with chauvinistic and often anti-alien¹ tendencies. Among the Kurds we find a growing national consciousness, which is definitely Kurdish and not for 'Irāq ; it is more strongly developed in the south and decreases as one goes northward, to die out entirely in the plain of Mosul and the mountains of 'Aqrah. This national consciousness is also fairly strong among the Turks in the vilāyet.

The absence of any 'Irāq national feeling explains the large number of conditional preferences. The most strongly nationalist Arabs say that they would prefer Turkey to an 'Irāq under foreign control. On the other hand, a large number of Christian chiefs say that they would feel less suspicious of a Turkish Government than of an 'Irāq Government without European control. The same views are to be found among the Yazīdī. The Kurds of Sulaymāniyah ask for a wide measure of local autonomy with the assistance of British advisers. . . .

Though it is fair to say that pro-'Irāq sentiments are somewhat tepid, there can at the same time be no doubt that the Turkish Government's assertions, to the effect that the majority of the people of the vilāyet of Mosul are indisputably anxious to return to Turkey, are incorrect. Opinion among the Kurds is divided ; the group in Sulaymāniyah and the neighbouring districts which asks for autonomy within the 'Irāq State includes almost half of the total Kurdish population of the vilāyet. Even among the Turks we find partisans of Baghdad. . . . Nationality and language are not always reliable evidence of political views. Many Arabs, particularly those of the poorer classes, are pro-Turkish,² and sometimes give touching expression to their sympathies.³

Subject to the reservations made in the report in regard to the opinions given, the fact seems to be established that, taking the territory as a whole, the desires expressed by the population are more in favour of 'Irāq than of Turkey. It must, however, be realized that the attitude of most of the people was influenced by the desire for effective support under the mandate, and by economic considerations, rather than by any feeling of solidarity with the Arab kingdom ; if these two factors had carried no weight with the persons consulted, it is probable that the majority of them would have preferred to return to Turkey rather than to be attached to 'Irāq.⁴

On the basis of these observations regarding the views of the population, and in the light of the geographical, ethnical, economic, and juridical data, the Commission presented the Council of the League with the following 'final conclusions' :

Looking at the question entirely from the point of view of the interests of the populations concerned, the Commission considers that it would be to some advantage that the disputed area should not be partitioned.

On the basis of this consideration the Commission, having assigned a relative value to each of the facts which it has established, is of opinion that important arguments, particularly of an economic and geographical nature, and the sentiments (with all the reservations

¹ i.e. anti-British ; cf. *Report*, p. 77.

³ *Report*, p. 78.

² For details see p. 77.

⁴ *Report*, p. 88.

stated) of the majority of the inhabitants of the territory taken as a whole, operate in favour of the union with ‘Irāq of the whole territory south of the ‘Brussels Line’,¹ subject to the following conditions :

(1) The territory must remain under the effective mandate of the League of Nations for a period which may be put at twenty-five years ;

(2) Regard must be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services.

The Commission is convinced that if the League of Nations’ control were to terminate on the expiry of the four-years Treaty now in force between Great Britain and ‘Irāq, and if certain guarantees of local administration were not to be given to the Kurds, the majority of the people would have preferred Turkish to Arab sovereignty.

The Commission is also convinced that the advantages of the union of the disputed territory with ‘Irāq would in that case be exchanged for very serious political difficulties, and considers that, under those circumstances, it would be more advantageous for the territory to remain under the sovereignty of Turkey, whose internal conditions and external political situation are incomparably more stable than those of ‘Irāq. Whatever decision may be taken, it is essential, however, that ‘Irāq should retain the Diyālah region, which is necessary for the solution of the irrigation problem.

The Commission feels bound to leave it to the Council of the League of Nations to appraise the legal and other political arguments stated in its report, and to decide what relative weight should be given to them as compared with the other arguments. Should the Council, as the outcome of its examination, consider it equitable to partition the disputed territory, the Commission would suggest that the best line would be that approximately following the Lesser Zāb.²

(e) THE KURDISH REVOLT IN TURKEY, FEBRUARY TO APRIL 1925.

In February 1925, while the League of Nations Commission was conducting its inquiry to the south of the ‘Brussels Line’, a serious revolt against the Turkish Government broke out, to the north of the line, in certain Kurdish districts in which Turkish sovereignty was not at that time contested by any foreign Power.

The leader of the revolt was a certain Sheykh Sa’id of Pālū, the hereditary local head of the Naqshibendī Dervīsh Order. His *tekke* was a place of pilgrimage, and the religious prestige of his family was reinforced by matrimonial alliances with the surrounding Kurdish chiefs³—especially with those of the Zāzā clans in the Dersīm high-

¹ The Commission considered that the British Government’s claim (put forward on the 19th May and the 20th September, 1924) to a frontier embracing a portion of Hakkīyārī was not justified (*Report*, p. 88).

² *Report*, pp. 88–9.

³ *The Times* of the 3rd March, 1925, quoting the *Tanīn* of Constantinople. Compare the position of Shaykh Mahmūd Barzānjī of Sulaymānīyah.

lands, between the two branches¹ of the Upper Euphrates. Two possible motives for the revolt were, first, a Kurdish national opposition to the Angora Government's policy of centralization and 'Turcification', and secondly a personal resentment against the 'Westernizing' tendency of the Angora Government on the part of hereditary tribal chiefs and religious dignitaries who feared to lose their traditional privileges and, therefore, struck while their customary influence over the mass of the population—which in eastern Turkey was particularly backward, ignorant, and fanatical—was still strong enough to secure a following. Probably both these motives were operative;² but it was difficult, at the time of writing, to estimate the respective strength of them, since almost all the information then available regarding the antecedents and history of the revolt was derived from Turkish sources, and the Turkish Government had strong inducements to minimize the nationalist and magnify the reactionary aspect of the movement.³

¹ The Qārah Sū and the Mūrād Sū.

² See *Le Temps*, 9th March, 1925.

³ The reactionary aspect, and especially the religious side of it, was emphasized by 'İsmet Pasha in a speech delivered in the Great National Assembly at Angora on the 7th April, 1925 (summary in *The Times*, 28th April, 1925); by Hilmi Bey, the Vāly of Ma'mūretu'l-'Aziz, in the *Tanin* of the 11th April, 1925; and in the official report of the trial of Sheykh Sa'id (*The Times*, 29th May, 1925). The Turkish Government, which at that time was contending that the Kurds south of the 'Brussels Line' were eager to come back under Turkish rule, was naturally loath to weaken its case before the League of Nations by admitting that, at the very same moment, the Kurds north of the line had taken up arms in order to win their national independence from Turkey. Besides this negative inducement to minimize the Kurdish Nationalist aspect of the revolt the Turkish Government had a positive inducement to magnify the reactionary aspect, since that made it possible to represent the revolt as a general struggle between progress and reaction in Turkey and so to implicate the leaders of the Turkish opposition at Angora and Constantinople, on the charge of having conspired with the rebels. The suppression of the revolt was certainly followed by repressive measures against prominent Turks. For example, the editor of the *Tanin*, Hüseyin Jahyd Bey, was arrested on the 17th April, 1925, and condemned on the 7th May to perpetual exile at Chörüm (*The Times*, 20th and 29th April, 7th and 9th May, 1925). There appears to have been no sufficient evidence that either Hüseyin Jahyd Bey (who had always been a strenuous 'Westernizer') or any of the other prominent members of the Turkish opposition who were sentenced, during 1925, by the so-called 'Tribunals of Independence', were in any direct or even indirect way responsible for Sheykh Sa'id's revolt. There is, however, some evidence that the reactionary and fanatical impetus behind the Kurdish Revolt was stronger than the national impetus (*The Manchester Guardian*, 27th February, 1925). The League Commission reported that the focus of the Kurdish national consciousness was to be found at Sulaymāniyah, and that, towards the north-west, it became progressively weaker (see p. 506 above). It may be inferred that Kurdish national feeling was weaker still among the remote and isolated Zāzās of Dersim. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the revolt did not spread among the Turkish population of Erzerüm, Trebizond, and Samsün, who were almost as backward

The actual occasion of the outbreak was an attempt by the Turkish gendarmerie to arrest two of the Sheykh's followers, which Sheykh Sa'īd resisted by force. By the 23rd February, 1925, the revolt had spread so far that on that date the proclamation of martial law, for one month, in the twelve south-eastern vilāyets and part of the vilāyet of Erzerūm was announced by the Government at Angora.¹ The rebels succeeded in temporarily capturing Kharpūt, but failed to take Diyārbekr, Arghanah, or Malātiyah;² and by the end of the month the extension of the revolt had been definitely arrested.³ Even so the repression of it was beset with difficulties. The mountainous nature of the region lent itself to guerrilla warfare; the altitudes were so high that, at this season, the few practicable routes and passes were blocked with snow; and the only railway available for bringing Turkish troops into the neighbourhood—that is, the Baghdad Line—traversed the French mandated territory of Syria on either side of Aleppo. In pursuance of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921 (Art. 10), the French authorities permitted the transport of Turkish troops over this section of the railway;⁴ but before the Turkish reinforcements could be brought to bear Sheykh Sa'īd made a desperate assault upon Diyārbekr. The repulse of these attacks on the 7th and 8th March, 1925, marked the turn of the tide;⁵ and in the last week of March the Turkish counter-offensive began.⁶ The aim of the Turkish General Staff was to encircle the insurgents, in order to prevent them from dispersing and taking

and reactionary as their Kurdish neighbours, and who not long afterwards (in November 1925) rose on their own account (*The Times*, 26th November, 1925), against the Angora Government's Westernizing reforms. (See Part I, Section (ii) (e), above.) The view that the revolt and its suppression represented a conflict between the Kurdish and the Turkish nationalities, not a conflict between reaction and progress, is supported by the following piece of information which the writer of this Survey received from a Turkish friend who was in a position to know the facts:

When the rebels entered Kharpūt all elements in the town opposed them under the leadership of Nūrī Efendī, the candidate of the Progressive Party in a by-election. In fact, the Kurdish insurgents were driven out of Kharpūt, the day following their entry, by the notables and other inhabitants belonging to two different political parties. Considering that the vilāyet of Kharpūt [i. e. Ma'mūretu'l-'Azīz] is one of the most fanatical vilāyets in Eastern Anatolia, the attitude of the inhabitants of this vilāyet affords concrete evidence that the character of the revolt was not in the least religious, and that the [Turkish] Opposition Party had no relations whatever with the rebels.

¹ *The Times*, 25th February, 1925.

² *Ibid.*, 28th February, 1925.

³ *Ibid.*, 2nd March, 1925.

⁴ *Le Temps*, 1st March, 1925. In granting this permission the French military authorities took precautions that it should not be abused in order to mass Turkish troops on the borders of the Mosul vilāyet.

⁵ *The Times*, 11th March, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 28th March, 1925.

advantage of the *terrain* in order to turn the struggle into a guerrilla warfare.¹ On the 8th April the main insurgent force was brought to battle and routed in the Chapāqjūr district.² Ghenj was retaken on the 12th April, 1925; Sheykh Sa'īd himself and thirty-four of his principal adherents were captured in the act of flight; and the remnant of the insurgents laid down their arms.³ On the 28th April the military authorities announced that the operations were at an end.⁴

The trial of Sheykh Sa'īd and twenty-nine of his fellow insurgents before the Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Vilāyets was opened at Diyārbekr on the 27th May.⁵ On the 28th June the tribunal condemned the Sheykh and forty others (including nine other Sheykh) ⁶ to death and ordered the closing of all *tekkehs* in the eastern vilāyets.⁷ The sentences were executed immediately.⁸

The Turkish Government had put down the Kurdish Revolt with energy and skill; but this military efficiency was not seconded by corresponding political wisdom. While the execution of the ring-leaders, even in such large numbers, may have been not unjustifiable nor even impolitic,⁹ the revolt itself indicated that something had been wrong with the Government's previous policy; and the more drastic the measures which the Government took for the re-establishment of its authority, the more conciliatory should have been its measures of administrative reconstruction when once order was restored. The British Government, for example, after the suppression of the 'Irāq Revolt of 1920, had made a radical change of policy in

¹ *The Times*, 1st April, 1925.

² Turkish *communiqué* of the 9th April, 1925, in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 5, pp. 239-40; *The Times* and *Le Temps*, 13th April.

³ Turkish official *communiqué* of the 15th April, 1925, in *Oriente Moderno*, loc. cit., p. 240; *The Times*, 16th and 17th April; *Le Temps*, 17th April. In documents captured on his person Sheykh Sa'īd styled himself *Amīrū'l-Mujāhidīn* (Commander of the Fighters for the Faith).

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, loc. cit., pp. 239-40. The statement that martial law was abrogated on the 1st May appears to be incorrect.

⁵ *The Times*, 29th May, 1925; for the preliminaries see *The Manchester Guardian*, 21st May.

⁶ One of these was the ex-Ottoman Senator Sayyid 'Abdu'l-Qādir, son of Sheykh 'Ubeydu'llāh of Neri in the Shemsdinān district of Hakkīyārī (*Oriente Moderno*, V, 5, p. 242, and 6, p. 281), and a cousin of Sayyid Taha, whom the British authorities in 'Irāq had made Qā'immaqām of Rowandūz in 1923.

⁷ *The Times*, 30th June, 1925.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1st July, 1925.

⁹ These executions were reported, nevertheless, to have made a deep impression, unfavourable to Turkey, upon the Kurds of the Mosul vilāyet (*The Times*, 17th August, 1925). For the 'correct attitude' of the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq towards the Turkish Government in regard to the insurgent Kurdish chiefs who sought asylum in 'Irāq see *'Irāq Report* for 1925, p. 22.

‘Irāq by recognizing the force of Arab national aspirations and abandoning direct British administration. On the other hand, the Turkish Government, after the suppression of the Kurdish Revolt of 1925, simply resumed with redoubled vigour that policy of centralization, ‘Turcification’, secularization,¹ and ‘Westernization’ by which the revolt had been caused. The fresh flicker of rebellion in the Bitlis and Mūsh districts,² and in the Shemsdīnān district,³ which this intransigence aroused, was stamped out, and the Dersīmlī Zāzās were reported⁴ to have been subjected to systematic deportation. The extension of such repressive measures to the Goyan Kurds and Chaldaeans in the immediate vicinity of the ‘Brussels Line’⁵ was to have an important (and, for Turkey, adverse) effect, at a critical moment, upon the deliberations of the League Council regarding the disputed territory in the vilāyet of Mosul.

(f) FROM THE PRESENTATION OF THE LEAGUE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY’S REPORT ON THE 16TH JULY, 1925, TO THE LEAGUE COUNCIL’S AWARD OF THE 16TH DECEMBER, 1925.

The Report of the Commission of Inquiry came before the Council of the League at its Thirty-Fifth Session (2nd–28th September, 1925).

The British representative, Mr. Amery,⁶ reminded the Council of the undertakings given to it by the British and Turkish representatives in September 1924 to accept in advance its decision, and he declared once again that the British Government would loyally accept whatever decision the Council might come to. After citing the Inquiry Commission’s final conclusions⁷ he gave the Council assurances that the British Government was prepared to fulfil the two conditions upon which the Commission had recommended the union with ‘Irāq of the whole territory south of the ‘Brussels Line’. On the first point—subject to the understanding that the Commission had contemplated the maintenance of the mandate ‘in the

¹ For the Great National Assembly’s decrees of the 2nd September, 1925, closing all Tekkehs, Zāwīyehs, and Tūrbehs and suppressing all religious fraternities in Turkey, see Part I, Section (ii) (e), pp. 72–3 above.

² *Oriente Moderno*, V, 9, pp. 454–5, quoting *Ālif-Bā* of Damascus, 22nd August, 1925.

³ For the rising of Sheykh ‘Abdu’llāh b. ‘Abdī’l-Qādir in June 1925, see ‘*Irāq Report* for 1925, p. 22.

⁴ *The Times*, 28th July, 1925.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 13th June, 1925.

⁶ As Secretary of State for the Colonies in Mr. Baldwin’s Government Mr. Amery was the Cabinet Minister responsible for the administration of British mandates.

⁷ For the text see pp. 506–7 above.

shape of the existing treaty',¹ and that the British Government was 'in no sense departing from its declared policy of using its good offices to secure the admission of 'Irāq to membership of the League as soon as possible'—the British Government was 'prepared, before the expiration in 1928 of the present treaty,² which was formally approved last year by the Council, to give effect to the provision contained in the Protocol of that Treaty by replacing it by a treaty of longer duration. . . .' It was further 'prepared to continue its responsibility towards the League in this respect until such time, within the limit suggested by the Commissioners, as the Council of the League is clearly convinced that those conditions of stability which the Commissioners postulate are definitely and permanently secured'. Mr. Amery added that in this matter the British Government could speak, not only for itself, but for the Parliament and Government of 'Irāq, from whose Prime Minister he had, in the last twenty-four hours, received the following resolution :

The 'Irāq nation, represented by its Chamber of Deputies, declares its strong friendship for Great Britain and expresses its desire to continue in alliance with her after the expiry of the present treaty.

In regard to the second condition laid down by the Commission of Inquiry Mr. Amery conveyed an assurance from the British Government that the existing system of administration in the Mosul vilāyet, which did 'to a large extent carry out the recommendations of the Commission' relating to the recognition of the Kurdish nationality in various practical ways, would 'be continued and made even more effective'.³

Mr. Amery then asked the Council—on the hypothesis that his assurances satisfactorily met the two conditions laid down by the Commission of Inquiry—to adopt the Commission's recommendation for the union of the disputed territory with 'Irāq not merely (as the Commission itself had proposed) up to the 'Brussels Line' but up to the Hakkīyārī line which had been demanded by Great Britain on the 19th May and the 20th September, 1924. On the other hand,

¹ As stated by them explicitly in another passage of their report (p. 85).

² See Section (x) above.

³ For the technical difficulties of providing education in the Kurdish language see *'Irāq Report* for 1925, p. 139 ; and paragraph 12 of Memorandum on the administration of the Kurdish districts in 'Irāq, enclosed, together with the Anglo-'Irāqī Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, in the British Government's letter of the 2nd March, 1926, to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. 'The development of the written language as a means of communication is entirely due to the efforts of British officials. . . . The work begun by the Government of Occupation is being loyally carried on by the 'Irāq Government.'

he deprecated 'any impairment of the present territorial unity of 'Irāq beyond' the 'Brussels Line' as 'fraught with the gravest possibilities of disaster to the whole policy of the regeneration of 'Irāq to which' the British Government had set its hand. In particular he protested against the Commission's alternative suggestion that the disputed territory might be partitioned along the line of the Lesser Zāb, and submitted that such a settlement would impose upon the 'Irāq State 'a task which would be entirely beyond its capacity and for which the League could not expect the British Government or the British tax-payers to make themselves responsible'.

The Turkish representative rested his case mainly upon a legal argument. Starting from the two premisses that, juridically, the sovereignty over the disputed territory had not ceased, pending a settlement, to lie with Turkey and that Turkey had not recognized the mandatory system even in countries already detached juridically from the former Ottoman Empire, he sought to deduce¹ the consequence that the first of the two conditions upon which the Commission had recommended the union of the disputed territory with 'Irāq could not be fulfilled. Since the Commission deprecated partition on the merits of the case the Turkish representative concluded, by the method of exhaustion, that the only one of the Commission's three alternatives which the Council was at liberty to adopt was the reinstatement of Turkish sovereignty *de facto* over the whole territory down to the southern limit of the Turkish claim.

The Turkish, unlike the British, representative omitted to give any assurance either that his Government accepted in advance the Council's decision or that, if the disputed territory were handed back to Turkey, that Government would fulfil the second of the conditions which the Inquiry Commission had laid down by granting local self-government on national lines to the Kurds. When pressed on both points by Mr. Amery he replied, on the second, that 'all Kurds possess in Turkey, without any restriction, all the rights possessed by the Turks', while on the first point he still maintained silence.

Thereupon the Council reconstituted that committee of three—consisting of the Spanish, Swedish, and Uruguyan representatives²—which had drawn the 'Brussels Line' in October 1924, with instructions 'to examine the documents and to conduct, with the

¹ The fallacy of this attempted deduction was exposed by Mr. Amery, whose counter-argument was afterwards confirmed by the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

² MM. Quinoñes de León, Undén (who had replaced the late M. Branting as Swedish representative on the Council), and Guani.

assistance of the parties, any inquiries it considered necessary in order to reach a just and peaceful solution';¹ and the Turkish representative's silence now proved to have been significant. 'In the course of conversations between the Committee of the Council and the representatives of the two Governments concerned disagreement arose as to the precise force and character of the decision to be taken by the Council under Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne. According to the representative of the British Empire Article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne empowered the Council to fix the frontier by a final decision, which should be binding on both parties, and not by a recommendation which would only take effect if both parties agreed. The Turkish representative, on the other hand, maintained that the Council's decision could be nothing more than a recommendation made within the limits of the competence of the League of Nations as defined by the Covenant, and therefore subject to the consent of the parties concerned.'² In doing so he implicitly went back behind the undertaking which had been given to the Council by Fethi Bey in September 1924 and explicitly took his stand on certain observations³ which had been made by Lord Curzon on the 23rd January, 1923, during the Lausanne Conference. In falling back upon this position he took two grounds: first, that when Fethi Bey gave his undertaking, 'he had in mind all the past phases of the question, including Lord Curzon's speech'; and, second, that 'the Great National Assembly of Turkey is not bound by any undertaking except the acts which it has ratified, and any declarations or undertakings given by the Government which modify or exceed the stipulations contained in the acts which have been ratified by the Turkish Assembly cannot constitute any engagement until that Assembly has approved them'.⁴

'The Council decided, on the 19th September, 1925, that it would be desirable to request the Permanent Court of International Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following questions:

1. What is the character of the decision to be taken by the Council in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne? Is it an arbitral award, a recommendation or a simple mediation?

¹ M. Undén's Report of the 16th December, 1925 (British White Paper, *Cmd.* 2565 of 1925, p. 4).

² *Cmd.* 2565, *loc. cit.*

³ Quoted above on p. 494, foot-note.

⁴ See the Turkish Constitution of the 30th April, 1924, Article 16, which confers on the Great National Assembly the treaty-making power *sans phrase* (whereas, under the United States Constitution, the Senate merely shares that power with the President). The Turkish Constitution of the 30th April, 1924, had carried the sovereignty of Parliament to great lengths—though, at the time of writing, constitutional theory and practice in Turkey were far apart.

2. Must the decision be unanimous or may it be taken by a majority vote? May the representatives of the interested parties take part in the vote?

The two interested Governments were invited by the Council to hold themselves at the disposal of the Court to furnish any documents or explanations that might be required. The representative of Great Britain agreed to this procedure¹—with the reservation that, ‘until the Turkish Government definitely and explicitly renews its pledge to accept in advance the decision of the Council, any pledge or assurance that the British Government has given falls to the ground and is not effective’. ‘The Turkish representative stated that the opinion of the Court could not in any circumstances affect the rights which the Turkish Government held itself to possess under the Treaty of Lausanne.’²

In the meantime the Turkish representative appears to have made unofficial overtures³ to the British delegation for a direct agreement between the parties on the basis that Turkey should renounce her claim to the Diyālah district,⁴ but that the whole of the Mosul vilāyet except this corner should revert to Turkey, while British fears for the strategic security of ‘Irāq were to be met by a four-Power security pact to be concluded between Turkey, ‘Irāq, Great Britain, and Persia. Since nothing came of this move, and since the Turkish representative persisted in his virtual disavowal of the assurance given by Fethi Bey, the settlement of the controversy was once more delayed, pending the receipt of the Court’s advisory opinion.

During this session, as during those of 1924, the Council received from both parties complaints and counter-complaints regarding alleged violations of the *status quo*, which General Lăidoner—the representative whom the Council eventually sent to the spot—classified as follows:

1. Complaints by one Party of having been accused by the other Party of assisting tribal and village chiefs to organize attacks and raids on the peaceful population of the other Party’s zone.
2. Occupation by Turkish posts of villages to the south of the ‘Brussels Line’, and inspection of those villages by Turkish military patrols.
3. Protests of the Turkish Government regarding flights made by British aircraft over the zone north of the line.

¹ *Cmd.* 2565 of 1925, pp. 4–5.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

³ Referred to both by the Turkish representative himself and by Mr. Amery at the Council meeting of the 19th September, 1925.

⁴ The Commission of Inquiry had recommended that in any case ‘Irāq should retain the Diyālah region, which is necessary for the solution of the irrigation problem’ (*Report*, p. 89).

4. Deportations of Christians from the zone north of the 'Brussels Line', and arrival in 'Irāq of a large number of refugees from that zone.¹

In a letter of the 21st September, 1925, Mr. Amery requested the Council to dispatch forthwith to the locality of the 'Brussels Line' 'representatives instructed to investigate, as far as possible, the charges which have already been made by the two Governments, British and Turkish, and to report immediately to the Council in the event of any similar occurrence in the future'.² On the 24th September the Council decided to accede to this request, and on the 28th it appointed as its representative General F. Laidoner (Estonia), with a Czechoslovak officer and a Spanish diplomatist as assistants. This Mission arrived at Mosul on the 30th October and signed two reports in that city on the 23rd November, after having made a thorough inspection of the line, on the ground and from the air, on the southern ('Irāqī) side. They were unable to extend their inspection to the northern (Turkish) side, since the Turkish Government would not consent to this League inquiry being conducted in that part of the disputed territory which the League Council's decision of the 29th October, 1924, had brought or left provisionally under Turkish occupation and administration.

General Laidoner reported that the raids were due to the fact that the 'Brussels Line' was 'not a natural frontier', and to the local unrest produced by the postponement of a definitive settlement. He found that the occupation of certain points south of the 'Brussels Line' by Turkish posts had been due to inaccuracies in the existing maps, and that there were no longer any Turkish posts south of the true *tracée*, which he himself had established on the ground. He suggested³ that the Turkish complaints regarding the flights of British aeroplanes to the north of the 'Brussels Line' arose from an optical delusion. He submitted, however, that 'the question of the deportation of Christians is infinitely more important, for these deportations are causing fairly serious and easily comprehensible agitation and nervousness among the Christian population living south of the

¹ General Laidoner's Report to the Council, printed in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 2557 of 1925, pp. 3-4. The Turkish Government further alleged (on somewhat fantastic grounds) that the British Navy was making hostile demonstrations in the Aegean Sea.

² Text of the Council's Resolution of the 24th September, 1925 (quoted in *Cmd.* 2557 of 1925, p. 2).

³ 'I am not in a position to express a formal opinion, as I have not been able to make an investigation in the Turkish Zone.' (*Cmd.* 2557 of 1925, p. 5).

enacted in detail the atrocities which had accompanied the Armenian deportations of 1915.¹ After repeated visits from the Turkish soldiers—in which these exacted first money, then cattle, and finally women (the men being massacred if they attempted to interfere)²—the inhabitants of a village would be rounded up and marched away north-eastward with their flocks and herds. ‘During the journey, which varied from six to ten days, no food was given to these unfortunate persons, several of whom fell out exhausted by fatigue, thirst, and hunger, and were immediately dispatched by the Turkish soldiers with their bayonets or the butts of their rifles. At their nightly halts the soldiers selected the women they desired and, if their husbands interfered, the latter were immediately killed.’³ The refugees (most of whom had escaped by bribing Turkish sentries) arrived on the ‘Irāq side of the ‘Brussels Line’ in a pitiful condition. The condition of those who reached the Turkish concentration camps was reported to be worse still.

While General Laidoner was on his way back from Mosul to Geneva to present his report the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice came before the Council of the League at its Thirty-Seventh Session (7th–16th December, 1925). ‘The Turkish Government having received the notification of the Court, [had] informed the Registrar of the Court in a telegram dated the 8th October “that there was no need for it to be represented at the extraordinary session of the Court”. It nevertheless forwarded to the Court certain documents and written replies to certain questions which the Court had already seen fit to put to it before the hearings. The Court found in its advisory opinion, given on the 21st November, 1925, that “the decision to be taken by the Council will be binding on the parties and will constitute a definitive determination of the frontier between Turkey and ‘Irāq”. The Court held that the decision “must be unanimous, the representatives of the parties taking part in the voting, but their votes not being counted in ascertaining whether there is unanimity”.’⁴ The Court stated that this interpretation was based on the actual wording of Article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty and that it did not require a complete analysis of

2563 of 1925, p. 4). On the occasion of the deportation of the Armenians in 1915 their Kurdish overlords were reported to have taken up a similar attitude in certain places, especially in Cilicia.

¹ For these see the British Blue Book, *Cmd.* 8325 of 1916, and J. Lepsius, *Deutschland und Armenien, 1914–18* (Potsdam, 1919, Tempelverlag).

² This crescendo movement was likewise characteristic of the Greek atrocities committed against Turkish villagers in the Qārahmursal Peninsula in 1921.

³ *Cmd.* 2563 of 1925, p. 4.

⁴ *Cmd.* 2565 of 1925, p. 5.

the preparatory work (i.e. of the *procès verbal* of the Lausanne Conference, in which Lord Curzon's observations, upon which the Turks laid so much stress, occurred). The Court took the view that, although Article 15 of the Covenant only contemplated the Council making recommendations, the parties to a dispute were at liberty, by an agreement entered into in advance, to recognize that a recommendation by the Council should have binding force. In the opinion of the Court such an agreement had been entered into by the Principal Allied Powers when they referred to the Council the case of Upper Silesia,¹ and again by the parties that had signed and ratified the Lausanne Treaty, in virtue of Article 3 of that instrument.

'At its meeting of the 8th December, 1925, the Council took note of this opinion and heard the observations of the two Governments concerned. The representative of Great Britain pointed out that the British Government had always regarded itself, under the terms of the Treaty, as bound in advance by the decision of the Council';² and he submitted that, inasmuch as this was likewise the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, it was immaterial whether, after signing and ratifying the treaty, either party had re-assumed its treaty obligation in September 1924, *vis-à-vis* the Council of the League, or had withdrawn this pledge of September 1924 in September 1925. 'The Turkish representative said that he could not accept any interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne other than that which had been given by the Great National Assembly of Turkey when the latter had ratified the treaty. According to him the Council could only adopt the opinion of the Court by a unanimous decision of its members, including the representatives of the parties. The Council refused to accept this argument and decided unanimously, the votes of the two parties not being counted, to adopt the opinion of the Court. The Turkish representative, who had voted against this resolution, then stated that the powers of his delegation, according to the instructions which he had received, would come to an end in the face of an arbitral procedure.'³

The Council was thus faced with the unpleasant duty of taking an arbitral decision which had been repudiated in advance by one of the parties to the dispute, albeit in defiance of the highest and most impartial legal opinion; and a final effort to bring the parties to an agreement by methods of conciliation proved of no avail. At this

¹ See *H. P. O.*, vol. ii, Ch. IV, Part II, Sections I (3) and II (3). See also *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 267-70.

² *Cmd.* 2565 of 1925, p. 5.

³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

juncture General Laidoner arrived at Geneva and read his report aloud before the Council on the 10th December. This meeting was believed to have had a decisive effect upon the mind of M. Undén, the Council's *rapporteur*, who was credited with having been in favour, up to this moment, of a compromised decision—'mainly on the ground that it would be unfortunate for a decision of the League in such a dispute to be given wholly in favour of a great Power within the League against a small Power outside it'.¹

The Council's committee of three, of which M. Undén was chairman, eventually narrowed down their conclusions to a choice between two alternatives.

1. The allocation to 'Irāq of all the territory south of the so-called 'Brussels Line';
2. The partition of the disputed territory by a line for the most part following the course of the Lesser Zāb.²

When they referred these alternatives to the full Council the general sense of the Council declared itself in favour of the former.³

On the 16th December, 1925, at a meeting at which the Turkish delegation was not present,⁴ the Council, after hearing a letter from the Turkish representative in which he once again repudiated their arbitral powers, decided⁵ that the frontier between Turkey and 'Irāq should be fixed at the 'Brussels Line'. In the text of their decision the Council embodied three conditions, of which the first two were these :

The British Government is invited to submit to the Council a new Treaty with 'Irāq, ensuring the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime defined by the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and 'Irāq and by the British Government's undertaking approved by the Council on the 27th September, 1924, unless 'Irāq is, in conformity with Article 1 of the Covenant, admitted as a Member of the League before the expiration of this period.

As soon as, within a period of six months from the present date, the execution of this stipulation has been brought to the knowledge of the Council, the Council shall declare that the present decision has become definitive and shall indicate the measures required to ensure the delimitation on the ground of the frontier line.

The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a

¹ The words in quotation marks are taken from *The Times* of the 11th December, 1925, but M. Undén's name is not mentioned by *The Times* in the context.

² *Cmd.* 2565 of 1925, p. 8.

³ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Their failure to receive the invitation until two hours before the meeting was due to begin was not the fault of the League Secretariat

⁵ Text of their decision in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 2562 of 1925.

view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Inquiry the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the Commission in its final conclusions.

This decision was immediately accepted by Mr. Amery and Sir Austen Chamberlain on behalf of both Great Britain and ‘Irāq. The Turkish Government took no action and made no declaration. The Permanent Court of International Justice, however, had pointed out that, in ratifying the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey, under Article 16, had renounced her title over the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the treaty, which, under Article 3, included, by anticipation, the frontier with ‘Irāq, which was to be fixed either by agreement between the parties or by a decision of the League Council. According to the Court’s advisory opinion of the 21st November, 1925, ‘this renunciation is suspended until the frontier has been determined, but it will become effective, in the absence of some other solution, in virtue of the binding decision.’¹ Juridically, therefore, the Mosul controversy would have been settled automatically if and when the Council’s decision of the 16th December, 1925, was declared by the Council to have become definitive. In practice, however, a juridical settlement could not extinguish the dispute unless it were followed up by a voluntary agreement between the British and Turkish Governments.

(g) THE RUSSO-TURKISH TREATY OF THE 17TH DECEMBER, 1925 ;
THE ANGLO-‘IRĀQĪ TREATY OF THE 13TH JANUARY, 1926 ; AND
THE ANGLO-‘IRĀQĪ-TURKISH TREATY OF THE 5TH JUNE, 1926.

On the 16th December, 1925, the Council of the League, in announcing its decision, had at the same time exhorted the two parties ‘to reach a friendly agreement in order to put an end to the regrettable state of tension existing between them owing to the dispute for which a solution has just been found’. In response to this Sir Austen Chamberlain had assured the Council that ‘the British Government have no wish to take up a rigid or uncompromising attitude towards Turkey’, and that, ‘the Council having given its decision, His Majesty’s Government will gladly lend itself to conversations with the Government of the Republic of Turkey in order to see whether, while taking due account of the Council’s decision, it may not be possible to render the relations between our two countries easier and safer.’ Thus, in order to reap the fruits of the Council’s award, the British Government had still to bring the Turkish Government to

¹ *Cmd.* 2565 of 1925, p. 6.

an agreement. At the same time it had to negotiate a new treaty with 'Irāq, and to reassure the British Parliament and public in regard to the responsibilities which the Council's award entailed for Great Britain.

The anxiety in Great Britain, especially in regard to the financial and military commitments involved,¹ was genuine and widespread (though hardly so acute as it was represented to be in certain organs of the British press). In face of Turkey's refusal to accept the League's award, it was felt to be hazardous for Great Britain to accept the first condition on which that award depended—namely that the obligations undertaken by Great Britain under the Anglo-'Irāqī Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, should be extended from a maximum period of four years running from the ratification of peace with Turkey (as provided in the protocol of the 30th April, 1923)² to a maximum period of twenty-five years running from the 16th December, 1925 (as required by the League Council's award of the latter date). The Government's answer was that no additional responsibilities would be imposed upon Great Britain by the prolongation of the maximum period, and this on three grounds: first, that 'the protocol, which brings the existing treaty to an end in 1928, definitely pledges us to endeavour, before 1928, to replace it by another treaty for the future',³ or 'to make such [other] provision as the Council would approve of for continuing to fulfil [British] mandatory obligations to the League in respect of 'Irāq,'⁴ unless and until 'Irāq had been admitted to membership in the League, whereupon Great Britain's treaty obligations would terminate. The Government's second contention was that the admission of 'Irāq to membership in the League would probably take place before the end of the four years' term, and almost certainly long before the end of the twenty-five years' term. In the third place they pointed out that British financial and military commitments to 'Irāq were de-

¹ For an optimistic forecast of the financial future of 'Irāq see a speech delivered on the 18th February, 1926, in the House of Commons by Mr. Hilton Young, who, in the spring of 1925, had visited 'Irāq on a financial mission from the British Government. For figures showing a striking progressive reduction of British expenditure in 'Irāq see statements in the House of Commons on the 21st December, 1925, and the 18th February, 1926, by Mr. Amery.

² For the history of the treaty and the protocol down to this point see Section (x) above.

³ Statement by Mr. Stanley Baldwin in the House of Commons on the 21st December, 1925. For the controversy over this point see a correspondence between Lord Parmoor and Mr. Amery in *The Times*, 23rd, 24th, and 29th December, 1925.

⁴ Mr. Baldwin, *loc. cit.*

terminated, not by the treaty, but by two separate agreements signed on the 25th March, 1924, the former of which ran for a maximum period of four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey, and the latter for a maximum period of four years from the date when it was made. It was pointed out that, although these two agreements arose respectively out of Articles 15 and 7 of the treaty, their duration always had been, and would continue to be, independent of the duration of the treaty. In two debates in the House of Commons, on the 21st December, 1925, and on the 18th February, 1926, the Government prevailed.¹ On the former occasion the House approved the acceptance of the League Council's award ; on the latter it approved the new Anglo-‘Irāqī Treaty which had been signed on the 13th January.

This new instrument ² abrogated (Art. 1) the provisions both of the treaty of the 10th October, 1922, and of the protocol of the 30th April, 1923, as far as they related to the duration of the treaty, and provided that the treaty itself, and the agreements subsidiary to it, in so far as the duration of these had been made dependent on that of the treaty, should remain in force for a period of twenty-five years from the 16th December, 1925, ‘ unless before the expiration of that period ‘Irāq shall have become a Member of the League of Nations ’. Having thus satisfied the requirements of the League Council the treaty took account of certain specific desires of the ‘Irāqīs by providing (Art. 2) for a continuance of discussions in regard to the revision of the military and financial agreements mentioned above,³ and also (Art. 3) for an active consideration by the British Government—first at the date when the treaty would have expired under the protocol of the 30th April, 1923, and thereafter at successive intervals of four years—of the following two questions : (i) the question whether it was possible for the British Government to press for the admission of ‘Irāq into the League ; (ii) if this were not possible the question of the amendment of [any of] the agreements subsidiary to the treaty of the 10th October, 1922.

¹ The Labour Party absented itself from the debate of the 21st December, 1925, but moved an amendment to the Government's motion in the debate of the 18th February, 1926.

² Text in League of Nations documents, C. 141. 1926. vii and C. 216. M. 77. 1926. vi ; and in British White Paper, *Cmd.* 2662.

³ These discussions had been opened in pursuance of the resolution in which the ‘Irāq Constituent Assembly had ratified the treaty on the 10th June, 1924 (see p. 469 above). The purpose was to lighten the financial burdens which these agreements imposed upon ‘Irāq. On the other hand, there was no question of increasing the burdens which they imposed on Great Britain by extending their duration.

The treaty of the 13th January, 1926, was approved by the 'Irāqī Chamber of Deputies on the 18th January,¹ a month before its approval by the British House of Commons. While the Nationalist Party in the Chamber not only abstained from voting but left the Chamber in protest the treaty was approved by the fifty-eight deputies who remained as against twenty who withdrew—a much more substantial majority than that by which the treaty of the 10th October, 1922, had been approved on the 10th June, 1924, in the Constituent Assembly.² These figures reflected the fact that, in the interval, the feeling towards Great Britain in 'Irāq had become noticeably more friendly—partly, perhaps, because the British Government had proved itself a loyal and effective champion of 'Irāq's claim to the vilāyet of Mosul,³ but possibly still more because the new régime which had been introduced by stages since the rising of 1920 had by this time begun to produce results which the 'Irāqis themselves appreciated. There had been an indication that the previous attitude of suspicion and hostility was passing away in the decision, taken by the 'Irāqī Cabinet in March 1925, to offer a number of long-term contracts (up to terms of ten years) to British advisers and officials;⁴ and the growth of a friendlier feeling had been promoted in the following month by Mr. Hilton Young's official recommendation that certain of the British Government's claims, in respect of works of public utility which had been transferred to 'Irāq, should be cancelled.⁵

The Anglo-'Irāqī Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, was transmitted to the League of Nations by the British Government under cover of a letter dated the 2nd March, in which it declared that, so long as the new treaty remained in force, it would regard as binding the undertakings given by it to the Council in September 1924 in

¹ *The Times*, 20th January, 1926.

² On that occasion there had been 37 votes in favour, 24 against, 8 abstentions, and not less than 31 absences, so that the treaty had been approved by an actual minority of the total number of deputies.

³ Considering that the Constituent Assembly of 'Irāq, in its resolution of the 10th June, 1924, had stipulated that the treaty of the 10th October, 1922, should become null and void if the British Government failed to safeguard the rights of 'Irāq in the Mosul vilāyet in its entirety (see p. 469 above), it would certainly have been illogical if the 'Irāqī Parliament had refused, in 1926, to approve a modification of the original treaty failing which the British Government's successful efforts to safeguard the rights above-mentioned would have been frustrated.

⁴ *'Irāq Report* for 1925, p. 11.

⁵ For Mr. Young's Report, dated the 25th April, 1925, on his financial mission to 'Irāq see *Cmd.* 2438 of 1925. On the 27th June, 1926, the British High Commissioner in 'Irāq announced (*The Times*, 28th June, 1926) the cancellation of a British claim amounting to £750,000.

respect of the previous treaty, and that it would extend to the new treaty Article 4 of those undertakings, in which it had engaged that it would agree to no modification of the previous treaty without the Council's consent.¹ This letter, with the text, annexed to it, of the new treaty, was approved by the Council of the League on the 11th March, 1926; and thereby the Council's award of the 16th December, 1925, became definitive.

It remained for the British Government to arrive at an agreement with Turkey. The first effect upon Turkey of her failure to win her case at Geneva was to throw her back into the arms of Soviet Russia. It has been recorded in a previous volume² how the co-operation which had been forced upon Angora and Moscow by a common danger from the Principal Allied Powers had shown signs of weakening as soon as the military crisis had been surmounted, and how the two parties had gone different ways over the question of the Black Sea Straits at the Conference of Lausanne. The Russians neglected no opportunity to retrieve this set-back to their diplomacy; and on the 17th December, 1925, the day after the Council of the League had given its award regarding the Turco-ʿIrāqī frontier, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfīq Rüşhdī Bey, who had been the principal Turkish representative at Geneva, signed a new treaty³ in Paris with the Commissary for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., M. Čičerin. In this instrument either contracting party bound itself to remain neutral if the other were attacked by a third Power or Powers (Art. 1); and also to abstain, on its own part, from hostile action against the other—such action being defined in comprehensive terms (Art. 2). The treaty was to run for three years in the first instance and to continue automatically for another year, unless denounced by either party at six months' notice. In the last of three protocols attached the parties bound themselves 'to begin negotiations for establishing an order of procedure for settling those differences which might arise between them and which could not be settled by ordinary diplomatic means'.

Though the signature of this Russo-Turkish Treaty was a diplomatic success for M. Čičerin it did not tempt Mustafā Kemāl Pasha and his colleagues into challenging the League of Nations award by force of arms. Before the end of December 1925 it was reported⁴ that the Turkish Government had debated, but had definitely re-

¹ See p. 470 above.

² *Survey for 1920-3*, pp. 374-6.

³ English translation of the text in *The Times*, 29th December, 1925.

⁴ *The Manchester Guardian* of the 28th December, 1925, quoting the Paris edition of *The Chicago Tribune*.

jected, a proposal to go to war. Already, however, on the 21st December, Mr. Baldwin had announced in the House of Commons that he was inviting the Turkish Ambassador to meet him next day, in order to give effect to Sir Austen Chamberlain's declaration of the 16th December at Geneva; and as a result of this meeting, which duly took place, it was arranged that the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Ronald Lindsay, should pay a visit from Constantinople to Angora.¹ The tact and ability with which the British negotiator performed his difficult task² were opportunely reinforced by a rumour³ that, in anticipation of a rupture between Turkey and Great Britain, Italy was holding herself ready to enter the lists, and that a Turkish invasion of 'Irāq would be the signal for an Italian landing in Anatolia.⁴ Whatever the relative strength of the various considerations which influenced the Turkish Government's decision,

¹ *The Times*, 6th January, 1926. At this time most of the diplomatic representatives accredited to the Government of the Turkish Republic were still officially resident at Constantinople, the former capital of the Ottoman Empire.

² See, for example, the translation, in *Le Temps* of the 27th May, 1926, of an interview given by Sir Ronald Lindsay at Angora to Yūnūs Nādī Bey, the editor of the *Jumhūriyet*, in which he made it clear that the British Government's championship of 'Irāq's claim to the Mosul vilāyet did not mask any ulterior design of using the disputed territory as a base of operations for subsequent encroachments at Turkey's expense.

³ The effect of this rumour upon Turkish opinion and policy is indicated in the following passage from a letter (in English) addressed to the writer by a Turkish friend of his in Smyrna, on the 13th April, 1926, after a visit to Angora:

'Angora, and indeed all Turkey, is a great deal uneasy about Mussolini's speeches in these days; and not only fears but also rumours and actions are there. . . . I see every one speaks of war as an imminent possibility. . . . There are of course those who say that this talk is mere bluff intended to exercise pressure on Turkey about Mosul. . . . It is further taken for granted here that in case of attack Turkey would have unwillingly to look for Bolshevik intervention, and would get it, but at what ultimate cost only the Lord knows. . . .'

⁴ It will be remembered that, in the secret Anglo-Franco-Italian Agreement signed on the 18th August, 1917, at St. Jean de Maurienne, Italy had been assigned a vast zone in southern and south-western Anatolia, including Smyrna; and that, though this agreement was technically invalid owing to the absence of the Russian Government's signature, Italy's claim in Anatolia had been recognized a second time, in the Tripartite (Anglo-Franco-Italian) Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, in which a zone, excluding Smyrna but including an additional area in the north-west in compensation, had been assigned to Italy as an economic sphere of influence (see *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, Ch. I, Part I A, Sections 9-11, and Part II, Section 5 (b)). This Tripartite Agreement, like the Peace Treaty of Sèvres, had fallen through in consequence of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's military triumph in the summer of 1922, but it was natural to suppose that Signor Mussolini's Government would not remain indifferent if a favourable opportunity recurred for attempting to realize Italian aspirations in a territory so admirably suited for Italian colonization—especially now that the elimination of the former native Christian minorities had created a vacuum there.

the outcome of the Anglo-Turkish negotiations was that Turkey ceased to kick against the pricks and accepted the *fait accompli* with less procrastination and with a better grace than had been anticipated. The news that a treaty between Turkey, Great Britain, and ‘Irāq had been signed at Angora on the 5th June, 1926, took the British public by surprise, and this surprise did not diminish when the text¹ of the treaty was made known.

In this instrument not only was the frontier between Turkey and ‘Irāq ‘definitively laid down’, by free agreement between the parties, along the ‘Brussels Line’, with one trifling modification;² but it was recorded in the preamble that the treaty had been concluded out of ‘regard to the provisions of the Treaty signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, regarding the settlement of the frontier between Turkey and ‘Irāq’. Thus, in the end, Turkey conceded both the substance of the British claim and the ground on which it had been put forward. The parties accepted the new frontier as ‘definitive and inviolable’, and undertook to make no attempt to alter it (Art. 5); and they facilitated this mutual undertaking by consecrating a whole chapter of the treaty (Arts. 6–13)³ to the maintenance of neighbourly relations. The provisions to this end followed the precedents which had been worked out in the recent agreements between ‘Irāq, Transjordan, and the Najd,⁴ and in the less formal consultations between the British and French authorities regarding the Syro-‘Irāqī frontier.⁵ Tribal raids were to be combated by specific co-operation between the competent Turkish and ‘Irāqī authorities in a zone extending 75 kilometres deep on either side of the line; and a Permanent Frontier Commission was to be set up and was to meet at least once every six months, in Turkey and in ‘Irāq alternately. In the third chapter of the treaty the parties agreed (Art. 15) to negotiate an extradition treaty; the ‘Irāq Government undertook to give an amnesty to the adherents of Turkey in the former disputed territory (Art. 16); and it was provided (Art. 14) that, for a period of twenty-five years from the coming into force of the treaty,

¹ Printed in British White Paper, *Omd.* 2679 of 1926.

² That part of the road between the two Turkish villages of Alamun and Ashuta which had been left by the ‘Brussels Line’ in ‘Irāqī territory was transferred, under the treaty of the 5th June, 1926, to Turkey (see Map No. III at the end of this volume).

³ While the territorial provisions of the treaty were naturally to be permanent it was provided (Art. 17) that Chapter II should remain in force for a period of ten years in the first instance, unless either party denounced it at the end of the first two years, in which case such denunciation would take effect after the lapse of one year.

⁴ See Section (vi) above.

⁵ See Section (ix) above.

the 'Irāqī Government should pay the Turkish Government 10 per cent. on all royalties received by it from the Turkish Petroleum Company (under Art. 10 of that company's concession of the 14th March, 1925), from other companies or persons who might exploit the oil under the provisions of the same concession (Art. 6), and from such subsidiary companies as might be constituted (under Art. 33). In a letter which was addressed to the Turkish plenipotentiary by the British and 'Irāqī plenipotentiaries on the date on which the treaty was signed, and which constituted an integral part of the treaty, Turkey was given the option, within twelve months of the coming into force of the treaty, of capitalizing the above-mentioned royalties at £500,000 sterling, to be payable by the 'Irāqī Government at thirty days' notice.

On the 6th June the treaty was discussed at a meeting of the (governmental) People's Party at Angora, where it encountered considerable opposition.¹ Nevertheless, it was approved in the Great National Assembly on the 7th by 143 votes against 2, with one abstention.² On the same day the treaty was formally brought to the notice of the League Council by Sir Austen Chamberlain.³ On the 14th June it was approved by the 'Irāqī Parliament at Baghdad.⁴

Thus, a controversy which had dragged on since the Armistice of the 30th October, 1918, and which had been a threat to the precariously re-established peace of the Middle East for upwards of seven years, was at last amicably settled as between the Governments of 'Irāq, Turkey, and Great Britain. The Governments, however, were not the only parties concerned. In the long run both they and the Persian Government would have to reckon with the Kurds, who after the treaty of the 5th June, 1926, were divided between three sovereignties, as against two before the War. The development of a Kurdish national consciousness had unmistakably begun, at any rate in the Sulaymāniyah district; and in this very region the British Government was committed to fostering this process by the second condition attached to the League Council's award. At the time of writing it was impossible to forecast at what rate, in these circumstances, Kurdish nationalism would grow, or what would be the ultimate effect of its growth upon that territorial settlement which had just been reached by the protracted and painful efforts of diplomacy.

¹ *The Times* and *The Manchester Guardian*, 8th June, 1926.

² *The Times*, 9th June, 1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 8th June, 1926.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 15th June, 1926.

Note on Oil.

While the diplomatic controversy over the Mosul vilāyet was in progress it was sometimes asserted by hostile critics of one or other party to the dispute that the real issue at stake was the exploitation of the oil-fields in the disputed territory, and that the intricate questions of history, ethnology, strategy, and legal interpretation which covered the pages of the official documents had been deliberately placed in the forefront in order to screen a struggle over economic assets on which all parties were intent but which all were ashamed to avow. In support of this thesis it was pointed out that, in the treaty of the 5th June, 1926, which brought the controversy to an end, the oil appeared on the surface, and the inference was drawn that, throughout the controversy, it had been the hidden motive power. Little positive evidence, however, appears to have been brought forward in support of this view; and while it is true that the imputation of oil-hunting was so invidious that statesmen against whom it was levelled (often most unfairly) were apt to protest too much,¹ it is probable that such protestations were at any rate less remote from the truth than the accusations which evoked them.

Though the truth about 'oil politics' was notoriously difficult to ascertain, the history of the Mosul controversy (at least in so far as the facts were known at the time of writing) would appear to show that, with all the Governments concerned, the desire to secure profits from the oil was quite subordinate to political considerations.

On the Turkish side, certainly, the oil question did not weigh in the balance against the Kurdish question. In the British House of Commons on the 18th February, 1926, Sir Austen Chamberlain revealed the fact that, in March 1925, the Turkish Government had approached him privately with an offer that, if Great Britain would allow Turkey to 'have so much as she desired of the vilāyet of Mosul . . . , a British company, approved by His Majesty's Government, should have the exploitation of all the oil', while other British companies were to have concessions for pipe-lines, for half a dozen ports, and for something like 3,000 kilometres of railways. 'The reply of His Majesty's Government was that they were trustees for Irāq; that they were not possessors but mandatories, and that as mandatories and trustees they could not bargain away the rights and interests of Irāq and her people in exchange for concessions to British capitalists.' Both the offer and its rejection indicate that oil was not the primary consideration with either party. The Turkish Government would have preferred to sacrifice oil profits in exchange for territory, and only entered into a bargain the other way round when it had become convinced that the recovery of the disputed territory by any means whatever was impossible.

As for the British Government Sir Austen Chamberlain's revelation substantially vindicates their diplomacy from the charge of being tainted by oil. At the same time the British Government was commercially interested in the Mosul oil-fields to this extent, that it held a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had an important holding in the Turkish Petroleum Company—an international concern which, in June 1914, before the outbreak

¹ See, for example, the declarations by Lord Curzon and Mr. Amery cited in *The Manchester Guardian*, 10th December, 1925.

of the War of 1914-18, had secured from the Ottoman Government a written promise of a concession covering the vilāyets of Mosul and Baghdad, and which eventually secured the concession itself from the 'Irāqī Government on the 14th March, 1925.

The history of the Turkish Petroleum Company's claim appeared to be, briefly, as follows,¹ though many episodes in it were obscure. In the Baghdad and Mosul vilāyets oil rights had been obtained by the Anatolian Railway Company and the Baghdad Railway Company (both mainly German concerns), while the Turkish Government was also negotiating with a British concern, the d'Arcy Exploration Company—the latter being the second in the field. To reconcile these claims there was founded, on the 23rd October, 1912, the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which the Deutsche Bank (as assignee of the Baghdad Railway Company) held 25 per cent. of the shares, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company (representing the Royal Dutch and Shell Companies) 22½ per cent., the National Bank of Turkey (a British concern) 47½ per cent., and Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian (an international financier instrumental in the formation of the company) 5 per cent. On the 19th March, 1914, after the British Government had acquired a controlling interest in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the National Bank of Turkey's interest in the Turkish Petroleum Company was transferred to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company—this transfer being made on the British Government's initiative and under its auspices. It was after this, in June 1914, that the written promise of a concession covering the Mosul and Baghdad vilāyets was received by the Turkish Petroleum Company from the Ottoman Government.

In the Anglo-French Oil Agreement signed on the 24th April, 1920, at San Remo,² the Deutsche Bank's 25 per cent. holding in the Turkish Petroleum Company was transferred to a French group. This transaction aroused the attention of oil interests in the United States; the Administration at Washington espoused their cause; and the publication of the British Government's draft for the British mandate in 'Irāq became the occasion of a controversy between the State Department and the Foreign Office in which the ostensible issue was the abstract principle of the 'Open Door' in mandated territories, while the real issue, as the outcome showed, was whether United States oil interests should wrest from British and French oil interests a share in the exploitation of the 'Irāq field. This controversy delayed the inauguration of the British mandate until—on political grounds unconnected with oil and arising out of the 'Irāq Revolt of 1920—the British Government jettisoned the draft mandate and regulated its relations with 'Irāq and with the League of Nations through an Anglo-'Irāqī Treaty. The Anglo-American diplomatic controversy was not composed until, at the instance of the British Government, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company offered half of its holding in the Turkish Petroleum Company to the Standard Oil Company and other American interests. The offer was apparently accepted in principle in the spring of 1923, but at the time of writing the details of American participation had not yet been arranged.

¹ See the League Commission of Inquiry's *Report*, pp. 68-9; *The Manchester Guardian*, 17th March and 10th December, 1925; *The Times*, 17th and 18th March, 1925; statement by Mr. Ormsby Gore in the House of Commons, 30th March, 1925.

² See *H. P. C.*, vol. vi, pp. 603-5.

Meanwhile, the Turkish Petroleum Company, which men of violence had thus been taking by storm, still held no more than the promise of a concession—and that from a Government which had now definitively lost the Baghdad vilāyet and was on the way to lose the Mosul vilāyet likewise. It was reported that, at the Lausanne Conference, the British delegation sought to have a confirmation of the Ottoman Government's promise of 1914 incorporated in the Peace Treaty, but that this attempt was frustrated by the United States Observer. At any rate the final text of the Lausanne Treaty contained no reference to the matter.

Eventually, on the 14th March, 1925, a concession was granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company by the Government of ‘Irāq. This concession¹ covered the whole territory of the kingdom except the former Ottoman vilāyet of Basrah (which had not been included in the Ottoman Government's promise of 1914) and the territories transferred to Turkey from Persia in 1913 (where the oil rights had already been acquired by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company exclusively). It thus applied automatically to that portion (approximately coincident with the former Ottoman vilāyet of Mosul) of the territory in dispute between Turkey and ‘Irāq which was eventually awarded to the latter. It may be noted that, under the concession of the 14th March, 1925, the Turkish Petroleum Company was not given a monopoly in the zone which the concession covered. The company was granted two years, running from the 14th November, 1925, to select 192 square miles, divided into twenty-four rectangular areas, and in these areas its concession was to run for seventy-five years; but, with this exception, the whole of the zone covered by the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession was to be open, at the end of the first four years, to companies and individuals of all nationalities, and all the geological information which had been obtained by the Turkish Petroleum Company was to be placed at the disposal of other applicants.

At the time when the concession was granted participation in the Turkish Petroleum Company was divided in the proportion given on p. 530 above, with the exception that the 25 per cent. share held by the Deutsche Bank had been transferred to the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, in which numerous French oil companies were represented. As already stated the American companies had not, either at that date or at the time of writing, taken up the shares offered to them. In the convention in which the concession was conferred upon the company by the Government of ‘Irāq it was stipulated that the company should always have a British chairman.

(xii) The Tension between ‘Irāq and Persia over the Exodus of the Persian Shī‘ī ‘Ulamā from Najaf.

The National Government of ‘Irāq and the mandatory Power were involved in international, as well as internal, difficulties by the existence in ‘Irāq (between the Euphrates and the Shāmīyah) of the

¹ For particulars see the League Commission's *Report*, p. 68. The text of the concession is not printed in the Appendix to the British Government's *Report on the Administration of ‘Irāq* for 1925, where it might be expected to be found. There is only a brief notice of the concession in the body of the *Report* (p. 11). It was published, however, in the *‘Irāq Government Gazette*.

holy cities of the Shī'ī denomination—Karbālā, Najaf, Sāmarrā, and Kāzimayn—with their resident *mujtahids* or Shī'ī doctors of the law. These *mujtahids* spoke with authority and not as the Sunni 'ulamā (who were constrained to follow one or other of the four orthodox interpretations of the *Shari'ah*). They not only possessed a great influence over the Shī'īs of 'Irāq (who were shown by the first census to constitute more than 50 per cent. of the population¹). They were a power among Shī'īs in all countries (for whom the holy cities in 'Irāq were places of pilgrimage), and especially among those of Persia—the leading Shī'ī country, where Shi'ism was the established religion. Most of the *mujtahids* in 'Irāq were of Persian origin, and many of them retained their Persian nationality.²

Under the Ottoman régime there had been no love lost between the *mujtahids* and the Turkish authorities, who had been inclined to favour their own co-religionists of the Sunni minority; but after the Turks had been driven out by the British the *mujtahids* showed themselves equally hostile to the latter. To some extent this may have been due to their national resentment, as Persians, at British policy towards Persia between 1907 and 1921.³ The fundamental reason, however, was the same as that which had frequently set them against the Ottoman Government, and for that matter against the Persian Government⁴—namely, the jealousy of an influential priesthood towards the civil power. The jealousy of the *mujtahids* towards the British régime was proportionate to the greater efficiency of this régime.

Certain of the *mujtahids* took an active part in instigating the revolt of 1920,⁵ and their anti-British activities did not cease after its suppression. The attempt, in April 1922, of the *mujtahid* Shaykh

¹ The Shī'ī element in 'Irāq was concentrated to the south of Baghdad, the Muslims of the Mosul Vilāyet being almost exclusively Sunnis.

² For an expert description of the Shī'ī holy cities of 'Irāq and the *mujtahids* see *Cmd.* 1061 of 1920, *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia* (from the beginning of the British military occupation down to the British Government's declaration of the 20th June, 1920), by Miss Gertrude Bell, especially pp. 27–9.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 144.

⁴ Shi'ism not only involved (in common with all forms of Islam) a theocratic basis of government but (unlike Sunnism) a theocracy incorporated in a priesthood. Under the Safawī Dynasty (A. D. 1502–1722) there had been a personal union between the highest offices of Church and State; but since the fall of that dynasty the Shī'ī priesthood had been in more or less constant opposition to all established civil authority—even in Persia itself, where the temporal rulers continued (with the exception of Nādir Shāh) to profess the Shī'ī faith. See Section xiii, p. 537 below, for an instance during the period under review.

⁵ *Cmd.* 1061, pp. 144–5; *Report on 'Irāq Administration*, October 1920–March 1922, p. 4; *Report*, 1923–4, p. 12.

Mahdiyyū'l-Khālīsī of Kāzimayn (a Persian national) to exploit against Great Britain the Wahhābī raid of the preceding month has been described elsewhere ;¹ and this leader, in particular, took a prominent part in the agitation first against the British mandate and then against the substitute provided for it in the Anglo-'Irāqī Treaty.² On the 24th May, 1922, while the treaty was under negotiation, a telegram, condemning it, from Al-Khālīsī was published in an 'Irāq newspaper. About the beginning of August he signed a *fatwā* pronouncing that those who failed to guard the independence of their country from the authority of foreigners should be expelled from the society of True Believers and denied burial in Muslim graveyards. As the sequel to a demonstration at Baghdad on the 23rd August against the British High Commissioner one of Al-Khālīsī's sons and two other Shaykhs were prevailed upon to leave 'Irāq voluntarily for Persia on the 29th August. After the signature of the treaty on the 10th October, 1922, the *mujtahids* promulgated decrees forbidding the participation of the Shī'īs of 'Irāq in the elections for the Constituent Assembly, and they reissued these in June 1923.³ Thereby the elections were effectively impeded, until, on the night of the 25th-26th June, the 'Irāqī Government, in virtue of an amendment to the penal code which had been passed on the 9th June, arrested Al-Khālīsī, with two of his sons and a nephew, and deported the party to Aden as the first stage on a pilgrimage to Mecca.⁴ In protest against this action nine 'ulamā of Najaf, with twenty-five followers, resolved to make an exodus from 'Irāq and crossed the frontier, on the 3rd July, into Persia, where they took up their residence in the holy city of Qum.⁵ In 'Irāq itself this gesture fell flat ; but there was an agitation in Persia which stimulated the Persian Government to make diplomatic protests. In July it was intimated to the Persian Government that the *mujtahids* would be allowed to return to 'Irāq after the Constituent Assembly had met and done its business. Two were actually permitted to return in September. The others, who remained at Qum, were joined there next month by Al-Khālīsī from Mecca. Meanwhile, the *mujtahids* (with the exception of Al-Khālīsī himself) and the Shī'ī community in 'Irāq were becoming more and more inclined to make their peace with the authorities. The Shī'ī community made a formal reconciliation in November 1923, on the occasion of a change of ministry, when

¹ See above, p. 333.² 'Irāq Report, 1922-3, pp. 10, 11, 16, 20.³ 'Irāq Report, 1923-4, pp. 6 and 9.⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 11-13.

they were given two portfolios in the new cabinet.¹ The 'Irāq Government, on its part, was disposed to make reconciliation easy for the *mujtahids* as well, since their exodus had interrupted the pilgrim traffic (thus causing serious financial loss to the holy cities and to the 'Irāq Railways) and had produced an estrangement between 'Irāq and Persia. Accordingly, the *mujtahids*, with the exception of Al-Khālīsī, were given permission to return to 'Irāq on condition that they refrained from taking part in politics. They accepted these terms and recrossed the frontier on the 22nd April, 1924,² while Al-Khālīsī withdrew from Qum to Mashhad.

(xiii) The Situation of Persia (1922-5).

In the *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*³ the developments in the situation of Persia have been recorded down to the *coup d'état* of the 21st February, 1921, which brought a Nationalist administration into power at Tih-rān, and the consequent denunciation of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of the 9th August, 1919, by the Persian Government. By these two events the independence of Persia was reasserted, and this was a striking reversal of the trend of affairs during the previous fifteen years. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of the 31st August, 1907, had been widely interpreted as portending an eventual partition of Persia between the two neighbouring Great Powers; the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1915⁴ had given point to this interpretation by granting Russia a free hand in her zone, and by including the 'neutral zone' of the 1907 agreement in the British zone (though the British Government never ceased to insist that the maintenance of Persian independence and integrity was a cardinal feature of British policy). When the Russian forces had ebbed away from Northern Persia after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 their place had been taken by British forces; and the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, while relieving Persia from the nightmare of partition, had apparently threatened to extinguish her independence in a less painful but hardly less effective way by bringing her permanently under the military and political ascendancy of a single foreign Power. In 1921 Persia unexpectedly shook herself free from these last trammels and signalized her new freedom by negotiating the treaty of the 26th February, 1921, with the

¹ *'Irāq Report*, 1923-4, p. 17.

² For the visit paid to them at Qum, a few weeks before their return to 'Irāq, by Rizā Khān Pahlawī, see p. 537 below.

³ Vol. vi, pp. 206-17.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

Soviet Government at Moscow ;¹ but her achievement up to this point, though noteworthy, was negative. She had recovered her freedom less by her own efforts than by a fortunate conjunction of external circumstances, and she could not hope to retain it unless she succeeded in putting her own house in order. During the next four years (1922-5), however, she made progress in internal reconstruction which was more remarkable than the recovery of her freedom of action in 1921, and it is noteworthy that her history during these years reproduced certain general phenomena which characterized the contemporary history of other Islamic countries.

In Persia, as in Turkey and Afghanistan, the reconstruction was mainly the work of a single dominant personality inspired by the ideal of effective national independence as against foreign Powers and effective national sovereignty at home. The new Persian leader was Rizā Khān Pahlawī, a soldier who had served a long apprenticeship in the Persian Cossack Division organized and commanded by Russian officers of the old régime. After rising from the ranks he had found his opportunity when the British military authorities in Persia had compelled the Russian officers of the Division to resign their commissions in the autumn of 1920. Rizā Khān led the Cossack force which marched from Qazwīn on Tihirān to make the *coup d'état* of February 1921, and from that time onwards he remained the power behind the Persian throne until he became its occupant. Like Mustafā Kemāl Pasha, whom he evidently admired and imitated, Rizā Khān was a soldier and a self-made man. Indeed, he had a more romantic career than his Turkish *confrère*, who only rose from second-lieutenant to President of a Republic, whereas Rizā Khān rose from trooper to Shāh. As a soldier he made it his first care to build up an efficient national army, and he employed this army effectively in asserting the authority of the Tihirān Government within the national frontiers, as against both recalcitrant native tribesmen and foreign Powers. He showed the same determination as Mustafā Kemāl to put an end to the encroachment of Western or Westernized Powers upon his country's independence ; but, again like Mustafā Kemāl, he was far from being hostile to Western methods and Western ideas. He not only applied these in the reorganization of the Persian army, but took the statesmanlike view that army reform could not be carried far without a general concomitant reform in finance and civil administration. In this belief Rizā Khān welcomed and

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 214-15 ; *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 387.

generally supported the American financial experts who were engaged by the Persian Government—on private contracts and not as seconded officials of the United States Government—in the summer of 1922.¹ It remains to describe briefly the steps by which Rizā Khān acquired the Persian crown, his success in asserting the authority of the Tihṙān Government throughout the country, and his co-operation with Dr. Millspaugh and his colleagues.

Rizā Khān's rise was rapid. After the *coup d'état* of the 21st February, 1921, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Persian army; a few weeks later he was appointed Minister of War as well; and, after making and unmaking several ministries, in each of which he retained his double office, he became Prime Minister himself on the 28th October, 1923. His sovereign, Ahmad Shāh Qājār, almost immediately left Persia for a tour of indefinite duration in Europe, and the way seemed open for a repetition of what had happened in Turkey—where the Ottoman Sultanate had been abolished on the 1st November, 1921, the deposed Sultan Vahīdu'd-Dīn Mehmed VI had fled the country sixteen days later, and a republic had been proclaimed on the 29th October, 1923, Mustafā Kemāl Pasha being elected simultaneously as the first President. Rizā Khān now aspired to follow in the Turkish Ghāzī's footsteps by becoming the first president of a republican Persia, and he timed this constitutional change to take place on the following Persian New Year's Day (Naw Rūz), which fell on the 21st March, 1924. The Majlis assembled on the 13th March, and on the 15th a meeting of forty ex-Prime Ministers, Cabinet Ministers, and other notables formally requested Rizā Khān to declare in favour of a republic and to make arrangements for the Majlis to elect a president.² Pro-republican demonstrations followed in Tihṙān, and telegrams in the same sense were dutifully dispatched from the provinces; but at this juncture events in Turkey again exerted their influence over Persian politics, this time in a contrary sense. On the 3rd March, 1924, the Great National Assembly at Angora had passed three laws which not only abolished the Ottoman Caliphate but entirely disestablished the Islamic 'Church' in Turkey by suppressing the Ministry of *Sherī'eh* and *Evqāf* (its revenues being nationalized and transferred to other departments) and by placing all religious schools and seminaries under the national Ministry of Education.

¹ The Persian Government had the cordial concurrence of the British Government in taking this step.

² *The Times*, 20th March, 1924.

On the 4th March the Caliph 'Abdu'l-Mejīd had followed into exile his predecessor the Sultan-Caliph Vahīdu'd-Dīn.¹ The news of these latest developments in Turkey made a deep impression upon the Persian divines, who, though they belonged to a different denomination from the Turkish divines, foreboded that the proclamation of a republic in Persia would be followed by similar consequences so far as they were concerned. Since at this time Persia had not been penetrated to the same extent as Turkey by Western ideas the Islamic divines were still a power in the land. They immediately threw themselves into an anti-republican campaign; the merchants of Tihirān gave this movement their support; a mob invaded the precincts of the Majlis when it was on the point of debating the proposed constitutional change; and the 21st March passed without Persia having ceased to be a monarchy. The republican movement had been defeated in the last three days—not only by the action of the divines, but by the feeling of the people at large, who had a deep-rooted prejudice in favour of monarchy.²

Rizā Khān at once accommodated himself to public sentiment. After visiting the sacred city of Qum to consult the 'ulamā from the holy cities of 'Irāq, who had taken up their residence there,³ he proclaimed on the 1st April, 1924, that the establishment of a republic in Persia would be contrary to religion and prohibited all further mention of the subject under penalty.⁴ In 1925 he found his reward. On the 12th December of that year a Persian Constituent Assembly, by 257 votes to 3, modified Articles 35 and 36 of the Persian Constitution, in which exclusive rights to the Persian Crown had been conferred upon the Qājārs, and conferred the crown upon Rizā Pahlawī and his heirs.⁵ The new Shāhīnshāh took the oath on the 15th, and thus, after a six weeks' interregnum, Persia obtained a new sovereign and a new dynasty.⁶

¹ See Part I, Section (ii) (d), pp. 51 and 60-1 above.

² See *The Times*, 24th and 25th March; and *The Manchester Guardian*, 23rd April, 1924.

³ See Section (xii), p. 533 above.

⁴ *The Times*, 2nd April, 1924.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 14th December; *Le Temps*, 16th December, 1925. For the steps which led up to this result see *The Times*, 8th and 15th April, 1924, 14th February and 2nd November, 1925; *Le Temps*, 16th February and 2nd November, 1925; and the Yefī Qāfqāsyā of Constantinople (an organ of the anti-Bolshevik Caucasian Muslim *émigrés*), No. 14, 15th April, 1924, quoted in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 5, pp. 325-6.

⁶ Rizā Shāh Pahlawī was a native of the Caspian Province of Mazandarān, which had been the last citadel of Persian independence after the fall of the Sāsānids, and the national character of the new dynasty was emphasized in the proviso that the crown should only pass to descendants of the founder who were born of Persian mothers. This was a deliberate reversal of the

Rizā Shāh had well earned his crown by the public services which he had rendered to Persia during the preceding five years. Before he came into power the threatened partition of Persia had been mirrored in the diversity of her armed forces. The Russian-officered Cossack Division in the north had been balanced by the British-officered South Persian Rifles in the Gulf Provinces, while Persian national interests had been upheld precariously by a Swedish-officered gendarmerie. Having already been relieved of the Russian officers through the action of Great Britain, Rizā Khān next got rid of their British and Swedish colleagues, and then organized the Persian rank and file of the three disbanded corps into the nucleus of a uniform force, about 40,000 strong. This new model army was kept properly equipped, clothed, housed, fed and paid by the vigilance of its commander, and it therefore rendered loyal and effective service to him and the country.

With these troops at his command Rizā Khān set himself to assert the Tihirān Government's authority over those tribes and chieftains who, in various parts of Persia, had periodically shaken off the Central Government's control, and who, in the present instance, had been in enjoyment of *de facto* independence since about the middle of the nineteenth century. First, during the months immediately following the *coup d'état* of the 21st February, 1921, he had to suppress a dangerous revolt in Khurāsān of Colonel Muhammad Taqī, the first military governor appointed to that important frontier province under the new régime.¹ In October 1921 he scattered the forces of Kūchūk Khān,² who, since the dissolution of the Imperial Russian forces in Persia in 1917, had organized a following of 'Jangalis' in the mountains and forests of the Caspian Provinces and, in co-operation with the Bolsheviks, had defied both the British forces in Northern Persia and the Central Persian Government at Tihirān. By these operations of October 1921 Rizā Khān restored the authority of the Tihirān Government over Rashd and Anzālī. At the same moment, however, he was confronted by a more serious danger in a movement for national autonomy among the Persian Kurds, under the leadership of Ismā'il Shakkāk Semīqō (Simko), a Kurdish chieftain from the

dynastic statute of the deposed Qājārs, under which the succession had been limited to the children of Qājār princesses. The Qājārs were a Turkish clan who spoke a Turkish *patois* as their household language, so that the effect of this rule had been to confine the title to the Persian crown to persons who were of non-Persian descent on both sides.

¹ *The Times*, 8th August, 1921; *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 548-9.

² *The Times*, 10th October, 1921.

Perso-Turkish frontier east of Lake Urumīyah.¹ In October 1921 Semīqō established his head-quarters at Sāwuchbulāgh, about thirty miles to the south of the lake, and extended his authority over the territory of the (Turkish) Avshār tribe in the vicinity. During the first seven months of 1922 the Persian Government maintained a truce with Semīqō and attempted to come to an agreement with him on the basis of granting the Persian Kurds a measure of autonomy. Meanwhile, in January 1922, the gendarmerie in Tabriz revolted and overpowered the Persian Cossack garrison, and possession of the city was not recovered by the Government until the 8th February.² The same summer the Turkish Shāh Seven tribes³ in the mountains of Persian Azerbaijan, towards the frontier of the U.S.S.R., temporarily seized the town of Ardabīl and had to be reduced to order.⁴ About the same time Semīqō took the offensive by inciting the kindred tribes of Luristan to join forces with the Kurds and by occupying Marāghah in the direction of Tabriz.⁵ Thereupon Rizā Khān, after crushing the incipient revolt in Luristan,⁶ attacked and dispersed Semīqō's forces in August 1922. Semīqō fled across the frontier into the Kurdish zone of the Mosul vilāyet, where, before the end of the year, he was ambushed and killed by two personal enemies.

In the spring of 1924 an expedition was sent by Rizā Khān to Luristan. An act of treachery on the part of its commander led to a general rising of the Lurs, who defeated the expeditionary force on the 16th May and compelled it to evacuate Khurramābād on the 20th, before Rizā Khān had time to send reinforcements.⁷ Khurramābād was retaken, however, by the Government troops before a month had passed,⁸ and the Lur chiefs were compelled to come to terms before the summer was over.

The gravest problem was presented by the south-western province of Khūzistān, adjoining 'Irāq and opening on to the Persian Gulf. Here the Tihirān Government had latterly possessed only a nominal sovereignty over the Bakhtiyārī tribesmen in the highlands and Shaykh Khaz'al of Muhammadarāh (an Arab prince ruling over Arab

¹ For Semīqō's revolt see *Oriente Moderno*, I, pp. 548, 615, and 754; II, pp. 115, 243-4, and 425.

² *Op. cit.*, I, p. 614.

³ The Shāh Sevens were adherents of the Qājār Dynasty (as indeed was denoted by their name—unless the Shāh whose lovers they were was the Caliph 'Alī), but they had long been an embarrassment to the Persian Government and a scourge to their neighbours.

⁴ *Oriente Moderno*, II, p. 115.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *The Times*, 18th and 19th July, 1922.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 23rd May and 23rd June, 1924.

⁸ *The Times*, 19th June, 1924.

tribesmen) in the plains ; and the situation was made more delicate by foreign complications. On the borderland of the Bakhtiyārī country towards Shaykh Khaz'al's country lay the South Persian oil-field ; and, though the concession for working it was held by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company from the Tihārān Government, the working arrangements inevitably depended upon direct understandings between the company and the Bakhtiyārī chiefs, in whose domain the field lay, and Shaykh Khaz'al, across whose territory the pipe-line from the field to the refinery on Ābdān Island had been laid by an agreement between the Shaykh and the company in 1909. Trouble might well arise between Tihārān and London if local attempts, on Rizā Khān's part, to assert the Persian Government's legitimate authority resulted incidentally in damage to the company's plant or interruption of their operations—involving, as this would, heavy financial losses to the British shareholders and incidentally to the British Government, which held a controlling interest in the company.¹

Moreover, Shaykh Khaz'al had an agreement not only with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company but with the British Government itself. In October 1910 he had received an assurance that Great Britain would not merely safeguard him to the best of her ability against unprovoked attack or encroachment by a foreign Power, but would afford him the support necessary for obtaining a satisfactory solution in the event of an encroachment by the Persian Government on his jurisdiction and recognized rights or on his property in Persia.² This assurance was renewed in November 1914, after Shaykh Khaz'al had taken sides with Great Britain upon the intervention of Turkey in the General War and had assisted the British Expeditionary Force in the capture of Basrah. On both occasions the assurance had been conditional upon the Shaykh and his descendants (to whom the assurance was to extend) not failing to observe their obligations towards the Persian Government or to be guided by the advice of the British Government ; and on the former occasion it was explained that the promised support might have to be confined to diplomatic action. Whether or not such an assurance, even with these limitations, was diplomatically correct, it was not indefensible morally, and perhaps not even demonstrably disadvantageous to Persia, at the dates when it was first given and then renewed.

¹ Under an agreement of the 20th May, 1914.

² On this occasion Shaykh Khaz'al was made a K.C.I.E. He had previously received an assurance from Sir A. Hardinge as far back as 1903.

Shaykh Khaz'al was the *de facto* ruler of the left bank of the Shattu'l-'Arab and of the navigable section of the Kārūn River from Muḥammaraḥ to Ahwāz ; his friendship was therefore essential to Great Britain if she was to maintain her position in the Persian Gulf ; and, in giving Shaykh Khaz'al an assurance in the terms indicated, she was consulting her own vital interests without causing any material loss to the Persian Government, whose practical authority over the Shaykh had already dwindled to vanishing-point before the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, from Shaykh Khaz'al's point of view, the receipt of some such assurances was clearly necessary before he lent his powerful support to the establishment in his territory of industrial operations which had no contemporary parallel in any Islamic country. The investment of British capital in South Persia by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was many times greater than all the British and other foreign capital invested in Persia and Turkey combined ; and by 1923 the company was employing in South Persia some 20,000 Persian subjects—mainly Arab and Bakhti'yārī tribesmen. The initiation of this enterprise brought the Industrial Revolution into a pastoral and agricultural country, and this fact was realized by Shaykh Khaz'al at the time. Nevertheless, these existing relations between Shaykh Khaz'al and a foreign Power made it a delicate matter for the Government at Tihrān to assert its lawful sovereignty over him now that it had grown strong enough to make the attempt ; and the fact that this enterprise was accomplished without any international incident arising is a testimony to the diplomatic ability both of Rīzā Khān and of those responsible for British policy in 1925. At the same time it is impossible not to feel some sympathy for Shaykh Khaz'al ; for, while he had no title in law against the Persian Government and presumably no case, in the particular circumstances in which his breach with the Persian Government occurred, for invoking the British assurance, his anomalous autonomy had been confirmed by long prescription, and he had some reason to regard the British assurance as a virtual guarantee of its permanence.

In November 1923 Shaykh Khaz'al came to a settlement with the American financial advisers of the Persian Government regarding the taxes payable by him to Tihrān ;¹ but in the summer of 1924 he appears to have been alarmed by Rīzā Khān's operations against the Lurs on his northern border and by information that the Govern-

¹ A. C. Millspaugh : *The American Task in Persia* (New York, 1925, Century Co.), p. 216 and pp. 226 *seqq.* ; *The Times*, 14th March, 1924.

ment intended to cancel the existing *firmāns* from the Shāhs on which his status legally depended. Upon receiving a complaint from him on this latter point the Government attempted to reassure him ; but his misgivings were not allayed, and he then took the false step of publicly denouncing Rizā Khān and his policy.¹ The Majlis retorted on the 30th September, 1924, by addressing a circular telegram to the tribal leaders in Khūzistān in which it exhorted them to show loyalty to the Government of Rizā Khān ; and on the 5th November Rizā Khān himself left Tihṛān in order to begin military operations. Ten days later Shaykh Khaz'al telegraphed to Rizā at Shīrāz, apologizing for his conduct and tendering his submission ;² but Rizā insisted that the submission should be unconditional and his forces advanced upon Ahwāz from the interior and the coast simultaneously. On the 6th December the Shaykh in person sued for and obtained an amnesty from Rizā, who had by then arrived at Nāsiri.³ The Wālī of Pusht-i-Kūh, a neighbouring autonomous chieftain, fled to 'Irāq, but submitted and obtained an amnesty in April 1925. After Shaykh Khaz'al's capitulation garrisons of Government troops were established in Shustar and Dizfūl,⁴ a Governor-General of Khūzistān was appointed, and the American financial advisers sent a commission to Khūzistān to organize a provincial financial administration and arrange for the direct collection of the local revenues in future. To make assurance doubly sure Shaykh Khaz'al was arrested on board his yacht off Muḥammadah by Persian troops on the 19th April, 1925, and removed to Tihṛān.⁵ On the 24th July, 1925, a party of Arabs, presumably former adherents of Shaykh Khaz'al, rendered desperate by the excesses of the Persian soldiery and by the non-payment of the salaries which they had been accustomed to receive from the Shaykh, made a surprise attack on Muḥammadah and temporarily occupied the Shaykh's palace, but on the 29th they were driven out with loss by Persian Government troops.⁶

Evidently the British Government did not consider that its assurance to Shaykh Khaz'al had become operative in the circumstances. At any rate, on the 2nd December, 1924, the Persian Government officially denied a report that it had received notes from

¹ *The Times*, 18th October, 1924. See also *Al-Akḥbār* of Cairo, 5th February, 1925, quoted in *Oriente Moderno*, V, 3, pp. 137-8.

² *The Times*, 22nd November, 1924 ; Millsaugh, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

³ *The Times*, 12th December, 1924 ; Millsaugh, p. 233.

⁴ The Khurramābād-Ahwāz road, however, had not been reopened to commerce at the time of writing.

⁵ *The Times*, 22nd April, 1925.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 27th and 31st July, 1925.

the British Government concerning the events in Khūzistān,¹ and on the 19th May, 1925, in the House of Lords, Lord Balfour stated that the Shaykh 'had not been treated as a prince by the British Government' and 'had always been under the suzerainty of Persia'. On the same occasion Lord Balfour declared that 'the Anglo-Persian Agreement was now ancient history—indeed obsolete history—and there was little use in reviving that controversy now'. By this time Great Britain had already shown her goodwill towards the new régime in Persia and her appreciation of Rizā Khān's success in restoring law and order by withdrawing the last British forces from Persian territory. The Indian troops guarding the railhead of the Baluchistan Railway at Duzd Āb, in the Sarhad, on the Persian side of the frontier, had been evacuated early in 1924;² and in the spring of the same year the Indian force which had been stationed at Bushire since the disbandment of the South Persian Rifles in 1921 was reduced to the numbers required for guarding the Consulate-General and Telegraph Office, as fixed by agreement between the two Governments.³

The work of pacification was substantially completed in 1925. In the May of that year the disarming of the Bakhtīyārī and Kashgai tribesmen, in the highlands adjoining Khūzistān on the north and east, was taken in hand.⁴ In the same month the Turkmen tribesmen on the Persian side of the Russo-Persian frontier east of the Caspian, resenting the assertion of the Tihirān Government's authority and the arrest of their chiefs, raided the coast of Mazandarān by sea and besieged the Government troops in Bujnurd.⁵ This rebellion which, like that of Shaykh Khaz'al, was dangerous owing to the possibility of foreign complications, was dealt with vigorously. Bujnurd was relieved on the 18th May; the Soviet Government emphatically disclaimed complicity with the rebels and maintained a correct attitude; seven of the arrested Turkmen notables were publicly hanged at Mashhad; and the rebellion had been almost entirely stamped out before the end of the year.⁶

It remains to glance at the work of the American financial

¹ Millspaugh, pp. 232-3. Notes appear to have been actually presented, but then withdrawn.

² See *Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress of India during the year 1924-5* (No. 60), by L. F. Rushbrook Williams, p. 20.

³ *The Times*, 14th March, 1924.

⁴ Millspaugh, p. 244.

⁵ Millspaugh, p. 243; *The Times*, 18th May, 1925.

⁶ *The Times*, 27th May, 25th July, and 6th November, 1925; *Le Temps*, 5th and 8th June, 1925.

advisers to the Persian Government.¹ It was the established policy of the Persians, since they had come to realize the necessity for national reconstruction, to enlist the services of Western experts belonging to distant and disinterested countries. Before the General War of 1914–18 Persia had engaged Belgians to manage her customs, Swedes to command her gendarmerie, and Americans, under the leadership of Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, to reorganize her finances. Mr. Shuster's efforts in 1911 were frustrated by the existence of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, and Russian diplomatic pressure quickly compelled him to abandon his task and leave the country;² but when Persia recovered her freedom of action in 1921 she promptly turned to America again and asked the State Department at Washington to recommend an American citizen for the post of financial adviser at Tihṙān. The State Department recommended its own economic adviser, Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, on the understanding that, if he undertook the work, he would do so in a private capacity and that the United States Government would assume no responsibility for his acts when in the Persian Government's employment. On these terms Dr. Millspaugh signed a contract with the Persian Government on the 14th August, 1922, and arrived in Tihṙān, with a staff of United States citizens selected by him, on the 18th November of that year. Dr. Millspaugh had wisely insisted that his contract should confer on him executive and not merely advisory powers; and the vigour with which he exerted his contractual authority in the cause of financial efficiency and reform brought him into constant and sometimes acute conflict with vested interests. This opposition, however, was overcome by the joint statesmanship of Dr. Millspaugh and Rizā Khān, who co-operated with one another loyally from the beginning. Dr. Millspaugh made it clear that he proposed to rely upon Rizā Khān's military organization for making the authority of the Ministry of Finance effective; and Rizā Khān, on his side, showed his goodwill by retransferring to the Ministry of Finance—in return for a guarantee from Dr. Millspaugh that the budget of the Ministry of War would be covered—certain revenues which, before the arrival of the American Mission, he had diverted—unconstitutionally but perhaps not unjustifiably—from the Ministry of Finance to his own department in order to ensure the proper maintenance of the new model army. With Rizā Khān's support

¹ The following information is taken from Millspaugh, *op. cit.*

² For the story of Mr. Shuster's mission, which falls outside the scope of this Survey, see his own book *The Strangling of Persia* (London, 1912, Fisher Unwin).

the American Mission performed signal economic and financial services, not only in reforming the internal administration but in negotiating—though so far unsuccessfully—with the Soviet Government over outstanding issues relating to the Persian customs tariff and the Caspian fisheries and in tendering advice regarding the grant of a concession for the North Persian oil-fields.

The good relations between the American financial experts and their Persian colleagues were not interrupted by the lamentable death, on the 24th July, 1924, of the American Vice-Consul in Tihṙān, Major R. W. Imbrie, who was attacked, with fatal results, by an overwrought Persian crowd owing to his rashness in attempting to photograph a Shī'ī shrine during a religious demonstration.¹ The Persian Government eventually gave full satisfaction to the United States Government's demands for redress and reparation ; ² and thereafter the United States Government announced that that part of the monetary reparation which had been paid by Persia to cover the cost of conveying Major Imbrie's body home on an American warship would be held as a trust fund, of which the income would be devoted to the education in the United States of Persian students.³ Thus the consequences of a crime which might have embittered the relations of two formerly friendly peoples were finely turned to account in order to render those relations more intimate and more cordial than before.

On the 22nd April, 1926, a treaty of perpetual peace and benevolent neutrality was signed at Tihṙān between Persia and Turkey.⁴ The neutrality to be observed reciprocally was conceived in the widest terms (Arts. 2-5). Arrangements were contemplated for the friendly settlement of frontier incidents and tribal complications (Art. 6). Within six months of signature negotiations were to be opened for the conclusion of commercial, consular, customs, postal, telegraphic, and extradition conventions (Art. 7). In this connexion the Turkish plenipotentiary gave his Persian colleague an assurance that Turkey would not insist upon the maintenance, in Persia, for Turkish nationals, of those capitulatory rights of which the Turkish

¹ Millspaugh, pp. 214-15 ; *The Times*, 21st, 22nd, and 24th July, 1924.

² *Ibid.*, 29th July, 1st August, 29th October, 3rd November, 1924.

³ Millspaugh, p. 222.

⁴ French text (which, according to Article 10 of the treaty, was to prevail over the Persian and Turkish texts in case of divergence) in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 252-5. Compare the Russo-Turkish Treaty signed in Moscow on the 16th March, 1921. The treaty of the 22nd April, 1926, was to last for five years from signature and thereafter for successive annual periods unless denounced six months in advance of any given date of expiry (Art. 11).

Government had already deprived Persian and other foreign nationals in Turkey.¹ A treaty of the same type between Persia and Afghanistan appears to have been concluded in 1923—the text being signed at Kābul on the 7th September of that year by the Amīr Amānu'llāh himself at a public ceremony.²

(xiv) India, Afghanistan, and the Frontier Tribes.

In a previous volume³ some account has been given of the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 and the subsequent negotiation of diplomatic agreements between Afghanistan and Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics⁴ and the Turkish Nationalist Government at Angora respectively. In this place it will be convenient to consider the after-effects of the War of 1919 upon the tribes inhabiting the zone of barren and almost inaccessible mountains through which ran the Indo-Afghan Frontier, as delimited in 1893 after negotiations at Kābul between the then Amīr of Afghanistan and Sir Mortimer Durand.

This mountainous zone, which extended from the Pamirs south-westwards in the direction of Quetta, stood out in sharp contrast to

¹ Letter of the 22nd April, 1926 (original French text in *Oriente Moderno*, loc. cit.).

² *Op. cit.*, III, 7, p. 437, quoting *Al-Akhhār* of Cairo, 18th November, 1923.

³ *Survey for 1920-3*, Part IV, Section iv, pp. 376-88.

⁴ Russian performance of the obligations undertaken under the Russo-Afghan Treaty was tardy and incomplete; but the number of Russians in Afghanistan continually increased, especially after the appointment of M. Stark as Minister in the summer of 1924. By 1926 the personnel of the Afghan Air Force consisted almost entirely of Russians, numbering over thirty. No other Europeans were then employed. The effective aeroplanes, numbering about twelve, had all (with the exception of the two British machines delivered in August 1924) been provided, free or on payment, by the Soviet Government, together with Russian pilots and mechanics, at various dates from October 1924. The construction of a telegraph line from Kushk to Herāt had been carried out by Russian engineers, and it was believed that arrangements were being made by them for further telegraph construction. Road survey parties had also been employed, and one was still engaged on a projected road to join Kābul with Mazār-i-Sharīf. The Consulate and Legation staffs tended to be unnecessarily large and were augmented by the trade agents—for whom, being Government officials, diplomatic privileges were claimed. In November 1925 the friendly relations between Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R. were momentarily disturbed by a frontier incident over an island in the River Oxus, from which an Afghan garrison, at that time in occupation, was ejected by Russian troops. The Russians appear to have claimed that, before the temporary breakdown of Russian authority in Central Asia in 1917, the island had been in their hands, while the Afghans claimed that it had always been recognized as Afghan territory. The incident was closed by the voluntary withdrawal of the Russian troops from the island pending a definitive settlement by a mixed Russo-Afghan commission. (*The Times*, 28th December, 1925; *The Daily Herald*, 8th January, 1926; *The Times*, 6th and 30th March, 1926.)

the Indus Plain on the one side and to the basins of the Upper Kābul River and the Helmand River on the other. Even the latter—containing as they did the towns of Kābul, Ghaznī, and Qandahār—were by comparison peaceful, prosperous, and civilized; the contrast on the Indian side was sharper still; and this difference between the regions was reflected in the social and political condition of their inhabitants. On both sides of the diplomatic frontier the mountaineers were poorer and more warlike than their lowland neighbours; they were well supplied with Western small-arms of modern patterns,¹ and were adepts at employing these to the best advantage on their local *terrain*; they were largely independent *de facto* of the two Governments which had agreed to draw the boundary between their respective sovereignties through this tribal country; and the tribesmen habitually employed their freedom and prowess in raiding their neighbours—particularly on the Indian side, where the contrast between highlands and lowlands was more abrupt in every respect than it was in Afghanistan. These raids were not merely wanton barbarities. The economic proceeds were essential to the subsistence of the highland population at its present density, which exceeded the economic capacity of the highlands themselves.² If the raids were to cease the tribesmen would have either to find alternative means of obtaining imports, or else emigrate or starve.

Experience showed that highlands as wild, barren, and extensive as these could hardly be reduced to order and civilized except by a Power in possession of the lowlands on both sides of them. During the nineteenth century the Russian Empire had subdued the Caucasus by a converging movement from Cis- and Trans-Caucasia; more recently the French had been subduing the Atlas by the same strategy;³ and, nearer home, in Baluchistan, the British Indian Empire had achieved a similar success half a century earlier by extending its influence to the other side of the mountains and establishing a base of operations in the Helmand Basin as well as in the

¹ For example, Major Arthur Moore states, in *The Times* of the 24th May, 1922, that no less than 90,000 Martini-Henry rifles, which had just been discarded by the Australian and New Zealand Militias, were smuggled from the Persian Gulf to Qandahār between 1907 and 1910. In 1920 the number of modern rifles in the 'independent' districts was estimated to be 140,000 (*The Round Table*, December 1925).

² In the 'independent' districts of the North-West Frontier Province of India alone (i.e. the tribal districts between the border of the territory administered as part of British India and the frontier of Afghanistan as laid down along the Durand Line) the population was estimated at 2,800,000 (*The Round Table*, December 1925).

³ See Part II, Section i, p. 97 above.

Lower Indus Valley. In Baluchistan, during the period under review, a peace and order still prevailed which threw into relief the constant disturbances along the North-West Frontier—notwithstanding the fact that the Baluchistan highlands were merely a continuation of the North-West Frontier highlands and that, before Sir Robert Sandeman crossed the mountains in 1868, the Balūchīs had been as notorious for turbulence and savagery as their Pathan neighbours. The highlands of the North-West Frontier, however, had not been exposed to a converging movement of this kind. It was true that the Mughūl Empire, of which the British Empire was the heir, had held the Upper Kābul valley as well as the Indus plain, had asserted its suzerainty over Badakhshān, and had contested with the Safawī sovereigns of Persia the possession of Qandahār ; but the effective rule of the Mughūls had lasted too short a time for this geographical encirclement of the north-western highlands to produce an appreciable effect, and in any case the penetration and civilization of backward districts had usually been beyond the compass of Oriental Empires. For the most part they had been content to dominate the plains and the passes and to leave the highlands to themselves, as the Mughūls did in this case, or else they had broken down in the attempt to subdue the highlanders, as Aurang Zib did in his campaigns against the Maratthas. Thus the north-western highlands had remained unaffected by the temporary presence of the Mughūl Empire at Peshāwar and Kābul ; and the British Empire, which might have taken better advantage of the same strategical position, had stopped short, in this one quarter, of its predecessor's frontiers.

The British Empire had never held the Upper Kābul Valley and the Panjāb simultaneously in permanent occupation. In 1838–42, when the British were in occupation of Afghanistan with intent to stay there, the Panjāb had still been an independent state and the British lines of communication had run through Sind and over the Bolān Pass. On the other hand, since 1849, when the annexation of the Panjāb extended British India up to the south-eastern foothills of the highlands, Kābul and Qandahār had not been in British hands except for a short time during the Second Afghan War of 1879, and then the occupation was never intended to be other than temporary.

Accordingly, down to and including the period under review, this zone of highlands had remained the frontier of British India, and the British Indian Government had only been able to approach the

highlanders frontally, while all the time their rear had been covered by the State of Afghanistan, which had been fully self-governing in its internal affairs and had been jealous of any further extension of British influence in its direction.

The situation and attitude of Afghanistan had aggravated the geographical and economic difficulties of the Indian frontier problem ;¹ and this local political difficulty had not been diminished appreciably by the British control over Afghan foreign policy which had been maintained from 1879 to 1919—however much that control may have contributed to the general international security of the Indian Empire. Of greater local effect had been the settlement of the Indo-Afghan frontier in 1893, when the boundary had been delimited from its point of junction with the Persian frontier in Seistan as far north-eastward as the head of the Kurram Valley and had been laid down approximately from that point onwards to the Pamirs. Thereafter, in 1901, Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India, had detached from the Panjāb the marginal administered districts of British India and had formed out of them the nucleus of a new North-West Frontier Province, in which the ‘independent’ tribal districts in the highlands, up to the Durand Line, were also included theoretically. In practice the highlands had still been left unadministered and ungarrisoned by regular troops. On the other hand, political officers had been stationed among the tribes, and tribal militias had been raised under British organizers and instructors, with the double object of policing such trade routes as existed in the highlands and of providing a livelihood for able-bodied men who might otherwise have had recourse to raiding. This was a compromise between the ‘close border’ policy of drawing a defensive cordon along the line of the foothills and the forward policy of bringing the highlands themselves under direct administration—an alternative which would almost necessarily have involved a permanent British occupation of Kābul, Ghaznī, and Qandahār.

Lord Curzon’s compromise worked satisfactorily on the whole from the turn of the century until the Third Afghan War of 1919. The Afghan Government, however, had never ceased to exert its influence upon the Pathan tribes living on the British side of the Durand Line. Ties of religion and language made it easy for the

¹ The relations between the British, the Pathan tribesmen, and the Afghans on the north-west frontier of India were not unlike the relations between the French, the Rifis, and the Spaniards in Morocco (see Part II, Section vi, pp. 125–40 above), and the British found this situation just as embarrassing as the French did.

Amīr to win their support and to stir up disloyalty to the British Indian Government ;¹ and in 1919 the 'firing of the frontier' formed an important part of the Afghan plan of campaign.² When the Afghan Army crossed the Durand Line in the May of that year the tribal militias proved unequal to the occasion. For this they could hardly be blamed, since they had been raised with a view to policing their fellow tribesmen and not to resisting an Afghan invasion, whereas the Indian High Command appears to have expected them to serve as a screen behind which the Indian Army might mobilize.³ Even so they did delay the Afghan advance sufficiently to enable the Indian Army to concentrate and deliver a blow which ended the campaign in nine days (9th-17th May) as far as the Afghan forces were concerned, and which forestalled any general rising of the tribes on the Indian side of the frontier. On the other hand, the local impression produced on several tribes by the breakdown of the militias was so much greater than that produced by the signal defeat of the Afghans at the hands of the Indian Regular Army that the nine days' war with Afghanistan left the Indian Government a legacy of four years' fighting with these tribes. This residual warfare was not only much longer drawn out than the Afghan campaign but was much more stubborn in character ; and, in the early stages of it, the operations of the Indian troops were chequered by set-backs which were often humiliating and, at times, even dangerous.

These set-backs were the more striking inasmuch as the trouble was confined substantially to a single section of the Frontier Province. North of the Kābul River, where the rule of petty chieftains

¹ The Afghan Government maintained a connexion with the tribes in two ways in particular which were the subject of repeated protests on the part of the British Government : (1) The payment of allowances to tribesmen domiciled on the British side of the frontier. In the case of certain tribes which possessed land or grazing rights in Afghanistan and migrated thither for a part of each year some defence of the grant of Afghan allowances was admittedly possible, but in other cases (notably the Mahsuds) no such justification could be offered. (2) Employment of tribesmen belonging to British tribal territory as Afghan 'khāssadārs', who continued to spend much of their time on the British side of the frontier. Payment of Afghan allowances to British tribesmen took place generally along the frontier. The tribesmen enrolled as khāssadārs were chiefly Wazirs and Mahsuds, and nearly always persons hostile to the Indian Administration. In some cases their duties were so negligible that their position differed little from that of the Afghan allowance-holders.

² *Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India*, 1919, pp. 9-10.

³ See articles by Major Arthur Moore in *The Times*, 4th, 16th, and 24th May, 1922.

prevailed, these rulers had remained loyal to the Indian Government during the crisis, and they gave little or no trouble during the following years. In the Khaybar Pass and the adjoining districts of Tirah and the Kurram Valley, where the tribesmen were a law unto themselves, the tribal militias had failed to stand the strain of the Afghan invasion ; but the main counter-stroke of the Indian Army had been delivered in this sector and the political situation had rapidly been restored. The trouble arose in the southernmost 'independent' district of the North-West Frontier Province, which lay between the Kurram Valley and Baluchistan and was known as Waziristan.¹

Waziristan was an epitome of the north-west frontier highlands, in which the general characteristics of the country were reproduced in extreme forms. The district itself, which covered an area of about 5,000 square miles, was particularly mountainous and barren ; the people, who numbered from 200,000 to 250,000 in all, divided into half a dozen tribes, were peculiarly individualistic, lawless, savage, and predatory. Every adult fighting-man was virtually a sovereign independent Power, and neither the *maliks* (notables) nor the *maulās* (religious leaders) possessed any certain or continuous authority. As fighters the Waziristan tribesmen were distinguished by mobility, skill in handling modern rifles, and 'untiring patience and vigilance in observing an enemy on the move' ; and they were 'expert in the attack of detached posts and in the surprise of small parties'. These qualities,² which were almost identical with those displayed by the Rifis at the opposite extremity of the Islamic World, made them very formidable adversaries on their own ground for an army organized on modern Western lines.

Between the British annexation of the Panjāb and the outbreak of the Third Afghan War the British Indian Army had carried out five serious expeditions in Waziristan³—the last in 1917, when the tribesmen had been touched by the wave of unrest which had set in among the Islamic peoples after the intervention of Turkey in the

¹ See Lieutenant-Colonel H. de Watteville's admirable study : *Waziristan, 1919-1920* ('Campaigns and their Lessons' series, London, 1925, Constable) ; the dispatch, dated the 1st August, 1920, from the Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir C. C. Monro, published as the second supplement to *The London Gazette* of the 7th December, 1920 ; and *Operations in Waziristan, 1919-1920*, compiled by the General Staff, Army Head-quarters, India (2nd ed., London, 1924, H.M. Stationery Office).

² See the description in de Watteville, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

³ 'Since 1852 we have had seventeen of these military operations, and since 1911 we have had four, including that just concluded.'—Lord Chelmsford, 20th August, 1920.

General War. None of these campaigns had been definitive, because there were no political or economic centres in the country the capture and occupation of which would give an invader any general control. The inhabitants of each valley and each village lived their own lives in independence of their neighbours. On the other hand, the balance of military advantage had already shown a tendency to incline in the tribesmen's favour.

In spite of the ease with which the campaign of 1917 was brought to its conclusion certain facts were already becoming patent. Whereas in 1860 a single brigade had marched right through Waziristan without grave hindrance, and whereas in 1894 and 1901 widely separated columns were employed with impunity, yet for many years it was beginning to be believed that an invader of Waziristan must employ greater forces and observe greater precautions. Further, just as the Mahsuds were acquiring more rifles of range and precision firing smokeless powder, and also exhibiting greater skill in their use, so the invader was ever inclined to resort to more scientific equipment and more impedimenta. In addition, public opinion now demanded more comforts for the troops; while a fresh difficulty was accruing out of the increasing number of medical units accompanying any expedition. Circumstances were thus all tending to complicate the transport problem and to augment the size of supply trains. Yet the Lines of Communication were unquestionably becoming more vulnerable than they were before the tribesmen possessed modern weapons. It was still necessary to employ long convoys of primitive pack transport; even in 1919 motor transport was impracticable above the lower valleys.¹

Meanwhile the heart of Waziristan, though repeatedly traversed by these expeditions, had been left without a permanent garrison. On the other hand, between 1890 and 1899, the Gomal and the Tochi Valleys, which bounded Waziristan on the south and north respectively, had been opened up as trade routes and garrisoned by two militia forces raised from the tribesmen themselves, commanded by British officers and numbering some 3,000 men in all.²

Upon the outbreak of the Third Afghan War on the 9th May, 1919, the Indian High Command made up its mind temporarily to withdraw these two militia forces from Waziristan if the Afghans threatened this sector, since the combatant troops and the transport which would have been necessary for their relief could not be spared from the main concentration in the Khaybar Sector. This decision was actually put into effect on the 21st May, 1919, four days after the major operations of the Afghan War had come to an end, upon the report of a hostile concentration in the adjoining Afghan province of Khost, and the results were disastrous. As soon as the

¹ de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-4.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

militia began to burn the stores which they could not evacuate and to abandon their fortified posts the tribesmen rose *en masse* and the militiamen deserted in large numbers. The Gomal Valley force, which fared the worse of the two, lost 1,100 men out of 1,700 by desertion, as well as 1,200 rifles, 50 muskets, and 700,000 rounds of ammunition.¹ It was reckoned that on this occasion the Waziristan tribesmen captured over 2,500 rifles and 800,000 rounds of ammunition altogether,² besides many hand-grenades and a few Lewis guns. They immediately began to harry the Indus plain; and between the outbreak of the Third Afghan War and the beginning of November 1919 these tribes alone conducted more than 182 raids into British Indian territory, as a result of which there were 220 British subjects killed, 276 wounded, and 126 missing, while there were heavy losses in money, movable property, and domestic animals. The Waziristan Force of the Indian Army, which was deputed to deal with them, lost 139 killed and 159 wounded between the 8th August, 1919 (the date on which the peace with Afghanistan was signed), and the 2nd November.³

The disproportion between the duration and military seriousness of the Third Afghan War and the legacy of unrest which it left among the tribesmen on the British side of the Durand Line can be gauged by the following figures :

‘ During the year 1919–20 no fewer than 611 raids took place in the Peshāwar, Kohat, Banu, and Dera Ismail Khan districts. They resulted in the killing of 298, the wounding of 392, and the kidnapping of 463 British subjects. Property to the estimated, though probably exaggerated, value of Rs. 30 lakhs was looted.’ During the year 1920–1 there were 391 raids. ‘ 153 persons were killed, 157 persons injured, and 56 persons kidnapped and returned on payment of ransom. Property to the value of some 2 lakhs was looted.’ In the year ending the 31st March, 1922, the number of raids fell to 194. ‘ The improvement was most marked in the Peshāwar and the Dera Ismail Khan districts; in the former the raids fell from 145 [in 1919–20] to 57 [in 1920–1] and 15 [in 1921–2]; the kidnapping from 105 to 22 and 1; the value of property looted from Rs. 3½ lakhs to Rs. 13,000 and Rs. 4,000. In Dera Ismail Khan the raids fell from 198 in 1920 to 84 in 1921 and 51 in 1922; the kidnappings from 127 to 36 and 17; and the lootings from Rs. 12 lakhs to Rs. 88,000 and Rs. 56,000.’ Finally, in the year 1922–3, 47 British subjects were killed by raiders, 48 wounded, 60 kidnapped, 10 of these ransomed and 43 released without ransom; and property was looted to the value of Rs. 77,540.⁴

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 66.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁴ These figures are taken from the annual *Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India* for the years 1920, 1921, 1922–3, 1923–4, and 1924–5 (Nos. 56–60 inclusive), by L. F. Rushbrook Williams.

It was not till 1923 that the North-West Frontier of India returned to something approaching a normal condition.

One cause of this prolonged unrest was the continuance of Afghan machinations. Working through the channels already described, as well as through deserters from British service enrolled in the Afghan regular forces and through small colonies of disaffected tribesmen who had crossed the frontier and had been given land in Afghanistan, the authorities in South-Eastern Afghanistan carried out a policy of active interference in Waziristan from 1919 to the spring of 1922, encouraging opposition to the Indian Government both by propaganda and by the material help of money and munitions. Repeated representations by the British Minister at last had effect and a more correct attitude was adopted by the Afghan Government, as shown, for example, in the dismissal of a party of Wazirs and Mahsuds who went up to Kābul in the autumn of 1922 to protest against the Government of India's policy in Waziristan. Afghan intrigue was resumed, however, early in 1923, and further representations by the British Minister became necessary. New assurances were given by the Afghan Government, and Afghan interference in Waziristan became less active—partly, perhaps, owing to the depletion of the Amīr's Treasury and to his difficulties with his own tribesmen, which are described below.

The unrest thus produced on the frontier by Afghanistan was further stimulated by the effects of the Khilāfat Movement¹ in British India. In the early summer of 1920, after the publication of the peace terms which were afterwards embodied in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres between the Allies and Turkey, a feeling arose in the Indian Muslim community—especially among the more backward elements in Sind and in the administered districts of the North-West Frontier Province—that it was the duty of devout Muslims under British rule to emigrate from the dominions of a Power which had shown itself so hostile to Islam. In the two provinces above mentioned, where this suggestion was taken up and preached by the local *mawlās*, the movement attained unexpected proportions.

Hundreds of families sold their land and property for a mere song, settled up all their worldly affairs, placed their wives and children on carts, surrendered the Government rifles entrusted to them for protection against marauders, and departed in the direction of the Khaybar

See the account of the raiders' tactics in No. 58, pp. 41–3, and the comparative charts of the damage caused by raids in No. 58 (opposite p. 41) and No. 59 (opposite p. 39).

¹ See Part I, Sections (i) and (ii) above.

Pass. From the point of view of the authorities the movement was most embarrassing. It is calculated that in all some 18,000 people, animated in a high degree by religious enthusiasm, moved in the direction of Afghanistan in the month of August. It would have been impossible to stop them without the employment of large numbers of troops; and any such attempt would have caused bloodshed on an unthinkable scale. So long as they were not interfered with the emigrants were perfectly peaceful and orderly, on the best terms with the local officials, and displaying neither malice nor resentment against any man. As in the case of the Crusades the individual suffering which was caused by this remarkable movement was very great. At first Afghanistan seemed to have looked upon it with something like favour. Before long, however, the immense scale upon which the movement was pursued rendered it necessary for the Afghan authorities, whose country is poor and comparatively sterile, to forbid altogether the admission of pilgrims. As a result the tide of emigrants slowly ebbed and fell back, sadly disillusioned, to its former home. The road from Peshāwar to Kābul was strewn with graves of old men, women, and children who had succumbed to the difficulties of the journey. The unhappy emigrants when they returned found themselves homeless and penniless, with their property in the hands of those to whom they had sold it for a tithe of its value in the first flush of their religious enthusiasm. Government did all it could to mitigate the hardships which resulted from this amazing enterprise, and was successful in arranging for the resettlement of many of the emigrants upon the land which they had so rashly abandoned.¹

Meanwhile, the focus of the trouble on the North-West Frontier was Waziristan. The tribes of this district had not only attacked the local militia forces during their withdrawal in May 1919 but had taken advantage of that withdrawal in order to raid the Indus plain with all their might. The Indian Government could not pass over these flagrant acts of hostility, and, after it had concentrated a sufficient military force to invade Waziristan if necessary, it sent ultimatums on the 9th and 3rd November, 1919, respectively, to the Tochi Wazirs and to the Mahsuds (the fiercest tribe in Waziristan, inhabiting the tangle of mountains intervening between the Tochi and the Gomal Valleys). Both tribes were summoned to meet representatives of the Indian Government in conferences (*jirghas*) at specified places, where the Government's terms were to be presented to them, and replies were to be given by the 17th and the 11th November respectively—that is, within eight days of the dates on which the ultimatums were dispatched. The terms were as follows: ²

(a) The British Government was to have the right to make roads, build

¹ *Statement exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India*, 1920 (No. 56), pp. 52-3.

² de Watteville, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

posts and station troops wherever it should deem necessary or desirable in any part of the 'Protected Areas'.¹

- (b) All rifles, ammunition, bombs, and other military equipment taken since the 1st May, 1919, were to be returned.
- (c) The tribes were not to interfere with the movement of troops or convoys in their country, nor to molest aeroplanes or their occupants when flying over their country.
- (d) All unpaid allowances were to be forfeited. No allowances were to be granted until the British Government was satisfied with the good behaviour of the tribes.
- (e) Each tribe was to deposit as a guarantee of good faith 200 rifles, which would be returned within a period of twelve months, subject to the continued behaviour of the tribes.
- (f) The Tochi Wazirs were to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000 and the Mahsuds Rs. 10,000.

In presenting these terms the Government informed the tribes, categorically, that there was no foundation for the report, current through Waziristan, that the Amīr had secured an amnesty for the tribes as part of his peace settlement in August with the British Government, and that there was no question of Wazir and Mahsud country being handed over to the Amīr, as was rumoured.

On the 17th November, 1919, these terms were accepted by the majority of the Tochi Wazirs, who gave little or no trouble thereafter, and this enabled the expeditionary force to concentrate its efforts against the Mahsuds, who had rejected the Indian Government's terms outright on the 11th.

The maximum fighting strength of the Mahsuds was estimated at 16,000 and that of the Wana Wazirs (who did not follow the example of the Tochi Wazirs in submitting) at 7,000; but the effective number of combatants was limited by the number of efficient breach-loading rifles at their disposal, and this was estimated at not more than 8,000 in the case of the Mahsuds and 3,000 in that of the Wana Wazirs. Moreover, the number of small bore rifles burning smokeless powder which the recalcitrant tribesmen possessed was estimated (even after their captures in May 1919) at not more than 3,500 in all, and this limited the size of the tribal force which would be under arms at any given moment, since throughout the campaign the tribesmen rigidly refrained, in daylight operations, from using rifles burning black powder, in order not to reveal their positions to the enemy. The largest force ever actually assembled at one moment was believed to have numbered 4,500, but this number was quite exceptional.²

¹ 'Protected Areas—certain portions of the country to be administered by our political officers; these were chiefly a belt of territory along the east and south of the Mahsud country.'

² de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-5.

On the other side the Indian Expeditionary Force numbered 29,256 combatants and 34,987 non-combatants on the 13th November, 1919, and rose to an eventual daily average of 41,800 combatants and 37,900 non-combatants approximately.

With the exception of staffs, aerial contingent, one mountain battery (equipped with the new 3·7" howitzer), and a few specialists the Waziristan Force consisted of Indian troops and followers with their normal establishment of British officers. It is important to note that this was the first frontier campaign of any magnitude in which so few British troops, and particularly no British infantry, participated.¹

It is also important to note that less than a fifth of the total force, and hardly more than a fifth of the combatants, could be included in the Striking Force, which consisted on the 8th November of 8,500 combatants, 6,500 followers, 1,400 horses and equipment animals, and 7,300 transport animals.

Thus the disparity between the real fighting strengths of the two parties was not so great as would appear at first sight; and the superiority, such as it was, of the Indian force in effective numbers and in equipment was balanced by the superior fighting qualities of the Mahsud tribesman, man for man, as compared with the Indian regular soldier; by the Mahsud's incomparable knowledge of the *terrain* and skill in turning it to advantage; and by the fact that the elaborate and costly equipment which had been invented on the European battle-fields of the General War, in operations on level ground between two highly organized armies, was very much less effective when employed against parties of tribesmen lurking in a tangle of mountains. At the same time the presence in Waziristan of not less than 1,800 fighting men—consisting of deserters from the two militia forces and ex-soldiers of the Indian Regular Army—who had received some form of British training had familiarized the tribesmen with the most modern tactics in rifle-fighting, and they now possessed sufficient stocks of ammunition to employ these tactics effectively.

The greatest disadvantage under which the Indian force laboured was its dependence upon bulky supplies and complicated lines of communication on which 'the remainder of the force' (apart from the Striking Force), 'together with all special and administrative troops and services, was retained for protective, transport, and supply duties'.² The broad-gauge Indian railway system stopped

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 71. Compare the composition of the French army in Morocco in the autumn of 1925 as described on pp. 148-9 above.

² de Watteville, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

short of the Indus, and from rail-head material and men had first to be conveyed across the Indus—at one point by ferry and at another by draft wheeled transport over pontoon bridges—and then forwarded by narrow-gauge railway, ford van transport, draft wheel transport and pack transport in successive stages,¹ while, at every step in the Striking Force's advance, those responsible for the communications had to contend with greater dangers of hostile attack as well as with greater physical difficulties.

In this respect the Expeditionary Force became caught in a vicious circle. 'It became manifest, soon after the expedition set out, that there was no alternative but to rely on a liberal employment of artillery and on a lavish expenditure of ammunition and of engineer stores to counterbalance the initial lack of skill displayed by the troops.'² This policy, however, increased the demands upon the lines of communication; and that, in turn, increased the strain upon the Expeditionary Force as a whole.

The first ten days of the campaign against the Mahsuds, which opened on the 17th December, 1919, were unfavourable to the Indian Army. The Mahsuds showed unprecedented skill and determination,³ while no less than five out of the eight battalions of the Striking Force were badly shaken.⁴ In one action on the 19th 130 rifles and 10 Lewis guns were lost, and in those ten days the force advanced less than four miles altogether. Nevertheless, at a *jirga* held on the 29th December, the majority of the Mahsud *maliks* accepted the Government's terms; and thereafter, when the operations were continued because the tribesmen omitted to honour their leaders' bond, the ascendancy gradually passed to the invaders. The climax of the campaign was reached on the 1st February, when a concentration of more than 4,000 Mahsuds and Wana Wazirs was brought to battle and defeated, and two pieces of Afghan artillery, which had arrived to support them, were put out of action in two rounds.⁵ From that date onwards the Expeditionary Force was able (like its predecessors in the five previous major campaigns) to move with more or less freedom; to plant permanent fortified posts in order to cover the lines of communication (a feature which reproduced the tactics of the French and Spanish armies in Morocco); to devastate hostile villages; and to destroy fortified towers. Kani-gūram, the principal village of the Mahsuds, was reached on the 4th March and Wana on the 22nd December, 1920.⁶

¹ See de Watteville *op. cit.*, diagram on p. 74.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 91.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 114–5.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 142–4.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 163 and 174.

At the opening of the campaign the ultimate policy of the Indian Government regarding Waziristan appears to have been in doubt. After seventy years' experience the 'forward' and the 'close border' policies both still kept the field, and the contest between their respective advocates was as lively as ever. On the 20th August, 1920, however, the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, made a public speech in which, after reciting the history of the Waziristan problem, he announced a new policy.

On a review of the facts we have now made up our minds that this continual and gratuitous provocation can no longer be suffered ; and we have decided, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, that our forces shall remain in occupation of Central Waziristan, that mechanical transport roads shall be constructed throughout the country, especially roads linking the Gomal with the Tochi line, and that our present line of posts shall be extended as may seem necessary. It is not possible to set any limits to the period of our occupation, our main care being that we shall not lose the advantage gained during the past nine months at the cost of valuable lives and of much money ; and that there shall be no recurrence of the series of outrages of which I have given you an outline.

In the same speech the Viceroy declared that

the operations against the Mahsuds have now practically been brought to a close, and as the result of hard fighting we have occupied a central and dominating position in Waziristan.

At that moment, however, the situation might equally well have been described as an *impasse*. The Expeditionary Force had ensconced itself in Waziristan but had by no means made itself master of the country. It controlled nothing beyond the ground which it occupied at any given moment ; the mass of the tribesmen remained recalcitrant ; and little progress was being made with the surrender of the arms and the payment of the fines demanded. Meanwhile, the maintenance of so large an Expeditionary Force under such difficult conditions was imposing a financial burden upon India which was relatively heavier than the economic loss inflicted upon the tribesmen by the partial devastation of their territory, in accordance with the economic law that, in a struggle of endurance, the advantage lies with the less highly organized community.

The Waziristan campaign made itself felt in Indian public finance and consequently in Indian politics. The military grant for the year 1921-2 had amounted to £62,200,000 out of a total estimated expenditure of £127,500,000, and the heaviness of this appropriation for defence had aroused a strong public demand for military economy.

In the course of the financial year the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Rawlinson, succeeded in saving £1,290,000 ; but this saving was cancelled more than twice over by the cost of operations in Waziristan, which by the end of the financial year had exceeded the original estimates by £2,750,000.¹

The financial strain can also be measured in part by the finances of the North-West Frontier Province. While the provincial revenues had increased from Rs. 46 lakhs odd in 1903-4 to Rs. 70 lakhs odd in 1919-20 the cost of administration had risen from Rs. 55 lakhs odd to Rs. 180 lakhs odd during the same period, until in 1920 the excess of provincial expenditure over revenues amounted to 109 lakhs, and the province became a burden to the Imperial Treasury.²

Meanwhile, the still greater burden imposed upon Indian finance by the prolonged maintenance of a regular force in the highlands was inclining Indian public opinion towards the 'close border' policy of withdrawing the troops to the administered territory in the plains and establishing a cordon along the foothills to keep out the raiders. The Indian Government was unwilling to adopt this 'policy of negation',³ which 'might gain for the settled districts of British India a momentary respite from tribal raids' but 'would result in a legacy of infinitely worse trouble for the future'. 'To leave the tribesmen in isolation would in reality be leaving them free to brew incalculable mischief'; and accordingly the Government determined to continue its efforts to bring the Mahsud country, 'the strategic heart of Waziristan', under control. At the same time they decided that a permanent occupation by regular troops was financially beyond the resources of India. The problem was to reconcile these two decisions with one another, and a solution was found in the construction of roads for mechanical transport, which had been one of the main purposes of the expedition of December 1919 and which had been pushed forward steadily after the Expeditionary Force had established itself in Waziristan. Such roads, when once constructed, could not easily be destroyed by the tribesmen, and their existence opened up the country not only strategically but economically. Thus, while they served the immediate purpose of enabling the Indian Government to maintain order in Waziristan

¹ *Statement exhibiting Moral and Material Progress*, 1921, pp. 12-13 and 124-5.

² *Op. cit.*, 1920, p. 11.

³ See a speech delivered in the Indian Legislature on the 5th March, 1923, by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Denys Bray, as reported in *Statement exhibiting Moral and Material Progress*, 1922-3, pp. 45-7.

by marching troops through it at will, they also promised eventually to render this repressive régime unnecessary by fostering trade and thus opening a channel for the entry of civilizing influences. Accordingly, the Indian Government decided that, as soon as the road-building was sufficiently far advanced to make military reoccupation possible at any moment, the regular force in Waziristan should be reduced to a minimum, and that for the policing of the roads fresh forces of irregular troops (*khāssadārs*) should be raised from the tribesmen themselves. This latter feature in the new policy was in effect a return to the militia system of the twenty years preceding the Third Afghan War.

This policy was not put into effect without disturbance, for the rumour that the troops were to be withdrawn was the signal for the Mahsuds to take the offensive again. On the 1st December, 1922, they interrupted the construction of the road which was to connect their territory with the Tochi Valley via Razmak, and the Expeditionary Force retorted by punitive operations.¹ These operations, which lasted from the 15th December, 1922, to the 12th March, 1923, were more effective than those of 1919–20; and at *jirghas* held on the 12th and the 23rd March the Mahsuds accepted the Government's conditions, recognized its right to construct roads in their territory, and undertook to raise *khāssadārs* to police them. Thereafter the construction of the road was largely carried forward by tribal contractors employing tribal labour; the Indian regular troops were withdrawn both from Wana and from Ladha (their headquarters in the Mahsud territory from 1920 to 1923); and the control of the Mahsuds was entrusted to a mobile brigade of all arms, including British artillery and infantry, at Razmak²—a station which placed them just outside the northern limits of the Mahsud territory yet gave them a commanding position near the summit of the pass over which the new road entered the Mahsud territory from the Tochi Valley. In the Mahsud and the Wana territories the regular troops were gradually replaced by tribal auxiliaries up to a strength of about 10,000 men in all.³ The last recalcitrant section of the Mahsuds, the 'Abdu'r-Rahmān Khēl, submitted and accepted

¹ See de Watteville, *op. cit.*, chapter xiv, and a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief in India, dated the 25th July, 1923, and published in *The London Gazette* of the 26th February, 1924.

² Two battalions of Indian infantry were also stationed at Razmak as the permanent garrison when the mobile brigade moved out for operations.

³ Three brigades of Indian infantry (in addition to the Razmak force) remained, however, in Waziristan: one at Bannu and in the Tochi, one at Razani between the Tochi and Razmak, and one at Manzai in the south.

the Government's terms in full in the spring of 1925, as the result of operations by the Royal Air Force.¹

Under this new régime² the flow of money from India into Waziristan continued in the shape of tribal allowances, pay drawn by the irregulars, expenditure on the new roads, and local purchases of goods and services by the Razmak garrison. On the other hand, the reduction of the regular garrison and the cessation of active operations produced on the balance a substantial diminution of expenditure in Waziristan as compared with the period 1919-23; and, when account is also taken of the diminution in the amount of damage suffered by the inhabitants of the administered territory through tribal raids, it would appear that the new régime was the most economical possible in the circumstances. At the same time this régime was precarious, because, as had been shown by the experience of 1919, it was at the mercy of Afghan policy.

During the period under review trouble arose more than once between the Indian and Afghan Governments over the activities of tribesmen from the Indian side of the Durand Line who had found asylum in Afghan territory. In November and December 1921, for example, a band of recalcitrant tribesmen from Waziristan who had settled at Shahjui, in the Qandahār Province, in 1919 and 1920, raided Baluchistan and inflicted casualties on Indian troops; on the 4th April, 1922, the same outlaws attacked the British garrison at Wana; and in the following December they raided as far afield as Seistan and attacked Baluchistan again.³ The Indian Government held the Afghan Government responsible for these outrages committed on the Indian side of the frontier by persons resident in Afghan territory, and towards the close of the year 1923 the Afghan Government duly made compensation for the incidents of 1921. On the other side, in June 1923, the British Government compensated the Afghan Government for casualties unintentionally inflicted upon Afghan subjects and damage done to their property by the British Air Force in the preceding April, in the course of bombing operations against recalcitrant tribesmen on the Indian side of the Durand Line.⁴

Graver trouble arose over a series of assassinations of individual British subjects of English nationality, including women, which were

¹ *The Times*, 4th May, 1925.

² See de Watteville, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14; *Statement exhibiting Moral and Material Progress*, 1924-5, p. 17; *The Times*, 4th September, 1925.

³ *Statement exhibiting Moral and Material Progress*, 1922-3, pp. 31 and 36; 1923-4, p. 27.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*

committed partly by Afghan subjects and partly by tribesmen from the Indian side of the Durand Line who subsequently fled to Afghan territory.

For example, a gang led by A'jab Khān of the Kohat district murdered Colonel and Mrs. Foulkes in 1920, raided forty-six rifles from the police post at Kohat in February 1922, and finally, on the 13th April, 1923, when the police were on their tracks, broke into the Kohat cantonment, murdered Mrs. Ellis, the wife of a British officer, and abducted her daughter, with the object of obtaining hostages with which to bargain for immunity. At a *jirga* held on the 12th May, 1923, the Indian authorities imposed severe terms upon the Kohat Pass Afridis and the Orakzais,¹ for having given passage to a notorious outlaw in breach of their agreements; but, before this, A'jab, with three companions, had fled to Mandatai in the Afghan Province of Ningrahar. Meanwhile, on the 8th April, two British officers, Majors Orr and Anderson, had been murdered in the neighbourhood of Landi Kotal, on the Indian side of the frontier, by two Afghan subjects, and the criminals—after being arrested by the Afghan Government at the British Government's instance—escaped from prison while awaiting trial and joined forces with A'jab.² On the 8th November, 1923, some members of the united band entered the house of Major Watts, of the Kurram militia, at Parachinar, and attempted to abduct his wife—once more with the object of securing an Englishwoman as a hostage³—and both Major and Mrs. Watts were killed in resisting.

The British Government put strong and continuous pressure upon the Afghan Government to bring these various criminals to book, and availed itself of the provisions of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of the 22nd November, 1921,⁴ in order to detain at Bombay a consignment of arms destined for the Afghan Government, pending satisfaction.⁵ This pressure placed the Amīr in an embarrassing position. There is no indication that he personally desired to shelter the murderers. It is more probable that he was anxious to demonstrate the effectiveness of his government by bringing them to justice. In fact, however, his authority was precarious, especially in the tribal districts; and he could not rely upon support from public opinion, which was inclined to take the view that the killing

¹ *Op. cit.*, 1923-4, pp. 35-6. A'jab himself was an Afridi of the Bosti Khēl section of the Adam Khēl clan.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

³ Miss Ellis had been rescued from her captors.

⁴ See *Survey for 1920-3*, p. 383.

⁵ *Statement exhibiting Moral and Material Progress*, 1923-4, p. 29.

of unbelievers was no murder and that the tribesmen among whom the slayers had taken asylum ought not to be forced to deliver up their suppliants. At last, in January 1924, Afghan troops were sent against the outlaws ; A'jab's band surrendered¹ and were banished, with their families and dependants, to Afghan Turkestan ; and on the 21st January one of the Landi Kotal murderers was killed in action with Afghan irregulars. His companion, however, escaped, and two of A'jab's band were never brought to surrender.²

These incidents illustrate the continuing importance of the Afghan factor in the Indian frontier problem ; and after the conclusion of the Third Afghan War there had been developments in Afghanistan of which the final outcome was still uncertain at the time of writing, but which portended radical changes in the frontier problem as it affected India.

During the period under review Afghanistan began to display those revolutionary phenomena which were in evidence at this time from end to end of the Islamic World. The new Amīr Amānu'llāh Khān was a dictatorial reformer of the same type as Rizā Shāh Pahlawī in Persia, President Ghāzī Mustafā Kemāl Pasha in Turkey, and Muhammad 'Abdu'l-Karīm in Morocco. His main objective was to make the national Government effectively independent of foreign control and effectively master in its own house ; his method was to introduce Western technique and to break with the Islamic tradition as far as might be necessary for that purpose ; and, in attempting to carry out this policy, he was inclined to be high-handed in his dealings both with foreign Powers and with his own countrymen. The war with the British Empire, on which he deliberately embarked in 1919, had its counterparts in Mustafā Kemāl Pasha's challenge to Greece and the principal Allied Powers a few months later, in the military resistance offered by the peoples of Syria and 'Irāq to the respective mandatory Powers during 1920, in the Syrian rising of 1925, and in 'Abdu'l-Karīm's successive challenges to Spain and France in Morocco. In all these cases the same spirit of unreflecting self-confidence was displayed, and in several of them it was justified by the event. This was the experience of the Amīr Amānu'llāh himself, who had been defeated swiftly and completely by the Indian Army in May 1919 and had then received

¹ *The Times*, 15th January, 1924.

² These two were Tirah Jawakis, not Bosti Khēl Afridis, and they had a safe asylum in Tirah while their companions were being hunted. The Afghan authorities made the tally complete by rounding up two more or less innocent relatives of A'jab in these men's place.

from the Indian Government, in the peace negotiations, a renunciation of their control over his foreign policy and a rectification of frontier in his favour. This auspicious outcome of his first military adventure naturally increased his self-confidence and his prestige at home, and after the restoration of peace he embarked at once upon internal reforms in which Westernization and the assertion of the Central Government's authority went hand in hand.¹

Diplomatic missions were accredited to London, Paris, Rome, and Berlin, as well as to Tihṛān, Angora, and Moscow; students were sent at Government expense both to Russia and to West European countries, especially to France, in order to study the Western arts of war, engineering, and other branches of technology; French, Italian, and German experts² were invited to Afghanistan; the building of roads and the exploitation of natural resources were taken in hand; and a number of new schools on the Western pattern were opened,³ including a school for girls which was reported to have been

¹ See articles in *The Times* of the 24th April, 17th and 25th May, and 8th June, 1922, by Major Arthur Moore; in *The Times* of the 15th June, 28th July, and 7th September from its Peshāwar correspondent; in *The Times* of the 9th December, 1923, from a special correspondent; and in *Le Temps*, 7th May, 1924.

² The Afghan Government did not invite experts either from British India or from the U.S.S.R., in the belief that the distant nations of Continental Europe were less to be feared by Afghanistan than her two powerful Asiatic neighbours. At least two international incidents arose out of the presence of European experts in the country. For example, on the 27th July, 1924, an Italian engineer, Signor Dario Piperno, killed an Afghan policeman who had served on him an order to appear before the Afghan police authorities, and was duly tried for murder and condemned to death. The Italian Legation persuaded the family of the murdered man to accept blood-money—a transaction which, according to Afghan custom, would involve the voiding of the death sentence; but there was some delay in releasing Signor Piperno from prison; he lost patience, broke out of prison, and attempted to reach the Russian frontier; and he was then recaptured by the authorities and was executed summarily on the 2nd June, 1925. (*The Corriere della Sera*, 13th June, 1925.) The Italian Government demanded a personal apology from the Afghan Foreign Minister, a salutation of the Italian flag by Afghan troops, the refunding of the blood-money, and an indemnity of £7,000. (*The Times*, 15th June, 1925.) In August the controversy was settled by a total payment of £6,000 and an apology from the Afghan Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. (*The Times*, 19th August, 1925.) In November of the same year a German explorer, Herr Sauer, while defending himself against brigands on the road, wounded one of his assailants mortally and was then indicted by the Afghan authorities for attempted murder. After his assailant's death, when the authorities proposed to place Herr Sauer under arrest, he attempted to escape across the Indian frontier but was intercepted and thrown into prison. (*The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3rd December, 1925.) His trial was not concluded for several months, but he was eventually sentenced by the Afghan Court to four years' imprisonment. He was, however, pardoned by the Amīr and released. (*Le Temps*, 18th March, 1926; *The Times*, 6th August, 1926.)

³ See G. L. Leszczyński, 'Afghanistan und Europa' (*Der Neue Orient*,

attended, at the end of the second year, by no less than 2,200 pupils. In order to find funds for these enterprises, and especially for the extension of education, the existing Afghan Regular Army, which had shown itself utterly inefficient in the war of 1919, was drastically cut down. An attempt was made to reform the provincial administration by bringing the officials under more effective central control and by giving the population greater facilities for lodging complaints against them; and towards the end of 1923 the Amīr went so far as to promulgate a constitution.¹ At the same time he set out to bring the population itself under central control by such measures as the introduction of compulsory military service, which he applied not only to the sedentary population of the lowlands but to the untamed tribesmen of the highlands on the Afghan side of the Durand Line.

This combination of measures inevitably led to trouble. To begin with Afghanistan had hitherto been the most isolated and reactionary of Islamic countries, so that Amānu'llāh's reforms, though much less drastic than those of Mustafā Kemāl, were in effect more revolutionary. In the second place, the Amīr was alienating the old army and the old official class, on whom the authority of the Central Government still depended, before he had built up new organizations to supersede them; and in this transition stage, when the Central Government was abnormally weak, he was attempting to exert his authority in unaccustomed ways over the most unruly of his subjects.

The first open rebellion seems to have occurred in the summer of 1923 among the 'Alizai tribe of the Zamindawar district, in the Helmand Valley north-west of Qandahār. Their grievances were taxation and conscription, and the Government's harsh measures for Jahrgang 7, Heft 5), and 'Schul- und Pressewesen in Afghanistan' (*ibid.*, Jahrgang 8, Heft 3-4), summarized in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 3, pp. 174-6. In addition to a French and a German school and four technical schools (for training surveyors, qādīs, officials, and technicians respectively) the Amīr Amānu'llāh was reported to have founded about a hundred elementary schools in the provinces.

¹ For a *résumé* of the text of this constitution, which ran to 73 articles, see *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 3, pp. 196-9, quoting *Al-Akhhār* of Cairo, 28th January, 1924. The Government of Afghanistan was declared an absolute monarchy (Art. 1), the crown passing by heredity to the direct male descendants of the reigning Amīr (Art. 4). Islam was declared the official religion (with toleration for the Parsee and Jewish communities) (Art. 2). The King (*sic*) was declared the Defender of the Faith (Art. 5), and his name was to be mentioned in the *Khutbah* (Art. 7). At the same time there was to be a Council of State and a number of consultative councils which were to be partly elective (Arts. 39-49); and once a year the Ministers of State were to render accounts of their year's work to an assembly of notables (Art. 27). Slavery was prohibited (Art. 10). Journalism and teaching were to be free for Afghans to pursue, though not for foreigners (Arts. 11 and 14). Primary education was to be compulsory and universal (Art. 68).

reducing them to order only stimulated them to more violent resistance. The new laws were met by passive resistance in Qandahār itself.¹

In March 1924 a more serious revolt broke out among the Mangal and Zadran tribes in the highland district of Khōst,² immediately adjoining the Durand Line, in which this district formed an Afghan salient between the Kurram Valley on one side and the Tochi Valley on the other.³ The proximate cause of this outbreak seems to have been the introduction of a new code of criminal law, which was denounced by the tribal *mawlās* as an attempt to supplant the *Sharī'ah*.⁴ At the same time the Afghan Government's frontier posts were seized by the tribesmen, and Matun, the local administrative centre, was invested⁵ by a force estimated to be 6,000 strong. The rebellion rapidly spread westwards. Gardez was soon invested as well as Matun, and at one moment in June the rebels actually held the Āl-Timūr Pass overlooking the road from Ghaznī to Kābul.⁶ They were then joined by the Sulaymān Khēl section of the Gilzais; and, after the regular Afghan forces had suffered several serious reverses, the Amīr was reduced to enlisting rival tribesmen to fight the rebels for him and to sowing dissension among the rebels themselves.⁷ The Āl-Timūr Pass was not finally cleared nor Gardez and Matun relieved until the autumn,⁸ and even then the slackening of the rebels' resistance seems to have been due not so much to the Afghan Government's military efforts as to the departure of the nomadic pastoral elements (*powindahs*) on their seasonal migration to the Indus plain.⁹ On this occasion the migration across the frontier was reinforced by several sections of the Gilzais, who did not usually leave Afghanistan but who found it prudent to vary their customary orbit in order to put themselves on the Indian side of the Durand Line. Upon their arrival at Bannu the British-Indian authorities took security from them that they would not use Indian territory as a base for hostile operations against the Afghan Government,¹⁰ and difficulties were put in the way of their return to Afghanistan in the spring. This benevolent neutrality on the Indian

¹ *The Times*, 18th December, 1923.

² *Ibid.*, 5th May, 1924; *Statement exhibiting Moral and Material Progress*, 1924-5, pp. 10-11.

³ Hydrographically, the Khōst district lay within the Kurram River Basin, draining into the Indus.

⁴ *The Times*, 9th May, 1924.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 9th May, 1924.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 19th June and 25th July, 1924.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 22nd October, 1924.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4th October, 1924.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3rd November, 1924.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 18th November, 1924.

Government's part may possibly have decided the struggle in the Afghan Government's favour. In February 1925 the Mangals and Zadrans were attacked in detail by the Afghan troops and heavily defeated;¹ and the Afghan press reported² that in two weeks all the Mangal villages were occupied, 3,500 houses bombarded and burnt, 1,575 rebel fighting men killed and wounded, and 6,000 cattle captured, while 460 women and children died of starvation and exposure in their flight through the snow. On the 28th February the suppression of the revolt was officially celebrated at Kābul, and 60 rebel leaders were put to death on the 25th May.³

The fighting, however, had lasted, off and on, for nearly a year, and the Amīr's prestige had been shaken. The rebels' hostility towards Westernization was shared by many Afghans who did not take up arms,⁴ and the Amīr betrayed his weakness by offering up the Ahmadiyah sectaries⁵ as scapegoats to the reactionaries. In the autumn of 1924 the *mawlā* Ni'matu'llāh Khān, a recent and prominent convert to the Qādyānī branch of the Ahmadiyah persuasion, was stoned to death on a trumped up charge of treason.⁶ Two humbler Qādyānīs of the tradesman class were condemned for apostasy and stoned to death at Kābul in February 1925;⁷ and in March two further arrests were reported. In this last case the accused appear to have escaped with their lives.

Meanwhile, the Indian Government had not only preserved a scrupulously correct neutrality, but had gone out of its way to assist the Afghan Government in surmounting its internal crisis.

¹ *Le Temps*, 26th February, 1925.

² *The Times*, 4th April, 1925.

³ *Ibid.*, 29th May, 1925.

⁴ e. g. in 1924 the *mawlās* were reported to have persuaded the National Assembly to vote for the closing of an infant school, which had been opened by the Amīr at Kābul, on the ground that it was contrary to the spirit of the Qur'ān and dangerous to public morals (*Oriente Moderno*, VI, 3, p. 174).

⁵ The Ahmadiyah Sect had been founded in 1882 by Ghulām Ahmad of Qādyān (a place in the Ghurdāspūr district of the Panjab), who claimed to be the Messiah and the Mahdī. After the death of the founder on the 26th May, 1908, the Ahmadiyah split into two branches, with head-quarters at Qādyān and Lahore respectively (the Lahore branch being the more susceptible to Western ideas). Both branches embarked on missionary activities not only in the Islamic World but in Great Britain, the United States, and Germany. (See M. Th. Houtsma, 'Le Mouvement Religieux des Ahmadiyya aux Indes Anglaises' (in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, I, 1907, pp. 533-76); H. A. Walter, *The Ahmadiyya Movement* (Calcutta, 1918, Oxford University Press); Mirzā Bashīr'u-d-Dīn Mahmūd Ahmad [son of the founder, and head of the Qādyān branch]: *Ahmad the Messenger of the Latter Days*, Part I (Qādyān, 1924; and Madras, 1924, Addison Press); *Idem*: *Ahmadiyyat or the True Islam* (Qādyān, 1924); Mawlānā Muhammad 'Alī [head of the Lahore branch]: 'The Ahmadiyya Movement' (in *The Light of Lahore*, 16th October, 1925, translated in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 2, pp. 108-23.)

⁶ *The Times*, 6th September, 1924.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 13th February, 1925.

For example, on the 22nd August, 1924, British airmen delivered at Kābul two aeroplanes which the Indian Government had sold to the Amīr ;¹ and, though these planes do not appear to have been used against the rebels by their German pilots with very great effect,² their presence (and the source from which they came) no doubt contributed to the maintenance of the Amīr's prestige. In May 1924 the Indian authorities did the Amīr another service by recapturing at Parachinar the two younger sons of the ex-Amīr, Ya'qūb Khān, who had escaped from internment at Dehra Dun and were on their way to join the rebels.³ In July another (slave-born) son of Ya'qūb Khān, 'Abdu'l-Karīm, a notorious bad character, did succeed in reaching Khōst after breaking parole from Benares ;⁴ but as soon as the rebellion showed signs of failing he fled back to India, and in January 1925 he was identified by the police at Lahore and arrested.⁵

The revolt of the Pathan highlanders against the Afghan Government at Kābul in 1924-5 bore a striking resemblance to the revolt of the Kurdish highlanders against the Turkish Government at Angora in the summer of 1925.⁶ In both cases tribesmen who had been accustomed for centuries to an anarchic liberty were up in arms against a state which was attempting to impose its authority upon them through a policy of Westernization. In both cases, again, the tribesmen were defeated after a severe struggle ; but the resemblance did not end here. In Afghanistan, as well as in Turkey, the relation of the tribesmen to the Government was not solely a question of internal politics. It was complicated by the fact that the tribal country was traversed by an international frontier, and that part of the tribes were subject *de jure* to another Government with a different tribal policy. In fact, in either case three parties were concerned—the tribesmen themselves and the state on either side of them—and the tribal policy of either state was bound to have a profound effect, for good or evil, upon the frontier conditions of the other.

¹ *Ibid.*, 23rd, 26th, and 29th August, 1924.

² *Ibid.*, 3rd November, 1924.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 4th October, 1924.

⁶ See Section (xi) (e) above.

³ *Ibid.*, 8th May, 1924.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 7th January, 1925.

APPENDICES

- I. Letter, dated the 24th November, 1923, addressed to his Excellency Ghāzī 'Ismet Pasha, Prime Minister of Turkey, at Angora, by his Highness the Agha Khan and the Right Honourable Sayyid Ameer Ali in London.¹

Your Excellency,

1. As consistent friends of new Turkey and in full sympathy with her aspirations as an independent member of the comity of the free nations of the world, we desire, with your permission, to invite the attention of the Grand National Assembly to the very disturbing effects the present uncertain position of the Caliph-Imām is exercising among the vast populations who belong to the Sunnī communion. We have noticed with the greatest regret that Islam, as a great moral and cohesive force, is losing among large sections of the Sunnī population, owing to the diminution in the Caliph's dignity and prestige, its weight and influence. For obvious reasons we do not wish to particularize the facts, but its absolute accuracy cannot be gainsaid.

2. In the Sunnī communion, we need not point out, the *spiritual* headship forms the link which binds the followers of Islam as a vast congregation. When the Caliphate was in peril from outside attacks, Musulman feeling all over the world was violently agitated, and the Muslims of India gave their sympathy and support to the Turkish nation in the belief that in fighting for their independence they were fighting also for the preservation intact of the institution which symbolized Muslim solidarity. Throughout those critical times we strenuously pleaded for the Turkish cause. And a British Muslim organization has, ever since the Turco-Italian War in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, devoted its energies in endeavouring to alleviate the untold suffering and distress among the Turkish people. Our observations and suggestions therefore, we trust, will receive a courteous hearing from your Excellency's Government regarding a question in which we, in common with all Muslims, take the deepest interest.

3. It must not be supposed for a moment from our remarks that we wish to suggest that the powers of the people's representatives should be in any degree curtailed. What we respectfully urge is that the religious headship of the Sunnī world should be maintained intact in accordance with the Shariyyet. In our opinion any diminution in the prestige of the Caliph or the elimination of the Caliphate as a religious factor from the Turkish body politic would mean the disintegration of Islam and its practical disappearance as a moral force in the world—a contingency which, we are sure, neither the Grand National Assembly nor his Excellency the President Ghāzī Mustafā Kemāl Pasha can view with equanimity.

4. In our opinion the Caliph-Imām symbolizes the unity of the Sunnī communion : and the fact that he is a member of the Turkish people and

¹ Reprinted by permission from *The Times*, 14th December, 1923.

is a descendant of the founder of the Turkish nation gives to Turkey a position pre-eminent among Islamic nations.

5. For fourteen centuries it has been the cardinal principle of the *Ahl-i-Sunnat*, and on this, we believe, is the *Ijmāa-i-Ummat*, that the Caliph, the Vice-gerent of the Prophet, is the Imām of the Sunnī congregations, and that between him and the general body of worshippers there is a nexus which knits together the *Ahl-i-Sunnat*. This mystical element cannot be eradicated from the Muslim mind without creating discord in the world of Islam.

6. We need not remind your Excellency that even when the Caliph-Imām lost his temporal power the great Kings and Chieftains sought and obtained from him investiture in order to validate their title to rule and to lead at prayers, the usual concomitant of secular authority. If Islam is to maintain its place in the world as a great moral force, the Caliph's position and dignity should not, in any event, be less than that of the Pontiff of the Church of Rome.

7. For these reasons, among others equally cogent, we, as the true friends of Turkey, respectfully urge upon the Grand National Assembly and its great and far-sighted leaders the imminent necessity for maintaining the religious and moral solidarity of Islam by placing the Caliph-Imamate on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations, and thus impart to the Turkish State unique strength and dignity.

We are, Your Excellency, your obedient
servants,

AGA KHAN.
AMEER ALI.

II. The three Turkish Laws voted by the Great National Assembly of Turkey at Angora on the 3rd March, 1340 (1924) [26 Rejeb, 1342.]¹

(1) LAW CONCERNING THE ABOLITION OF THE COMMISSARIATS [*Vekyāletler*] FOR THE *Sheri'eh* AND *Evqāf* AND FOR THE GENERAL STAFF

Article 1.—Whereas the laying down [*teshrī'*] and execution [*Infādh*] of the Law in cases concerning civil transactions [*mu'āmelāt-i-nās*] in the Republic of Turkey falls within the province of the Great National Assembly of Turkey and of the Government which it has constituted,²

¹ Official Turkish texts in *Qawānīn Mejmū'as̄y*, 1924/1340 (printed at Angora by the press of the Great National Assembly of Turkey), Nos. 429, 430, 431.

² This 'whereas' clause was perhaps the most important passage in the law, since the Great National Assembly here for the first time explicitly asserted a right which it eventually exercised when it adopted the Swiss Civil Code on the 17th February, 1926 (see p. 71 above). Hitherto the source of civil law in Turkey had been the Islamic Law (*Sheri'eh*)—and this not only in theory but in practice, for the code (*Mejelleh*) which was published during the years 1870–6 was little more than a somewhat modernized version, in the Turkish language, of the Islamic Law according to the Hanaffiyah interpretation, as presented in Arabic in older compilations such as the sixteenth-century *Multaqā'u'l-*

there is now [hereby] established, in the capital of the Republic, an office, designated 'Presidency of Religious Affairs', for the dispatch of all cases and concerns of the Exalted Islamic Faith which relate to dogma and ritual, and for the administration of religious foundations.

Article 2.—The Commissariat [*Vekyâlet*] for the *Sheri'eh* and *Evqâf* is abolished.

Article 3.—The President of Religious Affairs is appointed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Prime Minister [*Bâsh Vekîl*, literally 'Head Commissary'].

Article 4.—The Presidency of Religious Affairs is attached to the Premiership. The budget of the Presidency of Religious Affairs is appended to the budget of the Premiership. In regard to the organization of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, a regulative ordinance will be drawn up [hereafter].

Article 5.—The President of Religious Affairs is charged with the administration of all mosques of both classes [*jevâmy' ve mesâjid*] and of all dervish houses [*tekâyâ ve zevâyâ*] within the boundaries of the territories of the Republic of Turkey, as well as with the appointment and dismissal of all rectors of mosques [*imâm*], 'orators' [*khatîb*],¹ preachers [*vâ'yz*], abbots of dervish houses [*sheykh*], callers to prayer [*mu'ezzin*], sacristans [*qayyim*], and all other employees [of a religious character].

Article 6.—The Presidency of Religious Affairs is the proper place of legal recourse for jurisconsults in the Islamic Law [*müftüler*].

Article 7.—With a view to a settlement in conformity with the genuine

Abhar. Hitherto only criminal and commercial justice had been withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Islamic Law and provided for by a criminal and a commercial code, both drafted on French models. The procedure followed, as well as the law administered, in the criminal and commercial courts, had likewise been based on French models; and this was also the case with the procedure, though not with the law, in the civil courts which administered the *Mejelleh*. Thus, under the régime of the *Mejelleh*, civil justice had been administered in a civil court, according to a French procedure, in a code drafted in the Turkish language; but the law embodied in this code remained the law of the *Sheri'eh* nevertheless. Moreover, for religious affairs in the narrower sense, jurisdiction still lay with the *qâdis*, whose courts were under the control of the *Sheykhul-Islâm*. The control over these religious courts was transferred from the *Sheykhul-Islâm* to the Ministry of Justice in March 1917 (see p. 71 above); but the change presaged in the first clause of the first law of the 3rd March, 1924, was more revolutionary. The Great National Assembly was now putting forward the claim that the laying down as well as the execution of the law in cases concerning civil transactions fell within the province of the Great National Assembly. To pious Muslims the employment in this clause of the word *teshrî'* (that is 'the laying down of the *Sheri'eh*') must have read like blasphemy. According to Islamic theory the *Sheri'eh* had been revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad, and the only laying-down of the Law (*shâri'*) was the Prophet himself. Even the faculty of interpretation (*Ijtihād*) of the *Sheri'eh* was held to have come to an end with the completion of the work of the four canonical schools of interpretation (*madhâhib*). In effect the Great National Assembly was arrogating to itself a function which had been exercised by the Prophet alone, and by him only through Divine inspiration.—A. J. T.

¹ The *Khatîb* was a functionary authorized to deliver the *khutbah*—a ceremony which was only performed on Fridays and in Bayrâm, and which was a combination of a prayer and a sermon. Thus the *Khatîb* combined the functions of an *imâm* and a *vâ'yz* for these occasions.—A. J. T.

interests of the nation, *Evqāf* affairs are provisionally placed in the keeping of the Premiership in the form of a general administratorship.

Article 8.—The Commissariat [*Vekyālet*] of the General Staff is abolished.

Article 9.—As the highest military office charged with the high command in peace time [*hazarda*] there is established the post of Chief of the General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff is independent in the sphere of his own duties.

Article 10.—The Chief of the General Staff is appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister as confirmed by the President of the Republic.

Article 11.—The Chief of the General Staff corresponds with every Commissariat on particulars relating to the sphere of his own duties.

Article 12.—The responsibility towards the Great National Assembly of Turkey for the general military budget falls within the province of the Commissariat for National Defence.

Article 13.—The present law comes into force as from the date of promulgation.

Article 14.—The Cabinet [literally, 'Body of Executive Commissaries'] is charged with putting the present law into force.

(2) LAW FOR THE UNIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

Article 1.—All scientific and educational establishments within the boundaries of Turkey are attached to the Commissariat for Public Instruction.

Article 2.—All seminaries [*medreseh*] and primary schools [*mekteb*] hitherto administered by the Commissariat for the *Sheri'eh* and *Evqāf* or by private *vagfs* are handed over and attached to the Commissariat for Public Instruction.

Article 3.—The amounts ear-marked for primary schools and seminaries in the budget of the Commissariat for the *Sheri'eh* and *Evqāf* will be transferred to the budget of the Commissariat for Public Instruction.

Article 4.—In order to train specialists in higher religious studies, the Commissariat for Public Instruction will establish a faculty of theological studies in the University. For the training of officials charged with the duty of fulfilling such religious functions as those of mosque rector [*Imām*] and 'orator' [*Khatib*], the Commissariat will open separate schools.

Article 5.—As from the date of promulgation of this law, the military high schools and preparatory schools which concern themselves with public education and instruction and which have hitherto been attached to the [Commissariat for] National Defence, as well as the orphanages attached to the Commissariat for Health, together with their budgets and their teaching staffs, are [now] attached to the Commissariat for Public Instruction. The form of attachment of the teaching staff in the high schools and preparatory schools afore-mentioned will be considered and regulated by consultation between the Commissariats within whose provinces they are to fall in future. In the interim, teachers connected with the army will retain their respective connexions with the army.

Article 6.—The present law is valid as from the date of promulgation.

Article 7.—The Cabinet is charged with putting the present law into force.

(3) LAW CONCERNING THE ABOLITION OF THE CALIPHATE AND THE BANISHMENT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL FAMILY FROM THE TERRITORIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

Article 1.—The Caliph is deposed. The office of the Caliphate is abolished, since the Caliphate is essentially comprised in the meaning and signification of [the words] Government [*Hükümet*] and Republic [*Jumhūriyet*].

Article 2.—The deposed Caliph and all male and female members of the Imperial Family of the now extinguished Ottoman Sultanate, including the husbands of Imperial princesses [*Dāmād*], are deprived in perpetuity of the right to reside within the boundaries of the territories of the Republic of Turkey. The issue of ladies related to this Imperial Family are subject to the terms of this article.

Article 3.—The individuals mentioned in Article 2 are required to leave the dominions of the Republic of Turkey within a maximum period of ten days as from the date of proclamation of the present law.

Article 4.—The individuals mentioned in Article 2 are deprived of the status and rights of Turkish nationality.

Article 5.—From now onwards the individuals mentioned in Article 2 may not enjoy the disposal of real property within the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey. For the winding-up of their affairs they may have recourse, by proxy, to the public courts of law during a period of one year.

Article 6.—The individuals mentioned in Article 2 will be presented with sums to be adjudicated by the Government on the basis of covering the expenses of their journeys in a 'lump sum' payment varying in proportion to their [respective] degrees of wealth.

Article 7.—The individuals mentioned in Article 2 are required, within the term of one year, to liquidate, with the cognizance and consent of the Government, all their real property within the boundaries of the dominions of the Republic of Turkey. In the event of their not having liquidated the real property afore-mentioned, this will be liquidated under the supervision of the Government and the proceeds will be paid over to the owners.

Article 8.—Real property of individuals who have occupied the throne of the Ottoman Empire, situated within the boundaries of the dominions of the Republic of Turkey, and registered as copyhold [*tāpū*], is transferred to the Nation.

Article 9.—Upholstery, furniture, heirlooms, and, in general, any other personal property which is contained in palaces, castles, or any other buildings which were the property of the Crown, now abolished, is transferred to the Nation.

Article 10.—In addition to those freeholds which, under the name of Imperial Freeholds, were formerly handed over to the Nation, all freeholds appertaining to the Crown, now abolished, the former Imperial Regalia [*Khazīneh-i-Humāyūn*], and palaces, castles, buildings, and domains, including their contents, are transferred to the Nation.

Article 11.—For the security and safeguard of the property, both real and personal, which is transferred to the Nation, a regulative ordinance will be drawn up [hereafter].

Article 12.—The present law comes into force as from the date of promulgation.

Article 13.—The Cabinet is charged with putting the present law into force.

III. Decision published on the 19th Sha'bān, [A.H.] 1342 [25th March, 1924], by the Rector of Al-Azhar and by the other principal 'ulamā in Egypt concerning the convening of an Islamic Congress for the Appointment of a new Caliph.¹

On Tuesday the 19th Sha'bān, [A.H.] 1342 [25th March, 1924], there met, in the offices of the General Directorate of Establishments for Islamic Religious Instruction, a grand committee of 'ulamā, under the presidency of the Rector (*Shaykh*) of the [university] mosque of Al-Azhar, who is also President of the Establishments aforesaid.

There were present : the President of the Supreme *Sharī'ah* Court ; the Chief Mufti of Egypt ; the Vice-Rector (*Wakīl*) of Al-Azhar ; the Rectors of the Establishments for Religious Instruction ; the heads of departments in Al-Azhar, and a large number of leading 'ulamā and of inspectors of the Establishments aforesaid.

The object of the meeting was to discuss the situation of the Islamic Caliphate. After a long discussion, the following decision was reached :

1. Since the departure from Constantinople of the Amīr 'Abdu'l-Mejīd, there has been much talk on the question of the Caliphate, and Muslims are engaged in studying what they must do in the circumstances in order to fulfil their religious obligations. For this reason, we have thought it opportune to proclaim our opinion regarding the Caliphate of the Amīr 'Abdu'l-Mejīd and regarding the present and future course which it is the duty of Muslims to follow.

2. The Caliphate, which is synonymous with the Imamate, is a general headship (*ri'āṣah*) in matters of religion and of this world. Its fundamental function is to watch over the interests of the Islamic Church (*millah*) and over the administration of the Islamic Community (*ummah*). The Imām is the deputy of the promulgator of the Religious Law (*Sāhibu'sh-Sharī'ah*) for the defence of the Faith, for the application of its precepts, and for the administration of mundane affairs as the Religious Law (*Sharī'ah*) provides.

3. The Imām becomes Imām in virtue of a payment of allegiance (*bay'ah*) on the part of those with the power to loose and bind (*Ahlu'l-Hall wa'l-'Aqd*) or else through being chosen by his predecessor to succeed him. It is also indispensable, however, that his rule should carry authority among his subjects through fear inspired by his coercive force (*qahr*) and his [temporal] power (*Sultān*). In fact, if allegiance has been paid to the Imām, or if his predecessor has chosen him to succeed him, but nevertheless his rule fails to carry authority among the people owing to his inability to exercise compulsion upon them, then neither the payment of allegiance nor the choice of the preceding Caliph avail to make him Imām.

The Imamate can also be acquired by conquest, in the sense that if another party masters the Caliph and usurps his place, the Caliph loses his office. Sometimes acquisition by conquest is reinforced by the payment of allegiance or by the choice of the preceding Caliph, as was the case with the majority of Caliphs in the past.

¹ Printed in *Oriente Moderno*, IV, 4, pp. 223-6, and in *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1926 (2^{me} trimestre), vol. Lxiv, pp. 105-9.

All this is explicitly set forth in the texts [*nusūs*, plural of *nass*] of the Hanafi masters.¹

4. Since the Caliph has absolute discretion to dispose of his subjects' affairs, all powers must derive and proceed from him—for example, those of ministers, regional rulers (*umārā'u'l-Aqālīm*), qādīs, commanders of armies, and wardens of marches.

5. The social contract ('*aqd*') constituting the Imamate is dissolved whenever anything occurs to frustrate the purpose for which the contract exists: for example, supposing the Imām becomes a prisoner of war without hope of recovering his freedom, or supposing he is unable to carry on the religious and the public administration. When the Imām takes action which produces disturbance in the conditions of life of the Muslims or which does injury to religion, it is legitimate for the Islamic Community to depose him, if that does not lead to a civil war (*fitnah*). If it led to that, it would be better to bear with the lesser evil of the two.

6. Those Muslims who submitted to the Caliphate of the Amīr Wahīdud-Dīn consented to his deposition for the reasons which had come to their knowledge and which had satisfied them that his deposition was justified. After that, the Turks replaced him as Caliph by the Amīr 'Abdu'l-Mejīd—at the same time proclaiming the withdrawal from the Caliph of all [temporal] power (*sultān*). This they entrusted to their National Assembly, and they reduced the Amīr 'Abdu'l-Mejīd to the status of a purely spiritual (*rūhī*) Caliph.

7. By this act, the Turks introduced an innovation (*bid'ah*) which was without precedent in Islam. They followed this up by another innovation: the abolition of the office of the Caliphate.

8. In these conditions, the Caliphate of the Amīr 'Abdu'l-Mejīd was not a legal Caliphate, since the Islamic religion does not recognize a Caliph on the terms which were laid down for him and which he accepted. Hence the allegiance paid to him by Muslims was not valid in Islamic Law.

9. Even if we overlook this and assume that the allegiance was valid, it is certain, nevertheless, that his rule did not carry that authority which is the necessary legal condition for the realization of the Caliphate.

10. Even supposing that he had been fully qualified for the Caliphate according to the requirements of the Islamic Law, he would have ceased to be qualified as soon as he became unable to administer religious and mundane affairs—not to speak of his inability to reside in his country and kingdom and to defend himself and his family when the Turks eventually asserted their mastery over him.

11. From all this it follows that the allegiance paid to the Amīr 'Abdu'l-Mejīd is no longer binding upon Muslims, inasmuch as the purpose of the Imamate, as established in the Islamic Law, is no longer being fulfilled, and inasmuch as it would be neither sensible nor compatible with the dignity of Islam and of Muslims to declare that the latter remain bound by an allegiance given to a person who is not in a position to reside in his own country, while Muslims, on their part, are not in a position to enable him to reside there.

¹ The translator of the document in *Oriente Moderno* points out that the Rector of Al-Azhar was a Mālikī, and that the majority of the 'ulamā present were either Mālikīs or Shāfi'is. He conjectures that the Hanafi authorities were cited because the Hanafiyah school of interpretation was the school followed in Turkey.—A. J. T.

12. Considering that, in the sight of the Islamic religion and of all Muslims, the post of Caliph possesses a paramount importance—inasmuch as the Caliphate is responsible for maintaining the prestige of the religion and its adherents, for preserving the unity of the Islamic Community, and for creating strong and solid links between its members—it is incumbent upon Muslims to study the organization of the Caliphate and to base it on principles which are in conformity with the precepts of the Islamic religion and which do not depart from the Islamic ordinances by which Muslims have agreed to be ruled.

13. At the same time, the emotion aroused by the action of the Turks in abolishing the office of the Caliphate and asserting their mastery over the Amīr 'Abdu'l-Mejīd has thrown the Islamic World into such an agitation that it will be impossible for Muslims to discuss this organization, and to form a considered opinion regarding it and regarding the proper selection of a Caliph, until calm has been restored and until there has been time for reflection and for ascertaining the respective points of view of the several quarters [of the Islamic World].

14. For these reasons, we consider it indispensable to hold an Islamic religious congress, to which the representatives of all the Islamic peoples shall be invited, in order to consider upon whose shoulders the Islamic Caliphate ought to be placed. In view of the privileged position of Egypt among the Islamic peoples, the congress should be held in Cairo under the presidency of the *Shaykh* 'ul-*Islām* of Egypt, and should meet in the month of Sha'bān, [A.H.] 1343 [March 1925].

15. We must not omit to express our gratitude to all those who have manifested Islamic religious zeal over the question of the Caliphate and who have taken their duty in this matter to heart.

16. We also declare our gratitude to communities professing religions other than Islam, and to the Governments of these communities, for the scrupulousness with which they have refrained hitherto from interfering in the question of the Islamic Caliphate. We beg of them that they will regard the question of the Caliphate as a purely Islamic question with which non-Muslims cannot legitimately concern themselves. The entire Islamic World desires to live in peace with other peoples and to preserve the true principles of its religion and its own ordinances, which are free from any spirit of hostility [towards non-Muslims].

17. This is what we have considered it our religious duty to make known to all quarters of the Islamic World, and to other peoples, in order that all may be clearly informed of the situation.

IV. Memorandum submitted by the Third Committee of the Caliphate Congress held at Cairo on the 13th to 19th May, 1926.¹

The Committee entrusted with the study of the last three points on the programme of the Congress has the honour to submit its report on the considerations which have led it to take the decisions set forth in its foregoing report—leaving it to the honourable assembly to take whatever decision it may think fit in this matter.

The Caliphate possesses supreme importance in the eyes of Muslims,

¹ Printed in *Oriente Moderno*, VI, 5, pp. 272–3, and *Revue du Monde Musulman*, 1926 (2^{me} trimestre), vol. lxiv, pp. 105–9.

and this importance manifested itself in all the glory and prestige with which the Caliphate was surrounded in the age of the first Caliphs, when Muslims were united in the pursuit of a single end, namely, the glorifying of the Word of God, the defence of his religion, and [the maintenance of] the greatness of Islam. When, however, the strength of the Muslims declined and the influence of the Caliphate tended to disappear, the Caliphate became a heavy burden—so heavy that the Turks abolished it instead of making of it the foundation of their glory and power. Consequently, the leading *‘ulamā* of Egypt met as a body and published the well-known decision in regard to the Caliphate which raised the question of examining the Caliphate under all its aspects.

In this decision it is affirmed that the Imām defends the Faith, applies its precepts, and administers mundane affairs as the Islamic Law provides and on the understanding that the Caliph has absolute discretion to dispose of his subjects' affairs and that all powers derive from him.

It follows that the most important requirement in the Caliph is that he should carry sufficient authority to give execution to his decisions and ordinances and to defend the territory of Islam and the property of Muslims in accordance with the precepts of religion.

Is it now possible for a Caliphate of this character to exist? As has been stated above, the Caliphate in accordance with the Islamic Law, in the true sense of the term, only existed in primitive Islam, when Muslims were of one mind and when the countries had been united by Islam into a single *bloc* obeying the same orders and subjected to the same organization. Now, however, this union has been dissolved; the countries and peoples of Islam have been divorced from one another in government, administration, and policy; and many of their inhabitants have been possessed by a nationalistic agitation which prevents one group from accepting the leadership of another, not to speak of submitting to being governed by it and permitting it to interfere in its public affairs. In these circumstances it is difficult for the Caliphate, as defined above, to be realized.

This, moreover, is on the assumption that all Islamic peoples are independent and self-governing, whereas the reality is very different, seeing that the majority of these peoples are actually subject to alien Governments. This still further complicates the difficulty of a Caliphate according to the Islamic Law, owing to the delicate ties of relationship which link the independent with the non-independent Islamic peoples.

Accordingly, if a universal Caliph were appointed for all Muslims, he would not possess the requisite authority and the Caliphate to which he would pretend would not be a Caliphate in accordance with the Islamic Law, in the true sense of the term, but an illusory Caliphate without any authority, small or great.

Considering these difficulties which, in consequence of the actual condition of the Islamic peoples, prevent the creation of a Caliphate according to the Islamic Law, and considering further the very great importance of the Caliphate and the real advantages which would result from its establishment among Muslims, the Commission has expressed, in answer to the fourth question on the programme of the Congress, the opinion that

‘The Caliphate according to the Islamic Law, fulfilling all the conditions laid down for it in the Scriptures, as summarized in the Report of the First Commission which has been approved at the fourth sitting

of the Congress—the most important of the said conditions being ability to defend the possessions of the Faith in all Islamic countries and to put into execution the precepts of the Islamic Law—is incapable of realization at the present time, in view of the situation in which Muslims find themselves.’

On the other hand, out of regard to the inadmissibility of leaving Muslims in their present state of neglect and lack of leadership, we consider that the only possible solution of this difficulty is that the Islamic peoples should organize in concert, in the several Islamic countries, successive congresses which will give them the opportunity for periodical exchanges of views until they succeed in solving the question of the Caliphate in conformity with Islamic interests.

In order to provide for the contingency that circumstances might not permit these congresses to meet regularly, and in order to guard against the inconveniences which might result from a prolonged interregnum in the office of the Caliphate and from the absence of a higher authority to which Muslims could appeal on religious questions of a general nature, it would be advisable to establish a central committee consisting of distinguished Islamic leaders and dignitaries. This committee would meet annually to examine problems of interest to Islam. It would have in each Islamic country a national executive committee with which it would keep in constant touch and which would be entrusted with the execution, in its own territory, of the central committee’s decisions.

It follows from the above that in present circumstances the establishment of the Caliphate is difficult, if not impossible, from the practical point of view, and accordingly that it is advisable for the time being to dismiss the idea of appointing a Caliph. The appointment of a Caliph would not solve the problem of the Caliphate in the present situation of the Islamic peoples. On the contrary, it would involve a risk of complicating the problem still further—not to speak of the fact that, in the first place, there does not yet exist a body of authorized persons legally entitled to make the payment of allegiance, while in the second place several Islamic peoples which were invited to this Congress have abstained from participation.

Consequently, the Commission, in answer to the fifth question on the programme of the Congress, considering that

‘ the position of Caliph possesses, in the eyes of Muslims in East and West and in the eyes of the peoples of the whole world, a supreme importance which places it in the category of questions which it is impossible to settle now, for the reasons above mentioned ; and considering that in solving this question it is necessary to look to a solution which may be approved as expedient by the consensus of Muslims now and hereafter ’,

has expressed the opinion that

‘ the Administrative Council of the Islamic Caliphate Congress at Cairo ought to be maintained in being, on the understanding that the Council shall establish branches in the several Islamic countries, with which it shall keep in touch with a view to convening in those countries successive congresses, as need arises, to examine the question of the Caliphate and arrive at a decision in consonance with the dignity of the office ’.

The Islamic peoples need not take it to heart if, so far, they have not been able to solve the question of the Caliphate according to the Islamic Law or to appoint a Caliph. Nor, again, need the present Congress take it to heart if it has not succeeded in finding a definitive solution for the question of the Caliphate and the Caliph. It is sufficient for the Congress to know that it has rendered an immense service to Muslims in diagnosing for them the disease and indicating to them the remedy. It has thus fulfilled its religious duty towards Islam and Muslims.

‘God has promised to those among you that believe and do righteousness that He will make them to inherit the earth, even as He made them that were before them, and that He will assuredly establish firmly for them this religion which it hath pleased Him to give them, and, after their fear, will give them security in place thereof. Me will they worship, and will have none other gods but Me. They who hear this warning and remain in their unbelief, these are the transgressors.’¹

(signed) *The President of the Commission,*

‘Abdu’l-Hamidi’l-Bakrī.

The Members,

Muhammad Murād,² ‘Atā’u’l-Khatīb,³ Abū Bakr Kamālu’d-Dīn,⁴ Ya’qūb Shenkovich,⁵ Muhammadu’s-Sālihi,⁶ Muhammad Idrīsu’s-Sanūsī,⁷ ‘Ināyatu’llāh Khān,⁸ Yahyā ‘Adnān.⁹

V. Letter, dated the 27th January, 1926, from Muhammad b. ‘Abdi’l-Karīmī’l-Khattābī to the Editor of the ‘London Times’.¹⁰

Peace. We rejoice to communicate to you true information concerning the situation of our country so that you can publish it in your progressive newspaper, in order that the world may realize what exactly is the position of affairs. This is in the interests of truth, especially as there are rumours set abroad by the enemies of humanity and those hostile to peace, lovers of war.

We are relieved of responsibility and the whole world knows that we are prepared to make peace and to come to an understanding with our opponents. We only seek justice and search for tranquillity and that is all. It is nothing to us if our enemies for political purposes make false assertions. It has always been so since we began to defend our usurped rights, and we are always striving to obtain peace. We have exerted every effort in communicating with the French and Spanish authorities over and over again, and every time they meet us in their pride and in their egoism, interpreting our purposes contrary to their real intention. We are the weaker side and have no power to carry on war or resist for long, and so they charge us at times with weakness and at other times as having suffered defeat, and this whenever we make any communication to them or show any inclination for peace. This has astonished us. And when we continue to fight and to kill, abandoning our inclination to follow the path of peace—thereby seeking our rights justly and impartially—they accuse

¹ Qur’ān, xxiv. 54.

⁴ South Africa.

⁷ Libya.

² Palestine.

⁵ Poland.

⁸ India.

³ ‘Irāq.

⁶ Tunisia.

⁹ Hijāz.

¹⁰ Reprinted by permission from *The Times*, 17th March, 1926.

us of being barbarians and of loving war and bloodshed. And when we appeal to them for our rights and just treatment they explain it as a confession of weakness and of inefficiency. This shows a wrong understanding and is surprising. When we are in a dilemma, uncertain what road to take, we turn and carry out the Arab saying, 'The sword is more truthful than writings.'

Our intentions are sincere. We never write to our opponents or send them any communication except what we conscientiously and truthfully feel. We are sincere in all this. We know nothing of politics or intrigues or roguery, but our opponents are masters of those things. They do not understand any ways but those of the fox, and this brings about misunderstandings on every occasion.

We demand nothing but our rights and we defend nothing beyond what we consider our duty to defend. The sole purpose of all our actions is to arrive at peace. We desire to educate our people and to reform our country. We are always ready to make peace and to come to terms, as soon as we can perceive that our enemies recognize justice and admit our legitimate rights without (the enjoyment of) which we cannot exist. The Rif has characteristics of its own and an ability to exist which entitle it to be governed for and by its own people and to live as other nations do, in liberty and independence. The Rif trusts that when it obtains those rights, and its just demands are accepted, it will live in peace and tranquillity with all its neighbours and open its door to foreigners in a fitting way to bring about happiness. These are our hopes and our desires.

Concerning what our enemies charge us with, that we are in relations with the Soviet and the Germans, and that foreigners are taking a hand in our country, all that is imaginary and is the fruit of enemy rumours. Thus they find the means to upset those who defend the rights of weak nations, as is very evident. We have proved to the world more than once that there is no truth (in those rumours). I am sure that there are others who aid humanity as you do, and we trust that the fruit of your help in thus making known our ideas and our desires will be the obtaining of a noble peace by which the shedding of blood and all these terrible events, of which the world is a witness, will be removed. They have turned the face of humanity black and made the sons of men suffer every kind of torment.

Finally, we desire to assure you that although the enemy occupies a portion of our country, and may, we suppose, advance and occupy other parts, all this does not detract from our faith, for we remain steadfast to our principles even if only one mountain-top may remain to us to occupy or to inhabit. We shall cause great loss to our enemies. Although the enemy will possess a further part of our country, it will not trouble us, because we have won more than that in our victories in various battles; nor do we perceive any virtue in it; nor will it affect our determination, because all the enemy has done is to create new war fronts on which he is daily suffering great loss. We still continue prepared to defend our rights to the very end and to die for our principles. We shall be patient, as we have been for many years, until the day will come in which right will conquer wrong.

This is what we communicate to you, wishing you to publish it with anticipation of our thanks. Peace be upon you and great respect.

MOHAMMED BEN ABD-EL-KRIM EL-KHATTABI.

VI. Note on Educational Development in Egypt, before and after the British Declaration of the 28th February, 1922, communicated by an Egyptian friend to the writer of this Survey.

After some experience of educational administration I think that it is possible to say some good words for educational progress during the British occupation. On the whole I think it is not always fair to go by figures, and one must remember that up to 1904 the Egyptian Government had not acquired the free disposal of its revenue. Besides, there were the pressing claims of the bondholders, the Department of Public Works, the reconquest of the Sudan, &c.

I served under a minister who did a good deal to change the policy bequeathed by the British occupation. And it was high time too! But I thought all the time that that policy was quite sound in essence and quite justifiable, considering all the circumstances. I have had serious arguments over the progress of education under Mehmed 'Alī and Ismā'īl. I am firmly of opinion that no faith could ever be placed in any claim set up on behalf of these two rulers, and especially the latter—the more so when these claims take the shape of figures! And the fact that these figures are quoted by European travellers and journalists does not vouch for their truth. You are aware of the kind of traveller and journalist who came to Egypt in the 'fifties and 'sixties!

It may not be entirely unnecessary to set forth some short sketch of our educational affairs.

Lord Cromer and his assistants aimed at :

(1) spreading as far as possible, amongst both the male and the female population, a simple form of education, consisting of an elementary knowledge of the Arabic language and of arithmetic ;

(2) forming an educated class suitable for the requirements of the Government Service ;

(3) restricting the number of that class, in other words limiting the number of those who attended the new Europeanized schools, by abolishing free places and establishing age restrictions, examinations, and so on. The idea was that that kind of education turns out a large number of youths unfit for manual labour, or good only for subordinate positions, of which there were not enough to go round ;

(4) encouraging technical schools.

I think it is only just that the children of the upper and middle classes should not be educated at the expense of the fallāhīn.

The British authorities, within these limitations, achieved a high standard of efficiency in organization. Nothing could be worse, in that respect, than the schools in 1882. Through intrigue, social influence, and dishonesty the bulk of the free places were at that time secured by the rich and their protégés. The sense of parental responsibility was weakened. The schools were filled with a strange medley of pupils, regardless of social status or intellectual fitness, and they were housed in absolutely unsuitable buildings. The teaching was ill done. Moneys allocated for equipment or material found their way into the pockets of officials, &c. No faith could be placed in the examinations. In point of fact, people who

took the education of their children seriously never sent them to Government schools, but either to Europe or to schools maintained by the religious missions.

The British authorities changed all this. They were, moreover, conscious of the limitations of their educational policy. Even the much-maligned Mr. Dunlop (for long Education Adviser) once wrote: 'The Government system of schools, as has been frequently explained, was not conceived and cannot be regarded as a complete expression of the ultimate national needs in the matter of education. A national system of education remains yet to be developed' (Lord Cromer's Report for 1906).

Two Egyptian ministers have set themselves to evolve that policy. The first was Zakī Abu's-Sa'ūd Pasha (Minister of Education in the ministry of Yahyā Ibrāhīm Pasha, which arranged with Lord Allenby the abolition of martial law, the compensation of foreign officials, and the elections for the first Parliament). The second was 'Alī Māhir Pasha (who was Minister of Education in Zīwar Pasha's Cabinet—for which reason his work is receiving no just recognition here).

Broadly speaking, both men set themselves to make elementary education universal and free. Māhir Pasha allowed himself ten years for attaining this aim, and within one year he had started 750 schools of that type for boys and girls. The boys would attend in the morning and the girls in the afternoon, and the course would extend over five years. The idea was to save money on staff and buildings and to keep the children in touch with the parents' pursuits.

The second aim of both men was to reorganize higher education, to found, in short, one or two real universities.

Their third aim was to extend or reorganize primary and secondary education, in order to train the kind of pupil who would be fit for the new higher education.

'Alī Māhir Pasha (he is a brother of Ahmad Māhir Efendī, who was implicated in the assassination of British subjects), especially, did a good deal for education. His outlook was liberal and his hand vigorous. He did not hesitate to extend the length of school life, to introduce manual training and field work in schools where before pupils only memorized, to create more than one type of secondary school (some even with Latin and Greek!), to enable, in his own words, every Egyptian pupil to see the monuments of Upper Egypt and the sea by a big programme of excursions, to introduce the cinema and every modern equipment, to enable the teachers to visit neighbouring countries and to take courses abroad, &c.

VII. The Najdī-ʿAsīrī Agreement of the 21st October, 1926.¹

Praise be to God alone!

Between the King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies [of the one part] and the Imām Sayyid Hasan b. 'Alī the Idrīsī [of the other part]:

Animated by the desire to arrive at a common policy (*tawhīdī'l-kalamah*),

¹ Translation from the official text published in *As-Siyāsah* of Cairo, weekly edition, 29th January, 1927.

and with a view to protecting the status of the Arab countries and strengthening the links between the princes of the Jazīratu'l-‘Arab, His Majesty (*Sāhibu'l-Jalālah*) the King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies, ‘Abdu'l-‘Azīz b. ‘Abdīr-Rahmānī'l-Faysalī's-Sa‘ūd, and His Lordship (*Sāhibu's-Siyādah*) the Imām of ‘Asīr, Sayyid Hasan b. ‘Alī the Idrīsī, have agreed upon the following terms of agreement :

Article 1. His Lordship the Imām Sayyid Hasan b. ‘Alī the Idrīsī recognizes that the former frontiers, defined in the agreement of the 10th Safar of the year [A.H.] 1339, which was concluded between the Sultan of Najd and the Imām Sayyid Muhammad b. ‘Alī the Idrīsī—frontiers which are subject to the House of Idrīsī (*Al-Idārisah*) at the present date—are under the lordship (*siyādah*) of His Majesty the King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies in virtue of this [? i. e. the present] agreement.

Article 2. It is not permissible for the Imām of ‘Asīr to enter into political relations with any [other] Government, and likewise it is not permissible for him to grant any economic privilege [? concession] (*Imtiyāzu'l-Iqtisādī*), except with the previous consent of H.M. the King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies.

Article 3. It is not permissible for the Imām of ‘Asīr to declare war or to make peace except with the previous consent of H.M. the King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies.

Article 4. It is not permissible for the Imām of ‘Asīr to cede any portion of the territories of ‘Asīr described in the first article.

Article 5. The King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies recognizes the rulership [*Hākimiyyah*] of the present Imām of ‘Asīr over the territories described in the first article for his lifetime, and after him [extends the same recognition] to whatever person may be agreed upon by the House of Idrīsī (*Al-Idārisah*) and by the Binders and Loosers (*Ahlu'l-‘Aqdi wa'l-Hall*) who follow his Imāmah [literally : ‘leadership’].

Article 6. The King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies recognizes that the internal administration of the countries of ‘Asīr and the supervision of their tribal affairs—for example, appointments, dismissals, and other internal affairs of the kind—falls within the jurisdiction of the Imām of ‘Asīr, on condition that the decisions conform to the *Sharī‘ah* and to equity, according to the practice of both [contracting] Governments.

Article 7. The King of the Hijāz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies undertakes to repel every aggression (*ta‘add*), internal or external, which may befall the territories of ‘Asīr described in the first article—and this on the basis of agreement between the two parties, according to the dictates of the circumstances and the exigencies of the interest [of the two parties].

Article 8. The two parties undertake to observe this pact and to fulfil the obligations which it entails.

Article 9. This pact becomes operative after ratification [*ba‘da’l-tasdiqi ‘alayhi*] by the two High Contracting Parties [*At-Tarafayni’s-Sāmiyyayni*].

Article 10. This agreement is recorded in the Arabic language in two copies, which shall be preserved respectively in the archives of each of the two contracting Governments.

Article 11. This pact shall be known as the Pact of Mecca.

This pact was signed (*waqa‘at*) on the 14th Rabi‘u’l-Ākhir of the year [A. H.] 1345, corresponding to the 21st October of the year 1926.

[The official signatures follow.]

VIII. Treaty of Amity and Commerce signed at San‘a on the 2nd September, 1926, between Italy and the Yaman.¹

H.M. Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, and H.M. the Imām Yahyā *Amīru’l-Mu‘minīn*, King of the Yaman . . . have concluded an agreement on the following terms:

Article 1. The Government of H.M. the King of Italy recognizes the full and absolute independence of the Yaman and of its sovereign, H.M. the Imām Yahyā.

The Italian Government will not interfere in the Kingdom of H.M. the King of the Yaman in any manner that conflicts with the terms of the first paragraph of the present article.

Article 2. The two Governments pledge themselves to facilitate commercial intercourse between their respective countries.

Article 3. The Government of H.M. the King of the Yaman declares that it is its desire to import from Italy the equipment or technical means and materials which are capable of contributing advantageously to the economic development of the Yaman. Likewise in regard to technical personnel.

And the Italian Government declares its willingness to take all possible steps to secure that the dispatch of technical means and materials and of personnel shall be effected in the most convenient manner in regard to quality, price, and salaries.

Article 4. The terms of Articles 2 and 3 do not restrict freedom of trade, or freedom of supplying equipment, for either party.

Article 5. None of the traders who are nationals of either state may import and market articles which are prohibited by the two Governments in their respective countries.

Either of the two Governments shall be at liberty to confiscate any articles which may be imported into their respective countries contrary to the prohibition upon the introduction and marketing [of such articles], as soon as such prohibition has been made public.

Article 6. The present treaty shall only enter into force from the moment at which the ratification by H.M. the King of Italy reaches H.M. the King of the Yaman Imām Yahyā.

Article 7. The present treaty shall remain in force for ten years dating from the day of ratification referred to in Article 6; and, six months before this term runs out, the two parties shall come to an agreement in case they intend to replace the treaty by another or to prolong its term.

Article 8. In faith of the above, H.M. the King of the Yaman Imām

¹ Translated from the Italian text in *Rassegna della Stampa Estera*, Anno 1, fasc. 9, p. 415, published by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ufficio Stampa, Rome, 5th October, 1926. For the Arabic text see *Al-Manār* of Cairo, vol. xxvii, No. 10 (4th January, 1927).

Yahyā and H.E. Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini, acting in the name of H.M. the King of Italy, have signed the present treaty, which has been drawn up in two copies, conforming completely with one another, in Arabic and in Italian.

Since, however, H.M. the Imām of the Yaman has no one at his court who is capable of interpreting Italian with complete exactitude, and since the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the present treaty of friendship and commerce were conducted in Arabic, and since H.E. Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini has ascertained that the Arabic text is in perfect conformity with the Italian text, the two parties agree to abide, in case of doubts or divergences in the interpretation of the two texts, by the Arabic text, interpreted according to the classical language.

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
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
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
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EST.	Estonia	L.	Luxembourg	BUL.	Bulgaria
LITH.	Lithuania	SW.	Switzerland	A.	Albania
W.R. REP.	White Russian Republic	CZECHO.	Czechoslovakia	GR.	Greece
H.	Holland	AUS.	Austria	T.R.	Transcaucasian Republic
B.	Belgium	HUN.	Hungary	TRJN	Transjordan
		JUGO.	Jugoslavia		

Explanation of Republics & Provinces in Russian Republic					
Mar.	Mariisk	Chu.	Chuvash	Kal.	Kalmuck
Vot.	Votyak	Ger.	German Volga	Dagh.	Daghestan
1	Adigeevsko Cherkas	3	Kabarda	5	Ingush
2	Karachaevs	4	Ossetian	6	Chechensk

Explanation of Republics in Transcaucasian Republic			
7	Abkhasia	9	Georgia
8	Ajaria	10	Armenia
		11	Azerbaijan
		12	Nakhjuvan